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PLATO AND
XENOPHON

APOLOGIES OF
SOCRATES

EDITED BY NICHOLAS DENYER

PLATO

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PREFACE

It is a pleasure to record once more my intellectual debts: above all to earlier editors of the *Apologies*, to the Editors of this series, to my fellow members of the B Caucus, both past and present, to my splendidly scrupulous copy-editor Anna Oxbury, and – not least – to my students, both in Cambridge and at the JACT Greek Summer Schools in Bryanston.

But bigger than any purely intellectual debt is the debt both intellectual and other that I owe to Lynne Broughton. This book is for her.

Trinity College, Cambridge

N.C.D.

ABBREVIATIONS AND REFERENCES

THE APOLOGIES

References to Plato's *Apology* are given here in the form Pl. 34a5, where '34' is the number of a Stephanus page, 'a' the letter of a section within the page, and '6' the number of a line within the section. This form of reference goes back to Stephanus' 1578 edition, and pervades subsequent editions and translations of Plato. References to Xenophon's *Apology* are given here in the form Xen. 12.34, where '12' is the number of the chapter, in the division of chapters that is common to all editions of Xenophon, and '34' is the number of the line in this edition.

OTHER ANCIENT WORKS

Ael.	Aelian <i>Varia Historia</i>
Aesch.	Aeschylus
Aeschin.	Aeschines
Aul. Gell.	Aulus Gellius
And.	Andocides
Ant.	Antiphon
Antisth.	Antisthenes
Ar.	Aristophanes; <i>Ach.</i> = <i>Acharnians</i> , <i>Lys.</i> = <i>Lysistrata</i> , <i>Th.</i> = <i>Thesmophoriazousai</i>
Arist.	Aristotle; <i>Ath.</i> = <i>Constitution of Athens</i> , <i>Met.</i> = <i>Metaphysics</i> , <i>Pol.</i> = <i>Politics</i> , <i>Rh.</i> = <i>Rhetoric</i> , <i>SE</i> = <i>Sophistici Elenchi</i>
Ath.	Athenaeus
Cic.	Cicero
Dem.	Demosthenes
D.L.	Diogenes Laertius
D.S.	Diodorus Siculus
Emp.	Empedocles
Eup.	Eupolis
Eur.	Euripides; <i>El.</i> = <i>Electra</i> , <i>Med.</i> = <i>Medea</i> , <i>Tr.</i> = <i>Troades</i>
Grg.	Gorgias
Harp.	Harpocration <i>Lexicon</i>
Hdt.	Herodotus
Hom.	Homer; <i>Il.</i> = <i>Iliad</i> , <i>Od.</i> = <i>Odyssey</i>
Hipp.	Hippocrates
Isae.	Isaeus
Isoc.	Isocrates

Jos.	Josephus <i>Against Apion</i>
Lyc.	Lycurgus <i>Against Leocrates</i>
Lys.	Lysias
Men.	Menander
Pind.	Pindar; <i>N.</i> = <i>Nemeans</i>
Pl.	Plato; <i>Alc. Ma.</i> = <i>Alcibiades Major</i> , <i>Chrm.</i> = <i>Charmides</i> , <i>Cra.</i> = <i>Cratylus</i> , <i>Cri.</i> = <i>Crito</i> , <i>Dem.</i> = <i>Demodocus</i> , <i>Ep.</i> = <i>Epistles</i> , <i>Euthd.</i> = <i>Euthydemus</i> , <i>Euthphr.</i> = <i>Euthyphro</i> , <i>Grg.</i> = <i>Gorgias</i> , <i>Hipparch.</i> = <i>Hipparchus</i> , <i>Hp. Ma.</i> = <i>Hippias Major</i> , <i>Hp. Mi.</i> = <i>Hippias Minor</i> , <i>La.</i> = <i>Laches</i> , <i>Mnx.</i> = <i>Menexenus</i> , <i>Phd.</i> = <i>Phaedo</i> , <i>Phdr.</i> = <i>Phaedrus</i> , <i>Phlb.</i> = <i>Philebus</i> , <i>Plt.</i> = <i>Politicus</i> , <i>Prm.</i> = <i>Parmenides</i> , <i>Prt.</i> = <i>Protagoras</i> , <i>Rep.</i> = <i>Republic</i> , <i>Smp.</i> = <i>Symposium</i> , <i>Sph.</i> = <i>Sophist</i> , <i>Thg.</i> = <i>Theages</i> , <i>Tht.</i> = <i>Theaetetus</i>
Plu.	Plutarch, <i>Alc.</i> = <i>Alcibiades</i>
Soph.	Sophocles; <i>Aj.</i> = <i>Ajax</i> , <i>Ant.</i> = <i>Antigone</i> , <i>OC</i> = <i>Oedipus at Colonus</i> , <i>Phil.</i> = <i>Philoctetes</i>
Thphr.	Theophrastus; <i>Char.</i> = <i>Characters</i>
Thuc.	Thucydides
Xen.	Xenophon; <i>An.</i> = <i>Anabasis</i> , <i>Ath.</i> = <i>Constitution of Athens</i> , <i>Cyr.</i> = <i>Cyropaedia</i> , <i>HG</i> = <i>Historia Graeca</i> , <i>Lac.</i> = <i>Constitution of Sparta</i> , <i>Mem.</i> = <i>Memorabilia</i> , <i>Oec.</i> = <i>Oeconomicus</i> , <i>Smp.</i> = <i>Symposium</i>

COMPENDIA AND WORKS OF REFERENCE

<i>CID</i>	Georges Rougement et al., <i>Corpus des inscriptions de Delphes</i> (Paris 1977-)
<i>DK</i>	Hermann Diels and Walther Kranz, <i>Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker</i> , 6th edn (Berlin 1964)
<i>FGH</i>	Felix Jacoby, <i>Die Fragmente der griechischen Historiker</i> (Berlin and Leiden 1923-55)
<i>GP</i>	J. D. Denniston, <i>The Greek Particles</i> , 2nd edn revised by K. J. Dover (Oxford 1954)
<i>IEG</i>	M. L. West, <i>Iambi et elegi Graeci ante Alexandrum cantati</i> (Oxford 1971-2)
<i>IG</i>	A. Kirchhoff et al., <i>Inscriptiones Graecae</i> (Berlin 1873-)
<i>LSJ</i>	H. G. Liddell and R. Scott, <i>A Greek-English Lexicon</i> , 9th edn revised by H. S. Jones (Oxford 1940)
<i>PCG</i>	R. Kassel and C. Austin, <i>Poetae comici Graeci</i> (Berlin 1983-2001)
<i>SEG</i>	J. E. Hondius et al., <i>Supplementum Epigraphicum Graecum</i> (Leiden and elsewhere, 1923-)
<i>SSR</i>	G. Giannantoni, <i>Socratis et Socraticorum reliquiae</i> (Naples 1990)
<i>TrGF</i>	B. Snell et al., <i>Tragicorum Graecorum fragmenta</i> (Göttingen 1971-)

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INTRODUCTION

1 SOCRATES

In 399 BC Socrates was prosecuted, convicted, sentenced to death, and executed. The *Apologies* (Ἀπολογία or *Defences*) by Plato and Xenophon describe how he conducted himself at his trial.

At the time of his death, Socrates was seventy (Pl. *Cri.* 52e). He had long been, and long continued to be, highly controversial.¹ The *Apologies* are only a small part of the large literature generated by the controversy. The oldest surviving part of that literature dates from the 420s: a comedy by Aristophanes, the *Clouds*, in which Socrates is subjected to an extended mockery that, in Pl. 18a7–e4, he fears may have prejudiced the court against him. Apart from a few fragments of other comedies, also hostile (SSR 1.A), the *Clouds* is the only account we have of Socrates that we know to have been produced in his lifetime. Perhaps already to some extent in his lifetime, and certainly in vast profusion in the next few decades after his death, those who knew and admired Socrates wrote many accounts of him and his activities. Many of these accounts survive only in fragments (all gathered in SSR). Such of these accounts as survive intact are almost all by Xenophon and Plato; those by other authors have all been transmitted with Plato's genuine works. Furthermore, much is said about Socrates by ancient authors born too late to have known him personally. Of these authors, Plato's pupil Aristotle is the one best placed to give us independent confirmation or denial of what is said by Aristophanes, Xenophon, and Plato.

For all the debates that there have been about Socrates, some things can nevertheless be said that should not rouse controversy. One is that Socrates was, in many ways, alarmingly unprepossessing. He was conspicuously ugly (Pl. *Th.* 143e, Xen. *Smp.* 5.3–6) – and this in a city where men could win beauty contests, and boast of it (And. 4.42). He expressed admiration for Sparta (Pl. *Cri.* 52e, Ar. *Birds* 1281–3, Xen. *Mem.* 3.5.15–16), a city with which, for large parts of his lifetime, his own city was at war. He dressed shabbily, to the point of regularly going barefoot, even in the worst of weather (Ar. *Clouds* 103, Xen. *Mem.* 1.6.2, Pl. *Smp.* 220b). He rarely washed (Ar. *Birds* 1554–5, *Clouds* 830–7, Pl. *Smp.* 174a). He had some peculiar mannerisms of deportment, exhibited without regard to circumstance: both on a battlefield, and on the streets of Athens, he would

¹ What people down the ages have made of Socrates is discussed in the two volumes of Trapp (2007). Vander Waerdt (1994) and Ahbel-Rappe and Kamtekar (2009) 275–510 give other perspectives that between them cover the same chronological span.

strut and glance from side to side, in his own characteristic way (Ar. *Clouds* 362, Pl. *Smp.* 221b); he had an habitual broad stare, that he would give even when smiling (Pl. *Phd.* 86d); he would bow his head, and look up like a bull, even when cheerful (Pl. *Phd.* 117d; when someone else gives such a look in Ar. *Frogs* 803–4, it shows that he is taking something badly). He habitually went into immobile trances (Pl. *Smp.* 175a–b and 220c–d). He used to hear a voice that he took to be of supernatural origin: this voice would often tell him not to do a thing he had in mind (Pl. 31c4–d5, 40a3–c3, 41d5–6, *Tht.* 151a, *Euthd.* 272e, *Phdr.* 242b–c, *Alc. Ma.* 103a), and perhaps gave other advice and instructions too (Xen. 13.34–6, Xen. *Mem.* 1.1.4, [Pl.] *Thg.* 128d–131a). This supernatural voice was not the only voice that he heard: when philosophical ideas occurred to him, he would sometimes talk of their source as other voices sounding in his head (Pl. *Hp. Ma.* 286c–d and *Cri.* 54d).²

Although a husband and a father (e.g. Pl. *Phd.* 60a), Socrates liked to profess, in extravagant terms, erotic feelings for young men: thus in Xen. *Smp.* 4.27–8, someone says he has seen Socrates sitting beside Critoboulus, sharing a book with him, touching ‘head to head, and bare shoulder to bare shoulder’, and Socrates says that his shoulder itched for days afterwards, as if from the bite of an insect; and in Pl. *Chrm.* 155d, Socrates speaks of being inflamed by a glimpse inside the clothing of the beautiful Charmides. Socrates’ flirtations remained entirely chaste. Their upshot was however that, in a reversal of the ordinary pattern, the younger men fell in love with him. As Alcibiades puts it in Pl. *Smp.* 222b, ‘I am not the only one that Socrates has done this to. He’s done it to Charmides the son of Glaucon, to Euthydemus the son of Diocles, and to lots and lots of others. He tricks them by pretending to be their lover [ἐραστής], but ends up instead as the one that they love [παιδικά].’ The lots and lots of others included Apollodorus, who ‘had an enormous yearning for him [ἐπιθυμητής μὲν ὦν ἰσχυρῶς αὐτοῦ]’ (Xen. 28.21), and Antisthenes, Cebes and Simmias, whom he claims he has attracted to himself by his counterparts of the wiles whereby the courtesan Theodote attracts her clientele of admirers (Xen. *Mem.* 3.11.17 and *Smp.* 8.3–5).

Socrates was not rich. He had the modest means of those who could afford to equip themselves as infantry, but not as cavalry (Pl. *Smp.* 221a). The modesty of his means was affirmed by followers (e.g. Pl. 23b7–c2, Xen. *Mem.* 1.6.2), and exaggerated by contemporary comedies, according to which he is a ‘prating beggar’ (Eup. fr. 386 PCG), and sometimes has to go hungry (Ar. *Clouds* 175, Amipsias fr. 9.4 PCG). Contemporary comedy

² Some of Socrates’ less prepossessing traits (the voices, the mannerisms, the trances, the disdain for cleanliness) resemble closely the symptoms of schizophrenia described in Liddle (2009).

also claimed that Socrates charged fees for instruction in dishonest rhetoric (Ar. *Clouds* 98–9 and 111–18). This hardly fits with what contemporary comedy claimed about his poverty, and it is roundly contradicted by the consensus among his admirers that he took no fees at all (Pl. 19d7–e2, Xen. *Mem.* 1.6.3, and 1.6.11, Aristippus fr. 3 SSR).³

In spite of his unprepossessing traits and the modesty of his means, Socrates was able to associate with the richest and best-connected figures in Athens: men like Callias, host of grand gatherings at which Socrates was an honoured guest (Xen. *Smp.*, Pl. *Prt.*); and men like Critias and Alcibiades, who disgraced themselves by the damage they did to Athenian democracy and by their support for Athens' enemy Sparta (e.g. Xen. *Mem.* 1.2.12–47).

Among Socrates' oldest and closest associates was Chaerephon (e.g. Ar. *Clouds* 142–64). Chaerephon consulted the Delphic oracle about Socrates, and was told that there was no one 'wiser' (Pl. 20e7–21a6), or that there was no one 'more free-spirited, just and temperate' (Xen. 14.5–7). Followers of Socrates often represent Socrates himself as arguing that there is in fact only a single virtue, for each virtue is in fact nothing other than knowledge of good and bad (e.g. Xen. *Mem.* 3.9.4–5, Pl. *Meno* 87b–89b). In consequence, these two versions of the oracle's response would have seemed more similar to Socrates and his followers than they might to us. The most celebrated responses of the Delphic oracle were versified riddles, composed by priests from the ecstatic utterances of the priestess in the innermost sanctum of the temple: good examples are the responses to the Athenians in Hdt. 7.140–3. The response to Chaerephon was different. It was delivered 'in the presence of many people' (Xen. 14.6), and was comparatively straightforward: what 'No one is wiser than Socrates' means is plain enough; the only puzzle is how something of that meaning could be true. We may therefore conjecture that Chaerephon consulted the oracle by a less celebrated and apparently cheaper procedure: when he put his question 'Is anyone wiser than Socrates?', he got his answer by the random drawing of a lot (toasted beans were used, one colour for yes, another for no: see Xen. 14.6n.). Delphi's response to Chaerephon would consequently be no evidence that Socrates at the time had much of a reputation for wisdom, let alone a reputation that had already reached Delphi.

What prompted Chaerephon to ask the Delphic oracle whether there was anyone wiser than Socrates? Presumably, Socrates had already shown, at least to Chaerephon's satisfaction, some quite impressive wisdom. But

³ Blank (1985) explores the many sensitivities about payment for teaching.

what would that wisdom have been? Our sources make two distinct yet compatible claims about how Socrates spent the start of his intellectual career. The first claim is put in the mouth of Nicias in *Pl. La.* 187e–188a: ever since Socrates reached adulthood, anyone who ever spends time with him in conversation finds himself ‘incessantly harried with argument, until he is trapped into giving an account of himself, both his present way of life and the life he has lived in the past; and once he is trapped, Socrates will not let him go until he has subjected all this to a really thorough scrutiny’. In other words, Socrates was in earliest adulthood asking, no doubt at first only among his intimates, the sort of question that in *Pl.* 21b6–22e1 and 29d4–30a5 he says he came to ask of all and sundry after learning of the oracle’s response. The second claim is put in the mouth of Socrates himself in *Pl. Phd.* 96a: ‘In youth, I had an awesome yearning for the sort of wisdom that they call “the investigation of nature” [περὶ φύσεως ἱστορίαν]. I thought it would be superb to know the causes of each thing, why each thing comes to be, why it perishes and why it exists.’ This yearning led Socrates to investigate, among other things, ‘events both celestial and terrestrial [τὰ περὶ τὸν οὐρανὸν τε καὶ τὴν γῆν πάθῃ]’ (*Pl. Phd.* 96c). In other words, Socrates was in earliest adulthood thinking about the sort of question that in *Pl.* 19b4–d5 he denies ever discussing within the earshot of any of the jurors. Perhaps Socrates did discuss ‘the investigation of nature’ privately with Chaerephon when they were both young. Even so, such discussions would not have prompted Chaerephon to wonder at Socrates’ wisdom. For many competed in ‘the investigation of nature’ (the title περὶ φύσεως was given to works by at least seventeen authors of his day and before), and anyone who managed to distinguish himself from such competition would have left more substantial evidence of his distinction than we have for that of Socrates. We may conclude that what prompted Chaerephon to wonder at Socrates’ wisdom was an early version of the moral scrutiny to which he later subjected so many of his fellow Athenians.

Even if the wisdom of Socrates had ever included anything so elevated as ‘the investigation of nature’, it was in other respects rather humdrum. He would often lower the tone of a conversation by comparing statesmen to humble craftsmen such as fullers and cobblers and smiths (e.g. *Pl. Grg.* 491a–b, *Xen. Mem.* 1.2.37). He had ‘no grasp of any science [οὐδὲν μάθημα ἐπιστάμενος] which is such that by teaching it to people I can bring them benefit’ (*Aeschin. fr.* 53.26–7 SSR). He had the merely human wisdom of obeying the Delphic maxim γνῶθι σαυτόν (‘know yourself’), that is, of appreciating how little he knew about matters of greater importance (*Pl.* 23a1–b4, *Arist. On Philosophy fr.* 1; see also *Pl.* 17a2n. οὐν ἑμαυτοῦ ἐπελασθ-μην). This intellectual humility struck some as εἰρωνεία, that is, as a pose to conceal the fact that he knew a lot more than he let on (*Pl. Rep.* 337a, *Smp.*

216e and 218d).⁴ Unlike Solon and other wise men of Greek tradition, Socrates did not use his wisdom to rule his city. In fact, he took as small a part in public affairs as a citizen of democratic Athens decently could. He sometimes claimed nevertheless that in his influence on his fellow citizens he was more profoundly 'engaged in politics [πράττειν τὰ πολιτικά]' than any of his contemporaries (Pl. *Grg.* 521d and Xen. *Mem.* 1.6.15).

Socrates never put any of his wisdom in writing. To give written form to his oral philosophising, his admirers invented a new kind of literature: 'Socratic discourses' or Σωκρατικοὶ λόγοι (to use the useful coinage of Arist. *Rh.* 1417a21, *Poetics* 1447b11) describing conversations in which he took part. His teaching, such as it was, gave a prominent place to interrogating the learner (e.g. in Ar. *Clouds* 385 he is made to say 'It is from your own self that I will instruct you'), in such a way as to bring out the learner's own ideas and usually to reveal them as confused (there are such interrogations in Xen. 19.33–21.15, Pl. 24c7–28a5). When he revealed a learner's confusion he would often describe the learner's state as ἀπορία or 'lack of resources' (e.g. Pl. 23d4, Ar. *Clouds* 743). His way of bringing out the learner's own ideas invited comparisons with midwifery and childbirth (Ar. *Clouds* 137–9, Pl. *Tht.* 149a–152e).⁵ He liked to give 'inductive' arguments (ἐπακτικοὶ λόγοι), arguments which, by appealing to case after case of a generalisation, induce someone to accept the generalisation itself (e.g. Pl. 27b5–d1, Xen. 20.4–9, Aeschin. fr. 70 SSR, Arist. *Met.* 1078b27–8, and Ar. *Clouds* 1085–1104, where a personification of Socrates' bad reasoning argues, case by case, that, in every department of life, the key to success is to let yourself be buggered). He liked asking people to define things (Arist. *Met.* 1078b27–9, Xen. *Mem.* 1.1.16, and 4.6.1); in particular, he liked asking people to define things significant politically and ethically, such as democracy (Xen. *Mem.* 4.2.36–7) and piety (Pl. *Euthphr.* 5c–d).⁶ For his philosophical efforts were devoted 'to ethics, not to nature at large' (Arist. *Met.* 987b1–2), and 'he was the first to bring philosophy down from heaven; he settled it in cities, and even brought it into the home, and required it to ask about life, ethics, and good and bad' (Cic. *Tusculans* 5.4.10).

2 ACCUSATIONS, APOLOGIES, AND HISTORY

Much of the controversy about Socrates was conducted in pamphlets that purported to present what was said at his trial. Thus there were *Accusations* of Socrates: the earliest *Accusation* of which we hear was by Polycrates

⁴ See Lane (2006).

⁵ On these comparisons, see Burnyeat (1977).

⁶ Wolfsdorf (2003) looks in detail at how Plato presents Socrates' search for definitions.

(Isoc. 11.4–5, D.L. 2.39; Polycrates may well be the unnamed ‘Accuser’ whose accusations are reported and refuted in Xen. *Mem.* 1.2). So many others joined Polycrates that in the late second century AD someone exclaimed that ‘not even at this date has Socrates ceased to be subject to legal denunciation and scrutiny; on the contrary, he faces greater bitterness from successive generations, from denouncers more bitter than Anytus and Meletus [two of the prosecutors at his original trial] and from jurors more bitter than the Athenians of his time’ (Maximus of Tyre 3.1b). There were also many *Defences* of Socrates, or *Apologies*. Those by Plato and Xenophon are among the earliest. There also survives one from the fourth century AD, by Libanius. In addition, we hear tell of seven lost *Apologies*.⁷ If we may trust the claims of Proclus in *Timaeum* 1.65.22–29 Diehl about the ludicrous ineptitude with which most of these works attempted to represent the character of Socrates, we need not mourn their loss.

How close were these *Accusations* and *Apologies* to what was actually said at Socrates’ trial? The surviving works of the Attic orators contain many speeches written for delivery in the Athenian courts, and subsequently circulated in writing to advertise the prowess of their writer. Unless the speaker fluffed his lines, or the writer subsequently polished them, such speeches are no doubt pretty much what was said in court. Our *Apologies* are not like these speeches. They were written after the trial; and they so parade Socrates’ failure to win his case that no writer of speeches would circulate them to advertise his prowess. Our *Apologies* invite comparison rather with another genre of oratory, a genre that included the lost *Apology* of Busiris by Polycrates (Isoc. 11.4; this was the Polycrates who wrote the *Accusation* of Socrates), and three works still extant: the *Ajax* and the *Odysseus* by Antisthenes (fr. 53–4 SSR), and the *Apology* of Palamedes by Gorgias (DK 82 B 11a). In this genre, the orator writes a speech for a trial in the heroic past: Busiris, the Pharaoh of Egypt, defends himself when on trial for his cruelties; Ajax and Odysseus argue their rival claims to the weapons that had belonged to the now dead Achilles; Palamedes defends himself against charges of treason brought by Odysseus. In our *Apologies*, Socrates compares himself with Ajax (Pl. 41b3) and Palamedes (Pl. 41b3 and Xen. 26.6): all three die because the courts misjudge their cases. Particularly pronounced are the similarities between Gorgias’ *Apology* of Palamedes and Plato’s *Apology* of Socrates: in high sophistic style, each talks in jingles about knowledge and ignorance (compare Palamedes in 5 and 24 with Socrates in Pl. 21d4–6; cf. *Ajax* 1, 4, 8); each insistently contrasts

⁷ Such *Apologies* were ascribed to Crito (Suda s.v. Κρίτων Ἀθηναῖος), Lysias (fr. 271, 272 Carey), Theodectes (Arist. *Rh.* 1399a8–10 and *Lexicon rhetoricum Cantabrigiae* 78.15 Houtsma), Demetrius of Phalerum (fr. 91–3 Wehrli), Zeno of Sidon (Suda s.v. Ζήνων Μουσαίου), Theon of Antioch (Suda s.v. Θέων Ἀντιοχείας), and Plutarch (Lamprias, *Index to the works of Plutarch* 189).

'deeds' with 'words' (compare Palamedes in 34 with Socrates in Pl. 32a4, 32d1 and 40b5; cf. *Ajax* 1, 7–8); each invokes the public awareness of how modestly he lives (compare Palamedes in 15 with Socrates in Pl. 31c2–3; cf. *Ajax* 5, Xen. 17.24–5); each attempts a prolonged discussion with his accuser (compare Palamedes in 22–7, a passage that starts 'I want to have a conversation [διαλέχθηναι] with my accuser', with Socrates in Pl. 24c7–28a2; cf. Xen. 19.33–21.15); each accuses his accuser of self-contradiction (compare Palamedes in 25 with Socrates in Pl. 27a4–6); and each insists that his own dignity and the dignity of his judges require him to rely on telling the truth, not on sentimental appeals from his loved ones (compare Palamedes in 33 with Socrates in Pl. 34b6–35b7). In the light of such similarities, can we suppose that the *Apologies* of Socrates have any greater aspiration towards historical truth than the *Apology* of Palamedes?

The *Accusation* by Polycrates was so far from even pretending to record what was actually said that it contained a glaring anachronism (D.L. 2.39). No anachronism glared in the *Apologies* by Plato and Xenophon; at any rate, no anachronism from those works figures on the long list of such material in Ath. 5.216c–218e. But glaring anachronism is only one form of inaccuracy among many. That there is at least one gross inaccuracy somewhere in the *Apologies* by Plato and Xenophon is demonstrated by the fact that Plato has Socrates propose that he be fined (38b7–9), whereas Xenophon has him refuse to propose any penalty at all (23.22–5). Moreover, neither writer has a record of accuracy so unblemished elsewhere as to make us trust him here. For example, Xenophon was not in Athens between the battle he describes in *An.* 1.8 and the death of Socrates, yet he claims to have been present at a conversation in which Socrates spoke of that battle.⁸ And again, the remarks that Plato has his characters elsewhere make about the trial of Socrates do not always exactly match what is said in his *Apology*: contrast Crito's remarks to Socrates in Pl. *Cri.* 45b 'you shouldn't, as you were saying in the lawcourt, find it a problem that you wouldn't know what to do with yourself if you left Athens' and Pl. *Cri.* 52c 'your choice was, as you said, for death over exile' with their counterpart in Pl. 37c1–e2; and contrast Socrates' remark in Pl. *Phd.* 115d 'Give Crito the opposite guarantee to the one that he offered the jurors: his was that I would stay; let yours be ...' with the guarantee by Crito mentioned in Pl. 38b8–9.

In fact, not even the most scrupulous could have produced an *Accusation* or an *Apology* that was accurate word for word: the shorthand that enables verbatim transcription of an entire speech was not in use until long after the trial of Socrates (not until 63 BC according to Plu. *Cato* 23.3–4). In the awareness that complete accuracy was unattainable,

⁸ See *Oec.* 1.1 and 4.18–19.

Thucydides adopted the following policy for reporting speeches in his *History*: 'It was difficult for me to remember the precise details [τὴν ἀκριβείαν αὐτῇ] of what was said in my own hearing; it was difficult also for my various informants. So I have had the speakers say the things that according to my own ideas [ὡς δ' ἂν ἐδόκουν ἐμοί] were particularly appropriate [δέοντα] in the light of their circumstances, while keeping as close as possible to the general import of what was actually said' (1.22.1). To see how large a licence Thucydides here allows himself, compare the policy for reporting actions that he announces in 1.22.2: 'These I have thought fit to write down, not in reliance on information from any random bystander, nor even in accordance with my own ideas [οὐδ' ὡς ἐμοί ἐδόκει], but only after the most detailed scrutiny possible in each case [ὅσον δυνατόν ἀκριβεῖα περὶ ἐκάστου ἐπεξελθών], with regard both to events that I witnessed myself, and to events that I learnt of from others.' People at the time did not envisage reporting speeches with any less licence than that claimed by Thucydides; proof of this is the fact that, soon after announcing his policy for reporting speeches, Thucydides feels able, without any sense of incongruity, to boast that his own writing is free of the fabulous elements that other historians include to titillate their readers (1.22.4).⁹ We cannot expect any *Accusation* or *Apology* of Socrates to have aimed at a more than Thucydidean accuracy.

3 ATHENIAN LEGAL PROCEDURES

Athenian legal procedures, in so far as they are relevant to the case of Socrates, may be summarised as follows.¹⁰

In democratic Athens, citizens generally were able to prosecute those whom they alleged to be wrongdoers. Indeed, Athens had no counterpart of Procurators Fiscal, District Attorneys or the Crown Prosecution Service, no officials whose duty it was to prosecute on behalf of the community at large. In consequence, Socrates was prosecuted by a private citizen, acting on his own initiative. This prosecutor – κατήγορος – could have brought the prosecution all by himself. But he was also able to invite one or more other private citizens to assist him as συγκατήγοι. Thus Meletus had the assistance of Anytus and Lycon.

The first step of the prosecution was to arrange for the production of a γράφη, or writ. The production of the writ was the responsibility of either Meletus alone (as suggested by the singular ἐγράψατο in Pl. 19b2), or of the prosecutors collectively (as suggested by the plural ἐγράψαντο in

⁹ Zagorin (2005) 30–5 gives a gentle introduction to the large controversies prompted by these remarks of Thucydides.

¹⁰ There is a full account of all these matters in Todd (1993).

Xen. 24.32). An alternative procedure would have been a δίκη (Pl. *Euthphr.* 2a), which seems to have been the procedure favoured for the pursuit of private wrongs. In arranging for a γραφή, the prosecution was using the procedure that seems to have been favoured for the pursuit of those wrongs that impinged on the citizen body at large (hence Meletus' claim in Pl. 24b5 to be φιλόπολις). The writ included an ἔγκλημα (e.g. Pl. 24c2; hence Pl. 27e5 ἐγκαλοῖς), or statement of the charges against Socrates. In a version supposedly quoted verbatim from that in the Athenian archives, this ran 'Socrates is guilty of not acknowledging the gods that the city acknowledges, but introducing other novel supernatural beings instead [ἀδικεῖ Σωκράτης, οὓς μὲν ἡ πόλις νομίζει θεοὺς οὐ νομίζων, ἕτερα δὲ καινὰ δαιμόνια εἰσηγούμενος]; and he is guilty also of corrupting the young men [ἀδικεῖ δὲ καὶ τοὺς νέους διαφθείρων]' (D.L. 2.40; these charges are paraphrased in Pl. 24b8–c1, Xen. *Mem.* 1.1.1). Since the law fixed no standard penalty for these offences, Meletus' writ also specified the penalty that he proposed: 'Penalty: death [τίμημα θάνατος].' The formula 'ἀδικεῖ ... τίμημα ...' was standard in such writs, as shown by the parody of them in Ar. *Wasps* 894–7.

To contest the case, rather than leave it 'desolate' (ἐρήμη, as in Pl. 18c7, was the technical term for a case allowed to go by default), Socrates produced a writ of his own, declaring that the charges against him were false (Dem. 45.46 quotes such a document). Each of the two rival writs could be called an ἀντιγραφή (cf. Pl. 27c7). The prosecutor swore that his charges were true, and the defendant swore that they were false (hence Pl. 19b4 and 24b7 ἀνταμωσσίαν, and Pl. 27c7 διωμόσω). Perhaps this was at the preliminary hearing that took place before an official called the ἀρχων βασιλεύς (Pl. *Euthphr.* 2a and *Thet.* 210d). At this hearing, the ἀρχων βασιλεύς fixed a date for the trial proper.

Some time around this preliminary hearing, but before the trial proper, is the dramatic date of the conversation described in Xen. 2.9–9.15. It was at the trial proper that Socrates supposedly gave the speeches that occupy the whole of Plato's *Apology* and 10.16–26.12 of Xenophon's.

At the trial, litigants presented their case in person. Athenians had no such institution as the Bar or the Faculty of Advocates, no professionals whom they could hire to speak for them in court. Indeed, any such profession would have been contrary to Athenian law (Dem. 46.26). A litigant could however invite friends to share with him the task of presenting his case, as Socrates seems to have done (Xen. 22.16–17 τῶν συναγορευόντων φίλων αὐτῷ). The nearest that Athenians came to professional advocates were λογογράφοι or λογοποιοί: a litigant could hire such people to compose a speech, but he would still have to deliver the speech himself, and would not even acknowledge that another had composed it. A charming but improbable anecdote had the λογογράφος Lysias present Socrates

with the script for a speech to deliver in his own defence: 'Lovely speech,' said Socrates, 'but not my style; no more than lovely clothes or lovely shoes' (D.L. 2.41; all the evidence about this speech is assembled as Lys. fr. 271–6 Carey). Whatever the relation between our *Apologies* and the words that Socrates spoke at his trial, those words were, so far as we know, his own.

The trial had to be completed within a single day. This may not seem a long time in which to settle such an issue, as Socrates himself is made to remark (Pl. 37a7; there are more such remarks in Pl. *Grg.* 455a and *Tht.* 172e–173a). Nevertheless, trials like that of Socrates were the longest allowed under Athenian law. The court that tried him would have decided no other case that day, whereas a court would decide four cases in a day if those cases were of the kind called 'private' (Arist. *Ath.* 67.1).

Each side was allowed the same length of time in which to present its case. The length of time was regulated by a water-clock. If a side had several speakers, they had to share this time between them (hence the end of Dinarchus 1 'I hand the water on to my fellow prosecutors'). When a witness made a statement, or a document was read out, this did not count against the time allowed (hence e.g. Lys. 23.14 'I am going to provide you with witnesses to the truth of these assertions. Please stop the water.'). The constraints of time allowed a gambit: a speaker could indicate his confidence by offering a rival speaker some of his own time in which to contradict him. Socrates himself uses the gambit at Pl. 34a4–6.

The case was tried by a panel of δικασταί. We may translate δικασταί as 'jurors'; but if so, we need to remember that in many ways a panel of Athenian δικασταί was more like a bench of judges than a jury. For instance, no one was set over them to rule on matters of law; it was they who exercised any discretion allowed the court on how to punish someone whom they had convicted; and if they objected to the conduct of a litigant, they would express this out loud (hence e.g. Pl. 21a4–5 'do not heckle, gentlemen', Xen. 14.1 'on hearing this, the jurors started heckling'). The jury normally contained five hundred jurors, and sometimes even more (see Pl. 36a5–6n.). The jurors were chosen by an elaborate randomising procedure designed to ensure that they were a representative cross-section of the citizens of Athens (Arist. *Ath.* 63–5). Other citizens might be present at the trial, but they could be present only as an audience (hence Pl. 25a1 ἀκροασταί). The jury could be addressed as ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι (e.g. Pl. 17a1), the phrase proper when addressing the δῆμος gathered in the Assembly (e.g. Xen. *Mem.* 4.2.4–5, Dem. 1.1); and second person plurals addressed to the jury could refer to the δῆμος (e.g. Xen. 20.7 'you elect generals', Pl. 21a2 'he came back with you from exile', and Aeschin. 1.173, speaking to another jury fifty-four years after the death of Socrates: 'you put the sophist Socrates to death'). In short, for the purposes of the trial, the jury was, in effect, the Athenian δῆμος. In Athenian democracy, the Athenian

δῆμος was not used to subordinating itself to higher authority. This was why the jury was not subordinate to any judge. It was also why those who doubted the wisdom of Athenian democracy doubted in particular the wisdom of Athenian courts (e.g. Xen. 4.15–18 and *Mem.* 4.4.4, Pl. *Th.* 172c–e).

The jurors swore an oath. Key clauses from this oath, as given in Dem. 24.149–51, included ‘I will vote in accordance with the laws and the decrees of the Athenian people and of the Council of the Five Hundred’ and ‘I will listen equally to both accuser and defendant, and I will cast my vote on the issue that is the subject of the prosecution.’ This is the oath to which Socrates alludes in Pl. 35c4, when he is giving his reason for not appealing to the jurors’ emotions by, for example, parading his children before them: such appeals would be unlawful, for they would entice the jurors to violate their oath. Nevertheless, parading the children was commonplace (see Pl. 34c3–4n.); and we even hear tell of a jury moved by pity for Phryne, a ‘prophetess and acolyte of Aphrodite’, when they saw her breasts exposed (Ath. 13.590e). It seems therefore that few jurors interpreted their oath as strictly as Socrates thought proper.

The prosecution spoke first, and presented its entire case in support of its charges. Only then did the defence speak, to give its rebuttal of the charges. Pl. 17a1–35d8 purports to give the whole of what Socrates said at this stage of the trial; Xen. 11.18–21.15 purports to give it in part. We can only guess what the prosecution said at this or at any stage of Socrates’ trial. Moreover, there is little to guide our guesses. For example, what we know of speeches from other Athenian trials gives little reason to think that the prosecution would have confined themselves to what we would take as strictly relevant. Perhaps, however, we may believe the indications in Pl. 33c7–34b5 and Xen. 19.35 that the prosecution presented no details of the young men whom it accused Socrates of corrupting. Certainly, the most notoriously corrupt of those who as young men had associated with Socrates were Critias and Alcibiades (Xen. *Mem.* 1.2.12), yet the terms under which Athenian democracy had been restored, some three years before the trial, meant that Socrates’ dealings with them would have been exempt from legal scrutiny.¹¹

Litigants, whether prosecuting or defending, could call witnesses (as Socrates does at Pl. 21a7 and 32e1). Witnesses delivered their evidence under oath (hence Xen. 24.29 ‘to bear false witness, in violation of their oath’). The main function of a witness was simply to make a statement reaffirming something affirmed by the litigant. There is little evidence (only And. 1.14) that witnesses were ever questioned, and no evidence that witnesses were ever cross-questioned. Questioning people was, so Socrates

¹¹ See And. 1.90, Xen. *HG* 2.4.43, Arist. *Ath.* 39.1–40.2.

had learnt by the experiences recounted in Pl. 21b6–22e1, liable to reveal that they knew less than they thought. Because of this, he is sometimes represented as disdaining any argumentation, whether philosophical or legal, that relies on witnesses untested by cross-examination (Pl. *Crg.* 471e–472c). However, other Athenians so little valued the opportunity of questioning witnesses that, soon after the trial of Socrates, they ceased to have witnesses speak in court: witnesses' statements were instead taken down in writing before the trial, and read out by a clerk tasked with reading out all documents presented to the jury (hence e.g. Isae. 2.16 'Please read out these depositions, and the law').

Although litigants did not question witnesses, they nevertheless could question one another; and, according to the law quoted in Dem. 46.10 and invoked in Pl. 25d2, it was 'compulsory for the two rival litigants to answer each other's questions'. There seems to have been no exception to the requirement to answer, even when to answer was to incriminate oneself (Lys. 12.25 and 22.5). It is therefore not extraordinary that Socrates should question Meletus. It is however extraordinary that Socrates should question Meletus at the length represented in the *Apologies*. Aristotle's discussion of how litigants should ask questions gives this warning: 'One cannot put multiple questions; this is because of the weakness of the listener' (*Rh.* 1419a17–19). Even the version of the episode in Xen. 19.35–21.15 is longer than any other such questioning of which we know, and the version in Pl. 24c7–28a5 is longer still. Nevertheless, it is entirely credible that Socrates put multiple questions to Meletus. After all, multiple questions would not have been the only thing about his defence that listeners found tiresome; and his preference for questioning over continuous exposition was so marked as to lead admirers to devise the Socratic dialogue, the novel literary genre which represented him putting multiple questions.

The jury did not discuss the case among themselves: indeed, such discussion would have been, in most parts of the Greek world, downright unlawful (Arist. *Pol.* 1268b8–11). Instead, immediately after the defence had completed their rebuttal of the prosecution's charges, the jury voted. Athenians thought it an important democratic safeguard that such votes were secret (Lys. 13.37), and they devised ever more elaborate procedures to preserve secrecy but leave no room for cheating (contrast Ar. *Wasps* 986–91 with Arist. *Ath.* 68.1–69.1). If the votes were uneven, then the side with more votes won; and if the votes were even, then the defendant was acquitted (e.g. Ant. 5.51). If the prosecution did not secure at least one fifth of the votes, then as punishment for bringing a frivolous prosecution they were liable to a fine of 1,000 drachmas (hence Pl. 36a1–b2). The punishment was not negligible: such a fine was large enough to pay the daily subsistence allowance of 2,000 jurors (Arist. *Ath.*

28.3, 62.2). As it was, the jurors decided, apparently by 280 votes to 220 (Pl. 36a5–6n.), that Socrates was guilty of the offences of which he had been accused.

Having decided that the prosecutor's charges were correct, the jurors had next to consider whether to inflict the penalty that the prosecution had proposed. The prosecutor was given a short time in which to argue for his proposal: 'half a measure of water' says Arist. *Ath.* 69.2, and 67.2 specifies ten measures for some other speeches. The defendant had then the same time in which to propose and argue for an alternative penalty. The jurors then chose between the proposals of prosecutor and defendant, and had no possibility of proposing and voting for another penalty altogether, by way of compromise: the imaginary offer that Socrates considers and rejects in Pl. 29c5–d6 could not have been legally made.

This arrangement gave both prosecutor and defendant strong motives to propose penalties not far different from what the jury would think ideal, and therefore not far different from each other. If the prosecutor proposed a penalty very much larger than the jury's ideal, then the defendant could propose a penalty quite a bit, though not very much, smaller than the jury's ideal, and still hope to win the vote. So the prosecutor, although and because he wanted as large a penalty as possible, had strong motive to propose one not very much larger than the jury's ideal. If the defendant now proposed a penalty very much smaller than the jury's ideal, he could expect to lose the vote. So the defendant, although and because he wanted as small a penalty as possible, had strong motive to propose a penalty not very much smaller than the jury would think ideal. Indeed, it was not only the litigants to whom these arrangements gave motives to converge with each other. Those who had voted for acquittal, and who therefore, under other arrangements, would presumably vote for no penalty at all, could be expected, under these Athenian arrangements, to vote for the lesser of the two similar penalties, that proposed by the defendant. Thus, by the end of the trial, both prosecutor and defendant and jurors could be expected to be, if not exactly in concord, at least less in discord than before.

This did not happen at the trial of Socrates. For Socrates refused to play his part. That much is clear, although details are obscure. We have five accounts of what Socrates said about how to punish him. One is Pl. 36b3–38b10. It has Socrates say that if he is to propose what he really deserves, then he proposes free meals in the Prytaneum (36e1–37a2). It eventually has him conclude with two actual proposals, the first immediately superseded, at his friends' instigation, by the second: the first for a fine of 1 mina (= 100 drachmas, a tenth of the fine for bringing a frivolous prosecution),

the second for a fine of 30 minas instead. Another account is Xen. 23.22–5. This claims that Socrates refused to propose any penalty at all, and did not even allow his friends to propose one on his behalf, on the grounds that to propose a penalty would be to acknowledge guilt. A third account is ascribed by D.L. 2.41–2 to a Euboulides, who might be the philosopher of that name from the fourth century BC. This says that Socrates proposed a fine of 100 drachmas, and then, when the jurors objected, added ‘Having regard to my achievements, I propose a penalty of free meals in the Prytaneum.’ The fourth account is ascribed by D.L. 2.41 to Justus of Tiberias, a historian from the first century AD. This says that Socrates proposed a fine of 25 drachmas. The fifth account is in a letter of uncertain date and authorship, supposedly from Aeschines to Xenophon (Aeschin. fr. 102.4 SSR). This says simply that Socrates proposed a penalty of free meals in the Prytaneum. Socrates is elsewhere generally represented as punctiliously compliant with proper legal procedure (Pl. 32a4–d7, 35c1–6, *Cri.* 44b–54e, Xen. *Mem.* 4.4.1–4). It is therefore hard to credit the claim that Socrates would not comply with the letter of the law requiring him to propose a penalty. However, even those accounts that say he complied with the letter deny he complied with the spirit. Indeed, all five accounts agree that only late, if at all, did Socrates propose any very large penalty. Moreover, even the one account that does have him eventually propose a fine of 30 minas does nothing to suggest that his proposal indicated any reluctance to repeat his offences. So if any of these five accounts is true, we can well understand why Socrates was condemned to death. Indeed, if any of these five accounts is true, it is perfectly plausible that (as D.L. 2.42 claims, perhaps in reliance on Euboulides) more jurors voted that Socrates be put to death than ever voted to find him guilty.

After the decision on his penalty, a convicted criminal had a final opportunity to address the jurors. Our sole evidence for this opportunity is the accounts in the *Apologies* of Xenophon (24.28–26.12) and Plato (38c1–42a4) of what Socrates made of it. But we need not doubt that the opportunity was offered. So much of our evidence about Athenian courts comes from those trying to advertise their prowess as λογογράφοι or λογοποιοί that we should not expect it to contain other samples of speeches to be delivered by an unsuccessful litigant.

There was no appeal against the decision of the jurors. Such decisions were, after all, in effect the decisions of the Athenian δῆμος, the governing body of the Athenian democracy. At the end of the trial, Socrates therefore left in the custody of the Eleven (Pl. 37c2 and 39e2), a group of officials chosen by lot to act as gaolers (Arist. *Ath.* 52.1). The gaol was right next to the court (Pl. *Phd.* 59d). In this gaol ‘he was compelled to live on for another thirty days after the trial, since the Delian festival took place in

that month,¹² and since the law did not allow anyone to be executed until the official delegation had returned from Delos' (Xen. *Mem.* 4.8.2, Pl. *Phd.* 58a–c and *Cri.* 43c–d). The day after the delegation returned, Socrates was executed.

4 SOCRATES' CRIMES AGAINST RELIGION?

At his trial, Socrates was charged with two religious offences: the first was of 'not acknowledging the gods that the city acknowledges [οὓς μὲν ἡ πόλις νομίζει θεοὺς οὐ νομίζων]'; the second was of 'introducing other novel supernatural beings [ἕτερα δὲ καινὰ δαιμόνια εἰσηγούμενος]'. What did these charges amount to? And was Socrates guilty as charged?

The first charge amounts to accusing Socrates of lacking respect for the city's gods. For to νομίζειν a thing is more than simply to think that such a thing exists. Thus Lys. 12.9 says 'I knew that he οὔτε θεοὺς οὔτ' ἀνθρώπους νομίζει; nevertheless, given the circumstances, I thought that I had absolutely no choice but to take his word.' Here Lysias must mean something like 'has no respect or concern or regard for gods or men': his point is not that his opponent has the wild theory that there exist neither gods nor men; his point is rather that his opponent has the all too common practice of treating gods and men as if they did not matter. To νομίζειν gods is thus to have for them the proper respect. Some details of how the proper respect may be shown are listed in Ar. *Clouds* 423–6. Here Socrates asks a new recruit to his school 'Will you acknowledge [νομιεῖς] no god other than the three that we acknowledge: Chaos, Clouds, and Tongue?'; and the new recruit promises 'I literally wouldn't even exchange a word with the others, not even if I met them face to face, and I wouldn't offer sacrifices, or pour libations, or burn incense.' To the prayers and gifts listed here we might add oaths (Ar. *Clouds* 816–31, Xen. 24.34): you respect beings as gods if you swear by them, calling them to take vengeance on you if you have spoken falsely, and fearing that they will answer your call.

In Plato's *Apology*, Socrates does not address this first charge at all. Instead, he gets Meletus to amplify the original charge, of not acknowledging the gods of the city, into a new charge of not acknowledging any

¹² We do not know which month this was. Perhaps it was Hieros (the eighth lunar month in a year that started at midsummer, roughly our February–March), the month of a festival that the Delians called the Apollonia; perhaps it was Thargelion (the eleventh month, roughly our May–June), the month in which the Delians dated the births of Artemis and Apollo, and in which the Athenians purified their city by driving out two scapegoats (D.L. 2.44, 3.2; Suda s.v. φαρμακός). See Chankowski (2008) 110–15.

gods whatsoever (26b8–c7); he then refutes the new and amplified charge (26d1–28a6); and he concludes that this is all the refutation that is needed. Certainly, no more would have been needed to show that Meletus brought charges in a reckless disregard for truth. That however does not prove the original charge false. In Xenophon's *Apology*, Socrates addresses this first charge squarely: lots of people, he declares, have seen him participate in the Athenians' public worship (11.20–1). Such a declaration is entirely credible. There is nothing in Plato to contradict it, and much to confirm it: for example, in *Euthd.* 302c–d Socrates agrees that he has altars and so on, just like any other Athenian; in *Smp.* 176a he joins the others after dinner in pouring a libation and singing a hymn; and in *Rep.* 327a–b he goes down to the Piraeus to pray to Bendis, and watch a grand parade in her honour. But would the truth of such a declaration make the first charge false?

A complication here is that Socrates, even if a regular participant in the Athenians' public worship, did not always share the thoughts about the gods that were common among his fellow Athenians. At any rate, both Plato and Xenophon often describe Socrates in this way. For example, in *Phdr.* 229c–230a, Plato's Socrates hesitates to accept the more picturesque and grotesque stories told about the gods, but is too busy with more important things to indulge in the 'village intellectualism, as it were [ἀγροίκῳ τινὶ σοφίᾳ]' of finding the truth behind the stories. In Plato's *Republic*, Socrates is openly hostile to such stories: he says that God, being good, cannot, as the masses say, be the cause of everything, evils included (379c); he reasons that God, being perfect, cannot be liable to change, and is therefore badly misrepresented in the stories that poets tell their audiences and that mothers tell their children (380d–381e); and he objects to the vast mass of poetry, from poets as reputable as Homer and Aeschylus, that represents gods as telling lies (385a–c). Moreover, the stories that Plato's Socrates rejects include some as central to the Athenians' public worship as the stories of 'terrible enmities and battles and the like' embroidered on the garment offered to Athena at the great Panathenean festival (*Euthphr.* 6a–c). In *Mem.* 1.4, Xenophon's Socrates argues in elaborate detail that the gods show their benevolence towards the human race by the superb way in which they have designed and constructed us, both body and soul; and in *Mem.* 4.3, he argues in equal detail that gods show benevolence towards us also in their design and construction of other features of the universe, so that we have, for example, seasons and food. Hardly any Greeks previously had claimed that the entire world was subject to an intelligent control; and not even the most notable of them, Anaxagoras, had developed that claim in any detail, let alone held that the controlling intelligence arranges the world for human benefit (Pl. *Phd.* 97b–99c).

Would rejecting the beliefs that his fellow Athenians held about their gods mean that Socrates failed to acknowledge the same gods as they did? At least according to Xenophon, Socrates had no desire to alter the customary worship of the city's gods. On the contrary, his arguments about divine benevolence were produced to refute someone who 'offered no sacrifices to the gods, and never employed divination, but actually scoffed at those who do such things' (*Mem.* 1.4.2), and he drew from these arguments the moral that we should please the gods in the way that 'the god in Delphi' has himself ordained, that is, by honouring them with the city's customary rites (*Mem.* 4.3.16); the speaker of *Lys.* 30.19 takes it as uncontroversial that there could be nothing more pious than this. We can make some sense of such a combination of theological radicalism with cultic conservatism if we reason as follows: Socrates agrees with his fellow Athenians in taking the primary truth of theology to be that 'Zeus and Hera and the divinities who go along with them' (*Xen.* 24.33) live the finest of all lives; Socrates differs from his fellow Athenians only in having a more exalted conception than theirs of what exactly the finest of all lives is; in consequence, Socrates acknowledges, only in a more high-minded way, the same gods as his fellow Athenians; and that is why he can share their worship. Such reasoning can be absurd: a mother who helps her children write letters to Santa Claus, while holding that almost all their beliefs about Santa Claus are false, cannot easily claim that she and they both acknowledge the same bringer of Christmas presents. But such reasoning can be plausible, so long as Socrates' beliefs about gods were not too far from those of his fellow Athenians. Whether they were so far as to be too far remains obscure.

'Introducing novel supernatural beings' was the second religious offence in the charges against Socrates. Meletus evidently had in mind the supernatural being of which Socrates talked so often, the voice that spoke to veto plans of his (e.g. *Pl.* 31d2–4), and perhaps to give advice for him to relay to his friends (e.g. *Xen.* 13.34–6). What was objectionable about introducing such a thing? Athenian law had no general objection to the introduction of new divinities. Ridicule was the worst that happened to those who introduced Sabazius (*Ar. fr.* 908 *PCG*, *Dem.* 18.259–60). And there is no sign that the Athenians even ridiculed those who, in the century before Socrates was tried, introduced the following new divinities: Asclepius (*IG* II.ii.4960), Bendis (*Pl. Rep.* 327a), Boreas (*Hdt.* 7.189), Eucleia (Pausanias 1.14.5), PHEME (scholium on Aeschin. 1.128), Pan (*Hdt.* 6.105), and Aphroditus, Cynneius and Tychon (who, together with Asclepius, form a list of new gods in Apollonophanes fr. 6 *PCG*). Athenian law was, however, hostile to religious innovation outside the supervision of the citizen body. Thus we hear of two women in trouble with the law of Athens for running secret cults focused on un-Athenian

gods: a priestess was executed because 'she initiated people into the mysteries of foreign gods [ξένους ἐμύει θεούς]' (Jos. 2.267, who gives neither date nor names); and the courtesan Phryne was charged with impiety, when she had been initiating (ἐτέλει) common prostitutes into the rites of Isodaïtes, 'a sort of foreignish minor divinity [ξενικός τις δαίμων]' (Harp. s.v. ἰσοδαίτης). Athenian law was hostile also to religious innovations in support of autocrats. Thus we hear of three men who incurred, or at least feared, trouble from the laws of Athens for paying divine honours to a powerful human being: Demades was fined 10 talents for introducing Alexander the Great as a god (Ath. 6.251b θεὸν εἰσηγήσατο Ἀλέξανδρον), Timagoras was executed for prostrating himself before the Great King of Persia (Ath. 6.251b), and Aristotle went into exile, some said, to avoid prosecution for writing a paian or hymn to Hermias, tyrant of Atarneus (Ath. 15.696a-f, D.L. 5.5). Presumably then the legal objection to Socrates' introduction of his supernatural being would have been that he introduced it outside, or even against, the structures of democratic Athens, and it would have been such an introduction that was thought to make his supernatural being 'novel'.

So was Socrates guilty of 'introducing a novel supernatural being'? In Plato's *Apology*, Socrates comes nearest to countering this charge when he points out that belief in any supernatural being of any kind is inconsistent with the disbelief in all gods of which Meletus also accuses him (27b3-28a2); and of course that shows, not that the charge is false, but only that Meletus is unreliable. Indeed, in Plato's *Apology*, Socrates even comes close to substantiating the charge, at least inasmuch as it is a charge of being undemocratic. He asserts outright that his supernatural being has vetoed his participation in democratic politics (31c4-d5); he infers moreover that his supernatural being approves of all that he has said and done on the day of his trial (40a2-b6), which would include by implication even the disdain he has expressed for aspects of Athenian democracy. Perhaps then Plato was simply conceding that Socrates was guilty on this charge. In Xenophon's *Apology*, there is no such concession. Here Socrates actually gives two arguments against the charge. His first argument is that since others treat as prophetic sounds like the twitterings of birds, he too may treat a voice as prophetic (12.22-7). This argument, however, only emphasises the novelty of the voice that speaks to Socrates. Socrates himself alone can hear this voice, while all his putative parallels for it are sounds that many can hear; because many can hear these sounds, there can be proof of their occurrence and debate about their meaning, whereas others can but take on trust what Socrates declares about the voice that speaks to him alone. This first argument therefore puts Socrates in an élite of one. Socrates' second argument is that, in calling the prophetic voice supernatural, he is more reverent than those who ascribe prophetic

powers to things like birds (13.27–33). However, Socrates' fellow citizens were amused by the reasoning of the birds in Ar. *Birds* 716–22 ('We are your Ammon . . . Is it not clear that we are your prophetic Apollo?'); yet this joke would fall flat if the Athenians thought that birds were not a mere medium through which gods exercised prophetic powers, but instead had prophetic powers of their own. This argument too therefore claims for Socrates a quite unjustified superiority over his fellow citizens. And so the arguments in Xenophon's *Apology*, like the absence of argument in Plato's, in effect concede that when Socrates introduced his supernatural being, he was acting against democratic values.

5 SOCRATES THE CORRUPTER OF YOUNG MEN?

Socrates was also charged with 'corrupting the young men [τοὺς νέους διαφθείρων]. What would this corruption have been? And was the court right or wrong to convict Socrates of it?

Such talk as survives about corrupting the young does not seem independent of Socrates' case. We have no such talk from earlier. From later, we have two claims that the young are corrupted when taught argumentative devices of the kinds that Socrates was thought to teach his pupils. Such devices included the rhetorical techniques that sophists teach; hence Isoc. 15.30, reporting a complaint that 'I corrupt the younger men by teaching them to speak and to grab more than their fair share in trials [παρὰ τὸ δίκαιον ἐν τοῖς ἀγῶσι πλεονεκτεῖν].' And they included also the dialectical techniques that are more properly associated with Socrates; hence Stilpo fr. 18 SSR, describing some repartee between the philosopher Stilpo and the courtesan Glycera: 'Stilpo was once accusing Glycera at a drinking party of corrupting the young men . . . Glycera interrupted him to say "We incur the same accusation, Stilpo. They say that you corrupt those who come across you by teaching them useless and sexy tricks, and they say the same of me."¹³ When people are wasting their time and being maltreated, it makes no difference, they say, whether it is a philosopher with whom they are living, or a courtesan.'" And in evident reaction to such claims, we have Pl. *Rep.* 492a–c, averring that no private education can corrupt the impressionable young as thoroughly as the cheers and jeers of the

¹³ The useless and sexy tricks were ἀνωφελῆ καὶ ἐρωτικά σοφίσματα. Xen. *Smp.* 6.7, quoted in Pl. 18b7n., deals with a claim that philosophical reasoning is useless. Stilpo frs. 12 and 17 SSR have some dodgy reasoning (the thing to which the term σοφίσματα is most commonly applied) on smutty themes. The sexy tricks of a courtesan are best left to the imagination, as stimulated by the remarks of Alciphron 4.16.6 and Choricus 29.2.60 on the σοφίσματα whereby courtesans keep their lovers in thrall.

public at large, gathered in assemblies, lawcourts, theatres, and military encampments.

It is easy to list younger men whom Socrates could plausibly be claimed to have corrupted. For there are several who were guilty, or at least widely suspected, of gross misdeeds, and who are also represented, in sources sympathetic to Socrates, as having extensive and friendly dealings with him. One is Alcibiades, whose friendship with Socrates was so undeniable that at least six Socratic dialogues bore his name,¹⁴ who, it was said, sacrilegiously parodied the Eleusinian mysteries (e.g. *Plu. Alc.* 22.4), and committed incest with mother, sister, and daughter (accusations in *Antisth.* fr. 141 *SSR*, insinuations in *Lys.* 14.41 and fr. 8 Carey), and who certainly joined Athens' enemies, and gave them strategic advice most helpful to them, and most damaging to Athens (*Thuc.* 6.91.4–6 and 7.27.2–28.2). Another is Charmides, whom Socrates encouraged to take a greater part in public affairs (*Xen. Mem.* 3.7), and who became one of the Gang of Ten who ruled the Piraeus on behalf of the Thirty Tyrants (*Xen. HG* 2.4.19), a junta who between them murdered around fifteen hundred of their fellow Athenians (*Isoc.* 7.67). A third is Phaedrus, with whom Socrates converses as an intimate in Plato's *Phaedrus* (at 228a Socrates says 'Phaedrus, if I don't know Phaedrus, I've forgotten myself'), and who was accused of sacrilege (*And.* 1.15), and in consequence suffered exile and the confiscation of his property (*IG* 1.iii.426.102).

Socrates' dealings with Alcibiades, Charmides and Phaedrus perhaps helped motivate the prosecutors to prosecute, and the jurors to convict. Certainly, his dealings with Alcibiades were much resented (e.g. *Xen. Mem.* 1.2.12–28, *Isoc.* 11.4–6). But Socrates' dealings with these men could not have been made the direct subject of the charges on which he was tried. For these dealings would all have been before the restoration of Athenian democracy; and misdeeds before the restoration of Athenian democracy were exempt from prosecution thereafter (see n. 11 above).

Both Plato's *Apology* (33c7–34a6) and Xenophon's (19.33–20.3) indicate that, when presenting their case, Socrates' prosecutors did not name any young men whom he had corrupted, or even specify the ways in which he had corrupted them, although there were many young men (some listed by Plato) with whom Socrates dealt, and many ways (some listed by Xenophon) in which young men might be corrupted.

The prosecutors' refusal to go into detail about the charges of corruption suggests that they thought, or at least hoped, that it would be enough if they established Socrates' guilt on the charges of irreligion. That at least is how Socrates in *Pl. Euthphr.* 3a–b interprets the charges: Euthyphro

¹⁴ Two were ascribed to Plato, and are both extant. One each was ascribed to Aeschines, Antisthenes, Euclides and Phaedo; their remnants are gathered in *SSR*.

asks 'Tell me Socrates, what is it that he says you do to corrupt the young?' and Socrates replies 'Things that sound pretty strange on first hearing: he says that I am an inventor of gods, and it is on the grounds of inventing novel gods, and not accepting the old ones, that he has brought this charge.' Two things in Plato's *Apology* support the interpretation. The first is at 26b3–7, when Socrates asks 'Tell us, Meletus, how do you say I corrupt the younger men? Presumably, it is by teaching them, as your writ puts it, to acknowledge, not the gods whom the city acknowledges, but other supernatural beings instead? It's by teaching this lesson, you say, that I corrupt them?' and Meletus agrees, with unusual promptness and fervour 'That's precisely what I say.' The second is at 25a8–10, where Meletus readily agrees that Socrates alone does harm to young men, while all other Athenians do good. Such a contrast is only to be expected if the harm is that of teaching them religious beliefs at odds with those taught by all other Athenians. If, however, Meletus had another kind of harm in mind, then the contrast should be unexpected. For, as Socrates points out at 25a11–c1, things are usually the other way round: for example, it is only rare experts who can be relied on to benefit horses, while ordinary folk who take charge of horses are liable to do them harm. In consequence, the answer to the question 'Did Socrates corrupt the young?' must depend, at least in part, on the value of his theology.

Besides his teaching them his theology, our *Apologies* hint at two other ways for Socrates to corrupt the young. Or at least, they indicate that Socrates influenced young men in two other ways that must have exasperated their elders. First, in Pl. 23c3–6 and 33c2–4, Socrates says that young men enjoy hearing him catch out those with an undeserved reputation for expertise, and consequently attempt to copy him. And second, in Xen. 20.3–9, Socrates says that young men often think him an expert on how they should be educated, and consequently defer to him on this, the most important issue of all, instead of to their fathers. The two are connected: Socrates' ability to catch out supposed experts no doubt helped win him a following as a genuine expert, if on nothing else, at least on the question who can be trusted to teach; and those who defer to an expert who shows his expertise by catching out others would no doubt show their deference by attempting to catch out others themselves. This double influence inspired young men, in short, to philosophise as Socrates had done, or (to speak less sympathetically) to deploy tricky argumentation for disreputable purposes.

The attempts of Socrates' young men to philosophise as he had done led soon to the composition of 'Socratic discourses' like our *Apologies*, and ultimately to much else in philosophy. The answer to the question 'Did Socrates corrupt the young?' must therefore depend also at least in part on the value of later philosophical developments, the *Apologies* among them.

6 XENOPHON AND PLATO

Xenophon and Plato were both, like Socrates, natives of Athens. When Socrates died in 399, they were in their twenties;¹⁵ they lived on for another fifty years or so.¹⁶

Xenophon and Plato tell us little of their dealings with Socrates. Plato tells us, plausibly enough, that he was not present at Socrates' death (*Phd.* 59b), but that he was present at Socrates' trial, and there offered to stand surety for him (34a2, 38b7-9). Plato tells us nothing more about his own dealings with Socrates, and nothing at all about Xenophon's. Xenophon tells us of two conversations that he claims to have had with Socrates (*Mem.* 1.3.9-15, *An.* 3.1.4-7), and of several conversations that he claims to have heard Socrates have with others (e.g. *Oec.*, *Smp.*, *Mem.* 1.4, 2.4, 2.5, 4.3). His claim to have heard the conversation in the *Oeconomicus* is demonstrably false (see n. 8 above); but this is the only fact to cast doubt on what he claims about the other conversations. Xenophon also names Plato once, in a remark from which we learn that Plato was on good terms with Socrates before Plato's brother Glaucon reached the age of twenty (*Mem.* 3.6.1); Glaucon was perhaps a little older than Plato;¹⁷ if so, we may infer that Plato had, even in boyhood, already made a favourable impression on Socrates. Later sources add nothing but some picturesque and improbable tales: for example, Socrates once rescued Xenophon when he fell off his horse, and once had a prophetic dream in which Plato figured as a singing cygnet (see e.g. D.L. 2.48, 3.5-6, Ael. 2.30, Apuleius *De Platone* 1-2, Strabo 9.2.7).

Xenophon and Plato were prolific authors of accounts of the dealings of Socrates with others. They often use the same characters: for instance, the Hermogenes of Xenophon's *Apology* appears also in Plato's *Cratylus*. They twice even use the same titles: they each wrote an *Apology*, they each wrote a *Symposium*. Some in antiquity saw these overlaps as parts of a systematic pattern of rivalry between the two (Aul. Gell. 14.3, Ath.

¹⁵ Athenians over twenty were of military age, and any Athenian of military age would have fought against the Spartans in the bitter final stages of the war against them that ended in 404. In *An.* 3.1.4, Xenophon says that he was of military age, but without military experience, in 401. So he would have turned twenty in the last years of the fifth century. According to 38b7-10, Plato was an adult at the trial of Socrates; and according to Hermodorus *FGH* 1008 fr. 1.b, he was twenty-eight after the death of Socrates.

¹⁶ Xenophon must have lived beyond the event of 355 to which he refers in *Poroi* 5.12. Hermippus fr. 41 Wehrli, says that Plato died in 348-7.

¹⁷ In *Pl. Rep.* 368a, we learn that Glaucon's lover celebrated in verse his achievements in 'the battle of Megara'. This may perhaps have been the battle fought in 409 (D.S. 13.65.1-2). To be old enough to fight at this battle, Glaucon must have been at least twenty; to be young enough to have had a lover still, he cannot have been much older.

11.504c–505b, D.L. 3.34). Other things too were seen as parts of this pattern: Xenophon's complaint, at the start of his *Apology*, about earlier accounts of Socrates' defence; Plato's dismissal, in *Laws* 694c–696a, of an education that Xenophon's *Cyropaedia* deems exemplary; the contrast between the monstrous Meno of Xen. *An.* 2.6.21–9 and the amiable Meno of Pl. *Meno*; and the very fact that Xenophon and Plato make so little mention of one another, even though both represent Socrates in company with so many other people, including other authors of Socratic discourses (like Antisthenes, Aristippus, Simmias, and Cebes, who each figure in the writings of them both).

Plato and Xenophon differ systematically in how they relate things said by or to Socrates. Xenophon relates such things within a frame of narrative and editorial comment in the person of Xenophon himself: for example, the first person expressions *μοι δοκεῖ* at 1.1 and *νομίζω* at 3.4.21 mean 'I, Xenophon, think', and the same happens in all his Socratic discourses. Plato is more self-effacing: not one of his Socratic discourses contains a first person expression that means Plato. Instead, he likes to write Socratic discourses either in dramatic form, or, if narrated, narrated by a speaker other than himself. He uses both these devices in his *Apology*: he has Socrates narrate his conversation with Callias in 20a4–c1; and the *Apology* as a whole is in dramatic form with Socrates and Meletus as its two speakers. (This similarity between Plato's *Apology* and his other Socratic discourses is obscured by the convention of printing it differently, with no list of characters at the start, and no names at the start of speeches to indicate their speaker.)

A less systematic but still palpable difference is that Plato's Socratic discourses are often much more ambitious than Xenophon's. For example, Plato's *Philebus*, *Republic* and *Theaetetus* are much more intellectually demanding, across a much greater range of topics, epistemological, metaphysical and political. This leads many to infer that in such works Plato is using Socrates as mouthpiece for philosophical novelties of Plato's own devising.¹⁸ The inference is all the more plausible when not conjoined, as it often is, with speculations that Plato's more ambitious works are uniformly later than his others. The inference is supported by a big contrast between Socrates as described by Aristotle and Socrates as described by Plato: according to Arist. *Met.* 1078b30 'Socrates never treated universals as separate [τὰ καθόλου οὐ χωριστὰ ἐποίησεν]'; yet in Pl. *Prm.* 130b, Socrates agrees that 'In some cases there is a separation between forms themselves and things that share in them [χωρὶς μὲν εἶδη αὐτὰ ἄττα, χωρὶς δὲ τὰ τούτων αὐ μετέχοντα]', as for instance between justice itself and things that are just.

¹⁸ Vlastos (1991) 45–106 sets out reasons for making this inference; Rowe (2007) sets out reasons against.

By contrast, no one ever infers that Xenophon is using Socrates as mouthpiece for his own philosophical ideas, not even for the one philosophical idea in Xenophon's Socratic writings without earlier precedent or contemporary parallel, the theology of *Mem.* 1.4 and 4.3. The contrast is fair to both Plato and Xenophon if we may presume that any thinker creative enough to use Socrates as mouthpiece for one idea of his own would use him as mouthpiece for many.

Xenophon was an ostentatiously versatile writer. Besides his Socratic discourses, he wrote another dialogue, the *Hiero*, relating a conversation between Hiero tyrant of Syracuse and the poet Simonides, three extended narratives of a historical or pseudo-historical nature (one of which continued Thucydides' *History*), and pamphlets on a variety of topics from the Spartan constitution to hunting with hounds. Plato's extant works display less versatility. They consist largely or wholly of philosophical dialogues. Most have Socrates as a major character. Most of the rest have Socrates as a minor character, and so are still Socratic in an attenuated sense. Only the *Laws* (and its appendix the *Epinomis*) has no character at all whom it names Socrates, and even the *Laws* is not wholly un-Socratic: it contains, but does not name, a character whom Aristotle (*Pol.* 1265a10) took or mistook for Socrates. Plato may also have been the author of some of the letters and short poems that have come down to us under his name.¹⁹ We are told furthermore of some other poetry (e.g. *D.L.* 3.5). This other poetry is now lost, but it may have been the original location of the three otherwise unknown neologisms that Arist. *Topics* 140a3–5 quotes from Plato.

Neither Xenophon nor Plato was solely an author. Xenophon was also a mercenary soldier, achieving high command of a force whose adventures in the Persian empire he narrates in his *Anabasis*. Plato established, in a gymnasium dedicated to a minor supernatural being or 'hero' named Academus, the educational institution that has given its name to all subsequent academies. These other activities of Xenophon and Plato were not wholly creditable. Xenophon fought in battle against his fellow Athenians, on the side of their traditional enemies the Spartans (Xen. *Agesilaus* 2.11–12 and *HG* 4.3.15), and had a most enjoyable exile from Athens in territory controlled by Sparta (Xen. *An.* 5.3.7–13). Plato dreamt of replacing democracy by rulers equipped with the austere intellectual education offered in his Academy (Pl. *Rep.* 473c–e, 521d–540b), and his attempts to realise his dreams, if often endearingly incompetent (Pl. *Ep.* 7), nevertheless had some sinister effects: Ath. 11.508d–509b lists, with

¹⁹ All the surviving poems that have any chance of being by Plato, along with others also ascribed to him, are gathered in Page (1975) 47–55; on their authorship, see Page (1975) ix–x. Del Corno and Innocente (1988) 37–9 contains tables summarising the range of scholarly opinions on the authenticity of those letters transmitted with Plato's dialogues.

lavishly circumstantial detail, the crimes and follies of Plato's pupils. Both Xenophon and Plato could therefore be seen, by the standards of the Athenian democracy that condemned Socrates to death for corrupting the young, as among the young whom he had corrupted.

7 EVIDENCE FOR THE TEXTS

Our principal direct evidence for the text of each of the *Apologies* comes in each case from manuscripts of the entire work that are apparently independent both of one another and of any other manuscript now surviving. Plato's *Apology* survives in six such manuscripts, written at various dates between the ninth and the twelfth centuries; Xenophon's *Apology* survives in four such manuscripts, written at various dates between the twelfth and the fifteenth. For Plato's *Apology*, there is further direct evidence, in the form of fragments of two other manuscripts of the entire work, one written in the late first or early second century, the other in the fourteenth; there is no further direct evidence for Xenophon's *Apology*. This direct evidence is in various places supplemented by indirect evidence. Much of this indirect evidence is in the form of quotations in ancient anthologies. The indirect evidence includes also an early translation of Plato's *Apology* into Armenian, and the version of the material from his *Apology* 2.7–9.15 that Xenophon gave us in his *Memorabilia* 4.8.4–10. Detailed reports of this evidence can be found in the Oxford Classical Text of Plato and the Budé edition of Xenophon.²⁰ The texts printed here rely entirely on those reports.

The present edition passes over in silence most of the variant readings to be found in our evidence. Moreover, when this edition does mention variant readings, it gives them in a ruthlessly summary form. The following abbreviations are used in the notes at the foot of the text:

- D** The only reading found in the manuscripts that provide our direct evidence for the text.
- d** One of two or more readings found in the manuscripts that provide our direct evidence for the text.
- i** A reading found in or inferred from our indirect evidence for the text.
- c** A reading attested neither in our direct nor in our indirect evidence.

Readings described as **c** are typically 'conjectures', that is, proposals by scholars not satisfied with any readings in the direct or indirect evidence available to them. But this helpful mnemonic should not make us forget two facts: first, that some readings described as **c** are absolutely certain (see

²⁰ Duke et al. (1995) 27–63; Ollier (1961).

Pl. 34a1n. on Παράλιος); and second, that some readings described as other things may have originated as such proposals, and, in the case of Xenophon's *Apology*, some readings described as **d** almost certainly did.

There is always a note when a reading describable as **c** is printed in the text. There is always a note when a reading describable as **D** is not printed in the text. Otherwise there are notes only when the evidence for the text leaves it more than usually in doubt, in a more than usually significant way.

ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ ΑΠΟΛΟΓΙΑ ΣΩΚΡΑΤΟΥΣ

ὅτι μὲν ὑμεῖς, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, πεπόνθατε ὑπὸ τῶν ἐμῶν κατηγορῶν, **17**
οὐκ οἶδα· ἐγὼ δ' οὖν καὶ αὐτὸς ὑπ' αὐτῶν ὀλίγου ἑμαυτοῦ ἐπελαθόμην,
οὕτω πιθανῶς ἔλεγον. καίτοι ἀληθές γε ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν οὐδὲν εἰρήκασιν.
μάλιστα δὲ αὐτῶν ἐν ἐθαύμασα τῶν πολλῶν ὧν ἐψεύσαντο, τοῦτο ἐν
ὧι ἔλεγον ὡς χρῆν ὑμᾶς εὐλαβεῖσθαι μὴ ὑπ' ἐμοῦ ἐξαπατηθῆτε ὡς δεινοῦ **b**
ὄντος λέγειν. τὸ γὰρ μὴ αἰσχυνθῆναι ὅτι αὐτίκα ὑπ' ἐμοῦ ἐξελεγχθήσονται
ἔργῳ, ἐπειδὴν μὴδ' ὅπωςτιοῦν φαίνωμαι δεινὸς λέγειν, τοῦτό μοι
ἔδοξεν αὐτῶν ἀναισχυντότατον εἶναι, εἰ μὴ ἄρα δεινὸν καλοῦσιν οὗτοι
λέγειν τὸν τάληθ' ἔχοντα· εἰ μὲν γὰρ τοῦτο λέγουσιν, ὁμολογοῖν **5**
ἂν ἔγωγε οὐ κατὰ τούτους εἶναι ῥήτωρ. οὗτοι μὲν οὖν, ὥσπερ ἐγὼ
λέγω, ἣ τὶ ἢ οὐδὲν ἀληθές εἰρήκασιν, ὑμεῖς δέ μου ἀκούσεσθε πᾶσαν τὴν
ἀλήθειαν—οὐ μέντοι μὰ Δία, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, κεκαλλιπτημένους γε
λόγους, ὥσπερ οἱ τούτων, ῥήμασί τε καὶ ὀνόμασιν οὐδὲ κεκοσμημένους, **c**
ἀλλ' ἀκούσεσθε εἰκῇ λεγόμενα τοῖς ἐπιτυχοῦσιν ὀνόμασιν—πιστεύω
γὰρ δίκαια εἶναι ἃ λέγω—καὶ μηδεὶς ὑμῶν προσδοκησάτω ἄλλως· οὐδὲ
γὰρ ἂν δήπου πρόπει, ὦ ἄνδρες, τῇδε τῇ ἡλικίᾳ ὥσπερ μειρακίῳ
πλάττοντι λόγους εἰς ὑμᾶς εἰσιέναι. καὶ μέντοι καὶ πάνυ, ὦ ἄνδρες **5**
Ἀθηναῖοι, τοῦτο ὑμῶν δέομαι καὶ παρίεμαι· ἐὰν διὰ τῶν αὐτῶν λόγων
ἀκούητέ μου ἀπολογουμένου δι' ὧν περ εἴωθα λέγειν καὶ ἐν ἀγοραῖ ἐπὶ
τῶν τραπεζῶν, ἵνα ὑμῶν πολλοὶ ἀκηκόασι, καὶ ἄλλοθι, μήτε θαυμάζειν **d**
μήτε θορυβεῖν τούτου ἔνεκα. ἔχει γὰρ οὕτως. νῦν ἐγὼ πρῶτον ἐπὶ
δικαστήριον ἀναβέβηκα, ἔτη γεγινώς ἐβδομήκοντα· ἀτεχνῶς οὖν ξένως
ἔχω τῆς ἐνθάδε λέξεως. ὥσπερ οὖν ἂν, εἰ τῷ ὄντι ξένος ἐτύγχανον ὧν,
συνεγινώσκετε δήπου ἂν μοι εἰ ἐν ἐκείνῃ τῇ φωνῇ τε καὶ τῷ τρόπῳ **18**
ἔλεγον ἐν οἷσπερ ἐτεθράμμην, καὶ δὴ καὶ νῦν τοῦτο ὑμῶν δέομαι δίκαιον,
ὥς γέ μοι δοκῶ, τὸν μὲν τρόπον τῆς λέξεως ἔαν (ἴσως μὲν γὰρ χεῖρων,
ἴσως δὲ βελτίων ἂν εἴη), αὐτὸ δὲ τοῦτο σκοπεῖν καὶ τούτῳ τὸν νοῦν
προσέχειν, εἰ δίκαια λέγω ἢ μή· δικαστοῦ μὲν γὰρ αὕτη ἀρετὴ, ῥήτορος **5**
δὲ τάληθ' ἔχειν.

πρῶτον μὲν οὖν δίκαιός εἰμι ἀπολογήσασθαι, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι,
πρὸς τὰ πρῶτά μου ψευδῇ κατηγορημένα καὶ τοὺς πρῶτους
κατηγοροὺς, ἔπειτα δὲ πρὸς τὰ ὕστερον καὶ τοὺς ὑστέρους. ἐμοῦ γὰρ **b**
πολλοὶ κατήγοροι γεγόνασι πρὸς ὑμᾶς καὶ πάλαι πολλὰ ἤδη ἔτη

18b1 ὕστερον d: ὕστερα d

- καὶ οὐδὲν ἀληθὲς λέγοντες, οὓς ἐγὼ μᾶλλον φοβοῦμαι ἢ τοὺς ἀμφὶ Ἄνυτον, καίπερ ὄντας καὶ τούτους δεινούς· ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνοι δεινότεροι, ὧ ἄνδρες,
- 5 οἱ ὑμῶν τοὺς πολλοὺς ἐκ παίδων παραλαμβάνοντες ἔπειθόν τε καὶ κατηγοροῦν ἐμοῦ μᾶλλον οὐδὲν ἀληθές, ὥς ἔστιν τις Σωκράτης σοφὸς ἀνὴρ, τὰ τε μετέωρα φροντιστὴς καὶ τὰ ὑπὸ γῆς ἅπαντα ἀνεζητηκὼς
- c καὶ τὸν ἥττω λόγον κρείττω ποιῶν. οὗτοι, ὧ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, οἱ ταύτην τὴν φήμην κατασκεδάσαντες, οἱ δεινοὶ εἰσὶν μου κατήγοροι· οἱ γὰρ ἀκούοντες ἡγοῦνται τοὺς ταῦτα ζητοῦντας οὐδὲ θεοὺς νομίζειν. ἔπειτὰ εἰσιν οὗτοι οἱ κατήγοροι πολλοὶ καὶ πολὺν χρόνον ἤδη κατη-
- 5 γορηκότες, ἔτι δὲ καὶ ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ ἡλικίᾳ λέγοντες πρὸς ὑμᾶς ἐν τῇ ἂν μάλιστα ἐπιστεύσατε, παῖδες ὄντες ἔνιοι ὑμῶν καὶ μειράκια, ἀτεχνῶς ἐρήμην κατηγοροῦντες ἀπολογουμένου οὐδενός. ὁ δὲ πάντων ἀλογώ-
- d τατον, ὅτι οὐδὲ τὰ ὀνόματα οἷόν τε αὐτῶν εἰδέναι καὶ εἰπεῖν, πλὴν εἴ τις κωμωδιοποιὸς τυγχάνει ὦν. ὅσοι δὲ φθόνῳ καὶ διαβολῇ χρώμενοι ὑμᾶς ἀνέπειθον—οἱ δὲ καὶ αὐτοὶ πεπεισμένοι ἄλλους πείθοντες—οὗτοι πάντες ἀπορώτατοί εἰσιν· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἀναβιβάσασθαι οἷόν τ' ἐστὶν αὐτῶν
- 5 ἐνταυθοῖ οὐδ' ἐλέγξει οὐδένα, ἀλλ' ἀνάγκη ἀτεχνῶς ὥσπερ σκιαμαχεῖν ἀπολογούμενόν τε καὶ ἐλέγχειν μηδενός ἀποκρινομένου. ἀξιώσατε οὖν καὶ ὑμεῖς, ὥσπερ ἐγὼ λέγω, διττοὺς μου τοὺς κατηγοροὺς γεγενέαι,
- e ἐτέρους μὲν τοὺς ἄρτι κατηγορήσαντας, ἐτέρους δὲ τοὺς πάλοι οὓς ἐγὼ λέγω, καὶ οἰήθητε δεῖν πρὸς ἐκείνους πρῶτόν με ἀπολογήσασθαι· καὶ γὰρ ὑμεῖς ἐκείνων πρότερον ἠκούσατε κατηγορούντων καὶ πολὺ μᾶλλον ἢ τῶνδε τῶν ὕστερον.
- 19 εἶεν· ἀπολογητέον δὴ, ὧ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, καὶ ἐπιχειρητέον ὑμῶν ἐξελέσθαι τὴν διαβολὴν ἣν ὑμεῖς ἐν πολλῷ χρόνῳ ἔσχετε ταύτην ἐν οὕτως ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ. βουλοίμην μὲν οὖν ἂν τοῦτο οὕτως γενέσθαι, εἴ τι ἄμεινον καὶ ὑμῖν καὶ ἐμοί, καὶ πλέον τί με ποιῆσαι ἀπολογούμενον· οἶμαι
- 5 δὲ αὐτὸ χαλεπὸν εἶναι, καὶ οὐ πᾶν με λανθάνει οἷόν ἐστιν. ὅμως τοῦτο μὲν ἴτω ὅππῃ τῷ θεῷ φίλον, τῷ δὲ νόμῳ πειστέον καὶ ἀπολογητέον.
- b ἀναλάβωμεν οὖν ἐξ ἀρχῆς τίς ἡ κατηγορία ἐστὶν ἐξ ἧς ἡ ἐμὴ διαβολὴ γέγονεν, ἣ δὴ καὶ πιστεύων Μέλητος με ἐγράψατο τὴν γραφὴν ταύτην. εἶεν· τί δὴ λέγοντες διέβαλλον οἱ διαβάλλοντες; ὥσπερ οὖν κατηγορῶν τὴν ἀντωμοσίαν δεῖ ἀναγνῶναι αὐτῶν· “Σωκράτης ἀδίκῃ
- 5 καὶ περιεργάζεται ζητῶν τὰ τε ὑπὸ γῆς καὶ οὐράνια καὶ τὸν ἥττω
- c λόγον κρείττω ποιῶν καὶ ἄλλους ταῦτά ταῦτα διδάσκων.” τοιαύτη τίς ἐστίν· ταῦτα γὰρ ἑωρᾶτε καὶ αὐτοὶ ἐν τῇ Ἀριστοφάνους κωμῳδίᾳ, Σωκράτη τινὰ ἐκεῖ περιφερόμενον, φάσκοντά τε ἀεροβατεῖν καὶ ἄλλην πολλὴν φλυαρίαν φλυαροῦντα, ὦν ἐγὼ οὐδὲν οὔτε μέγα οὔτε μικρόν

πéρι ἐπαῖω. καὶ οὐχ ὡς ἀτιμάζων λέγω τὴν τοιαύτην ἐπιστήμην, εἴ τις 5
 περὶ τῶν τοιούτων σοφὸς ἐστιν—μὴ πως ἐγὼ ὑπὸ Μελήττου τοσαύ-
 τας δίκας φεύγοιμι—ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἐμοὶ τούτων, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, οὐδὲν
 μέτεστιν. μάρτυρας δὲ αὐτῶν ὑμῶν τοὺς πολλοὺς παρέχομαι, καὶ ἀξιῶ d
 ὑμᾶς ἀλλήλους διδάσκειν τε καὶ φράζειν, ὅσοι ἐμοῦ πώποτε ἀκηκόατε
 διαλεγομένου (πολλοὶ δὲ ὑμῶν οἱ τοιοῦτοὶ εἰσιν). φράζετε οὖν ἀλλήλοις
 εἰ πώποτε ἢ μικρὸν ἢ μέγα ἤκουσέ τις ὑμῶν ἐμοῦ περὶ τῶν τοιούτων
 διαλεγομένου, καὶ ἐκ τούτου γνῶσεσθε ὅτι τοιαυτ' ἐστὶ καὶ τᾶλλα περὶ 5
 ἐμοῦ ἃ οἱ πολλοὶ λέγουσιν.

ἀλλὰ γὰρ οὔτε τούτων οὐδὲν ἐστιν, οὐδὲ γ' εἴ τινας ἀκηκόατε ὡς
 ἐγὼ παιδεύειν ἐπιχειρῶ ἀνθρώπους καὶ χρήματα πράττομαι, οὐδὲ e
 τοῦτο ἀληθές. ἐπεὶ καὶ τοῦτό γέ μοι δοκεῖ καλὸν εἶναι, εἴ τις οἷός τ'
 εἴη παιδεύειν ἀνθρώπους ὥσπερ Γοργίας τε ὁ Λεοντῖνος καὶ Πρόδικος
 ὁ Κεῖος καὶ Ἰππίας ὁ Ἡλεῖος. τούτων γὰρ ἕκαστος, ὦ ἄνδρες, οἷός τ'
 ἐστὶν ἰὼν εἰς ἐκάστην τῶν πόλεων τοὺς νέους, οἷς ἕξεσι τῶν ἑαυτῶν 5
 πολιτῶν προῖκα συνεῖναι ὧς ἂν βούλωνται, τούτους πείθουσι τὰς 20
 ἐκείνων συνουσίας ἀπολιπόντας σφίσιν συνεῖναι χρήματα διδόντας καὶ
 χάριν προσειδέναι. ἐπεὶ καὶ ἄλλος ἀνὴρ ἐστὶ Πάριος ἐνθάδε σοφὸς ὃν
 ἐγὼ ἡισθόμην ἐπιδημοῦντα· ἔτυχον γὰρ προσελθὼν ἀνδρὶ ὃς τετέλεκε
 χρήματα σοφισταῖς πλείω ἢ σύμπαντες οἱ ἄλλοι, Καλλίαί τῳ Ἰππο- 5
 νίκου· τοῦτον οὖν ἀνηρόμην (ἐστὸν γὰρ αὐτῷ δύο υἱεῖ)· “ὦ Καλλία,” ἦν
 δ' ἐγώ, “εἰ μὲν σου τῷ υἱεῖ πῶλῳ ἢ μόσχῳ ἐγενέσθην, εἵχομεν ἂν αὐτοῖν
 ἐπιστάτην λαβεῖν καὶ μισθώσασθαι ὃς ἐμελλεν αὐτῷ καλῶ τε κάγαθῷ b
 ποιήσῃ τὴν προσήκουσαν ἀρετὴν, ἦν δ' ἂν οὗτος ἢ τῶν ἵππικῶν τις
 ἢ τῶν γεωργικῶν· νῦν δ' ἐπειδὴ ἀνθρώπῳ ἐστὸν, τίνα αὐτοῖν ἐν νῶι
 ἔχεις ἐπιστάτην λαβεῖν; τίς τῆς τοιαύτης ἀρετῆς, τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης τε καὶ
 πολιτικῆς, ἐπιστήμων ἐστίν; οἶμαι γὰρ σε ἐσκέφθαι διὰ τὴν τῶν υἱῶν 5
 κτῆσιν. ἔστιν τις,” ἔφην ἐγώ, “ἢ οὐ;” “πάνυ γε,” ἦ δ' ὅς. “τίς,” ἦν δ'
 ἐγώ, “καὶ ποδαπός, καὶ πόσου διδάσκει;” “Εὐνός,” ἔφην, “ὦ Σώκρατες,
 Πάριος, πέντε μνῶν.” καὶ ἐγὼ τὸν Εὐνὸν ἐμακάρισα εἰ ὡς ἀληθῶς ἔχοι c
 ταύτην τὴν τέχνην καὶ οὕτως ἐμμελῶς διδάσκει. ἐγὼ γοῦν καὶ αὐτὸς
 ἐκαλλυνόμην τε καὶ ἡβρυνόμην ἂν εἰ ἡπιστάμην ταῦτα· ἀλλ' οὐ γὰρ
 ἐπίσταμαι, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι.

ὑπολάβοι ἂν οὖν τις ὑμῶν ἴσως· “ἀλλ', ὦ Σώκρατες, τὸ σὸν τί ἐστὶ 5
 πρᾶγμα; πόθεν αἱ διαβολαὶ σοι αὗται γεγόνασιν; οὐ γὰρ δήπου σοῦ
 γε οὐδὲν τῶν ἄλλων περιττότερον πραγματευομένου ἔπειτα τοσαύτη
 φήμη τε καὶ λόγος γέγονεν, εἰ μὴ τι ἔπραττες ἄλλοιον ἢ οἱ πολλοί. λέγε

- d** οὖν ἡμῖν τί ἐστίν, ἵνα μὴ ἡμεῖς περὶ σοῦ αὐτοσχεδιάζωμεν.” ταυτί μοι δοκεῖ δίκαια λέγειν ὁ λέγων, κάγώ ὑμῖν πειράσομαι ἀποδείξαι τί ποτ’ ἐστὶν τοῦτο ὃ ἐμοὶ πεποιήκεν τό τε ὄνομα καὶ τὴν διαβολήν. ἀκούετε δὴ. καὶ ἴσως μὲν δόξω τισὶν ὑμῶν παίζειιν· εὐ μέντοι ἴστε, πᾶσαν ὑμῖν τὴν
5 ἀλήθειαν ἔρω. ἐγὼ γάρ, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, δι’ οὐδὲν ἄλλ’ ἢ διὰ σοφίαν τινὰ τοῦτο τὸ ὄνομα ἔσχηκα. ποῖαν δὲ σοφίαν ταύτην; ἥπερ ἐστὶν ἴσως ἀνθρωπίνη σοφία· τῷ ὄντι γάρ κινδυνεύω ταύτην εἶναι σοφός.
- e** οὗτοι δὲ τάχ’ ἄν, οὓς ἄρτι ἔλεγον, μείζω τινὰ ἢ κατ’ ἀνθρώπον σοφίαν σοφοὶ εἶεν, ἢ οὐκ ἔχω τί λέγω· οὐ γάρ δὴ ἔγωγε αὐτὴν ἐπίσταμαι, ἀλλ’ ὅστις φησὶ ψεύδεται τε καὶ ἐπὶ διαβολῇ τῇ ἐμῇ λέγει. καὶ μοι, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, μὴ θορυβήσητε, μηδ’ ἂν δόξω τι ὑμῖν μέγα λέγειν·
5 οὐ γάρ ἐμὸν ἔρω τὸν λόγον ὃν ἂν λέγω, ἀλλ’ εἰς ἀξιόχρεων ὑμῖν τὸν λέγοντα ἀνοίσω. τῆς γάρ ἐμῆς, εἰ δὴ τίς ἐστὶν σοφία καὶ οἷα, μάρτυρα ὑμῖν παρέξομαι τὸν θεὸν τὸν ἐν Δελφοῖς. Χαιρεφῶντα γάρ ἴστε που.
- 21** οὗτος ἐμός τε ἐταῖρος ἦν ἐκ νέου καὶ ὑμῶν τῷ πλήθει ἐταῖρός τε καὶ συνέφυγε τὴν φυγὴν ταύτην καὶ μεθ’ ὑμῶν κατήλθε. καὶ ἴστε δὴ οἷος ἦν Χαιρεφῶν, ὡς σφοδρὸς ἐφ’ ὅτι ὀρμήσειεν. καὶ δὴ ποτε καὶ εἰς Δελφοὺς ἔλθων ἐτόλμησε τοῦτο μαντεύσασθαι, καί—ὅπερ λέγω, μὴ θορυβεῖτε,
5 ὦ ἄνδρες—ἦρετο γάρ δὴ εἴ τις ἐμοῦ εἴη σοφώτερος. ἀνεῖλεν οὖν ἡ Πυθία μηδένα σοφώτερον εἶναι. καὶ τούτων περὶ ὁ ἀδελφός ὑμῖν αὐτοῦ οὐτοσί μαρτυρήσει, ἐπειδὴ ἐκεῖνος τετελεύτηκεν.
- b** σκέψασθε δὴ ὧν ἕνεκα ταῦτα λέγω· μέλλω γάρ ὑμᾶς διδάξειν ὅθεν μοι ἡ διαβολὴ γέγονεν. ταῦτα γάρ ἐγὼ ἀκούσας ἐνεθυμούμην οὕτως· “τί ποτε λέγει ὁ θεός, καὶ τί ποτε αἰνίττεται; ἐγὼ γάρ δὴ οὔτε μέγα οὔτε σμικρὸν σύννοϊδα ἐμαυτῷ σοφός ὢν· τί οὖν ποτε λέγει φάσκων
5 ἐμὲ σοφώτατον εἶναι; οὐ γάρ δήπου ψεύδεται γε· οὐ γάρ θέμις αὐτῷ.” καὶ πολὺν μὲν χρόνον ἠπόρουν τί ποτε λέγει· ἔπειτα μόγις πάνυ ἐπὶ ζήτησιν αὐτοῦ τοιαύτην τινὰ ἐτραπόμην. ἦλθον ἐπὶ τινὰ τῶν δοκούν-
- c** των σοφῶν εἶναι, ὡς ἐνταῦθα εἴπερ που ἐλέγχων τὸ μαντεῖον καὶ ἀποφανῶν τῷ χρησμῷ ὅτι “οὐτοσί ἐμοῦ σοφώτερός ἐστι, σὺ δ’ ἐμὲ ἔφησθα.” διασκοπῶν οὖν τοῦτον (ὀνόματι γάρ οὐδὲν δέομαι λέγειν, ἦν δὲ τις τῶν πολιτικῶν πρὸς ὃν ἐγὼ σκοπῶν τοιοῦτόν τι ἔπαθον, ὦ ἄνδρες
5 Ἀθηναῖοι) καὶ διαλεγόμενος αὐτῷ—ἔδοξέ μοι οὗτος ὁ ἀνὴρ δοκεῖν μὲν εἶναι σοφός ἄλλοις τε πολλοῖς ἀνθρώποις καὶ μάλιστα ἐαυτῷ, εἶναι δ’ οὐ· κἄπειτα ἐπειρώμην αὐτῷ δεικνύναι ὅτι οἷοίτο μὲν εἶναι σοφός, εἴη
- d** δ’ οὐ. ἐντεῦθεν οὖν τούτῳ τε ἀπηχθόμην καὶ πολλοῖς τῶν παρόντων· πρὸς ἐμαυτὸν δ’ οὖν ἀπιὼν ἐλογιζόμην ὅτι τούτου μὲν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἐγὼ σοφώτερός εἰμι· κινδυνεύει μὲν γάρ ἡμῶν οὐδέτερος οὐδὲν καλὸν
21a2 ταύτην **D**: τὴν αὐτὴν **c** **21b1** δὴ **d**, **i**: δὲ **d** **21c2** οὐτοσί ἐμοῦ **d**: οὗτός γέ μου **d**

κάγαθόν εἶδέναι, ἀλλ' οὗτος μὲν οἶται τι εἶδέναι οὐκ εἰδώς, ἐγὼ δέ, ὥσπερ οὐν οὐκ οἶδα, οὐδὲ οἶμαι· ἔοικα γοῦν τούτου γε σμικρῶνι τινι αὐτῷ 5
τούτων σοφώτερος εἶναι, ὅτι ἂ μὴ οἶδα οὐδὲ οἶμαι εἶδέναι. ἐντεῦθεν ἐπ' ἄλλον ἦα τῶν ἐκείνου δοκούντων σοφωτέρων εἶναι καί μοι ταῦτα e
ταῦτα ἔδοξε, καὶ ἐνταῦθα κάκείνῳ καὶ ἄλλοις πολλοῖς ἀπηχθόμεν.

μετὰ ταῦτ' οὖν ἤδη ἐφεξῆς ἦια, αἰσθανόμενος μὲν καὶ λυπούμενος καὶ δεδιώς ὅτι ἀπηχθανόμεν, ὅμως δὲ ἀναγκαῖον ἐδόκει εἶναι τὸ τοῦ θεοῦ περὶ πλείστου ποιεῖσθαι—ἰτέον οὖν, σκοποῦντι τὸν χρησμὸν τί 5
λέγει, ἐπὶ ἅπαντας τοὺς τι δοκούντας εἶδέναι. καὶ νῆ τὸν κύνα, ὧ ἄνδρες 22
Ἀθηναῖοι (δεῖ γὰρ πρὸς ὑμᾶς τάληθῃ λέγειν) ἡ μὴν ἐγὼ ἔπαθόν τι τοιοῦτον· οἱ μὲν μάλιστα εὐδοκίμουντες ἔδοξάν μοι ὀλίγου δεῖν τοῦ πλείστου ἐνδεεῖς εἶναι ζητοῦντι κατὰ τὸν θεόν, ἄλλοι δὲ δοκοῦντες φαυλότεροι ἐπιεικέστεροι εἶναι ἄνδρες πρὸς τὸ φρονίμως ἔχειν. δεῖ δὴ ὑμῖν τὴν ἐμὴν 5
πλάνην ἐπιδείξαι ὥσπερ πόνους τινὰς πονοῦντος ἵνα μοι καὶ ἀνέλγκτος ἡ μαντεία γένοιτο. μετὰ γὰρ τοὺς πολιτικούς ἦια ἐπὶ τοὺς ποιητὰς τοὺς τε τῶν τραγωιδιῶν καὶ τοὺς τῶν διθυράμβων καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους, ὡς b
ἐνταῦθα ἐπ' αὐτοφώρῳ καταληψόμενος ἑμαυτὸν ἀμαθέστερον ἐκείνων ὄντα. ἀναλαμβάνων οὖν αὐτῶν τὰ ποιήματα ἂ μοι ἐδόκει μάλιστα πεπραγματεῦσθαι αὐτοῖς, διηρώτων ἂν αὐτοὺς τί λέγοιεν, ἵν' ἅμα τι καὶ μανθάνοιμι παρ' αὐτῶν. αἰσχύνομαι οὖν ὑμῖν εἰπεῖν, ὧ ἄνδρες, τάληθ' 5
ὅμως δὲ ῥητέον. ὡς ἔπος γὰρ εἰπεῖν ὀλίγου αὐτῶν ἅπαντες οἱ παρόντες ἂν βέλτιον ἔλεγον περὶ ὧν αὐτοὶ ἐπεποιήκεσαν. ἔγνω οὖν αὐ καὶ περὶ τῶν ποιητῶν ἐν ὀλίγῳ τοῦτο, ὅτι οὐ σοφία ποιοῖεν ἂ ποιοῖεν, ἀλλὰ c
φύσει τινὶ καὶ ἐνθουσιάζοντες ὥσπερ οἱ θεομάντεις καὶ οἱ χρησμοιδοί· καὶ γὰρ οὗτοι λέγουσι μὲν πολλὰ καὶ καλὰ, ἴσασι δὲ οὐδὲν ὧν λέγουσι. τοιοῦτόν τί μοι ἐφάνησαν πάθος καὶ οἱ ποιηταὶ πεπονθότες, καὶ ἅμα ἡισθόμεν αὐτῶν διὰ τὴν ποίησιν οἰομένων καὶ τᾶλλα σοφωτάτων εἶναι 5
ἀνθρώπων ἂ οὐκ ἦσαν. ἀπῆια οὖν καὶ ἐντεῦθεν τῷ αὐτῷ οἰόμενος περιγεγονέναι ὥπερ καὶ τῶν πολιτικῶν.

τελευτῶν οὖν ἐπὶ τοὺς χειροτέχνας ἦια· ἑμαυτῷ γὰρ συνήδη οὐδὲν d
ἐπισταμένῳ ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν, τούτους δὲ γ' ἤδη ὅτι εὐρήσοιμι πολλὰ καὶ καλὰ ἐπισταμένους. καὶ τούτου μὲν οὐκ ἐψεύσθην, ἀλλ' ἠπίσταντο ἂ ἐγὼ οὐκ ἠπιστάμην καὶ μου ταύτῃ σοφώτεροι ἦσαν. ἀλλ', ὧ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ταυτόν μοι ἔδοξαν ἔχειν ἀμάρτημα ὅπερ καὶ οἱ ποιηταὶ καὶ 5
οἱ ἀγαθοὶ δημιουργοί—διὰ τὸ τὴν τέχνην καλῶς ἐξεργάζεσθαι ἕκαστος ἡξίου καὶ τᾶλλα τὰ μέγιστα σοφώτατος εἶναι—καὶ αὐτῶν αὕτη ἡ πλημμελία ἐκείνην τὴν σοφίαν ἀποκρύπτειν· ὥστε με ἑμαυτὸν ἀνερωτᾶν e

21e5 ἰτέον οὖν d: καὶ ἰέναι d, ἰτέον οὖν ἐδόκει εἶναι i 22e1 ἀποκρύπτειν d: ἀποκρύπτει d, ἀπέκρυπτεν d, i

ὑπὲρ τοῦ χρησμοῦ πότερα δεξαίμην ἂν οὕτως ὥσπερ ἔχω ἔχειν, μήτε τι σοφὸς ὢν τὴν ἐκείνων σοφίαν μήτε ἀμαθὴς τὴν ἀμαθίαν, ἢ ἀμφοτέρα ἃ ἐκείνοι ἔχουσιν ἔχειν. ἀπεκρινάμην οὖν ἑμαυτῷ καὶ τῷ χρησμῷ ὅτι
5 μοι λυσiteloi ὥσπερ ἔχω ἔχειν.

23 ἐκ ταυτησί δὴ τῆς ἐξετάσεως, ὧ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, πολλὰ μὲν ἀπέχ-
θιαί μοι γεγόνασι καὶ οἶα χαλεπώταται καὶ βαρύταται, ὥστε πολλὰς
διαβολὰς ἀπ’ αὐτῶν γεγονέναι, ὄνομα δὲ τοῦτο λέγεσθαι, σοφὸς εἶναι·
οἶονται γάρ με ἐκάστοτε οἱ παρόντες ταῦτα αὐτὸν εἶναι σοφὸν ἃ ἂν
5 ἄλλον ἐξελέγξω. τὸ δὲ κινδυνεύει, ὧ ἄνδρες, τῷ ὄντι ὁ θεὸς σοφὸς
εἶναι, καὶ ἐν τῷ χρησμῷ τούτῳ τοῦτο λέγειν, ὅτι ἡ ἀνθρωπίνη
σοφία ὀλίγου τινὸς ἀξία ἐστίν καὶ οὐδενός. καὶ φαίνεται τοῦτον λέγειν
b τὸν Σωκράτη, προσκεχρήσθαι δὲ τῷ ἐμῷ ὀνόματι, ἐμὲ παράδειγμα
ποιοῦμενος, ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ εἴποι ὅτι “οὗτος ὑμῶν, ὧ ἄνθρωποι, σοφώ-
τατός ἐστιν, ὅστις ὥσπερ Σωκράτης ἔγνωκεν ὅτι οὐδενὸς ἀξίος ἐστι τῇ
ἀληθείᾳ πρὸς σοφίαν.” ταῦτ’ οὖν ἐγὼ μὲν ἔτι καὶ νῦν περιῶν ζητῶ
5 καὶ ἐρευνῶ κατὰ τὸν θεὸν καὶ τῶν ἀστῶν καὶ ξένων ἂν τίνα οἶμαι σοφὸν
εἶναι· καὶ ἐπειδὴν μοι μὴ δοκῇ, τῷ θεῷ βοηθῶν ἐνδείκνυμαι ὅτι
οὐκ ἔστι σοφός. καὶ ὑπὸ ταύτης τῆς ἀσχολίας οὔτε τι τῶν τῆς πόλεως
c πράξαι μοι σχολή γέγονεν ἀξιον λόγου οὔτε τῶν οἰκείων, ἀλλ’ ἐν πενίᾳ
μυρία εἰμι διὰ τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ λατρείαν.

πρὸς δὲ τούτοις οἱ νέοι μοι ἐπακολουθοῦντες, οἷς μάλιστα σχολή ἐστιν,
οἱ τῶν πλουσιωτάτων, αὐτόματοι χαίρουσιν ἀκούοντες ἐξετα-
5 ζομένων τῶν ἀνθρώπων, καὶ αὐτοὶ πολλάκις ἐμὲ μιμοῦνται, εἴτα ἐπι-
χειροῦσιν ἄλλους ἐξετάζειν· κἄπειτα οἶμαι εὐρίσκουσι πολλὴν ἀφθονίαν
οἰομένων μὲν εἰδέναι τι ἀνθρώπων, εἰδότες δὲ ὀλίγα ἢ οὐδέν. ἐντεῦθεν
d οὖν οἱ ὑπ’ αὐτῶν ἐξεταζόμενοι ἐμοὶ ὀργίζονται, ἀλλ’ οὐχ αὐτοῖς, καὶ
λέγουσιν ὡς Σωκράτης τίς ἐστι μιαιώτατος καὶ διαφθείρει τοὺς νέους·
καὶ ἐπειδὴν τις αὐτοὺς ἔρωτᾷ ὅτι ποιῶν καὶ ὅτι διδάσκων, ἔχουσι μὲν
οὐδὲν εἰπεῖν ἀλλ’ ἄγνοοῦσιν, ἵνα δὲ μὴ δοκῶσιν ἀπορεῖν, τὰ κατὰ πάν-
5 των τῶν φιλοσοφούντων πρόχειρα ταῦτα λέγουσιν, ὅτι “τὰ μετέωρα
καὶ τὰ ὑπὸ γῆς” καὶ “θεοὺς μὴ νομίζειν” καὶ “τὸν ἥττω λόγον κρείττω
ποιεῖν.” τὰ γὰρ ἀληθῆ οἶμαι οὐκ ἂν ἐθέλοιεν λέγειν, ὅτι κατάδηλοι
γίγονται προσποιοῦμενοι μὲν εἰδέναι, εἰδότες δὲ οὐδέν. ἅτε οὖν οἶμαι
e φιλότιμοι ὄντες καὶ σφοδροὶ καὶ πολλοί, καὶ συντεταμένως καὶ πιθανῶς
λέγοντες περὶ ἐμοῦ, ἐμπεπλήκασιν ὑμῶν τὰ ῥα καὶ πάλαι καὶ σφο-
δρῶς διαβάλλοντες. ἐκ τούτων καὶ Μέλητος μοι ἐπέθετο καὶ Ἄνυτος καὶ

23a1 ἐξετάσεως d: ἐξεως d 23b2 εἰ εἴποι c: εἴποι D 23d1 ἀλλ’ οὐχ αὐτοῖς d: ἀλλ’ οὐκ
αὐτοῖς d, οὐχ αὐτοῖς d 23e1 συντεταμένως c: ξυντεταγμένως D

Λύκων, Μέλητος μὲν ὑπὲρ τῶν ποιητῶν ἀχθόμενος, Ἄνυτος δὲ ὑπὲρ τῶν δημιουργῶν, Λύκων δὲ ὑπὲρ τῶν ῥητόρων· ὥστε, ὅπερ ἀρχό- 24
μενος ἐγὼ ἔλεγον, θαυμάζοιμι· ἂν εἰ οἶός τ' εἴην ἐγὼ ὑμῶν ταύτην τὴν
διαβολὴν ἐξελέσθαι ἐν οὕτως ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ οὕτω πολλὴν γεγонуῖαν.
ταῦτ' ἔστιν ὑμῖν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τάληθ' ἢ, καὶ ὑμᾶς οὐτε μέγα οὐτε
μικρὸν ἀποκρυψάμενος ἐγὼ λέγω οὐδ' ὑποστειλάμενος. καίτοι οἶδα 5
σχεδὸν ὅτι τούτοις αὐτοῖς ἀπεχθάνομαι, ὃ καὶ τεκμήριον ὅτι ἀληθὴ
λέγω καὶ ὅτι αὕτη ἐστὶν ἡ διαβολὴ ἢ ἐμὴ καὶ τὰ αἵτια ταῦτά ἐστιν. καὶ b
ἐάντε νῦν ἐάντε αὖθις ζητήσητε ταῦτα, οὕτως εὐρήσετε.

περὶ μὲν οὖν ὧν οἱ πρῶτοί μου κατήγοροι κατηγόρουν αὕτη
ἔστω ἱκανὴ ἀπολογία πρὸς ὑμᾶς· πρὸς δὲ Μέλητον τὸν ἀγαθὸν
καὶ φιλόπολιν, ὥς φησι, καὶ τοὺς ὑστέρους μετὰ ταῦτα πειράσ- 5
ομαι ἀπολογησασθαι. αὖθις γὰρ δὴ, ὥσπερ ἐτέρων τούτων ὄντων
κατηγόρων, λάβωμεν αὐτὴν τούτων ἀνταμωσίαν. ἔχει δὲ πῶς ὧδε·
Σωκράτῃ φησὶν ἀδικεῖν τοὺς τε νέους διαφθείροντα καὶ θεοὺς οὓς ἡ
πόλις νομίζει οὐ νομίζοντα, ἕτερα δὲ δαιμόνια καινά. τὸ μὲν δὴ ἔγκλημα c
τοιοῦτόν ἐστιν· τούτου δὲ τοῦ ἐγκλήματος ἐν ἑκαστον ἐξετάσωμεν.
φησὶ γὰρ δὴ τοὺς νέους ἀδικεῖν με διαφθείροντα. ἐγὼ δὲ γε, ὦ ἄνδρες
Ἀθηναῖοι, ἀδικεῖν φημι Μέλητον, ὅτι σπουδῇ χαριεντίζεται, ραιδίως
εἰς ἄγῳνα καθιστὰς ἀνθρώπους, περὶ πραγμάτων προσποιούμενος 5
σπουδάζειν καὶ κήδεσθαι ὧν οὐδὲν τούτῳ πώποτε ἐμέλησεν· ὥς δὲ
τοῦτο οὕτως ἔχει, πειράσομαι καὶ ὑμῖν ἐπιδείξαι. καὶ μοι δεῦρο, ὦ
Μέλητε, εἰπέ· ἄλλο τι ἢ περὶ πολλοῦ ποιῇ ὅπως ὥς βέλτιστοι οἱ νεώτεροι d
ἔσονται;

ἔγωγε.

ἴθι δὴ νυν εἰπέ τούτοις, τίς αὐτοὺς βελτίους ποιεῖ; δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι
οἶσθα, μέλον γέ σοι. τὸν μὲν γὰρ διαφθείροντα ἐξευρών, ὥς φῆις, ἐμέ, 5
εἰσάγεις τουτοῖσι καὶ κατηγορεῖς· τὸν δὲ δὴ βελτίους ποιοῦντα ἴθι εἰπέ
καὶ μῆνυσον αὐτοῖς τίς ἐστίν. ὁρᾷς, ὦ Μέλητε, ὅτι σιγαῖς καὶ οὐκ ἔχεις
εἰπεῖν; καίτοι οὐκ αἰσχρὸν σοι δοκεῖ εἶναι καὶ ἱκανὸν τεκμήριον οὗ δὴ
ἐγὼ λέγω, ὅτι σοι οὐδὲν μεμέληκεν; ἀλλ' εἰπέ, ὦγαθέ, τίς αὐτοὺς ἀμείνους
ποιεῖ; 10

οἱ νόμοι.

ἀλλ' οὐ τοῦτο ἐρωτῶ, ὦ βέλτιστε, ἀλλὰ τίς ἀνθρώπος, ὅστις πρῶτον e
καὶ αὐτὸ τοῦτο οἶδε, τοὺς νόμους;
οὗτοι, ὦ Σώκρατες, οἱ δικασταί.

24a1 δημιουργῶν c: δημιουργῶν καὶ τῶν πολιτικῶν D, i 24a6 τούτοις αὐτοῖς c: τοῖς
τούτοις D, αὐτοῖς τούτοις i 24d1 πολλοῦ d: πλείστου d

- πῶς λέγεις, ὦ Μέλητε; οἶδε τοὺς νέους παιδεύειν οἷοί τέ εἰσι καὶ
 5 βελτίους ποιεῖν;
 μάλιστα.
 πότερον ἅπαντες, ἢ οἱ μὲν αὐτῶν, οἱ δ' οὐ;
 ἅπαντες.
 εὖ γε νῆ τήν Ἥραν λέγεις καὶ πολλήν ἀφθονίαν τῶν ὠφελούντων. τί
 25 δὲ δῆ; οἶδε οἱ ἀκροαταὶ βελτίους ποιοῦσιν ἢ οὐ;
 καὶ οὗτοι.
 τί δὲ οἱ βουλευταί;
 καὶ οἱ βουλευταί.
 5 ἄλλ' ἄρα, ὦ Μέλητε, μὴ οἱ ἐν τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ, οἱ ἐκκλησιασται,
 διαφθείρουσι τοὺς νεωτέρους; ἢ κακῆϊνοι βελτίους ποιοῦσιν ἅπαντες;
 κακῆϊνοι.
 πάντες ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικεν, Ἀθηναῖοι καλοὺς κάγαθούς ποιοῦσι πλὴν
 ἐμοῦ, ἐγὼ δὲ μόνος διαφθείρω. οὕτω λέγεις;
 10 πᾶν σφόδρα ταῦτα λέγω.
 πολλήν γέ μου κατέγνωκας δυστυχίαν. καὶ μοι ἀπόκριναι· ἦ καὶ
 b περὶ ἵππους οὕτω σοι δοκεῖ ἔχειν; οἱ μὲν βελτίους ποιοῦντες αὐτοὺς
 πάντες ἄνθρωποι εἶναι, εἷς δέ τις ὁ διαφθεῖρων; ἢ τούναντίον τούτου
 πᾶν εἷς μὲν τις ὁ βελτίους οἶός τ' ὦν ποιεῖν ἢ πᾶν ὀλίγοι, οἱ ἵππικοί,
 οἱ δὲ πολλοὶ ἑάντερ συνῶσι καὶ χρῶνται ἵπποις, διαφθείρουσιν; οὐχ
 5 οὕτως ἔχει, ὦ Μέλητε, καὶ περὶ ἵππων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀπάντων ζώων;
 πάντως δῆπου, ἑάντε σὺ καὶ Ἄνυτος οὐ φῆτε ἑάντε φῆτε· πολλὴ γὰρ
 ἂν τις εὐδαιμονία εἴη περὶ τοὺς νέους εἰ εἷς μὲν μόνος αὐτοὺς διαφθείρει,
 c οἱ δ' ἄλλοι ὠφελοῦσιν. ἀλλὰ γάρ, ὦ Μέλητε, ἱκανῶς ἐπιδείκνυσαι ὅτι
 οὐδεπώποτε ἐφρόντισας τῶν νέων, καὶ σαφῶς ἀποφαίνεις τὴν σαυτοῦ
 ἀμέλειαν, ὅτι οὐδέν σοι μεμέληκεν περὶ ὧν ἐμέ εἰσάγεις. ἔτι δὲ ἡμῖν εἶπέ,
 ὦ πρὸς Διὸς Μέλητε, πότερόν ἐστιν οἰκεῖν ἄμεινον ἐν πολίταις χρηστοῖς
 5 ἢ πονηροῖς; ὦ τάν, ἀπόκριναι· οὐδέν γάρ τοι χαλεπὸν ἔρωτώ. οὐχ οἱ
 μὲν πονηροὶ κακὸν τι ἐργάζονται τοὺς ἀεὶ ἐγγυτάτω αὐτῶν ὄντας, οἱ
 δ' ἀγαθοὶ ἀγαθόν τι;
 πᾶν γε.
 d ἔστιν οὖν ὅστις βούλεται ὑπὸ τῶν συνόντων βλάπτεσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ
 ὠφελεῖσθαι; ἀποκρίνου, ὦ ἀγαθέ· καὶ γὰρ ὁ νόμος κελεύει ἀποκρίνεσθαι.
 ἔσθ' ὅστις βούλεται βλάπτεσθαι;
 οὐ δῆτα.
 5 φέρε δῆ, πότερον ἐμέ εἰσάγεις δεῦρο ὡς διαφθείροντα τοὺς νεωτέρους
 καὶ πονηροτέρους ποιοῦντα ἐκόντα ἢ ἄκοντα;
 24e5 ποιεῖν d: ποιοῦσιν d 25d5 νεωτέρους d: νέους d

ἐκόντα ἔγωγε.

τί δῆτα, ὦ Μέλητε; τοσοῦτον σὺ ἐμοῦ σοφώτερος εἶ τηλικούτου
 ὄντος τηλικόσδε ὦν, ὥστε σὺ μὲν ἔγνωκας ὅτι οἱ μὲν κακοὶ κακὸν τι
 ἐργάζονται ἀεὶ τοὺς μάλιστα πλησίον ἑαυτῶν, οἱ δὲ ἀγαθοὶ ἀγαθόν, e
 ἐγὼ δὲ δὴ εἰς τοσοῦτον ἀμαθίας ἦκω ὥστε καὶ τοῦτ' ἄγνοω, ὅτι ἔαν
 τινα μοχθηρὸν ποιήσω τῶν συνόντων, κινδυνεύσω κακὸν τι λαβεῖν ὑπ'
 αὐτοῦ, ὥστε τοῦτο τὸ τοσοῦτον κακὸν ἐκὼν ποιῶ, ὥς φῆις σύ; ταῦτα
 ἐγὼ σοι οὐ πείθομαι, ὦ Μέλητε, οἶμαι δὲ οὐδὲ ἄλλον ἀνθρώπων οὐδέ- 5
 να· ἀλλ' ἢ οὐ διαφθείρω, ἢ εἰ διαφθείρω, διαφθείρω ἄκων, ὥστε σὺ γε 26
 κατ' ἀμφοτέρω φεύδῃ. εἰ δὲ ἄκων διαφθείρω, τῶν τοιούτων ἀμαρτη-
 μάτων οὐ δεῦρο νόμος εἰσάγειν ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ ἰδία λαβόντα διδάσκειν
 καὶ νοθετεῖν· δῆλον γάρ ὅτι ἔαν μάθω, παύσομαι ὃ γε ἄκων ποιῶ.
 σὺ δὲ συγγενέσθαι μὲν μοι καὶ διδάξαι ἔφυγες καὶ οὐκ ἠθέλησας, δεῦρο 5
 δὲ εἰσάγεις, οἱ νόμος ἐστὶν εἰσάγειν τοὺς κολάσεως δεομένους ἀλλ' οὐ
 μαθήσεως. ἀλλὰ γάρ, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τοῦτο μὲν δῆλον ἦδη ἐστὶν b
 οὐγὰρ ἔλεγον, ὅτι Μελήτῳ τούτων οὔτε μέγα οὔτε μικρὸν πώποτε
 ἐμέλησεν. ὅμως δὲ δὴ λέγε ἡμῖν, πῶς με φῆις διαφθεῖρειν, ὦ Μέλητε,
 τοὺς νεωτέρους; ἢ δῆλον δὴ ὅτι κατὰ τὴν γραφὴν ἦν ἐγράψω θεοὺς
 διδάσκοντα μὴ νομίζειν οὓς ἡ πόλις νομίζει, ἕτερα δὲ δαιμόνια καινά; οὐ 5
 ταῦτα λέγεις ὅτι διδάσκων διαφθείρω;

πάνυ μὲν οὖν σφόδρα ταῦτα λέγω.

πρὸς αὐτῶν τοίνυν, ὦ Μέλητε, τούτων τῶν θεῶν ὧν νῦν ὁ λόγος
 ἐστίν, εἰπέ ἔτι σαφέστερον καὶ ἐμοὶ καὶ τοῖς ἀνδράσιν τουτοισί. ἐγὼ c
 γάρ οὐ δύναμαι μαθεῖν πότερον λέγεις διδάσκειν με νομίζειν εἶναι τινος
 θεοῦς—καὶ αὐτὸς ἄρα νομίζω εἶναι θεοῦς καὶ οὐκ εἰμὶ τὸ παράπαν ἄθεος
 οὐδὲ ταύτῃ ἀδικῶ—οὐ μέντοι οὕσπερ γε ἡ πόλις ἀλλὰ ἐτέρους, καὶ
 τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ὃ μοι ἐγκαλεῖς, ὅτι ἐτέρους, ἢ παντάπασί με φῆις οὔτε αὐτὸν 5
 νομίζειν θεοὺς τοὺς τε ἄλλους ταῦτα διδάσκειν.

ταῦτα λέγω, ὥς τὸ παράπαν οὐ νομίζεις θεοῦς.

ὦ θαυμάσιε Μέλητε, ἵνα τί ταῦτα λέγεις; οὐδὲ ἥλιον οὐδὲ σελήνην d
 ἄρα νομίζω θεοὺς εἶναι, ὥσπερ οἱ ἄλλοι ἀνθρώποι;

μὰ Δί', ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί, ἔπει τὸν μὲν ἥλιον λίθον φησὶν εἶναι, τὴν
 δὲ σελήνην γῆν.

Ἄναξαγόρου οἶε καταγορεῖν, ὦ φίλε Μέλητε; καὶ οὕτω καταφρονεῖς 5
 τῶνδε καὶ οἶε αὐτοὺς ἀπείρους γραμμάτων εἶναι ὥστε οὐκ εἰδέναι ὅτι

25e4 τοῦτο τὸ c: τοῦτο D 26a1 εἰ διαφθείρω, διαφθείρω ἄκων c: εἰ διαφθείρω, ἄκων D,
 διαφθείρω ἄκων c 26a2 τοιούτων c: τοιούτων καὶ ἀκουσίων D 26b2 Μελήτῳ
 τούτων c: Μελήτῳ τούτῳ D

τὰ Ἀναξαγόρου βιβλία τοῦ Κλαζομενίου γέμει τούτων τῶν λόγων; καὶ δὴ καὶ οἱ νέοι ταῦτα παρ' ἐμοῦ μανθάνουσιν, ἃ ἔξεστιν ἐνίοτε εἰ πάνυ πολλοῦ δραχμῆς ἐκ τῆς ὀρχήστρας πριαμένοις Σωκράτους καταγελαῖν, ἐὰν προσποιῆται ἑαυτοῦ εἶναι, ἄλλως τε καὶ οὕτως ἄτοπα ὄντα; ἀλλ', ὦ πρὸς Διός, οὕτωςί σοι δοκῶ; οὐδένα νομίζω θεὸν εἶναι;

οὐ μέντοι μὰ Δία οὐδ' ὅπωςτιοῦν.

5 ἀπιστός γ' εἶ, ὦ Μέλητε, καὶ ταῦτα μέντοι, ὥς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖς, σαυτῶι. ἐμοὶ γὰρ δοκεῖ οὐτοσί, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, πάνυ εἶναι ὕβριστῆς καὶ ἀκόλαστος, καὶ ἀτεχνῶς τὴν γραφὴν ταύτην ὕβρει τινὶ καὶ ἀκολασίαι
27 καὶ νεότητι γράψασθαι. ἔοικεν γὰρ ὥσπερ αἶνιγμα συντιθέντι διαπειρωμένῳ “ἄρα γινώσεται Σωκράτης ὁ σοφὸς δὴ ἐμοῦ χαριεντιζομένου καὶ ἐναντί' ἑμαυτῶι λέγοντος, ἢ ἐξαπατήσω αὐτὸν καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους τοὺς ἀκούοντας;” οὗτος γὰρ ἐμοὶ φαίνεται τὰ ἐναντία λέγειν αὐτὸς ἑαυτῶι
5 ἐν τῇ γραφῇ ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ εἴποι· “ἀδικεῖ Σωκράτης θεοὺς οὐ νομίζων, ἀλλὰ θεοὺς νομίζων.” καίτοι τοῦτό ἐστι παίζοντος. συνεπισκέψασθε δὴ, ὦ ἄνδρες, ἥ μοι φαίνεται ταῦτα λέγειν· σὺ δὲ ἡμῖν ἀπόκριναί, b ὦ Μέλητε. ὑμεῖς δέ, ὅπερ κατ' ἀρχὰς ὑμᾶς παρητητήσαμην, μέμνησθέ μοι μὴ θορυβεῖν ἐὰν ἐν τῷ εἰωθότῳ τρόπῳ τοὺς λόγους ποιῶμαι. ἔστιν ὅστις ἀνθρώπων, ὦ Μέλητε, ἀνθρώπεια μὲν νομίζει πράγματ' εἶναι, ἀνθρώπους δὲ οὐ νομίζει; ἀποκρινέσθω, ὦ ἄνδρες, καὶ μὴ ἄλλα
5 καὶ ἄλλα θορυβεῖται· ἔσθ' ὅστις ἵππους μὲν οὐ νομίζει, ἵππικὰ δὲ πράγματα; ἢ αὐλητὰς μὲν οὐ νομίζει εἶναι, αὐλητικὰ δὲ πράγματα; “οὐκ ἔστιν, ὦ ἄριστε ἀνδρῶν.” εἰ μὴ σὺ βούλει ἀποκρίνασθαι, ἐγὼ σοὶ λέγω καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις τουτοισί. ἀλλὰ τὸ ἐπὶ τούτῳ γε ἀποκρι- c ναι· ἔσθ' ὅστις δαιμόνια μὲν νομίζει πράγματ' εἶναι, δαίμονας δὲ οὐ νομίζει;

οὐκ ἔστιν.

ὥς ὠνησας ὅτι μόγις ἀπεκρίνω ὑπὸ τουτωνὶ ἀναγκαζόμενος. οὐκοῦν
5 δαιμόνια μὲν φῆις με καὶ νομίζειν καὶ διδάσκειν, εἴτ' οὖν καινὰ εἴτε παλαιά, ἀλλ' οὖν δαιμόνιά γε νομίζω κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον, καὶ ταῦτα καὶ διωμώσω ἐν τῇ ἀντιγραφῇ. εἰ δὲ δαιμόνια νομίζω, καὶ δαίμονας δήπου πολλὴ ἀνάγκη νομίζειν μέ ἐστιν· οὐχ οὕτως ἔχει; “ἔχει δὴ.” τίθημι γάρ d σε ὁμολογοῦντα, ἐπειδὴ οὐκ ἀποκρίνηι. τοὺς δὲ δαίμονας οὐχὶ ἦτοι θεοὺς γε ἡγούμεθα ἢ θεῶν παῖδας; φῆις ἦ οὐ;

πάνυ γε.

οὐκοῦν εἴπερ δαίμονας ἡγοῦμαι, ὥς σὺ φῆις, εἰ μὲν θεοὶ τινὲς εἰσιν
5 οἱ δαίμονες, τοῦτ' ἂν εἴη ὃ ἐγὼ φημί σε αἰνίττεσθαι καὶ χαριεντίζεσθαι, θεοὺς οὐχ ἡγούμενον φάναι με θεοὺς αὐτῶν ἡγεῖσθαι πάλιν, ἐπειδήπερ γε δαίμονας ἡγοῦμαι· εἰ δ' αὖ οἱ δαίμονες θεῶν παῖδες εἰσιν νόθοι τινὲς ἢ ἐκ νυμφῶν ἢ ἐκ τινων ἄλλων ὧν δὴ καὶ λέγονται, τίς ἂν ἀνθρώπων

θεῶν μὲν παῖδας ἡγοῖτο εἶναι, θεοὺς δὲ μή· ὁμοίως γὰρ ἂν ἄτοπον εἶη **e**
 ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ τις ἵππων μὲν παῖδας ἡγοῖτο ἢ καὶ ὄνων, τοὺς ἡμιόνους,
 ἵππους δὲ καὶ ὄνους μὴ ἡγοῖτο εἶναι. ἀλλ', ὦ Μέλητε, οὐκ ἔστιν ὅπως
 σὺ ταῦτα οὐχὶ ἀποπειρώμενος ἡμῶν ἐγράψω τὴν γραφὴν ταύτην ἢ
 ἀπορῶν ὅτι ἐγκαλοῖς ἔμοι ἀληθὲς ἀδίκημα· ὅπως δὲ σὺ τινα πείθοις ἂν **5**
 καὶ σμικρὸν νοῦν ἔχοντα ἀνθρώπων, ὥς οὐ τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἔστιν καὶ δαιμό-
 νια καὶ θεῖα ἡγεῖσθαι, καὶ αὐ τοῦ αὐτοῦ μήτε δαίμονας μήτε θεοὺς μήτε **28**
 ἥρωας, οὐδεμία μηχανὴ ἔστιν.

ἀλλὰ γάρ, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ὥς μὲν ἐγὼ οὐκ ἀδικῶ κατὰ τὴν
 Μελήτρου γραφὴν, οὐ πολλῆς μοι δοκεῖ εἶναι ἀπολογίας, ἀλλὰ ἱκανὰ
 καὶ ταῦτα· ὁ δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν ἔλεγον, ὅτι πολλὴ μοι ἀπέχθεια **5**
 γέγονεν καὶ πρὸς πολλοὺς, εὐ ἴστε ὅτι ἀληθὲς ἔστιν. καὶ τοῦτ' ἔστιν ὁ
 ἐμὲ αἰρήσει, ἐάνπερ αἰρήῃ, οὐ Μέλητος οὐδὲ Ἄνυτος ἀλλ' ἡ τῶν πολλῶν
 διαβολὴ τε καὶ φθόνος. ἃ δὴ πολλοὺς καὶ ἄλλους καὶ ἀγαθοὺς ἄνδρας **b**
 ἥρισκεν, οἶμαι δὲ καὶ αἰρήσειν· οὐδὲν δὲ δεινὸν μὴ ἐν ἐμοὶ στήι.

ἴσως ἂν οὖν εἴποι τις· “εἴτ' οὐκ αἰσχύνη, ὦ Σώκρατες, τοιοῦτον
 ἐπιτήδευμα ἐπιτηδεύσας ἐξ οὗ κινδυνεύεις νυνὶ ἀποθανεῖν;” ἐγὼ δὲ
 τούτῳ ἂν δίκαιον λόγον ἀντίποιμι, ὅτι “οὐ καλῶς λέγεις, ὦ ἄνθρ- **5**
 ῶπε, εἰ οἷε δεῖν κίνδυνον ὑπολογίζεσθαι τοῦ ζῆν ἢ τεθνάναι ἄνδρα
 οὗτο τι καὶ σμικρὸν ὀφελὸς ἔστιν, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐκεῖνο μόνον σκοπεῖν ὅταν
 πράττηι, πότερον δίκαια ἢ ἀδίκῃ πράττει, καὶ ἀνδρὸς ἀγαθοῦ ἔργα
 ἢ κακοῦ. φαῦλοι γὰρ ἂν τῷ γε σῶι λόγῳ εἶεν τῶν ἡμιθέων ὅσοι ἐν **c**
 Τροίᾳ τετελευτήκασιν οἱ τε ἄλλοι καὶ ὁ τῆς Θέτιδος υἱός, ὃς τοσοῦ-
 τον τοῦ κινδύνου κατεφρόνησεν παρὰ τὸ αἰσχρὸν τι ὑπομεῖναι ὥστε,
 ἐπειδὴ εἶπεν ἡ μήτηρ αὐτῷ προθυμουμένῳ “Ἐκτορα ἀποκτείνει, θεὸς
 οὐσα, οὕτωσί πως, ὥς ἐγὼ οἶμαι· ὦ παῖ, εἰ τιμωρήσεις Πατρόκλῳ τῷ **5**
 ἐταίρῳ τὸν φόνον καὶ “Ἐκτορα ἀποκτενεῖς, αὐτὸς ἀποθανῇ. αὐτίκα
 γάρ τοι,” φησί, “μεθ' Ἐκτορα πότμος ἐτοῖμος,” ὁ δὲ τοῦτ' ἀκούσας τοῦ
 μὲν θανάτου καὶ τοῦ κινδύνου ὠλιγώρησε, πολὺ δὲ μᾶλλον δέσας τὸ **d**
 ζῆν κακὸς ὦν καὶ τοῖς φίλοις μὴ τιμωρεῖν, ‘αὐτίκα,’ φησί, ‘τεθναίνην,
 δίκην ἐπιθεις τῷ ἀδικοῦντι, ἵνα μὴ ἐνθάδε μένω καταγέλαστος παρὰ
 νηυσὶ κορωνίσιν ἄχθος ἀρούρης.’ μὴ αὐτὸν οἷε φροντίσαι θανάτου καὶ
 κινδύνου;” **5**

οὕτω γὰρ ἔχει, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τῇ ἀληθείᾳ· οὐ ἂν τις ἐαυτὸν
 τάξῃ ἡγησάμενος βέλτιστον εἶναι ἢ ὑπ' ἄρχοντος ταχθῇ, ἐνταῦθα
 δεῖ, ὥς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, μένοντα κινδυνεύειν, μηδὲν ὑπολογιζόμενον μήτε
 θάνατον μήτε ἄλλο μηδὲν πρὸ τοῦ αἰσχροῦ. ἐγὼ οὖν δεινὰ ἂν εἶην

- e εἰργασμένοι, ὧ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, εἰ ὅτε μὲν με οἱ ἄρχοντες ἔταπτον, οὓς ὑμεῖς εἴλεσθε ἄρχειν μου, καὶ ἐν Ποτειδαίᾳ καὶ ἐν Ἀμφιπόλει καὶ ἐπὶ Δηλῷ, τότε μὲν οὐ ἔκείνοι ἔταπτον ἔμμενον ὥσπερ καὶ ἄλλος τις καὶ ἐκινδύνεον ἀποθανεῖν, τοῦ δὲ θεοῦ τάπτοντος, ὥς ἐγὼ ωῆθην τε καὶ
- 5 ὑπέλαβον, φιλοσοφοῦντά με δεῖν ζῆν καὶ ἐξετάζοντα ἑμαυτὸν καὶ τοὺς
- 29 ἄλλους, ἐνταῦθα δὲ φοβηθεὶς ἢ θάνατον ἢ ἄλλ' ὅτιοῦν πρᾶγμα λίποιμι τὴν τάξιν. δεινὸν τᾶν εἶη, καὶ ὥς ἀληθῶς τὸτ' ἂν με δικαίως εἰσάγοι τις εἰς δικαστήριον, ὅτι οὐ νομίζω θεοὺς εἶναι ἀπειθῶν τῇ μαντείᾳ καὶ δεδιδῶς θάνατον καὶ οἰόμενος σοφὸς εἶναι οὐκ ὦν. τὸ γὰρ τοι θάνατον
- 5 δεδιέναι, ὧ ἄνδρες, οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἐστὶν ἢ δοκεῖν σοφὸν εἶναι μὴ ὄντα· δοκεῖν γὰρ εἰδέναι ἐστὶν ἃ οὐκ οἶδεν. οἶδε μὲν γὰρ οὐδεὶς τὸν θάνατον οὐδ' εἰ τυγχάνει τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ πάντων μέγιστον ὃν τῶν ἀγαθῶν, δεδίασι δ'
- b ὥς εὖ εἰδότες ὅτι μέγιστον τῶν κακῶν ἐστί. καὶ τοῦτο πῶς οὐκ ἀμαθία ἐστὶν αὕτη ἢ ἐπονείδιστος, ἢ τοῦ οἴεσθαι εἰδέναι ἃ οὐκ οἶδεν; ἐγὼ δ', ὧ ἄνδρες, τούτῳ καὶ ἐνταῦθα ἴσως διαφέρω τῶν πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων, καὶ εἰ δὴ τῷ σοφώτερός του φαίην εἶναι, τούτῳ ἂν, ὅτι οὐκ εἰδῶς
- 5 ἱκανὸς περὶ τῶν ἐν Ἄιδου οὕτω καὶ οἶμαι οὐκ εἰδέναι· τὸ δὲ ἀδικεῖν καὶ ἀπειθεῖν τῷ βελτίονι καὶ θεῷ καὶ ἀνθρώπῳ, ὅτι κακὸν καὶ αἰσχρὸν ἐστὶν οἶδα. πρὸ οὖν τῶν κακῶν ὦν οἶδα ὅτι κακὰ ἐστίν, ἃ μὴ οἶδα εἰ καὶ
- c ἀγαθὰ ὄντα τυγχάνει οὐδέποτε φοβήσομαι οὐδὲ φεύξομαι· ὥστε οὐδ' εἰ με νῦν ὑμεῖς ἀφίετε Ἀνύτῳ ἀπιστήσαντες, ὃς ἔφη ἢ τὴν ἀρχὴν οὐ δεῖν ἐμὲ δεῦρο εἰσελθεῖν ἢ, ἐπειδὴ εἰσηλθὼν, οὐχ οἶόν τ' εἶναι τὸ μὴ ἀποκτεῖναι με, λέγων πρὸς ὑμᾶς ὥς, εἰ διαφευξοίμην, ἤδη ἂν ὑμῶν οἱ υἱεῖς ἐπιτηδεύοντες
- 5 ἃ Σωκράτης διδάσκει πάντες παντάπασι διαφθαρήσονται,—εἰ μοι πρὸς ταῦτα εἴποιτε· “ὦ Σώκρατες, νῦν μὲν Ἀνύτῳ οὐ πεισόμεθα ἀλλ' ἀφίεμέν σε, ἐπὶ τούτῳ μέντοι, ἐφ' ὧτε μηκέτι ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ ζητήσῃ διατρίβειν
- d μὴδὲ φιλοσοφεῖν· ἔαν δὲ ἄλῳις ἔτι τοῦτο πράττων, ἀποθανῇ!”—εἰ οὖν με, ὅπερ εἶπον, ἐπὶ τούτοις ἀφίετε, εἴποιμι' ἂν ὑμῖν ὅτι “ἐγὼ ὑμᾶς, ὧ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ἀσπάζομαι μὲν καὶ φιλῶ, πείσομαι δὲ μᾶλλον τῷ θεῷ ἢ ὑμῖν, καὶ ἕωστερ ἂν ἐμπνέω καὶ οἶός τε ὦ, οὐ μὴ παύσωμαι φιλοσοφῶν
- 5 καὶ ὑμῖν παρακελευόμενός τε καὶ ἐνδεικνύμενος ὅτῳ ἂν αἰεὶ ἐντυγχάνω ὑμῶν, λέγων οἰάπερ εἶωθα, ὅτι ‘ὦ ἄριστε ἀνδρῶν, Ἀθηναῖος ὦν, πόλεως τῆς μεγίστης καὶ εὐδοκιμωτάτης εἰς σοφίαν καὶ ἰσχύν, χρημάτων μὲν
- e οὐκ αἰσχύνῃ ἐπιμελούμενος ὅπως σοι ἔσται ὥς πλεῖστα, καὶ δόξης καὶ τιμῆς, φρονήσεως δὲ καὶ ἀληθείας καὶ τῆς ψυχῆς ὅπως ὥς βελτίστη ἔσται οὐκ ἐπιμελῇ οὐδὲ φροντίζεις;’ καὶ ἔαν τις ὑμῶν ἀμφοισβητῇ καὶ φῇ ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, οὐκ εὐθύς ἀφήσω αὐτὸν οὐδ' ἄπειμι, ἀλλ' ἐρήσομαι

αὐτὸν καὶ ἐξετάσω καὶ ἐλέγξω, καὶ ἐάν μοι μὴ δοκῇ κεκτηῖσθαι ἀρετὴν, **30**
 φάναι δέ, ὄνειδιῶ ὅτι τὰ πλείστου ὄξια περὶ ἐλαχίστου ποιεῖται, τὰ δὲ
 φαυλότερα περὶ πλείονος. ταῦτα καὶ νεωτέρωι καὶ πρεσβυτέρωι ὅτωι
 ἂν ἐντυγχάνω ποιήσω, καὶ ξένωι καὶ ἀστώι, μᾶλλον δὲ τοῖς ἀστοῖς,
 ὅσωι μου ἐγγυτέρω ἐστὲ γένει. ταῦτα γὰρ κελεύει ὁ θεός, εὖ ἴστε, καὶ ἐγὼ **5**
 οἶμαι οὐδὲν πω ὑμῖν μείζον ἀγαθὸν γενέσθαι ἐν τῇ πόλει ἢ τὴν ἐμὴν τῶι
 θεῶι ὑπηρεσίαν. οὐδὲν γὰρ ἄλλο πράττων ἐγὼ περιέρχομαι ἢ πείθων
 ὑμῶν καὶ νεωτέρους καὶ πρεσβυτέρους μήτε σωμάτων ἐπιμελεῖσθαι μήτε **b**
 χρημάτων πρότερον μηδὲ οὕτω σφόδρα ὥς τῆς ψυχῆς ὅπως ὥς ἀρίστη
 ἔσται, λέγων ὅτι 'οὐκ ἐκ χρημάτων ἀρετὴ γίγνεται, ἀλλ' ἐξ ἀρετῆς
 χρήματα καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ἀγαθὰ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἅπαντα καὶ ἰδία καὶ
 δημοσία.' εἰ μὲν οὖν ταῦτα λέγων διαφθείρω τοὺς νέους, ταῦτ' ἂν εἴη **5**
 βλαβερὰ· εἰ δὲ τίς μὲ φησιν ἄλλα λέγειν ἢ ταῦτα, οὐδὲν λέγει. πρὸς
 ταῦτα," φαίνει ἂν, "ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ἢ πείθεσθε Ἀνύτωι ἢ μή, καὶ ἢ
 ἀφίετέ με ἢ μή, ὥς ἐμοῦ οὐκ ἂν ποιήσοντος ἄλλα, οὐδ' εἰ μέλλω πολλὰκίς **c**
 τεθνάναι."

μὴ θορυβεῖτε, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ἀλλ' ἐμμείνατέ μοι οἷς ἐδεήθην
 ὑμῶν, μὴ θορυβεῖν ἐφ' οἷς ἂν λέγω ἀλλ' ἀκούειν· καὶ γὰρ, ὥς ἐγὼ **5**
 οἶμαι, ὀνήσεσθε ἀκούοντες. μέλλω γὰρ οὖν ἅττα ὑμῖν ἐρεῖν καὶ ἄλλα **5**
 ἐφ' οἷς ἴσως βοήσεσθε· ἀλλὰ μηδαμῶς ποιεῖτε τοῦτο. εὖ γὰρ ἴστε, ἐάν
 με ἀποκτείνητε τοιοῦτον ὄντα οἷον ἐγὼ λέγω, οὐκ ἐμὲ μείζω βλάψετε
 ἢ ὑμᾶς αὐτούς· ἐμὲ μὲν γὰρ οὐδὲν ἂν βλάψειεν οὔτε Μέλητος οὔτε
 Ἄνυτος—οὐδὲ γὰρ ἂν δύναιτο—οὐ γὰρ οἶμαι θεμιτὸν εἶναι ἀμείνονι **d**
 ἀνδρὶ ὑπὸ χείρονος βλάπτεσθαι. ἀποκτείνειε μεντὰν ἴσως ἢ ἐξελάσειεν
 ἢ ἀτιμώσειεν· ἀλλὰ ταῦτα οὗτος μὲν ἴσως οἶεται καὶ ἄλλος τίς που
 μέγала κακά, ἐγὼ δ' οὐκ οἶμαι, ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον ποιεῖν ἢ οὐτοσί
 νῦν ποιεῖ, ἄνδρα ἀδίκως ἐπιχειρεῖν ἀποκτείνυναι. νῦν οὖν, ὦ ἄνδρες **5**
 Ἀθηναῖοι, πολλοῦ δέω ἐγὼ ὑπὲρ ἐμαυτοῦ ἀπολογεῖσθαι, ὥς τις ἂν
 οἶοιτο, ἀλλὰ ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν, μὴ τι ἐξαμάρτητε περὶ τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ δόσιν **e**
 ὑμῖν ἐμοῦ κατασφαισάμενοι. ἐάν γὰρ με ἀποκτείνητε, οὐ ραιδίως ἄλλον
 τοιοῦτον εὐρήσετε, ἀτεχνῶς, εἰ καὶ γελοιότερον εἰπεῖν, προσκείμενον
 τῇ πόλει ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ ὥσπερ ἵππῳ μεγάλῳ μὲν καὶ γενναίῳ, ὑπὸ
 μεγέθους δὲ νωθεστέρῳ καὶ δεομένῳ ἐγείρεσθαι ὑπὸ μύωπός τινος· **5**
 οἷον δὴ μοι δοκεῖ ὁ θεὸς ἐμὲ τῇ πόλει προστεθηκέναι—τοιοῦτόν τινα ὃς
 ὑμᾶς ἐγείρων καὶ πείθων καὶ ὀνειδίζων ἕνα ἕκαστον οὐδὲν παύομαι τὴν **31**
 ἡμέραν ὅλην πανταχοῦ προσκαθίζων. τοιοῦτος οὖν ἄλλος οὐ ραιδίως
 ὑμῖν γενήσεται, ὦ ἄνδρες, ἀλλ' ἐάν ἐμοὶ πείθησθε, φείσεσθέ μου· ὑμεῖς δ'
 ἴσως τάχ' ἂν ἀχθόμενοι, ὥσπερ οἱ νυστάζοντες ἐγειρόμενοι, κρούσαντες

- 5 ἂν με, πειθόμενοι Ἀνύτῳ, ραϊδίως ἂν ἀποκτείναιτε, εἴτα τὸν λοιπὸν βίον καθεύδοντες διατελοῖτε ἂν, εἰ μὴ τίνα ἄλλον ὁ θεὸς ὑμῖν ἐπιτέμψειεν κηδόμενος ὑμῶν. ὅτι δ' ἐγὼ τυγχάνω ὦν τοιοῦτος οἷος ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ
- b** τῇ πόλει δεδόσθαι, ἐνθὲνδε ἂν κατανοήσαιτε· οὐ γὰρ ἀνθρωπίνῳ ὅμοιόν τὸ ἐμὲ τῶν μὲν ἑμαυτοῦ ἀπάντων ἡμεληκέναι καὶ ἀνέχεσθαι τῶν οἰκείων ἀμελουμένων τοσαῦτα ἤδη ἔτη, τὸ δὲ ὑμέτερον πράττειν αἰεὶ, ἰδίαι ἐκάστωι προσιόντα ὥσπερ πατέρα ἢ ἀδελφὸν πρεσβύτερον πείθοντα
- 5 ἐπιμελεῖσθαι ἀρετῆς. καὶ εἰ μὲν τι ἀπὸ τούτων ἀπέλαυνον καὶ μισθὸν λαμβάνων ταῦτα παρεκελεύομην, εἶχον ἂν τίνα λόγον· νῦν δὲ ὁρᾶτε δὴ καὶ αὐτοὶ ὅτι οἱ κατήγοροι τᾶλλα πάντα ἀναισχύντως οὕτω κατηγοροῦντες τοῦτό γε οὐχ οἷοί τε ἐγένοντο ἀπαναισχυντῆσαι παρασχόμενοι μάρτυρα, ὥς ἐγὼ ποτέ τίνα ἢ ἐπραξάμην μισθὸν ἢ ἡτιῆσα. ἱκανὸν γάρ, οἶμαι, ἐγὼ παρέχομαι τὸν μάρτυρα ὥς ἀληθῆ λέγω, τὴν πενίαν.
- ἴσως ἂν οὖν δόξειεν ἄτοπον εἶναι, ὅτι δὴ ἐγὼ ἰδίαι μὲν ταῦτα
- 5 συμβουλεύω περιιὼν καὶ πολυπραγμονῶ, δημοσίαι δὲ οὐ τολμῶ ἀναβαίνων εἰς τὸ πλῆθος τὸ ὑμέτερον συμβουλεύειν τῇ πόλει. τούτου δὲ αἰτίον ἐστίν ὁ ὑμεῖς ἐμοῦ πολλάκις ἀκηκόατε πολλαχοῦ λέγοντος,
- d** ὅτι μοι θεῖόν τι καὶ δαιμόνιον γίγνεται, ὃ δὴ καὶ ἐν τῇ γραφῇ ἐπικωμωιδῶν Μέλητος ἐγράψατο. ἐμοὶ δὲ τοῦτ' ἐστίν ἐκ παιδὸς ἀρξάμενον, φωνὴ τις γιγνομένη, ἣ ὅταν γένηται, αἰεὶ ἀποτρέπει με τούτου ὃ ἂν μέλλω πράττειν, προτρέπει δὲ οὐποτε. τοῦτ' ἐστίν ὃ μοι ἐναντιοῦται
- 5 τὰ πολιτικά πράττειν, καὶ παγκάλως γέ μοι δοκεῖ ἐναντιοῦσθαι· εὐ γάρ ἴστε, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, εἰ ἐγὼ πάλαί ἐπεχείρησα πράττειν τὰ
- e** πολιτικά πράγματα, πάλαί ἂν ἀπολώλη καὶ οὐτ' ἂν ὑμᾶς ὠφελήκη οὐδὲν οὐτ' ἂν ἑμαυτόν. καὶ μοι μὴ ἄχθεσθε λέγοντι τάλῃθι· οὐ γάρ ἐστιν ὅστις ἀνθρώπων σωθήσεται οὔτε ὑμῖν οὔτε ἄλλῳ πλῆθει οὐδενὶ γνησίως ἐναντιούμενος καὶ διακωλύων πολλὰ ἄδικα καὶ παράνομα ἐν
- 32** τῇ πόλει γίγνεσθαι, ἀλλ' ἀναγκαῖόν ἐστι τὸν τῷ ὄντι μαχοῦμενον ὑπὲρ τοῦ δικαίου, καὶ εἰ μέλλει ὀλίγον χρόνον σωθήσεσθαι, ἰδιωτεύειν ἀλλὰ μὴ δημοσιεύειν. μεγάλη δ' ἐγωγε ὑμῖν τεκμήρια παρέξομαι τούτων, οὐ λόγους ἀλλ' ὃ ὑμεῖς τιμᾶτε, ἔργα. ἀκούσατε δὴ μου τὰ ἐμοὶ συμ-
- 5 βεβηκότα, ἵνα εἰδῇτε ὅτι οὐδ' ἂν ἐνὶ ὑπείκῃθιμι παρὰ τὸ δίκαιον δέσας θάνατον, μὴ ὑπέικων δὲ ἅμα κἄν ἀπολοίμην. ἐρῶ δὲ ὑμῖν φορτικά μὲν καὶ δικανικά, ἀληθῆ δέ. ἐγὼ γάρ, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ἄλλην μὲν ἀρχὴν
- b** οὐδεμίαν πῶποτε ἤρξα ἐν τῇ πόλει, ἐβούλευσα δέ· καὶ ἔτυχεν ἡμῶν

31b5 μὲν τι c: μέντοι τι D, μέντοι i 31b6 εἶχον d: εἶχεν d, i 31d1 γίγνεται c: γίνετα φωνή D 32a6 ἅμα κἄν c: ἅμα καὶ ἅμα ἂν d, ἅμα καὶ ἅμ' ἂν d, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἅμ' ἂν d, ἅμα καὶ d, ἅμ' ἂν καὶ i

ἡ φυλὴ Ἀντιοχίς πρυτανεύουσα ὅτε ὑμεῖς τοὺς δέκα στρατηγούς τοὺς
 οὐκ ἀνελομένους τοὺς ἐκ τῆς ναυμαχίας ἐβουλεύσασθε ἀθρόους κρίνειν,
 παρὰ νόμους, ὥς ἐν τῷ ὑστέρω χρόνῳ πᾶσιν ὑμῖν ἔδοξεν. τότε ἐγὼ
 μόνος τῶν πρυτάνεων ἠγαντιώθην ὑμῖν μηδὲν ποιεῖν παρὰ τοὺς νόμους 5
 καὶ ἐναντία ἐψηφισάμην· καὶ ἐτοίμων ὄντων ἐνδείκνυναι με καὶ ἀπάγειν
 τῶν ῥητόρων, καὶ ὑμῶν κελευόντων καὶ βοώντων, μετὰ τοῦ νόμου καὶ c
 τοῦ δικαίου ὦμιον μᾶλλον με δεῖν διακινδυνεύειν ἢ μεθ' ὑμῶν γενέσθαι
 μὴ δίκαια βουλευομένων, φοβηθέντα δεσμὸν ἢ θάνατον. καὶ ταῦτα μὲν
 ἦν ἔτι δημοκρατουμένης τῆς πόλεως· ἐπειδὴ δὲ ὀλιγαρχία ἐγένετο, οἱ
 τριάκοντα αὐτὸ μεταπεμφάμενοί με πέμπτον αὐτὸν εἰς τὴν θόλον προσ- 5
 ἔταξαν ἀγαγεῖν ἐκ Σαλαμῖνος Λέοντα τὸν Σαλαμῖνιον ἵνα ἀποθάνῃ,
 οἷα δὴ καὶ ἄλλοις ἐκείνοι πολλοῖς πολλὰ προσέταττον, βουλόμενοι ὥς
 πλείστους ἀναπληῆσαι αἰτίων. τότε μέντοι ἐγὼ οὐ λόγῳ ἀλλ' ἔργῳ αὐτῷ d
 ἐνεδειξάμην ὅτι ἐμοὶ θανάτου μὲν μέλει, εἰ μὴ ἀγροικότερον ἦν εἰπεῖν,
 οὐδ' ὅτι οὖν, τοῦ δὲ μηδὲν ἄδικον μηδ' ἀνόσιον ἐργάζεσθαι, τούτου δὲ τὸ
 πᾶν μέλει. ἐμὲ γὰρ ἐκείνη ἡ ἀρχὴ οὐκ ἐξέπληξεν, οὕτως ἰσχυρὰ οὖσα,
 ὥστε ἄδικόν τι ἐργάσασθαι, ἀλλ' ἐπειδὴ ἐκ τῆς θόλου ἐξήλθομεν, οἱ μὲν 5
 τέτταρες ὥιχοντο εἰς Σαλαμῖνα καὶ ἤγαγον Λέοντα, ἐγὼ δὲ ὥιχόμην ἀπίων
 οἴκαδε. καὶ ἴσως ἂν διὰ ταῦτα ἀπέθανον, εἰ μὴ ἡ ἀρχὴ διὰ ταχέων
 κατελύθη. καὶ τούτων ὑμῖν ἔσονται πολλοὶ μάρτυρες. e

ἄρ' οὖν ἂν με οἴεσθε τοσάδε ἔτη διαγενέσθαι εἰ ἔπραττον τὰ δημόσια,
 καὶ πράττων ἀξίως ἀνδρὸς ἀγαθοῦ ἐβοήθουν τοῖς δικαίοις καὶ ὥσπερ
 χρὴ τοῦτο περὶ πλείστου ἐποιοῦμην; πολλοῦ γε δεῖ, ὧς ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι·
 οὐδὲ γὰρ ἂν ἄλλος ἀνθρώπων οὐδεὶς. ἀλλ' ἐγὼ διὰ παντός τοῦ βίου 33
 δημοσίαι τε εἴ ποῦ τι ἔπραξα τοιοῦτος φανοῦμαι, καὶ ἰδίαι ὁ αὐτὸς
 οὗτος, οὐδενὶ πώποτε συγχωρήσας οὐδὲν παρὰ τὸ δίκαιον οὔτε ἄλλῳ
 οὔτε τούτων οὐδενὶ οὕς δὴ διαβάλλοντες ἐμέ φασιν ἐμούς μαθητὰς
 εἶναι. ἐγὼ δὲ διδάσκαλος μὲν οὐδενὸς πώποτ' ἐγενόμην· εἰ δὲ τίς μου 5
 λέγοντος καὶ τὰ ἑαυτοῦ πράττοντος ἐπιθυμεῖ ἀκοῦειν, εἴτε νεώτερος
 εἴτε πρεσβύτερος, οὐδενὶ πώποτε ἐφθόνησα, οὐδὲ χρήματα μὲν λαμ-
 βάνων διαλέγομαι μὴ λαμβάνων δὲ οὐ, ἀλλ' ὁμοίως καὶ πλουσίῳ καὶ b
 πέννιῳ παρέχω ἑαυτὸν ἔρωτᾶν, καὶ ἐάν τις βούληται ἀποκρινόμενος
 ἀκοῦειν ὧν ἂν λέγω. καὶ τούτων ἐγὼ εἴτε τις χρηστὸς γίγνεται εἴτε μὴ,
 οὐκ ἂν δικαίως τὴν αἰτίαν ὑπέχοιμι, ὧν μήτε ὑπεσχόμην μηδενὶ μηδὲν
 πώποτε μάθημα μήτε ἐδίδαξα· εἰ δὲ τίς φησὶ παρ' ἐμοῦ πώποτ' εἰ τι μαθεῖν 5
 ἢ ἀκοῦσαι ἰδίαι ὅτι μὴ καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι πάντες, εὐ ἴστε ὅτι οὐκ ἀληθῆ λέγει.

ἀλλὰ διὰ τί δὴ ποτε μετ' ἐμοῦ χαίρουσί τινες πολὺν χρόνον δια- c
 τρίβοντες; ἀκηκόατε, ὧς ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι· πᾶσαν ὑμῖν τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἐγὼ

32b3 ἐβουλεύσασθε d, i: ἐβούλεσθε d 33a6 ἐπιθυμεῖ d: ἐπιθυμοῖ d, ἐπεθύμει c

εἶπον· ὅτι ἀκούοντες χαίρουσιν ἐξεταζομένοις τοῖς οἰομένοις μὲν εἶναι σοφοῖς, οὗσι δ' οὐ. ἔστι γὰρ οὐκ ἀηδές. ἐμοὶ δὲ τοῦτο, ὡς ἐγὼ φημι, 5 προστέτακται ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ πράττειν καὶ ἐκμαντεῖν καὶ ἐξ ἐνυπνίων καὶ παντὶ τρόπῳ ὥσπερ τις ποτε καὶ ἄλλη θεία μοῖρα ἀνθρώπῳ καὶ ὁτιοῦν προσέταξε πράττειν. ταῦτα, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, καὶ ἀληθὴς d ἔστιν καὶ εὐλέγκτα. εἰ γὰρ δὴ ἔγωγε τῶν νέων τούς μὲν διαφθεῖρω τοὺς δὲ διέφθαρκα, χρῆν δῆπου, εἴτε τινὲς αὐτῶν πρεσβύτεροι γενόμενοι ἔγνωσαν ὅτι νέοις οὖσιν αὐτοῖς ἐγὼ κακὸν πῶποτε τι συνεβούλευσα, νυνὶ αὐτοὺς ἀναβαίνοντας ἐμοῦ κατηγορεῖν καὶ τιμωρεῖσθαι· εἰ δὲ μὴ 5 αὐτοὶ ἤθελον, τῶν οἰκείων τινὰς τῶν ἐκείνων, πατέρας καὶ ἀδελφούς καὶ ἄλλους τοὺς προσήκοντας, εἴπερ ὑπ' ἐμοῦ τι κακὸν ἐπεπόνθεσαν αὐτῶν οἱ οἰκεῖοι, νῦν μεμνήσθαι καὶ τιμωρεῖσθαι. πάντως δὲ πάρεσιν αὐτῶν πολλοὶ ἐνταυθοῖ οὓς ἐγὼ ὀρῶ, πρῶτον μὲν Κρίτων οὗτος, ἐμὸς e ἡλικιώτης καὶ δημότης, Κριτοβούλου τοῦδε πατήρ, ἔπειτα Λυσανίας ὁ Σφήττις, Αἰσχίνου τοῦδε πατήρ, ἔτι δ' Ἀντιφῶν ὁ Κηφισιεύς οὗτος, Ἐπιγένους πατήρ, ἄλλοι τοίνυν οὗτοι ὧν οἱ ἀδελφοὶ ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ διατριβῇ γεγόνασιν, Νικόστρατος Θεοζοτίδου, ἀδελφὸς Θεοδότου—καὶ ὁ 5 μὲν Θεόδοτος τετελεύτηκεν, ὥστε οὐκ ἂν ἐκεῖνός γε αὐτοῦ καταδεηθῇ— 34 καὶ Παράλιος ὅδε, ὁ Δημοδόκου, οὗ ἦν Θεάγης ἀδελφός· ὅδε δὲ Ἀδείμαντος, ὁ Ἀρίστωνος, οὗ ἀδελφός οὗτος Πλάτων, καὶ Αἰαντόδωρος, οὗ Ἀπολλόδωρος ὅδε ἀδελφός. καὶ ἄλλους πολλοὺς ἐγὼ ἔχω ὑμῖν εἰπεῖν, ὧν τινὰ ἐχρῆν μάλιστα μὲν ἐν τῷ ἑαυτοῦ λόγῳ παρασχέσθαι Μέλητον 5 μάρτυρα· εἰ δὲ τότε ἐπελάθετο, νῦν παρασχέσθω—ἐγὼ παραχωρῶ— καὶ λεγέτω εἴ τι ἔχει τοιοῦτον. ἀλλὰ τούτου πᾶν τὸυναντίον εὐρήσετε, ὦ ἄνδρες, πάντας ἐμοὶ βοηθεῖν ἐτοιμούς τῷ διαφθεῖροντι, τῷ κακὰ ἐργα- b ζομένῳ τοὺς οἰκείους αὐτῶν, ὡς φασὶ Μέλητος καὶ Ἄνυτος. αὐτοὶ μὲν γὰρ οἱ διεφθαρμένοι τάχ' ἂν λόγον ἔχοιεν βοηθοῦντες· οἱ δὲ ἀδιάφθαρτοι, πρεσβύτεροι ἤδη ἄνδρες, οἱ τούτων προσήκοντες, τίνα ἄλλον ἔχουσι λόγον βοηθοῦντες ἐμοὶ ἄλλ' ἢ τὸν ὀρθόν τε καὶ δίκαιον, ὅτι συνίσασι 5 Μελήτῳ μὲν ψευδομένῳ, ἐμοὶ δὲ ἀληθεύοντι.

εἶεν δὴ, ὦ ἄνδρες· ἃ μὲν ἐγὼ ἔχοιμ' ἂν ἀπολογεῖσθαι, σχεδὸν ἔστι c ταῦτα καὶ ἄλλα ἴσως τοιαῦτα. τάχα δ' ἂν τις ὑμῶν ἀγανακτήσειεν ἀναμνησθεὶς ἑαυτοῦ, εἰ ὁ μὲν καὶ ἐλάττω τουτοῦ τοῦ ἀγῶνος ἀγῶνα ἀγωνιζόμενος ἐδεήθη τε καὶ ἰκέτευσε τοὺς δικαστὰς μετὰ πολλῶν δακρύων, παιδία τε αὐτοῦ ἀναβιβασάμενος ἵνα ὅτι μάλιστα ἐλεηθῇ, 5 καὶ ἄλλους τῶν οἰκείων καὶ φίλων πολλούς, ἐγὼ δὲ οὐδὲν ἄρα τούτων ποιήσω, καὶ ταῦτα κινδυνεύων, ὡς ἂν δόξαιμι, τὸν ἔσχατον κίνδυνον. τάχ' ἂν οὖν τις ταῦτα ἐννοήσας αὐθαδέστερον ἂν πρὸς με σχοίῃ καὶ

ὀργισθεὶς αὐτοῖς τούτοις θεῖτο ἄν μετ' ὀργῆς τὴν ψῆφον. εἰ δὴ τις ὑμῶν d
οὕτως ἔχει (οὐκ ἀξιῶ μὲν γὰρ ἔγωγε, εἰ δ' οὖν) ἐπιεικῆ ἄν μοι δοκῶ
πρὸς τοῦτον λέγειν λέγων ὅτι “ἐμοί, ὦ ἄριστε, εἰσὶν μὲν πού τινες καὶ
οἰκεῖοι” καὶ γὰρ τοῦτο αὐτὸ τὸ τοῦ Ὀμήρου, οὐδ' ἐγὼ ‘ἀπὸ δρυὸς οὐδ’
ἀπὸ πέτρης’ πέφυκα ἀλλ’ ἐξ ἀνθρώπων, ὥστε καὶ οἰκεῖοί μοι εἰσι καὶ 5
ὑεῖς γε, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τρεῖς, εἰς μὲν μεираκιον ἤδη, δύο δὲ παιδία
ἀλλ’ ὅμως οὐδένα αὐτῶν δεῦρο ἀναβιβασάμενος δεήσομαι ὑμῶν ἀπο-
ψηφίσασθαι.” τί δὴ οὖν οὐδὲν τούτων ποιήσω; οὐκ αὐθαδιζόμενος, ὦ
ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, οὐδ' ὑμᾶς ἀτιμάζων, ἀλλ’ εἰ μὲν θαρραλέως ἐγὼ ἔχω e
πρὸς θάνατον ἢ μὴ, ἄλλος λόγος, πρὸς δ' οὖν δόξαν καὶ ἐμοί καὶ ὑμῖν
καὶ ὅληι τῇ πόλει οὐ μοι δοκεῖ καλὸν εἶναι ἐμὲ τούτων οὐδὲν ποιεῖν
καὶ τηλικόνδε ὄντα καὶ τοῦτο τοῦνομα ἔχοντα—εἴτ' οὖν ἀληθὲς εἴτ' οὖν
ψεῦδος, ἀλλ’ οὖν δεδογμένον γέ ἐστι τὸ Σωκράτη διαφέρειν τῶν πολ- 35
λῶν ἀνθρώπων. εἰ οὖν ὑμῶν οἱ δοκοῦντες διαφέρειν εἴτε σοφία εἴτε
ἀνδρεία εἴτε ἄλληι ἡτινιοῦν ἀρετῇ τοιοῦτοι ἔσονται, αἰσχρὸν ἄν εἴη
οἴουσπερ ἐγὼ πολλάκις ἐώρακά τινες ὅταν κρίνονται, δοκοῦντας μὲν
τι εἶναι, θαυμάσια δὲ ἐργαζομένους, ὥς δεινὸν τι οἰομένους πείσεσθαι εἰ 5
ἀποθανοῦνται, ὥσπερ ἀθανάτων ἐσομένων ἄν ὑμεῖς αὐτοὺς μὴ ἀπο-
κτείνητε· οἱ ἐμοί δοκοῦσιν αἰσχύνῃ τῇ πόλει περιάπτειν, ὥστ' ἄν τινα
καὶ τῶν ξένων ὑπολαβεῖν ὅτι οἱ διαφέροντες Ἀθηναίων εἰς ἀρετὴν, οὓς b
αὐτοὶ αὐτῶν ἔν τε ταῖς ἀρχαῖς καὶ ταῖς ἄλλαις τιμαῖς προκρίνουσιν,
οὗτοι γυναικῶν οὐδὲν διαφέρουσιν. ταῦτα γάρ, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι,
οὔτε ὑμᾶς χρὴ ποιεῖν τοὺς δοκοῦντας καὶ ὀππιοῦν τι εἶναι, οὔτ', ἄν ἡμεῖς
ποιῶμεν, ὑμᾶς ἐπιτρέπειν, ἀλλὰ τοῦτο αὐτὸ ἐνδείκνυσθαι, ὅτι πολὺ 5
μᾶλλον καταψηφιεῖσθε τοῦ τὰ ἐλεῖνὰ ταῦτα δράματα εἰσάγοντος καὶ
καταγέλαστον τὴν πόλιν ποιοῦντος ἢ τοῦ ἡσυχίαν ἄγοντος.

χωρὶς δὲ τῆς δόξης, ὦ ἄνδρες, οὐδὲ δίκαιόν μοι δοκεῖ εἶναι δεῖσθαι τοῦ c
δικαστοῦ οὐδὲ δεόμενον ἀποφεύγειν, ἀλλὰ διδάσκειν καὶ πείθειν. οὐ γὰρ
ἐπὶ τούτῳ κἀθηται ὁ δικαστής, ἐπὶ τῷ καταχαρίζεσθαι τὰ δίκαια, ἀλλ’
ἐπὶ τῷ κρίνειν ταῦτα· καὶ ὁμώμοκεν οὐ χαριεῖσθαι οἷς ἄν δοκῇ αὐτῷ,
ἀλλὰ δικάσειν κατὰ τοὺς νόμους. οὐκ οὖν χρὴ οὔτε ἡμᾶς ἐθίζειν ὑμᾶς 5
ἐπιπορκεῖν οὔθ' ὑμᾶς ἐθίζεσθαι· οὐδέτεροι γάρ ἄν ἡμῶν εὐσεβοῖεν. μὴ οὖν
ἀξιοῦτέ με, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τοιαῦτα δεῖν πρὸς ὑμᾶς πράττειν ἢ
μῆτε ἡγοῦμαι καλὰ εἶναι μῆτε δίκαια μῆτε ὅσια, ἄλλως τε μέντοι νῆ d
Δία πάντως καὶ ἀσεβεῖας φεύγοντα ὑπὸ Μελήτρου τουτουί. σαφῶς γὰρ
ἄν, εἰ πείθοιμι ὑμᾶς καὶ τῷ δεῖσθαι βιαζοίμην ὁμωμοκότας, θεοὺς ἄν

5 διδάσκοιμι μὴ ἡγεῖσθαι ὑμᾶς εἶναι, καὶ ἀτεχνῶς ἀπολογούμενος κατ-
 5 ηγοροῖην ἂν ἑαυτοῦ ὥς θεοὺς οὐ νομίζω. ἀλλὰ πολλοῦ δεῖ οὕτως ἔχειν
 νομίζω τε γάρ, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ὥς οὐδείς τῶν ἐμῶν κατηγορῶν, καὶ
 ὑμῖν ἐπιτρέπω καὶ τῷ θεῷ κρίναι περὶ ἐμοῦ ὅπῃ μέλλει ἐμοὶ τε ἄριστα
 εἶναι καὶ ὑμῖν.

36 τὸ μὲν μὴ ἀγανακτεῖν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ἐπὶ τούτῳ τῷ γεγονότι, ὅτι
 μου κατεψηφίσασθε, ἄλλα τέ μοι πολλὰ συμβάλλεται, καὶ οὐκ
 ἀνέλπιστόν μοι γέγονεν τὸ γεγονός τοῦτο, ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον θαυμάζω
 5 οὕτω παρ' ὀλίγον ἔσσεσθαι ἀλλὰ παρὰ πολὺ· νῦν δέ, ὥς ἔοικεν, εἰ
 τριάκοντα μόναι μετέπεσον τῶν ψήφων, ἀπεπεφευγὴ ἂν. Μέλητον μὲν
 οὖν, ὥς ἐμοὶ δοκῶ, καὶ νῦν ἀποπέφευγα, καὶ οὐ μόνον ἀποπέφευγα,
 ἀλλὰ παντὶ δῆλον τοῦτό γε, ὅτι εἰ μὴ ἀνέβη Ἄνυτος καὶ Λύκων κατ-
 b ηγορήσαντες ἐμοῦ, κἂν ὥφλε χιλίας δραχμάς, οὐ μεταλαβὼν τὸ πέμπτον
 μέρος τῶν ψήφων.

τιμᾶται δ' οὖν μοι ὁ ἀνὴρ θανάτου. εἴεν· ἐγὼ δὲ δὴ τίνος ὑμῖν ἀντιτιμή-
 σομαι, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι; ἢ δῆλον ὅτι τῆς ἀξίας; τί οὖν; τί ἀξίός
 5 εἰμι παθεῖν ἢ ἀποτεῖσαι, ὅτι μαθὼν ἐν τῷ βίῳ οὐχ ἡσυχίαν ἦγον,
 ἀλλ' ἀμελήσας ὧν περ οἱ πολλοί, χρηματισμοῦ τε καὶ οἰκονομίας καὶ
 στρατηγιῶν καὶ δημηγοριῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀρχῶν καὶ συνωμοσιῶν
 c καὶ στάσεων τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει γιγνομένων, ἡγησάμενος ἑμαυτὸν τῷ
 ὄντι ἐπιεικέστερον εἶναι ἢ ὥστε εἰς ταῦτ' ἰόντα σώιζεσθαι, ἐνταῦθα μὲν
 οὐκ ἦיא οἱ ἐλθὼν μήτε ὑμῖν μήτε ἑμαυτῷ ἔμελλον μὴδὲν ὄφελος εἶναι,
 5 ἐπὶ δὲ τὸ ἰδίαι ἕκαστον ἰὼν εὐεργετεῖν τὴν μεγίστην εὐεργεσίαν, ὥς ἐγὼ
 φημι, ἐνταῦθα ἦיא, ἐπιχειρῶν ἕκαστον ὑμῶν πείθειν μὴ πρότερον μήτε
 τῶν ἑαυτοῦ μὴδενὸς ἐπιμελεῖσθαι πρὶν ἑαυτοῦ ἐπιμεληθεῖν ὅπως ὥς
 βέλτιστος καὶ φρονιμώτατος ἔσοιτο, μήτε τῶν τῆς πόλεως, πρὶν αὐτῆς
 d τῆς πόλεως, τῶν τε ἄλλων οὕτω κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ἐπιμελεῖσθαι—
 τί οὖν εἰμι ἀξίος παθεῖν τοιοῦτος ὧν; ἀγαθόν τι, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, εἰ δεῖ
 γε κατὰ τὴν ἀξίαν τῇ ἀληθείᾳ τιμᾶσθαι· καὶ ταῦτά γε ἀγαθὸν τοιοῦτον
 ὅτι ἂν πρέποι ἐμοί. τί οὖν πρέπει ἀνδρὶ πένητι εὐεργέτῃ δεομένῳ
 5 ἄγειν σχολὴν ἐπὶ τῇ ὑμετέρᾳ παρακελεύσει; οὐκ ἔσθ' ὅτι μᾶλλον, ὦ
 ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, πρέπει οὕτως ὥς τὸν τοιοῦτον ἄνδρα ἐν πρυτανείῳ
 σιτεῖσθαι, πολὺ γε μᾶλλον ἢ εἴ τις ὑμῶν ἵππῳ ἢ συνωρίδι ἢ ζεύγει
 νενίκηκεν Ὀλυμπίαςιν· ὁ μὲν γὰρ ὑμᾶς ποιεῖ εὐδαίμονας δοκεῖν εἶναι,
 e ἐγὼ δὲ εἶναι, καὶ ὁ μὲν τροφῆς οὐδὲν δεῖται, ἐγὼ δὲ δέομαι. εἰ οὖν δεῖ
 37 με κατὰ τὸ δίκαιον τῆς ἀξίας τιμᾶσθαι, τούτου τιμῶμαι, ἐν πρυτανείῳ
 σιτήσεως.

36d2–3 εἰ δεῖ γε ... τιμᾶσθαι c: εἰ δέ γε ... τιμᾶσθε d, εἰ δὴ γε ... τιμᾶσθε d

ἴσως οὖν ὑμῖν καὶ ταυτὶ λέγων παραπλησίως δοκῶ λέγειν ὥσπερ περὶ τοῦ οἴκτου καὶ τῆς ἀντιβολήσεως, ἀπαυθαδιζόμενος· τὸ δὲ οὐκ ἔστιν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τοιοῦτον ἀλλὰ τοιόνδε μάλλον. πέπεισμαι 5 ἐγὼ ἐκὼν εἶναι μηδὲν ἀδικεῖν ἀνθρώπων, ἀλλὰ ὑμᾶς τοῦτο οὐ πείθω· ὀλίγον γὰρ χρόνον ἀλλήλοις διειλέγμεθα. ἐπεὶ, ὡς ἐγῶμαι, εἴ ἦν ὑμῖν νόμος, ὥσπερ καὶ ἄλλοις ἀνθρώποις, περὶ θανάτου μὴ μίαν ἡμέραν **b** μόνον κρίνειν ἀλλὰ πολλὰς, ἐπείσθητε ἄν· νῦν δ' οὐ ράδιον ἐν χρόνῳ ὀλίγῳ μεγάλας διαβολὰς ἀπολύεσθαι. πεπεισμένοις δὲ ἐγὼ μηδὲν ἀδικεῖν πολλοῦ δέω ἑμαυτὸν γε ἀδικήσῃν καὶ κατ' ἑμαυτοῦ ἐρεῖν αὐτὸς ὡς ἄξιός εἰμι τοῦ κακοῦ καὶ τιμῆσεσθαι τοιούτου τινὸς ἑμαυτῷ. τί 5 δεῖσας; ἢ μὴ πάθω τοῦτο οὗ Μέλητος μοι τιμᾶται, ὃ φημι οὐκ εἰδέναι οὗτ' εἰ ἀγαθὸν οὗτ' εἰ κακόν ἐστιν; ἀντὶ τούτου δὲ ἔλωμαι ὧν εὖ οἶδά τι κακῶν ὄντων τούτου τιμηςάμενος; πότερον δεσμοῦ; καὶ τί με δεῖ ζῆν **c** ἐν δεσμοτηρίῳ, δουλεύοντα τῇ αἰε καθισταμένῃ ἀρχῇ, τοῖς ἑνδεκα; ἀλλὰ χρημάτων καὶ δεδέσθαι ἕως ἂν ἐκτείσω; ἀλλὰ ταυτὸν μοί ἐστιν ὅπερ νυνδὴ ἔλεγον· οὐ γὰρ ἔστι μοι χρήματα ὅποθεν ἐκτείσω. ἀλλὰ δὴ φυγῆς τιμῆσωμαι; ἴσως γὰρ ἂν μοι τούτου τιμῆσαιτε. πολλὴ μεντὰν με 5 φιλοψυχία ἔχοι, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, εἰ οὕτως ἀλόγιστός εἰμι ὥστε μὴ δύνασθαι λογιζέσθαι ὅτι ὑμεῖς μὲν ὄντες πολῖταιί μου οὐχ οἰοί τε ἐγένεσθε ἐνεργεῖν τὰς ἐμὰς διατριβὰς καὶ τοὺς λόγους, ἀλλ' ὑμῖν βαρύτεραι **d** γεγόνασιν καὶ ἐπιφθονώτεραι, ὥστε ζητεῖτε αὐτῶν νυνὶ ἀπαλλαγῆναι· ἄλλοι δὲ ἄρα αὐτὰς οἴσουσι ραιδίως; πολλοῦ γε δεῖ, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι. καλὸς οὖν ἂν μοι ὁ βίος εἴη ἐξελθόντι τηλικῶδε ἀνθρώπῳ ἄλλην ἐξ ἄλλης πόλεως ἀμειβομένῳ καὶ ἐξελαυνομένῳ ζῆν. εὐ γὰρ οἶδ' ὅτι ὅποι 5 ἂν ἔλθω, λέγοντος ἐμοῦ ἀκροάσονται οἱ νέοι ὥσπερ ἐνθάδε· κἂν μὲν τούτους ἀπελαύνω, οὗτοί με αὐτοὶ ἐξελώσι πείθοντες τοὺς πρεσβυτέρους· **e** ἐὰν δὲ μὴ ἀπελαύνω, οἱ τούτων πατέρες τε καὶ οἰκεῖοι δι' αὐτοὺς τούτους.

ἴσως οὖν ἂν τις εἴποι· “σιγῶν δὲ καὶ ἡσυχίαν ἄγων, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐχ οἰός τ' ἔσῃ ἡμῖν ἐξελθὼν ζῆν;” τουτὶ δὲ ἐστὶ πάντων χαλεπώτατον 5 πείσαι τινας ὥμων. ἐάντε γὰρ λέγω ὅτι “τῷ θεῷ ἀπειθεῖν τοῦτ' ἐστὶν καὶ διὰ τοῦτ' ἀδύνατον ἡσυχίαν ἄγειν,” οὐ πείσεσθέ μοι ὡς εἰρωνευομένῳ; **38** ἐάντ' αὖ λέγω ὅτι “καὶ τυγχάνει μέγιστον ἀγαθὸν ὃν ἀνθρώπῳ τοῦτο, ἐκάστης ἡμέρας περὶ ἀρετῆς τοὺς λόγους ποιεῖσθαι καὶ τῶν ἄλλων περὶ ὧν ὑμεῖς ἐμοῦ ἀκούετε διαλεγομένου καὶ ἑμαυτὸν καὶ ἄλλους ἐξετάζοντος, ὃ δὲ ἀνεξέταστος βίος οὐ βιωτὸς ἀνθρώπῳ,” ταῦτα δ' ἔτι ἥττον 5 πείσεσθέ μοι λέγοντι. τὰ δὲ ἔχει μὲν οὕτως, ὡς ἐγὼ φημι, ὦ ἄνδρες, πείθειν δὲ οὐ ράδιον. καὶ ἐγὼ ἅμα οὐκ εἴθισμαι ἑμαυτὸν ἀξιοῦν κακοῦοῦδενός. εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἦν μοι χρήματα, ἐτιμηςάμην ἂν χρημάτων ὅσα **b** ἔμελλον ἐκτείσειν, οὐδὲν γὰρ ἂν ἐβλάβην· νῦν δὲ οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν, εἰ μὴ

ἄρα ὅσον ἂν ἐγὼ δυναίμην ἐκτεῖσαι, τοσούτου βούλεσθέ μοι τιμῆσαι.

5 ἴσως δ' ἂν δυναίμην ἐκτεῖσαι ὑμῖν που μνᾶν ἀργυρίου· τοσούτου οὐν τιμῶμαι.

Πλάτων δὲ ὅδε, ὧ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, καὶ Κρίτων καὶ Κριτόβουλος καὶ Ἀπολλόδωρος κελεύουσί με τριάκοντα μνῶν τιμήσασθαι, αὐτοὶ δ' ἐγγυᾶσθαι· τιμῶμαι οὐν τοσούτου, ἐγγυηταὶ δὲ ὑμῖν ἔσονται τοῦ

10 ἀργυρίου οὗτοι ἀξιώχρεωι.

c οὐ πολλοῦ γ' ἔνεκα χρόνου, ὧ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ὄνομα ἔξετε καὶ αἰτίαν ὑπὸ τῶν βουλομένων τὴν πόλιν λοιδορεῖν ὥς Σωκράτη ἀπεκτόνατε, ἄνδρα σοφόν—φήσουσι γὰρ δὴ σοφὸν εἶναι, εἰ καὶ μὴ εἰμι, οἱ βουλόμενοι ὑμῖν ὀνειδίζουσιν—εἰ γοῦν περιεμείνατε ὀλίγον χρόνον, ἀπὸ τοῦ

5 αὐτομάτου ἂν ὑμῖν τοῦτο ἐγένετο· ὁρᾶτε γὰρ δὴ τὴν ἡλικίαν ὅτι πόρρω

d ἤδη ἐστὶ τοῦ βίου, θανάτου δὲ ἐγγύς. λέγω δὲ τοῦτο οὐ πρὸς πάντας ὑμᾶς, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τοὺς ἐμοῦ καταψηφισαμένους θάνατον. λέγω δὲ καὶ τόδε πρὸς τοὺς αὐτοὺς τούτους. ἴσως με οἴσθε, ὧ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ἀπορίαὶ λόγων ἐαλωκέναι τοιούτων οἷς ἂν ὑμᾶς ἔπεισα, εἰ ὥμην δεῖν

5 ἅπαντα ποιεῖν καὶ λέγειν ὥστε ἀποφυγεῖν τὴν δίκην. πολλοῦ γε δεῖ. ἀλλ' ἀπορίαὶ μὲν ἐάλωκα, οὐ μέντοι λόγων, ἀλλὰ τόλμης καὶ ἀναισχυντίας καὶ τοῦ μὴ ἐθέλειν λέγειν πρὸς ὑμᾶς τοιαῦτα οἷ ἂν ὑμῖν μὲν ἡδιστα ἦν ἀκούειν—θρηνοῦντός τέ μου καὶ ὀδυρομένου καὶ ἄλλα ποιοῦντος

e καὶ λέγοντος πολλὰ καὶ ἀνάξια ἐμοῦ, ὥς ἐγὼ φημι, οἷα δὴ καὶ εἴθισθε ὑμεῖς τῶν ἄλλων ἀκούειν. ἀλλ' οὔτε τότε ὠιήθην δεῖν ἔνεκα τοῦ κινδύνου πράξαι οὐδὲν ἀνελεύθερον, οὔτε νῦν μοι μεταμέλει οὕτως ἀπολογησαμένῳ, ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον αἰρούμαι ὧδε ἀπολογησάμενος τεθνάναι

5 ἢ ἐκείνως ζῆν. οὔτε γὰρ ἐν δίκῃ οὐτ' ἐν πολέμῳ οὐτ' ἐμὲ οὐτ' ἄλλον

39 οὐδένα δεῖ τοῦτο μηχανᾶσθαι, ὅπως ἀποφεύξεται πᾶν ποιῶν θάνατον.

καὶ γὰρ ἐν ταῖς μάχαις πολλάκις δῆλον γίγνεται ὅτι τό γε ἀποθανεῖν ἂν τις ἐκφύγοι καὶ ὅπλα ἀφείς καὶ ἐφ' ἱκετείαν τραπόμενος τῶν δικωκόντων· καὶ ἄλλαι μηχαναὶ πολλαὶ εἰσιν ἐν ἐκάστοις τοῖς κινδύνοις ὥστε διαφεύγειν

5 θάνατον, ἐάν τις τολμᾷ πᾶν ποιεῖν καὶ λέγειν. ἀλλὰ μὴ οὐ τοῦτ' ἦι χαλεπὸν, ὧ ἄνδρες, θάνατον ἐκφυγεῖν, ἀλλὰ πολὺ χαλεπώτερον

b πονηρίαν· θᾶπτον γὰρ θανάτου θεῖ. καὶ νῦν ἐγὼ μὲν ἅτε βραδύς ὢν καὶ πρεσβύτης ὑπὸ τοῦ βραδυτέρου ἐάλων, οἱ δ' ἐμοὶ κατήγοροι ἅτε δεινοὶ καὶ ὀξεῖς ὄντες ὑπὸ τοῦ θάττονος, τῆς κακίας. καὶ νῦν ἐγὼ μὲν ἄπειμι ὑφ' ὑμῶν θανάτου δίκην ὀφλὼν, οὗτοι δ' ὑπὸ τῆς ἀληθείας ὠφληκότες

5 μοχθηρίαν καὶ ἀδικίαν. καὶ ἐγὼ τε τῷ τιμῆματι ἐμμένω καὶ οὗτοι. ταῦτα μὲν που ἴσως οὕτως καὶ ἔδει σχεῖν, καὶ οἶμαι αὐτὰ μετρίως εἶχεν.

τὸ δὲ δὴ μετὰ τοῦτο ἐπιθυμῶ ὑμῖν χρησμιωδῆσαι, ὧ κατα- c
ψηφισάμενοί μου· καὶ γὰρ εἰμι ἤδη ἐνταῦθα ἐν ᾧ μάλιστα ἄνθρωποι
χρησμιωδοῦσιν, ὅταν μέλλωσιν ἀποθανεῖσθαι. φημί γάρ, ὦ ἄνδρες οἱ
ἐμὲ ἀπεκτόνατε, τιμωρίαν ὑμῖν ἤξειν εὐθύς μετὰ τὸν ἐμὸν θάνατον πολὺ
χαλεπωτέραν νῆ Δία ἢ οἷαν ἐμὲ ἀπεκτόνατε· νῦν γὰρ τοῦτο εἵργασθε 5
οἰόμενοι μὲν ἀπαλλάξεσθαι τοῦ διδόναι ἔλεγχον τοῦ βίου, τὸ δὲ ὑμῖν
πολὺ ἐναντίον ἀποβήσεται, ὥς ἐγὼ φημι. πλείους ἔσονται ὑμᾶς οἱ ἐλέγ- d
χοντες, οὓς νῦν ἐγὼ κατέιχον, ὑμεῖς δὲ οὐκ ἡισθάνεσθε· καὶ χαλεπώτεροι
ἔσονται ὅσῳ νεώτεροί εἰσιν, καὶ ὑμεῖς μᾶλλον ἀγανακτήσετε. εἰ γὰρ
οἴεσθε ἀποκτείνοντες ἀνθρώπους ἐπισχῆσειν τοῦ ὀνειδίζειν τινὰ ὑμῖν
ὅτι οὐκ ὀρθῶς ζῆτε, οὐκ ὀρθῶς διανοεῖσθε· οὐ γὰρ ἔσθ' αὕτη ἡ ἀπαλ- 5
λαγὴ οὔτε πάνυ δυνατὴ οὔτε καλὴ, ἀλλ' ἐκείνη καὶ καλλίστη καὶ ῥάσιση, μὴ
τοὺς ἄλλους κολουῖν ἀλλ' ἑαυτὸν παρασκευάζειν ὅπως ἔσται ὥς
βέλτιστος. ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ὑμῖν τοῖς καταψηφισαμένοις μαντευσάμενος
ἀπαλλάττομαι.

τοῖς δὲ ἀποψηφισαμένοις ἡδέως ἂν διαλεχθεῖην ὑπὲρ τοῦ γεγονό- e
τος τουτοῦ πράγματος, ἐν ᾧ οἱ ἄρχοντες ἀσχολίαν ἄγουσι καὶ οὐπω
ἔρχομαι οἱ ἐλθόντα με δεῖ τεθνάναι. ἀλλὰ μοι, ὦ ἄνδρες, παραμείνατε
τοσοῦτον χρόνον· οὐδὲν γὰρ κωλύει διαμυθολογῆσαι πρὸς ἀλλήλους ἕως
ἕξεστιν. ὑμῖν γὰρ ὥς φίλοις οὓσιν ἐπιδείξαι ἐθέλω τὸ νυνὶ μοι συμ- 40
βεβηκὸς τί ποτε νοεῖ. ἐμοὶ γάρ, ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί—ὑμᾶς γὰρ δικαστὰς
καλῶν ὀρθῶς ἂν καλοῖην—θαυμάσιόν τι γέγονεν. ἡ γὰρ εἰωθυῖά μοι
μαντικὴ ἢ τοῦ δαιμονίου ἐν μὲν τῷ πρόσθεν χρόνῳ παντὶ πάνυ πυκνὴ
αἰεὶ ἦν καὶ πάνυ ἐπὶ σμικροῖς ἐναντιούμενη, εἴ τι μέλλοιμι μὴ ὀρθῶς πράξειν. 5
νυνὶ δὲ συμβέβηκέ μοι ἅπερ ὁρᾶτε καὶ αὐτοί, ταυτὶ ἅ γε δὴ οἰηθεῖν ἂν τις
καὶ νομίζεται ἔσχατα κακῶν εἶναι· ἐμοὶ δὲ οὔτε ἐξιόντι ἔωθεν οἴκοθεν b
ἠναντιώθη τὸ τοῦ θεοῦ σημεῖον, οὔτε ἠνίκα ἀνέβαινον ἐνταυθοῖ ἐπὶ
τὸ δικαστήριον, οὔτε ἐν τῷ λόγῳ οὐδαμοῦ μέλλοντί τι ἐρεῖν. καίτοι ἐν
ἄλλοις λόγοις πολλαχοῦ δὴ με ἐπέσχε λέγοντα μεταξύ· νῦν δὲ οὐδαμοῦ
περὶ ταύτην τὴν πράξιν οὐτ' ἐν ἔργῳ οὐδενὶ οὐτ' ἐν λόγῳ ἠναντιώται 5
μοι. τί οὖν αἴτιον εἶναι ὑπολαμβάνω; ἐγὼ ὑμῖν ἐρῶ· κινδυνεύει γὰρ
μοι τὸ συμβεβηκὸς τοῦτο ἀγαθὸν γεγονέναι, καὶ οὐκ ἔσθ' ὅπως
ἡμεῖς ὀρθῶς ὑπολαμβάνομεν, ὅσοι οἰόμεθα κακὸν εἶναι τὸ τεθνάναι. μέγα c
μοι τεκμήριον τούτου γέγονεν· οὐ γὰρ ἔσθ' ὅπως οὐκ ἠναντιώθη ἂν μοι
τὸ εἰωθὸς σημεῖον, εἰ μὴ τι ἔμελλον ἐγὼ ἀγαθὸν πράξειν.

39c4 ἐμὲ ἀπεκτόνατε d: με ἀπεκτενεῖτε d 39c5 οἷαν ἐμὲ ἀπεκτόνατε d: οἷαν ἐμὲ
ἀπεκτείνετε d 39c5 εἵργασθε d: εἵργάσασθε d 39c6 οἰόμενοι μὲν c: οἰόμενοί με d,
οἰόμενοι γε d, οἰόμενοι d 39d5 οὐκ ὀρθῶς d: οὐ καλῶς d 40b5 ἠναντιώται d:
ἠναντιώθη d

- ἐννοήσωμεν δὲ καὶ τῇδε ὡς πολλὴ ἐλπίς ἐστὶν ἀγαθὸν αὐτὸ εἶναι.
- 5 δυοῖν γὰρ θάτερόν ἐστιν τὸ τεθνάναι· ἢ γὰρ οἷον μηδὲν εἶναι μηδὲ αἰσθητὸν μηδεμίαν μηδενὸς ἔχειν τὸν τεθνεῶτα, ἢ κατὰ τὰ λεγόμενα μεταβολὴ τὴν τυγχάνει οὐσα καὶ μετοίκησις τῇ ψυχῇ τοῦ τόπου τοῦ
- d ἐνθένδε εἰς ἄλλον τόπον. καὶ εἴτε δὴ μηδεμία αἰσθησίς ἐστιν ἄλλ' οἷον ὕπνος ἐπειδάν τις καθεύδων μὴδ' ὄναρ μὴδὲν ὄραϊ, θαυμάσιον κέρδος ἂν εἴη ὁ θάνατος. ἐγὼ γὰρ ἂν οἶμαι, εἴ τινα ἐκλεξάμενον δέοι ταύτην τὴν νύκτα ἐν ἣ οὕτω κατέδραθεν ὥστε μὴδὲ ὄναρ ἰδεῖν, καὶ τὰς ἄλλας
- 5 νύκτας τε καὶ ἡμέρας τὰς τοῦ βίου τοῦ ἑαυτοῦ ἀντιπαραθέντα ταύτῃ τῇ νυκτὶ εἰ δέοι σκεψάμενον εἰπεῖν πόσας ἄμεινον καὶ ἥδιον ἡμέρας καὶ νύκτας ταύτης τῆς νυκτὸς βεβίωκεν ἐν τῷ ἑαυτοῦ βίῳ, οἶμαι ἂν
- e μὴ ὅτι ἰδιώτην τινά, ἀλλὰ τὸν μέγαν βασιλέα εὐαριθμήτους ἂν εὐρεῖν αὐτὸν ταύτας πρὸς τὰς ἄλλας ἡμέρας καὶ νύκτας. εἰ οὖν τοιοῦτον ὁ θάνατός ἐστιν, κέρδος ἔγωγε λέγω· καὶ γὰρ οὐδὲν πλεῖον ὁ πᾶς χρόνος φαίνεται οὕτω δὴ εἶναι ἢ μία νύξ. εἰ δ' αὖ οἷον ἀποδημησαί ἐστιν ὁ
- 5 θάνατος ἐνθένδε εἰς ἄλλον τόπον, καὶ ἀληθὴ ἐστὶν τὰ λεγόμενα, ὥς ἄρα ἐκεῖ εἰσιν ἅπαντες οἱ τεθνεῶτες, τί μείζον ἀγαθὸν τούτου εἴη ἂν, ὧ
- 41 ἄνδρες δικασταί; εἰ γὰρ τις ἀφικόμενος εἰς Ἄιδου, ἀπαλλαγείς τουτωνὶ τῶν φασκόντων δικαστῶν εἶναι, εὐρήσει τοὺς ὡς ἀληθῶς δικαστάς, οἵπερ καὶ λέγονται ἐκεῖ δικάζειν, Μίνως τε καὶ Ῥαδάμανθους καὶ Αἰακὸς καὶ Τριπτόλεμος καὶ ἄλλοι ὅσοι τῶν ἡμιθέων δίκαιοι ἐγένοντο ἐν τῷ
- 5 ἑαυτῶν βίῳ, ἄρα φαύλη ἂν εἴη ἡ ἀποδημία; ἢ αὖ Ὅρφεϊ συγγενέσθαι καὶ Μουσαιῶι καὶ Ἡσιόδῳ καὶ Ὀμήρῳ ἐπὶ πόσῳ ἂν τις δέξαιτ' ἂν ὕμῳ; ἐγὼ μὲν γὰρ πολλάκις ἐθέλω τεθνάναι εἰ ταῦτ' ἐστὶν ἀληθὴ. ἐπεὶ ἔμοιγε καὶ αὐτῷ θαυμαστὴ ἂν εἴη ἡ διατριβὴ αὐτόθι, ὁπότε ἐντύχοιμι Παλαμῆδει καὶ Αἴαντι τῷ Τελαμῶνος καὶ εἴ τις ἄλλος τῶν παλαιῶν διὰ κρίσιν ἄδικον τέθνηκεν, ἀντιπαρὰβάνοντι τὰ ἑμαυτοῦ πάθη πρὸς
- 5 τὰ ἐκείνων (ὥς ἐγὼ οἶμαι, οὐκ ἂν ἀηδὲς εἴη) καὶ δὴ καὶ τὸ μέγιστον, τοὺς ἐκεῖ ἐξετάζοντα καὶ ἔρευνῶντα ὥσπερ τοὺς ἐνταῦθα διάγειν, τίς αὐτῶν σοφός ἐστιν καὶ τίς οἶεται μὲν, ἐστὶν δ' οὐ. ἐπὶ πόσῳ δ' ἂν τις,
- c ὧ ἄνδρες δικασταί, δέξαιτο ἐξετάσαι τὸν ἐπὶ Τροίαν ἀγαγόντα τὴν πολλὴν στρατιάν ἢ Ὀδυσσέα ἢ Σίσυφον ἢ ἄλλους μυρίους ἂν τις εἴποι καὶ ἄνδρας καὶ γυναῖκας, οἷς ἐκεῖ διαλέγεσθαι καὶ συνεῖναι καὶ ἐξετάζειν ἀμύχανον ἂν εἴη εὐδαιμονίας; πάντως οὐ δήπου τούτου γε ἕνεκα οἱ ἐκεῖ
- 5 ἀποκτενοῦσι· τὰ τε γὰρ ἄλλα εὐδαιμονέστεροί εἰσιν οἱ ἐκεῖ τῶν ἐνθάδε, καὶ ἤδη τὸν λοιπὸν χρόνον ἀθάνατοί εἰσιν, εἴπερ γε τὰ λεγόμενα ἀληθὴ ἐστίν.

40d6 εἰ δέοι i: δέοι D 40e6 εἰσιν ἅπαντες d: εἰσι πάντες d 41a6 δέξαιτ' ἂν d, i: δέξαιτο d, i 41c5 ἀποκτενοῦσι d: ἀποκτείνουσι d

ἀλλὰ καὶ ὑμᾶς χρή, ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί, εὐέλπιδας εἶναι πρὸς τὸν
 θάνατον, καὶ ἔν τι τοῦτο διανοεῖσθαι ἀληθές, ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν ἀνδρὶ d
 ἀγαθῷ κακὸν οὐδὲν οὔτε ζῶντι οὔτε τελευτήσαντι, οὐδὲ ἀμελεῖται
 ὑπὸ θεῶν τὰ τούτου πράγματα· οὐδὲ τὰ ἐμὰ νῦν ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτομά-
 του γέγονεν, ἀλλὰ μοι δῆλόν ἐστι τοῦτο, ὅτι ἤδη τεθνάναι καὶ
 ἀπηλλάχθαι πραγμάτων βέλτιον ἦν μοι. διὰ τοῦτο καὶ ἐμὲ οὐδαμοῦ 5
 ἀπέτρεψεν τὸ σημεῖον, καὶ ἔγωγε τοῖς καταψηφισαμένοις μου καὶ τοῖς
 κατηγοροῖς οὐ πάνυ χαλεπαίνω. καίτοι οὐ ταύτηι τῇ διανοίᾳ κατε-
 ψηφίζοντό μου καὶ κατηγοροῦν, ἀλλ' οἰόμενοι βλάπτειν· τοῦτο αὐτοῖς e
 ἄξιον μέμφεσθαι. τοσόνδε μέντοι αὐτῶν δέομαι· τοὺς ὑεῖς μου, ἐπειδὴν
 ἠβήσωσι, τιμωρήσασθε, ὦ ἄνδρες, ταῦτά ταῦτα λυποῦντες ἅπερ ἐγὼ
 ὑμᾶς ἐλύπουν, ἐὰν ὑμῖν δοκῶσιν ἢ χρημάτων ἢ ἄλλου του πρότερον
 ἐπιμελεῖσθαι ἢ ἀρετῆς, καὶ ἐὰν δοκῶσί τι εἶναι μηδὲν ὄντες, ὄνειδίετε 5
 αὐτοῖς ὥσπερ ἐγὼ ὑμῖν, ὅτι οὐκ ἐπιμελοῦνται ὧν δεῖ, καὶ οἶονταί τι
 εἶναι ὄντες οὐδενὸς ἄξιοι. καὶ ἐὰν ταῦτα ποιῇτε, δίκαια πεπονθώς ἐγὼ 42
 ἔσομαι ὑφ' ὑμῶν αὐτός τε καὶ οἱ ὑεῖς. ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἤδη ὥρα ἀπιέναι, ἐμοὶ
 μὲν ἀποθανομένῳ, ὑμῖν δὲ βιωσομένοις· ὁπότεροι δὲ ἡμῶν ἔρχονται
 ἐπὶ ἄμεινον πρᾶγμα, ἄδηλον παντὶ πλὴν ἢ τῷ θεῷ.

ΧΕΝΟΦΩΝΤΟΣ ΑΠΟΛΟΓΙΑ ΣΩΚΡΑΤΟΥΣ

- 1 Σωκράτους δὲ ἄξιόν μοι δοκεῖ εἶναι μεμνησθαι καὶ ὥς ἐπειδὴ ἐκλήθη εἰς
τὴν δίκην ἐβουλεύσατο περὶ τῆς ἀπολογίας καὶ τῆς τελευτῆς τοῦ
βίου. γεγράφασι μὲν οὖν περὶ τούτου καὶ ἄλλοι, καὶ πάντες ἔτυχον τῆς
μεγαληγορίας αὐτοῦ· ὧι καὶ δῆλον ὅτι τῷ ὄντι οὕτως ἐρρήθη ὑπὸ
Σωκράτους. ἀλλ' ὅτι ἡδὴ ἑαυτῷ ἡγεῖτο αἰρετώτερον εἶναι τοῦ βίου 5
θάνατον, τοῦτο οὐ διεσαφηνίσαν· ὥστε ἀφρονεστέρα αὐτοῦ φαίνεται
2 εἶναι ἢ μεγαληγορία. Ἐρμογένης μέντοι ὁ Ἰππονίκου ἐταῖρός τε ἦν
αὐτῷ καὶ ἐξήγγειλε περὶ αὐτοῦ τοιαῦτα ὥστε πρέπουσαν φαίνεσθαι
τὴν μεγαληγορίαν αὐτοῦ τῇ διανοίᾳ. ἐκείνος γὰρ ἔφη ὁρῶν αὐτὸν περὶ
3 πάντων μᾶλλον διαλεγόμενον ἢ περὶ τῆς δίκης εἰπεῖν· “οὐκ ἔχρην μέντοι 10
σκοπεῖν, ὦ Σώκратες, καὶ ὅτι ἀπολογήσῃ.” τὸν δὲ τὸ μὲν πρῶτον
ἀποκρίνασθαι· “οὐ γὰρ δοκῶ σοι ἀπολογεῖσθαι μελετῶν διαβεβιωκέναι;”
ἐπεὶ δ' αὐτὸν ἐρέσθαι· “πῶς;” “ὅτι οὐδὲν ἄδικον διαγεγένημαι
4 ποιῶν· ἦν περ νομίζω μελέτην εἶναι καλλίστην ἀπολογίας.” ἐπεὶ δὲ 15
αὐτὸν πάλιν λέγειν· “οὐχ ὁράεις τὰ Ἀθηναίων δικαστήρια ὥς πολλάκις
μὲν οὐδὲν ἀδικοῦντας λόγῳ παραχθέντες ἀπέκτειναν, πολλάκις δὲ
ἀδικοῦντας ἢ ἐκ τοῦ λόγου οἰκτίσαντες ἢ ἐπιχαρίτως εἰπόντας
ἀπέλυσαν;” “ἀλλὰ ναὶ μὰ Δία,” φάναι αὐτόν, “καὶ δις ἡδὴ ἐπιχειρήσαντός
5 μου σκοπεῖν περὶ τῆς ἀπολογίας ἐναντιοῦταί μοι τὸ δαιμόνιον.” ὥς δὲ 20
αὐτὸν εἰπεῖν· “θαυμαστὰ λέγεις,” τὸν δ' αὖ ἀποκρίνασθαι· “ἡ θαυμαστὸν
νομίζεις εἰ καὶ τῷ θεῷ δοκεῖ ἐμὲ βέλτιον εἶναι ἢ δὴ τελευτᾶν; οὐκ οἶσθα
ὅτι μέχρι μὲν τοῦδε οὐδενὶ ἀνθρώπων ὑφείμην ἂν βέλτιον ἐμοῦ βεβιωκέναι;
ὅπερ γὰρ ἡδιστόν ἐστιν, ἡδιδεν ὁσίως μοι καὶ δικαίως ἅπαντα τὸν
βίον βεβιωμένον· ὥστε ἰσχυρῶς ἀγάμενος ἑμαυτὸν ταῦτα ἡὔρισκον
6 καὶ τοὺς ἐμοὶ συγγιγνομένους γινώσκοντας περὶ ἐμοῦ. νῦν δὲ εἰ ἔτι 25
προβήσεται ἡ ἡλικία, οἶδ' ὅτι ἀνάγκη ἔσται τὰ τοῦ γήρως ἐπιτελεῖσθαι
καὶ ὁρᾶν τε χεῖρον καὶ ἀκούειν ἥττον καὶ δυσμαθέστερον εἶναι καὶ ὦν
ἐμαθον ἐπιλησμονέστερον. ἂν δὲ αἰσθάνωμαι χείρων γινόμενος καὶ
καταμέμφωμαι ἑμαυτόν, πῶς ἂν,” εἰπεῖν, “ἐγὼ ἔτι ἂν ἡδέως βιοτεύοιμι;
7 ἴσως δέ τοι,” φάναι αὐτόν, “καὶ ὁ θεὸς δι' εὐμένειαν προξενεῖ μοι οὐ μόνον 30
τὸ ἐν καιρῷ τῆς ἡλικίας καταλῦσαι τὸν βίον, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ ἥι ῥάϊστα. ἂν
γὰρ νῦν κατακριθῇ μοι, δῆλον ὅτι ἐξέσται μοι τῇ τελευτῇ χρῆσθαι ἢ

13 ἐπεὶ c: ἔπειτα D 20 ἢ c: εἰ D 22 ὑφείμην ἂν βέλτιον i: ὑφείμην βέλτιον
D 26 ἐπιτελεῖσθαι i: ἀποτελεῖσθαι d, ἀπολεῖσθαι d 32 μοι c: μοι D

5
 10
 15

ράιστη μὲν ὑπὸ τῶν τούτου ἐπιμεληθέντων κέκριται, ἀπραγμονεστάτη δὲ τοῖς φίλοις, πλεῖστον δὲ πόθον ἐμποιοῦσα τῶν τελευτώντων. ὅταν γὰρ ἀσχημον μὲν μηδὲν μηδὲ δυσχερὲς ἐν ταῖς γνώμαις τῶν παρόντων καταλείπεται τις, ὑγιὲς δὲ τὸ σῶμα ἔχων καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν δυναμένην φιλοφρονεῖσθαι ἀπομαραίνεται, πῶς οὐκ ἀνάγκη τοῦτον ποθεῖν εἶναι; ὀρθῶς δὲ οἱ θεοὶ τότε μου ἡναντιοῦντο,” φάναι αὐτόν, “τῇ τοῦ λόγου ἐπισκῆψει ὅτε ἐδόκει ἡμῖν ζητητέα εἶναι ἐκ παντὸς τρόπου τὰ ἀποφευκτικά. εἰ γὰρ τοῦτο διεπραξάμην, δῆλον ὅτι ἡτοιμασάμην ἂν ἀντὶ τοῦ ἤδη λῆξαι τοῦ βίου ἢ νόσοις ἀλγυνόμενος τελευτῆσαι ἢ γῆραι, εἰς δὲ πάντα τὰ χαλεπὰ συρρεῖ καὶ μάλα ἔρημα τῶν εὐφροσυνῶν. μὰ Δί,” εἰπεῖν αὐτόν, “ὦ Ἐρμόγενης, ἐγὼ ταῦτα οὐδὲ προθυμήσομαι, ἀλλ’ ὅσων νομίζω τετυχηκέναι καλῶν καὶ παρὰ θεῶν καὶ παρ’ ἀνθρώπων, καὶ ἦν ἐγὼ δόξαν ἔχω περὶ ἑαυτοῦ, ταύτην ἀναφαίνων εἰ βαρυνῶ τοὺς δικαστάς, αἰρήσομαι τελευτᾶν μᾶλλον ἢ ἀνελευθέρως τὸ ζῆν ἔτι προσαιτῶν κερδᾶναι τὸν πολὺ χεῖρω βίον ἀντὶ θανάτου.”

20
 25
 30
 35

οὕτως δὲ γνόντα αὐτὸν ἔφη, ἐπειδὴ κατηγόρησαν αὐτοῦ οἱ ἀντίδικοι ὥς οὓς μὲν ἡ πόλις νομίζει θεοὺς οὐ νομίζοι, ἕτερα δὲ καινὰ δαιμόνια εἰσφέρει καὶ τοὺς νέους διαφθείροι, παρελθόντα εἰπεῖν· “ἀλλ’ ἐγὼ, ὦ ἄνδρες, τοῦτο μὲν πρῶτον θαυμάζω Μελήτου, ὅτωι ποτὲ γνοὺς λέγει ὥς ἐγὼ οὓς ἡ πόλις νομίζει θεοὺς οὐ νομίζω· ἐπεὶ θύοντά γε με ἐν ταῖς κοιναῖς ἑορταῖς καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν δημοσίων βωμῶν καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι οἱ παρατυγχάνοντες ἐώρων καὶ αὐτὸς Μέλητος, εἰ ἐβούλετο. καινὰ γε μὴν δαιμόνια πῶς ἂν ἐγὼ εἰσφέροιμι λέγων ὅτι θεοῦ μοι φωνὴ φαίνεται σημαίνουσα ὅτι χρὴ ποιεῖν; καὶ γὰρ οἱ φθόγγοις οἰωνῶν καὶ οἱ φήμαις ἀνθρώπων χρώμενοι φωναῖς δῆπου τεκμαίρονται. βροντὰς δὲ ἀμφιλέξει τις ἢ μὴ φωνεῖν ἢ μὴ μέγιστον οἰωνιστήριον εἶναι; ἢ δὲ Πυθοὶ ἐν τῷ τρίποδι ἰέρεια οὐ καὶ αὕτη φωνῇ τὰ παρὰ τοῦ θεοῦ διαγγέλλει; ἀλλὰ μέντοι καὶ τὸ προειδέναι γε τὸν θεὸν τὸ μέλλον καὶ τὸ προσημαίνειν ὧι βούλεται, καὶ τοῦτο, ὥσπερ ἐγὼ φημι, οὕτω πάντες καὶ λέγουσι καὶ νομίζουσιν. ἀλλ’ οἱ μὲν οἰωνοὺς τε καὶ φήμας καὶ συμβόλους τε καὶ μάντεις ὀνομάζουσι τοὺς προσημαίνοντας εἶναι, ἐγὼ δὲ τοῦτο δαιμόνιον καλῶ καὶ οἶμαι οὕτως ὀνομάζων καὶ ἀληθέστερα καὶ ὁσιώτερα λέγειν τῶν τοῖς ὄρνισιν ἀνατιθέντων τὴν τῶν θεῶν δύναμιν. ὥς γε μὴν οὐ ψεύδομαι κατὰ τοῦ θεοῦ καὶ τοῦτ’ ἔχω τεκμήριον· καὶ γὰρ τῶν φίλων πολλοῖς δὴ ἐξαγγελίας τὰ τοῦ θεοῦ συμβουλευόμενα οὐδεπώποτε ψευδάμενος ἐφάνην.”

2 τῶν τελευτώντων C: τῶν τελευτῶν d, τῶι τελευτῶντι d
 καταλείπεται D
 6 μου C: μὲν D, μοι c
 13 ταύτην ἀναφαίνων εἰ βαρυνῶ C:
 ταύτην ἀναφαίνων εἰ βαρύνω D, ταύτ’ ἦν ἀναφαίνων βαρύνω c
 16 ἔφη, ἐπειδὴ C: ἔφη
 εἰπεῖν, ἐπειδὴ D
 25 βροντὰς C: βρονταῖς D
 4 καταλείπεται τις C:

- 14 ἐπεὶ δὲ ταῦτα ἀκούοντες οἱ δικασταὶ ἐθорύβουν, οἱ μὲν ἀπιστοῦντες τοῖς
 λεγομένοις, οἱ δὲ καὶ φθονοῦντες, εἰ καὶ παρὰ θεῶν μειζόνων ἢ
 αὐτοὶ τυγχάνοι, πάλιν εἰπεῖν τὸν Σωκράτην· “ἄγε δὴ ἀκούσατε καὶ
 ἄλλα, ἵνα ἔτι μάλλον οἱ βουλόμενοι ὑμῶν ἀπιστώσι τῷ ἐμὲ τετιμῆσθαι 5
 ὑπὸ δαιμόνων. Χαιρεφώντος γάρ ποτε ἐπερωτῶντος ἐν Δελφοῖς περὶ
 ἐμοῦ πολλῶν παρόντων ἀνέειλεν ὁ Ἀπόλλων μῆδένα εἶναι ἀνθρώπων
 ἐμοῦ μῆτε ἐλευθεριώτερον μῆτε δικαιοτέρον μῆτε σωφρονέστερον.”
- 15 ὥς δ' αὖ ταῦτ' ἀκούσαντες οἱ δικασταὶ ἔτι μάλλον εἰκότως ἐθорύβουν,
 αὐθις εἰπεῖν τὸν Σωκράτην· “ἀλλὰ μείζω μὲν, ὦ ἄνδρες, εἶπεν ὁ θεὸς
 ἐν χρησμοῖς περὶ Λυκούργου τοῦ Λακεδαιμονίου νομοθετήσαντος ἢ περὶ 10
 ἐμοῦ. λέγεται γάρ εἰς τὸν ναὸν εἰσιόντα προσεῖπεῖν αὐτόν· ‘φροντίζω
 πότερα θεὸν σε εἶπω ἢ ἀνθρώπων.’ ἐμὲ δὲ θεῶι μὲν οὐκ εἴκασεν,
 ἀνθρώπων δὲ πολλῶι προέκρινεν ὑπερφέρειν. ὅμως δὲ ὑμεῖς μὴδὲ ταῦτ'
 εἰκῇ πιστεύσητε τῷ θεῶι, ἀλλὰ καθ' ἐν ἑκάστον ἐπισκοπεῖτε ὧν εἶπεν 15
 ὁ θεός. τίνα μὲν γάρ ἐπίστασθε ἥττον ἐμοῦ δουλεύοντα ταῖς τοῦ σώματος
 ἐπιθυμίαις; τίνα δὲ ἀνθρώπων ἐλευθεριώτερον, ὃς παρ' οὐδενὸς οὔτε
 δῶρα οὔτε μισθὸν δέχομαι; δικαιοτέρον δὲ τίνα ἂν εἰκότως νομίσατε 20
 τοῦ πρὸς τὰ παρόντα συνηρμοσμένου, ὥς τῶν ἀλλοτρίων μηδενὸς
 προσδεῖσθαι; σοφὸν δὲ πῶς οὐκ ἂν τις εἰκότως ἄνδρα φήσειεν εἶναι
 ὃς ἐξ ὅτουπερ ξυνίεναι τὰ λεγόμενα ἡρξάμην οὐπώποτε διέλειπον καὶ 25
 ζητῶν καὶ μανθάνων ὅτι ἐδυνάμην ἀγαθόν; ὥς δὲ οὐ μάτην ἐπόνουν
 οὐ δοκεῖ ὑμῖν καὶ τάδε τεκμήρια εἶναι, τὸ πολλοὺς μὲν πολίτας τῶν
 ἀρετῆς ἐφιεμένων, πολλοὺς δὲ ξένων, ἐκ πάντων προαιρεῖσθαι ἐμοὶ
 ξυνεῖναι; ἐκείνου δὲ τί φήσομεν αἴτιον εἶναι, τοῦ πάντας εἰδέναι ὅτι 30
 ἐγὼ ἥκιστ' ἂν ἔχοιμι χρήματα ἀντιδιδόναι, ὅμως πολλοὺς ἐπιθυμῶν
 ἐμοὶ τι δωρεῖσθαι; τὸ δ' ἐμὲ μὲν μῆδ' ὕφ' ἐνὸς ἀπαιτεῖσθαι εὐεργεσίας,
 18 ἐμοὶ δὲ πολλοὺς ὁμολογεῖν χάριτας ὀφείλειν; τὸ δ' ἐν τῇ πολιορκίᾳ
 τοὺς μὲν ἄλλους οἰκτίζειν ἑαυτούς, ἐμὲ δὲ μῆδὲν ἀπορώτερον διάγειν
 ἢ ὅτε τὰ μάλιστα ἢ πόλις εὐδαιμόνει; τὸ δὲ τοὺς ἄλλους μὲν τὰς
 εὐπαθείας ἐκ τῆς ἀγορᾶς πολυτελεῖς πορίζεσθαι, ἐμὲ δὲ ἐκ τῆς ψυχῆς 35
 ἄνευ δαπάνης ἡδίδους ἐκείνων μηχανᾶσθαι; εἴ γε μὴν ὅσα εἴρηκα περὶ
 ἑμαυτοῦ μηδεὶς δύναται· ἂν ἐξελέγξαι με ὥς ψεύδομαι, πῶς οὐκ ἂν ἤδη
 19 δικαίως καὶ ὑπὸ θεῶν καὶ ὑπ' ἀνθρώπων ἐπαινοίμην; ἀλλ' ὅμως σύ με
 φῆις, ὦ Μέλητε, τοιαῦτα ἐπιτηδεύοντα τοὺς νέους διαφθεῖρειν; καίτοι
 ἐπιστάμεθα μὲν δήπου τίνες εἰσὶ νέων διαφθοραὶ· σύ δὲ εἶπε εἴ τινα οἴσθα 35
 ὑπ' ἐμοῦ γεγενημένον ἢ ἐξ εὐσεβοῦς ἀνόσιον ἢ ἐκ σώφρονος ὕβριστήν ἢ
 ἐξ εὐδαιμόνου πολυδάπανον ἢ ἐκ μετριοπότου οἰνόφυλα ἢ ἐκ φιλοπόνου

13 πολλῶν C: πολλῶν D

17 νομίσατε C: νομίσητε d, νομίσετε d

25 ἥκιστ' ἂν C:

ἥκιστα D 29 εὐδαιμόνει d: εὐδαιμονεῖ d 37 ἐκ μετριοπότου C: ὥς ἐκ μετριοπότου D

μαλακὸν ἢ ἄλλης πονηρᾶς ἡδονῆς ἡττημένον.” “ἀλλὰ ναὶ μὰ Δί’,” ἔφη **20**
 ὁ Μέλητος, “ἐκείνους οἶδα οὐς σὺ πέπεικας σοὶ πείθεσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ
 τοῖς γειναμένοις.” “ὁμολογῶ,” φάναι τὸν Σωκράτην, “περὶ γε παιδείας”
 τοῦτο γὰρ ἴσασιν ἐμοὶ μεμεληκός. περὶ δὲ ὑγείας τοῖς ἰατροῖς μᾶλλον
5 οἱ ἄνθρωποι πείθονται ἢ τοῖς γονεῦσι· καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἐκκλησίαις γε πάντες
 δήπου οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι τοῖς φρονιμώτατα λέγουσι πείθονται μᾶλλον ἢ τοῖς
 προσήκουσιν. οὐ γὰρ δὴ καὶ στρατηγούς αἰρεῖσθε καὶ πρὸ πατέρων καὶ
 πρὸ ἀδελφῶν, καὶ ναὶ μὰ Δία γε ὑμεῖς πρὸ ὑμῶν αὐτῶν, οὐς ἂν ἡγήσθε
 περὶ τῶν πολεμικῶν φρονιμωτάτους εἶναι;” “οὕτω γάρ,” φάναι τὸν
10 Μέλητον, “ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ συμφέρεῖ καὶ νομίζεται.” “οὐκοῦν,” εἶπεν **21**
 τὸν Σωκράτην, “θαυμαστὸν καὶ τοῦτό σοι δοκεῖ εἶναι, τὸ ἐν μὲν ταῖς
 ἄλλαις πράξει μὴ μόνον ἰσομοιρίας τυγχάνειν τοὺς κρατίστους, ἀλλὰ
 καὶ προτετιμῆσθαι, ἐμὲ δέ, ὅτι περὶ τοῦ μεγίστου ἀγαθοῦ ἀνθρώποις,
 περὶ παιδείας, βέλτιστος εἶναι ὑπὸ τινων προκρίνομαι, τούτου ἕνεκα
15 θανάτου ὑπὸ σοῦ διώκεσθαι.”

ἐρρήθη μὲν δῆλον ὅτι τούτων πλείω ὑπὸ τε αὐτοῦ καὶ τῶν **22**
 συναγορευόντων φίλων αὐτῶι. ἀλλ’ ἐγὼ οὐ τὰ πάντα εἶπεν τὰ ἐκ
 τῆς δίκης ἐσπούδασα, ἀλλ’ ἤρκεσέ μοι δηλῶσαι ὅτι Σωκράτης τὸ μὲν
 μήτε περὶ θεοῦ ἀσεβῆσαι μήτε περὶ ἀνθρώπους ἄδικος φανῆναι περὶ
20 παντός ἐποιεῖτο· τὸ δὲ μὴ ἀποθανεῖν οὐκ ὤιετο λιπαρῆτέον εἶναι, **23**
 ἀλλὰ καὶ καιρὸν ἦδη ἐνόμιζεν ἑαυτῶι τελευτᾶν. ὅτι δὲ οὕτως ἐγίγνωσκε
 καταδηλότερον ἐγένετο, ἐπειδὴ καὶ ἡ δίκη κατεψηφίσθη. πρῶτον
 μὲν γὰρ κελεύόμενος ὑποτιμᾶσθαι οὔτε αὐτὸς ὑπετιμῆσατο οὔτε τοὺς
 φίλους εἶασεν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἔλεγεν ὅτι τὸ ὑποτιμᾶσθαι ὁμολογούντος εἴη
25 ἄδικεῖν. ἔπειτα τῶν ἐταίρων ἐκκλέψαι βουλομένων αὐτὸν οὐκ ἐφείπετο,
 ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐπισκῶσαι ἐδόκει ἐρόμενος εἴ που εἰδεῖν τι χωρίον ἔξω τῆς
 Ἀττικῆς ἔνθα οὐ προσβατὸν θανάτῳ.

ὥς δὲ τέλος εἶχεν ἡ δίκη, εἶπεν αὐτόν· “ἀλλ’, ὦ ἄνδρες, τοὺς μὲν **24**
 διδάσκοντας τοὺς μάρτυρας ὥς χρή ἐπιорκοῦντας καταψευδομαρτυρεῖν
30 ἐμοῦ καὶ τοὺς πειθομένους τούτοις ἀνάγκη ἐστὶ πολλὴν ἑαυτοῖς συνειδέναι
 ἀσέβειαν καὶ ἀδικίαν· ἐμοὶ δὲ τί προσήκει νῦν μείον φρονεῖν ἢ
 πρὶν κατακριθῆναι, μὴδὲν ἐλεγχθέντι ὥς πεποίηκά τι ὧν ἐγράψαντό
 με; οὐδὲ γὰρ ἔγωγε ἀντὶ Διὸς καὶ Ἥρας καὶ τῶν σὺν τούτοις θεῶν οὔτε
 θύων τισὶ καινοῖς δαίμοσιν οὔτε ὁμνύς οὔτε ὀνομάζων ἄλλους
35 θεοὺς ἀναπέφνηνα. τοὺς γε μὴν νέους πῶς ἂν διαφθείροιμι καρτερίαν καὶ **25**
 εὐτέλειαν προσεθίζων; ἐφ’ οἷς γε μὴν ἔργοις κεῖται θάνατος ἢ ζημία,

8 ἡγήσθε c: ἡγείσθε D 13 δέ, ὅτι περὶ c: δέ περὶ D, δέ, ὅς περὶ c 14 εἶναι ὑπὸ d:
 εἶναι εἰ ὑπὸ d 30 πολλὴν d: πολλή d 32 ἐγράψαντό d: ἐγράψατό d 34 ὀνομάζων
 D: νομίζων c

- ἱεροσυλίας, τοιχωρυχίας, ἀνδραποδίσει, πόλεως προδοσίαι, οὐδ' αὐτοὶ
 οἱ ἀντίδικοι τούτων πράξαι τι κατ' ἐμοῦ φασιν. ὥστε θαυμαστὸν
 ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ εἶναι ὅπως ποτὲ ἐφάνη ὑμῖν τοῦ θανάτου ἔργον ἄξιον
 26 ἐμοὶ εἰργασμένον. ἀλλ' οὐδὲ μέντοι ὅτι ἀδίκως ἀποθνήσκω, διὰ τοῦτο
 μείον φρονιτέον· οὐ γὰρ ἐμοὶ ἀλλὰ τοῖς καταγνοῦσι τοῦτο αἰσχρὸν 5
 αἰσχρὸν γάρ ἐστι. παραμυθεῖται δ' ἔτι με καὶ Παλαμίδης ὁ παραπλησίως
 ἐμοὶ τελευτήσας· ἔτι γὰρ καὶ νῦν πολὺ καλλίους ὕμνους παρέχεται
 Ὀδυσσέως τοῦ ἀδίκως ἀποκτείναντος αὐτόν· οἷδ' ὅτι καὶ
 ἐμοὶ μαρτυρήσεται ὑπὸ τε τοῦ ἐπιόντος καὶ ὑπὸ τοῦ παρεληλυθότος
 χρόνου ὅτι ἡδίκησα μὲν οὐδένα πώποτε οὐδὲ πονηρότερον ἐποίησα, 10
 εὐηργέτουν δὲ τοὺς ἐμοὶ διαλεγόμενους προῖκα διδάσκων ὅτι ἐδυνάμην
 ἀγαθόν.”
 27 εἰπὼν δὲ ταῦτα μάλα ὁμολογουμένως δὴ τοῖς εἰρημένοις ἀπήγει
 καὶ ὄμμασι καὶ σχήματι καὶ βαδίσματι φαιδρός. ὥς δὲ ἤισθετο ἄρα
 τοὺς παρεπομένους δακρύνοντας, “τί τοῦτο;” εἰπεῖν αὐτόν, “ἦ ἄρτι 15
 δακρύετε; οὐ γὰρ πάλαι ἴστε ὅτι ἐξ ὅτουπερ ἐγενόμην κατεψηφισμένος
 ἦν μου ὑπὸ τῆς φύσεως ὁ θάνατος; ἀλλὰ μέντοι εἰ μὲν ἀγαθῶν
 ἐπιπρεόντων προσπόλλυμαι, δηλὸν ὅτι ἐμοὶ καὶ τοῖς ἐμοῖς εὖνοις
 λυπητέον· εἰ δὲ χαλεπῶν προσδοκωμένων καταλύω τὸν βίον, ἐγὼ μὲν
 οἶμαι ὥς εὐπραγοῦντος ἐμοῦ πᾶσιν ὑμῖν εὐθυμητέον εἶναι.” 20
 28 παρὼν δὲ τις Ἀπολλόδωρος, ἐπιθυμητὴς μὲν ὧν ἰσχυρῶς αὐτοῦ,
 ἄλλως δ' εὐήθης, εἶπεν ἄρα· “ἀλλὰ τοῦτο ἔγωγε, ὦ Σώκратες,
 χαλεπώτατα φέρω ὅτι ὁρῶ σε ἀδίκως ἀποθνήσκοντα.” τὸν δὲ λέγεται
 καταψήσαντα αὐτοῦ τὴν κεφαλὴν εἰπεῖν· “σὺ δέ, ὦ φίλτατε Ἀπολλόδωρε,
 μᾶλλον ἂν ἐβούλου με ὁρᾶν δικαίως ἢ ἀδίκως ἀποθνήσκοντα;” 25
 καὶ ἅμα ἐπιγέλᾶσαι.
 29 λέγεται δὲ καὶ Ἄνυτον παριόντα ἰδὼν εἰπεῖν· “ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν ἀνὴρ ὅδε
 κυδρός, ὥς μέγα τι καὶ καλὸν διαπεπραγμένος, εἰ ἀπέκτονέ με, ὅτι αὐτόν
 τῶν μεγίστων ὑπὸ τῆς πόλεως ὁρῶν ἀξιούμενον οὐκ ἔφην χρῆναι τὸν
 υἱὸν περὶ βύρσας παιδεύειν. ὥς μοχθηρὸς οὗτος,” ἔφη, “ὅς οὐκ ἔοικεν 30
 εἰδέναι ὅτι ὀπότερος ἡμῶν καὶ συμφορώτερα καὶ καλλίω εἰς τὸν αἰῶ
 30 χρόνον διατέπρακται, οὗτός ἐστι καὶ ὁ νικῶν. ἀλλὰ μέντοι,” φάναι
 αὐτόν, “ἀνέθηκε μὲν καὶ Ὅμηρος ἔστιν οἷς τῶν ἐν καταλύσει τοῦ βίου
 προγινώσκειν τὰ μέλλοντα, βούλομαι δὲ καὶ ἐγὼ χρησμοιδοῦσαί τι.
 συνεγενόμην γὰρ ποτε βραχέα τῷ Ἄνυτου υἱῷ, καὶ ἔδοξε μοι οὐκ 35

1 ἀνδραποδίσει c: ἀνδραπόδισις D 1 προδοσίαι c: προδοσία D 3 ὑμῖν τοῦ i:
 ὑμῖν τὸ τοῦ D 6 τοῦτο αἰσχρὸν· αἰσχρὸν γάρ ἐστι c: τοῦτο αἰσχρὸν γάρ ἐστι D, τοῦτο
 αἰσχρὸν ἐστι i 9 μαρτυρήσεται c: μαρτυρήσετε D 21 μὲν ὧν ἰσχυρῶς i: μὲν
 ἰσχυρῶς D 30 ὅς i: ὥς D

ἄρρωστος τὴν ψυχὴν εἶναι· ὥστε φημί αὐτὸν ἐπὶ τῇ δουλοπρεπεῖ
 διατριβῇ ἣν ὁ πατὴρ αὐτῷ παρεσκεύακεν οὐ διαμενεῖν· διὰ δὲ τὸ μηδένα
 ἔχειν σπουδαῖον ἐπιμελητὴν προσπεσεῖσθαι τινι αἰσχυραὶ ἐπιθυμίαι, καὶ
 προβήσεσθαι μέντοι πόρρω μοχθηρίας.” ταῦτα δ' εἰπὼν οὐκ ἐψεύσατο, **31**

5 ἀλλ' ὁ νεανίσκος ἥσθεις οἴνωι οὔτε νυκτὸς οὔτε ἡμέρας ἐπαύετο πίνων,
 καὶ τέλος οὔτε τῇ ἑαυτοῦ πόλει οὔτε τοῖς φίλοις οὔτε αὐτῷ ὄξιος
 οὐδενὸς ἐγένετο. Ἄνυτος μὲν δὴ διὰ τὴν τοῦ υἱοῦ πονηρὰν παιδείαν
 καὶ διὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ ἀγνωμοσύνην ἔτι καὶ τετελευτηκῶς τυγχάνει
 κακοδοξίας.

10 Σωκράτης δὲ διὰ τὸ μεγαλύνειν ἑαυτὸν ἐν τῷ δικαστηρίῳ φθόνον **32**
 ἐπαγόμενος μᾶλλον καταψηφίσασθαι ἑαυτοῦ ἐποίησε τοὺς δικαστάς.
 ἐμοὶ μὲν οὖν δοκεῖ θεοφιλοῦς μοίρας τετυχηκέναι· τοῦ μὲν γὰρ βίου
 τὸ χαλεπώτατον ἀπέλιπε, τῶν δὲ θανάτων τοῦ ράιστου ἔτυχεν.
 ἐπεδείξατο δὲ τῆς ψυχῆς τὴν ῥώμην· ἐπεὶ γὰρ ἔγνω τοῦ ἔτι ζῆν τὸ **33**

15 τεθνάναι αὐτῷ κρεῖττον εἶναι, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ πρὸς τᾶλλα τᾶγαθὰ
 προσάντης ἦν, οὐδὲ πρὸς τὸν θάνατον ἐμαλακίσατο, ἀλλ' ἱλαρῶς καὶ
 προσεδέχετο αὐτὸν καὶ ἐπετελέσατο.

ἐγὼ μὲν δὴ κατανοῶν τοῦ ἀνδρὸς τὴν τε σοφίαν καὶ τὴν γενναιότητα **34**
 οὔτε μὴ μεμνησθαι δύναμαι αὐτοῦ οὔτε μεμνημένος μὴ οὐκ ἐπαινεῖν. εἰ
20 δέ τις τῶν ἀρετῆς ἐφιεμένων ὠφελιμωτέρῳ τινὶ Σωκράτους συνεγένετο,
 ἐκείνον ἐγὼ τὸν ἄνδρα ἀξιομακαριστότατον νομίζω.

COMMENTARY

PLATO'S APOLOGY OF SOCRATES

17a1–18a6: The Inexperience of Socrates

Socrates is now seventy, and yet this is the first time that he has ever presented a case in court. The jurors should sympathise with his inexperience, and not believe the warnings of the prosecution that he is clever at oratory. Indeed, they can hear for themselves his opponents' cleverness and his own inexperience.

Speeches written for novice litigants typically begin with some such plea for sympathy. The distinctive thing about Socrates' plea is its air of casualness, an early symptom of the disdain on his part for the customary decencies of court rhetoric that he will later warn the jury to distinguish from mere wilfulness or αὐθαδία (34d8, 37a4). In this, Socrates differs greatly from, for example, the speaker of Isae. 10. 1, who gives a series of neat and mannered antitheses to contrast his inexperience with the hardened professionalism of his opponents.

17a1 ὅτι ... πεπόνθατε ὑπὸ τῶν ἐμῶν κατηγορῶν 'the effect that my accusers have had on you'. This ὅτι is a neuter accusative singular pronoun, object of πεπόνθατε. Here, as also in Pl. 33d6 and 42a1, πάσχω is more or less the passive of ποιῶ, just as προσκείμεαι is more or less the passive of προστίθημι in Pl. 30e2–3 προσκείμενον ... ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ. ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι is the standard form of address for the citizen body of Athens, and so perfectly proper for an Athenian jury, who are, after all, simply a representative sample acting for the citizen body as a whole. In Pl. 40a2–3 however, Socrates will show that there is some point to his using this form of address, rather than the equally proper ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί. a2 δ' οὖν implies 'but (what I said in my μέν clause does not matter); the real point is that ...'. Cf. Pl. 34e1–2 εἰ μέν ..., πρὸς δ' οὖν ... ὀλίγου 'almost'. The construction in full would be ὀλίγου δεῖν (literally 'needs a little') as in Pl. 22a3. Contrast πολλοῦ δέω ('I am far from' in e.g. Pl. 30d6), and πολλοῦ δεῖ ('Not in the least!' in e.g. Pl. 32e4). ἐμαυτοῦ ἐπελαθόμεν: contrast the self-knowledge commended in the slogan ΓΝΩΘΙ ΣΕΑΥΤΟΝ, famously inscribed on the temple in Delphi (Pl. *Prt.* 343b) of the god who declared that no one was wiser than Socrates (Pl. 21a5–6). There is similar play with the themes of self-knowledge and self-ignorance in Ar. *Clouds*, where potential customers for Socrates' teaching are asked 'How did you manage to get into debt without noticing?' (242: πόθεν δ' ὑπόχρεως σαυτὸν ἔλαθες γενόμενος;); and later, when they ask what can be learnt from Socratics, they are told 'All human wisdom: you will know yourself for an ignorant thicko' (841–2: ὅσα πέρ ἐστιν ἀνθρώποις σοφά·

γνώσει δὲ σαυτὸν ὡς ἀμαθὴς εἶ καὶ παχύς). **a3** ὡς ἵπος εἰπεῖν: this idiomatic expression tones down what would otherwise be the exaggeration οὐδέν. The idiom recurs in Pl. 22b6 and d2. **a4** μάλιστα δὲ αὐτῶν ἐν ἐθαύμασα τῶν πολλῶν ὧν ἐψεύσαντο τοῦτο: the novice rhetorician Socrates produces a thought that would be at home in the grandest rhetoric: see Dem. 18.291 πολλὰ τοίνυν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, καὶ ἄλλα κατηγορηκὸς αὐτοῦ καὶ κατεψευσμένου, μάλιστα ἐθαύμασα πάντων ὅτε ... ('Although, men of Athens, he has made many other false accusations, the most astonishing of them all was when...'). αὐτῶν ἐν ἐθαύμασα: the accusative is for the word or deed that prompts the amazement, the genitive for the person whose word or deed it was; hence also Xen. 11.19 τοῦτο ... θαυμάζω Μελήτου. The same contrast of cases is standard when also talking of who and what is heard: see Pl. 17b7-8n. οἱ μου ἀκούσεσθε πᾶσαν τὴν ἀλήθειαν. **τῶν πολλῶν ὧν ἐψεύσαντο** 'of the many lies that they told'. τῶν πολλῶν is a partitive genitive, and the antecedent of ὧν, which it has attracted into its own case.

17b1-2 δεινοῦ ὄντος λέγειν: other signs that Socrates had a reputation as a clever speaker include Ar. *Clouds* 98-9 ('Here [in Socrates' school] they teach anyone who'll give them the money how to be victorious when he speaks, however just or unjust his cause may be') and Xen. *Mem.* 1.2.31 (according to which the Thirty Tyrants, in order to get at Socrates, made a law against teaching rhetoric). **b3** τοῦτο 'this fact', the fact recorded in the articular infinitive phrase that ran from τὸ γὰρ to δεινὸς λέγειν. **b4** εἰ μὴ ἄρα 'unless, come to think of it'; see Pl. 38b3-4, and *GP* 37 'ἄρα in a conditional protasis denotes that the hypothesis is one of which the possibility has only just been realized.' **b5** εἰ μὲν: Socrates interrupts himself before he ever reaches a contrasting δέ clause. **b5-6** ὁμολογοίην ἂν ἔγωγε οὐ κατὰ τούτους εἶναι ῥήτωρ 'I would agree that I am an orator, but not in the same way that they are.' For this use of οὐ κατὰ cf. Pl. *Euthd.* 271d οὐ κατὰ τῷ Ἀκαρνᾶνι 'unlike the pair from Acarnania'. **b6-7** ὥσπερ ἐγὼ λέγω: Socrates said the same thing back in Pl. 17a3. He uses the present tense to reaffirm now what he affirmed then. Contrast the imperfect in Pl. 20e1 οὗτοι ... οὓς ἄρτι ἔλεγον, where his purpose is simply to allude to, not to reiterate, some earlier words. **b7** ἢ τὴ ὁὐδὲν is idiomatic for 'little or nothing', as in e.g. Hdt. 3.140.2 ἀναβέβηκε δ' ἢ τὴς ἢ οὐδεὶς κω παρ' ἡμέας αὐτῶν ('hardly any of them has ever come to visit us'), Xen. *Cyr.* 7.5.45 τούτων δὲ τῶν περιεστηκόντων ἢ τίνα ἢ οὐδένα οἶδα ('I know hardly any of these people who are gathered around me'). **b7-8** μου ἀκούσεσθε πᾶσαν τὴν ἀλήθειαν: Socrates will repeat his promise to tell the whole truth in Pl. 20d4-5, and assert that he has done so in Pl. 33c2-3. The use of both accusative and genitive cases with the verb for hearing is standard (see e.g. Pl. *Prt.* 318d ἐμοῦ ταῦτα ἀκούσας); for its

explanation, see Pl. 17a4n. on αὐτῶν ἐν ἐθαύμασα and the cases that go with the verb for wondering. **b8–17c1** οὐ . . . κεκαλλιεπημένους γε λόγους . . . οὐδὲ κεκοσμημένους: this ornamental but obscure phrase itself exemplifies the kind of speech that it describes. Socrates hopes to evoke the prejudice that stylish speech indicates dishonesty. This prejudice was common enough to be evoked also by Theban envoys, addressing Spartans in Thuc. 3.67.6 ‘When deeds are good, a brief announcement of them suffices [βραχεῖα ἢ ἀπαγγελία ἀρκεῖ]; and when they are in error, speeches with verbal adornments [λόγοι ἔπαισι κοσμηθέντες] will serve to cover them up [προκαλύμματα γίνονται]’, and by the chorus in Eur. *Med.* 576–8 ‘Jason, you have given these things that you say some good adornment [εὖ μὲν τοῦσδ’ ἐκόσμησας λόγους]. Nevertheless, I think – unwise as it may be to say so – that you wrong your wife in abandoning her.’

17c1 ῥήμασι τε καὶ ὀνόμασιν ‘words and phrases’, as in Pl. *Crt.* 399a–b, where Διὶ φίλος is a ῥήμα, while Δίφιλος is an ὄνομα. These terms were later given technical senses, whereby an ὄνομα is a noun and a ῥήμα is a verb: see Pl. *Sph.* 261d–262a, and Arist. *De Interpretatione* 16a1–b25. **c2** εἰκῇ λεγόμενα: this phrase can be used of any sort of careless speech, including speech that is careless about the effects that it might have (e.g. Pl. *Grg.* 530d) or the evidence that there might be (e.g. Arist. *Met.* 987b17). Socrates here means presumably that he will not marshal his material into the sort of order on which a proper orator prides himself in Isoc. 12.24: ‘If I do this, and do not bring to its conclusion what I have written, and do not conjoin the start of what I am about to say together with the end of what I have already said, then I would look like those who say in a random, vulgar and sloppy way [εἰκῇ καὶ φορτικῶς καὶ χυδῆν] whatever comes into their heads.’ **c3–4** οὐδὲ γὰρ ἂν δήπου πρόπτοι, ὧ ἄνδρες, τῇδε τῇ ἡλικίαι: see Isoc. 12.2–3, on how ‘antithetical and balanced phrases and other flashy forms of rhetoric’ do not befit old age. Socrates was seventy at the time of his trial: see Pl. 17d3. **c4** μειρακίῳ is an indirect dig at the prosecutor Meletus, who was conspicuously young; there are similar digs in Pl. 25d8–9 and Pl. *Euthphr.* 2b. Socrates hopes to evoke the prejudice that the young are too hot-headed to have any very delicate sense of truth; hence Pl. *Rep.* 466b talks of ‘thoughtless and juvenile [ἀνόητός τε καὶ μειρακιώδης] opinion’; Pl. *Grg.* 499b ‘even if it’s in jest that somebody grants you something, you seize on it with delight, as juveniles do’; Arist. *Rh.* 1413a30 ‘exaggerations [ὑπερβολαί] are juvenile, for they show vehemence [σφοδρότητα]’; Polybius 12.25i.5 ‘untruthful, juvenile [ἀνάλγητος καὶ μειρακιώδης] and scholastic’; Ath. 13.585e ‘acting the juvenile in front of her, and saying that he had tangled with lots of women’. See Pl. 26e–27a1n. on other invocation of prejudices against the young. **c5** πλάττοντι λόγους: this idiom means inventing fictions, and

not simply using ornamental language: other examples include Soph. *Aj.* 148, Isae. 8.13, Hdt. 4.77.2. εἰς ὑμᾶς εἰσιέναι is the standard term in the orators for 'to appear before you' or 'to come before the court', as in e.g. Dem. 44.4, Ant. 5.46, Isoc. 20.5, Isae. 1.3, Lys. 3.2. c7–d1 ἐν ἀγοραῖ ἐπὶ τῶν τραπεζῶν: the market stalls where the bankers did their business were a favourite place at which to meet and chat (Lys. 9.5, Pl. *Hp. Mi.* 368b, Thphr. *Char.* 5.7).

17d1 ἵνα 'where'; hence the perfect indicative ἀκηκόασι. d1–2 μῆτε θαυμάζειν μῆτε θορυβεῖν: infinitives, because they explain what Socrates begs and beseeches (17c6 δέομαι καὶ παρίεμαι) the jurors to do. A θόρυβος is any sort of noisy response, whether cheers or jeers (Pl. *Rep.* 492b σὺν πολλῶν θορύβῳ τὰ μὲν ψέγωσι . . . τὰ δὲ ἐπαινῶσιν). The chorus of jurors in Ar. *Wasps* 619–24 revel in their ability to make a θόρυβος: 'Isn't my office grand, just as grand as that of Zeus? Don't they say the same about me as they do about Zeus? At any rate, if we make a noise [θορυβήσωμεν], anyone who's passing says "How the law court's thundering, King Zeus!"' An Athenian court had no judge to keep order. Hence, litigants who wanted silence had to beg the jury for it, as Socrates does here and at Pl. 20e4–21a4, Pl. 27b2, Pl. 30c3. d2 ἔχει γὰρ οὕτως: this idiom marks a very vehement assertion. It occurs in a wide variety of stylistic registers (e.g. Eur. *Med.* 506, Isoc. 8.28, Men. *Misumenus* 235). The demonstrative adverb οὕτως supplies all the connection that is needed between this sentence and the next, which is why the next sentence has no connecting particle. d2–3 νῦν ἐγὼ πρῶτον ἐπὶ δικαστήριον ἀναβέβηκα 'this is the first time I have appeared in court as a litigant'. ἀναβαίνειν (literally 'I go up') means to mount the platform from which one speaks (Ant. 6.21 ἀναβάς ἐγὼ εἰς τὸ δικαστήριον . . . ἔλεξα, Ar. *Wasps* 905 ἀναβάς κατηγορεῖ and 944 ἀνάβαιν', ἀπολογοῦ). As he acknowledges himself in Pl. 35a4, Socrates has often appeared in court in other capacities. The speaker of Isae. 1.1 outdoes Socrates, saying that he is so carefully brought up that he has never been in a lawcourt, not even as audience. Socrates' lack of experience as a litigant would not have shown him innocent of the art of persuasion; for consider Antiphon, who, according to Thuc. 8.68.1, 'was, of all the Athenians of his day, second to none in virtue; he had also the greatest capacity for thinking and for expressing his knowledge; he never addressed the Assembly or – unless he was forced to – any other venue in which issues are contested, but the masses viewed him with suspicion because of his reputation for cleverness; nevertheless, when people had issues to contest, whether before the Assembly or in a court of law, he was the man best able to help whoever consulted him on anything.' d3 ἀτεχνῶς: like the English 'literally', this word emphasises the aptness of a figure of speech by claiming that it is no figure. From

its presence here we may infer that the metaphor in **d3–4** ξένως ἔχω τῆς ἐνθάδε λέξεως is more vivid than in the English translation ‘I am a stranger to the language here.’ **d4** εἰ τῷ ὄντι ξένος ἐτύγχανον ὦν: the Athenians not merely permitted, but in some cases actually required, non-Athenians to appear before their courts. Xen. *Ath.* 1.16–18 describes how the Athenian δῆμος used this to consolidate its control over allied cities. For an example, see *IG* 1.iii.40.70–6, recording a proposal made in 446–5 that Athens was to be the venue of certain Chalcidian cases concerning exile, death, and privation of civic rights. **d4** ἄν ... **18a1** ἄν: the repetition helps the listener appreciate that ὥσπερ κτλ and συνεγιγνώσκετε κτλ both belong to the same clause, even though they are separated by the subordinate clause εἰ τῷ ὄντι ξένος ἐτύγχανον ὦν. There is a similar repetition in Xen. 6.29.

18a1 τῇ φωνῇ τε καὶ τῷ τρόπῳ: here φωνή seems to be accent in particular (as apparently at e.g. Ar. *Knights* 218), while τρόπος seems to cover other features that make a dialect alien. Yet τρόπος is an expression so indefinite that Socrates can easily extend it so that his own preferred way of addressing the court is part of his τρόπος of speaking. **a2** τοῦτο ... δίκαιον ‘this thing that justice requires’; at 34d6–35d8 Socrates will conclude this speech with an impassioned explanation why it would be wrong for him to ask the court, either to do anything other than what is just, or to do what is just for any reason other than its justice. **a3** τὸν μὲν τρόπον τῆς λέξεως ἔαν: likewise the speaker of Dem. 25.14, who poses as a reluctant litigant (25.13) contending against hardened orators (25.9), asks the jury to let him talk in his ordinary way. **a3** χείρων/4 βελτίων: worse or better sc. ‘than the way in which my prosecutors speak’. **a4–5** αὐτὸ δὲ τοῦτο σκοπεῖν καὶ τούτῳ τὸν νοῦν προσέχειν: by using two different phrases that mean ‘consider this’, Socrates stresses how important it is for the jurors to consider solely whether his remarks are just.

18a7–19a6: Early Defamation of Socrates

Long before the current charges were ever brought against Socrates, he was misrepresented in gossip, and on the stage, as the sort of person who would readily be thought likely to commit the offences with which he is currently charged. For fear that these misrepresentations might prejudice the court, Socrates will attempt to address them first.

18b3 τοὺς ἀμφὶ Ἄνυτον: this phrase, like Pl. 31a5 πειθόμενοι Ἀνύτῳ, suggests that even if the prosecution was brought officially in the name of Meletus, Anytus was the main force behind it. Certainly Anytus has left

a far bigger mark on the historical record than either Meletus or the third prosecutor Lycon (Pl. 23e4n., Pl. 24a1n.). **μᾶλλον οὐδὲν ἀληθές** ‘not one bit more true’ sc. than the charges made by Anytus. **β5 παραλαμβάνοντες** ‘taking in hand’ or ‘getting their grip on’, as in e.g. Pl. *Phd.* 82e–83a. **β6 ἔστιν τις Σωκράτης**: in combination with the proper name, the indefinite pronoun expresses disdain, as also at Pl. 19c3 Σωκράτη τινά, Pl. 23d2 Σωκράτης τις, Xen. 28.21 τις Ἀπολλόδωρος, Aeschin. 1.54 ‘Among the people who spend their time like that [sc. in dicing and cockfighting] ἔστι τις Πιττάλακος, a fellow who’s public property, a slave belonging to the city.’ **β7 τὰ τε μετέωρα φροντιστής**: μετέωρα is accusative because the verb φροντίζω can take the accusative; see Pl. 30a6–7n. Many used the term μετέωρα (‘lofty’, or ‘up above’) in the belief that we can at best speculate about what is literally in the sky above us. The term was hence used metaphorically of terrestrial matters, to indicate that they were the objects of uncontrolled speculation (Dem. 19.122). A typical representation of Socrates as thinker of lofty thoughts is this prayer of his in Ar. *Clouds* 264–6: ‘O lord and master, measureless Air, you who hold the earth aloft [μετέωρον], and bright Aither, and Clouds, holy goddesses who thunder and lighten, arise, o ye mistresses, and manifest yourselves up aloft to this thinker [τῷ φροντιστῇ μετέωροι].’ A little exchange between Socrates and someone else in Xen. *Smp.* 6.6–7 shows how double-edged talk of lofty thoughts can be: “So Socrates, are you the one they call the thinker?” “Isn’t that better,” said he, “than being called the thoughtless?” “Yes, so long as you’re not taken for a thinker about lofty things.” “Do you know of anything,” said Socrates, “loftier than the gods?” “But by Zeus,” he said, “it’s not gods they say you’re concerned with, but totally useless [ἀνωφελεστάτων] stuff.” **τὰ ὑπὸ γῆς ἅπαντα**: things below the earth are standardly paired with lofty things as objects of uncontrolled speculation. Another example is Hipp. *On ancient medicine* 1, contrasting medicine with ‘the obscure and baffling things on which one can attempt to speak only by relying on assumptions, such as τῶν μετεώρων ἢ τῶν ὑπὸ γῆν. If someone were to assess and speak of the state of these things, it still would not be clear, either to the speaker himself or to the audience, whether what he is saying is true or not. For there is no standard to which one should refer in order to get certain knowledge.’

18c1 τὸν ἥττω λόγον κρείττω ποιῶν: the sophist Protagoras coined this phrase for the rhetorical skill that he professed to teach (DK 80 A 21). In Ar. *Clouds*, 97–8, 112–18, a man who wants to cheat his creditors is getting his son to join Socrates’ school: ‘The people here teach anyone who’ll give them the money how to be victorious when he speaks, however just or unjust his cause may be [λέγοντα νικᾶν καὶ δίκαια καδίκαι] ... They say they’ve

got both the arguments, both the stronger, whatever it is, and the weaker [ἄμφω τῷ λόγῳ, τὸν κρείττον', ὅστις ἐστί, καὶ τὸν ἥττονα], and they say that one of these two arguments, the weaker one, is victorious when it speaks, even though its cause is less just. So if you don't mind learning this one, the unjust argument, I won't have to repay any of the debts that you've been running up, not one obol to anybody.' **c2 ταύτην τὴν φήμην κατασκεδάσαντες**: this favourite metaphor for spreading foul rumours recurs in Pl. *Minos* 320d-e and Lys. 10.24, and represents the rumours as dregs or the contents of chamber pots. There is more such talk in Demos. 18.50 'He has as it were spattered me with the dregs [ὥσπερ ἐωλοκρασίαν τινά μου ... κατασκεδάσας] of his villainy and crimes', and 54.4 'They punched them, poured chamber pots over them [τὰς αἰμίδας κατσκεδάννυσον], urinated on them, committing every kind of brutality and outrage.' **c3 θεοὺς νομίζειν** means 'to acknowledge, to respect, or to have a care for, the gods', and not simply to think that such beings exist. Thus Lys. 12.9 speaks of an unscrupulous liar who οὔτε θεοὺς οὔτ' ἀνθρώπους νομίζει. In Ar. *Clouds*, Socrates says to a new customer 'Will you acknowledge no god apart from those that we acknowledge: Chaos here, and Clouds, and Tongue, these three?' (422-3), and the views that 'Zeus does not exist' and 'Vortex now reigns; he has driven Zeus away' are ascribed to 'Socrates the Melian' (827-30; Diogenes the Melian was nicknamed ἄθεος). **c4 πολὺν χρόνον ἤδη**: twenty-four years at least. Socrates was tried in 399 and Aristophanes' *Clouds* was first staged in 423. **c6 παῖδες ὄντες ἐνιοὶ ὕμῶν καὶ μεράκια**: as in Pl. 23a7 ὀλίγου τινός ... καὶ οὐδενός ('little or nothing'), the καὶ here links alternatives (παῖδες are younger than μεράκια; they are contrasted also at Pl. 34d6). **ἀτεχνῶς**: see Pl. 17d3n. **c7 ἐρήμην** is short for ἐρήμην δίκην ('deserted lawsuit'), the technical term for a case where one of the litigants does not come to the court, and thus loses by default. **c7-18d1 ὃ δὲ πάντων ἀλογώτατον, ὅτι ...** 'And what's craziest of all is the fact that ...' Greek idiom, unlike English, happily omits the copula, and has here done so twice.

18d2 κωμωδοποιός: Socrates has in mind above all Aristophanes, the author of *Clouds*. Other comedians who mocked Socrates include Ameipsias (fr. 9 *PCG*), Callias (fr. 15 *PCG*), Eupolis (fr. 386, 395 *PCG*), and Teleclides (fr. 41-2 *PCG*). **d4 ἀναβιβάσασθαι** 'make them appear before the court'; literally, 'make them ἀναβαίνειν' as in Pl. 17d3 ἀναβέβηκα 'I have appeared in court as a litigant'; that is, make them mount the platform from which people spoke to the jurors. **d5 ἐλέγχειν**: this became all but a technical term for the distinctively Socratic way of testing people by asking them awkward

questions, questions that will trip all save the very wisest. A personification of Socratic bad reasoning uses this verb to describe its own questions in Ar. *Clouds* 1043. Socrates has a distinctive preference for discourse in which such testing is done. In consequence he disdains, not only gossip, but also delivering long speeches (e.g. Pl. *Grg.* 449b-c), interpreting poems (Pl. *Prt.* 347c-348a), and reading books (e.g. Pl. *Phdr.* 275d-e). **ἀτεχνῶς**: see Pl. 17d3n. **d6 μηδενὸς ἀποκρινομένου**: with this suggestion that if there is nobody to answer his questions then Socrates' task will be harder, contrast his suggestion in Pl. 18c6-7 that the first accusers had an easy task, since there was no one to defend against them. The two suggestions will be seen to be consistent once we accept that argumentative give-and-take favours truth, while one-sided gossip favours falsehood.

19a2-3 ἐν οὕτως ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ: at most one day would have been allocated for the entire case in which Socrates is now speaking, and that would have been, by Athenian standards, a lot: Socrates' case was a γραφή (Pl. *Euthphr.* 2a-b) or δημοσία δίκη ('public case'), and courts would decide private cases at the rate of four a day (Arist. *Ath.* 67). Elsewhere Socrates contrasts philosophers' freedom to pursue arguments at whatever length they fancy with litigants' enslavement to the clock, and complains that in the time allowed them, litigants cannot impart to jurors any understanding of the facts, but at best some accurate beliefs about them (Pl. *Tht.* 172c-173a, 201a-c, *Grg.* 455a). See also Pl. 37b1-2n. **a3-4 βουλοίμην ... πλὴν τί με ποιῆσαι ἀπολογούμενον**: with the wish that Socrates here expresses to 'get somewhere with my defence' contrast Xenophon's suggestions (Xen. 1.5-6, 32.10-11) that he deliberately chose to defend himself in a way that would get nowhere. If Socrates is at all sincere in his claims that he should defend himself in a way that will help the jury to reach the right verdict for the right reasons (Pl. 35b3-c6), then he is sincere in his hope to get somewhere with his defence. **a6 ἴτω ὅππῃ τῷ θεῷ φίλον**: such phrases, here as at e.g. Xen. *HG* 7.4.9, Pl. *Phdr.* 246d, express an entirely general reverence. There is no particular god in mind, any more than with the phrase ἂν θεὸς θέλῃ ('God willing'). **τῷ δὲ νόμῳ πειστίον καὶ ἀπολογητέον**: a recurrent theme in descriptions of Socrates is his regard for the rule of law and for procedural niceties. Other examples include Pl. 32a6-d7 and 34c1-35d5, his insistence that he execute the death sentence that had been passed upon him (Pl. *Cri.* 53a-c), and his response to those who passed a law against 'teaching the art of words' as a device to stop his conversations with young men: the law was not worded precisely enough to have its intended effect (Xen. *Mem.* 1.2.31-8).

19b1-20c4: Removing the Prejudice

The prejudice is that Socrates is in fact as he was represented in Aristophanes' Clouds: a man who studies natural science and rhetoric, and teaches them to others. Many of the jurors have heard Socrates talk, and can inform the others that he never even talks about such matters. Indeed, Socrates does not offer lessons in any subject whatsoever, not even on how to be a good human being, although he would be very pleased to have the knowledge that would enable him to do this.

19b3-4 ὥσπερ οὖν κατηγορῶν τὴν ἀντωμοσίαν δεῖ ἀναγνῶναι αὐτῶν 'I must, as if they were prosecutors [κατηγορῶν is, as the accent shows, genitive plural of the noun κατήγορος; κατηγορῶν would be a participle of κατηγορέω] read out their sworn statement.' Before a case ever came to court, the accuser and the accused had to take oaths, one affirming the charges, the other denying them. Each of these rival oaths was recorded in a written document called an ἀντωμοσία (see e.g. Harp. s.v. ἀντωμοσία). These documents were available to the jury that tried the case; thus in Isae. 5.2 and 4, the speaker asks the clerk to read them out: καὶ μοι ἀνάγνωθι τὴν ἀντωμοσίαν.

b5 περιεργάζεται: Socrates describes himself with compounds of περί at Pl. 23b4 and 31c5 περιῶν, and Pl. 30a7 περιέρχομαι. There, as here, the insinuation is that Socrates is something of a fusspot or busybody. οὐράνια: these are the same as the μετέωρα of Pl. 18b7. **b5-19c1** καὶ τὸν ἥττω λόγον κρείττω ποιῶν: see Pl. 18c1n.

19c1-2 τοιαύτη τίς ἐστίν 'It is something like that.' The τίς here is the indefinite pronoun, not the interrogative. It has an accent because it is followed by the enclitic ἐστίν.

c2 ταῦτα γὰρ ἰωρᾶτε καὶ αὐτοὶ ἐν τῇ Ἀριστοφάνους κωμωδίᾳ: jurors too young to have seen the original performance of this comedy would no doubt have been able to see reruns at rural festivals (Aeschin. 1.157, Pl. *Rep.* 475d).

c3 Σωκράτη τινά: contemptuously indefinite, as in Pl. 18b6. **περιφερόμενον, φάσκοντά τε ἀεροβατεῖν**: in Ar. *Clouds* 225, Socrates makes his entrance announcing 'I tread the air and look down upon the sun.' He may even have been swung in on the crane, like an ἀπὸ μηχανῆς θεός.

c5 περί governs ὦν in c4. A dissyllabic 'preposition' can be postponed until after the word that it governs; when it is postponed, its accent shifts, as here, from the ultimate to the penultimate syllable. **c6** μὴ in effect introduces a final clause. Socrates points out that he has no disrespect for those who have this knowledge 'in the hope that I may thus avoid being prosecuted by Meletus' or 'for fear that I may otherwise be prosecuted by Meletus' on their behalf.

c6-7 τοσαύτας δίκας: that is, on charges as many or as great as those against which Socrates is now defending himself. **c7** ἀλλὰ γὰρ 'But that is all by the bye, for the important thing is ...'; see *GP* 101-2.

c7-19d1 ἐμοὶ τούτων ... οὐδὲν μέτεστιν: Xen. *Mem.* 1.1.11-15

gives several arguments that Socrates ‘used to prove the folly of those who think about [φροντίζοντας; see Pl. 18b7n.] such things’ as ‘what are the forces whereby each celestial event occurs [τίσιν ἀνάγκαις ἕκαστα γίγνεται τῶν οὐρανίων]’: Can these thinkers really believe that their understanding of things human is good enough for them to start thinking about things divine? Are not the results of their investigations as wildly divergent from one another as the opinions of madmen? And can they hope that their investigations will give them control over the weather? Or, failing that, can they be satisfied with mere knowledge of causes that does not lead to control? Nevertheless, in Pl. *Phd.*, Socrates recalls that ‘as a young man, I had an amazing lust for the sort of wisdom that they call “the investigation of nature [περὶ φύσεως ἱστορίαν]”’ (96a), and in particular that he enquired into ‘conditions pertaining to the heavens and the earth [τὰ περὶ τὸν οὐρανὸν τε καὶ τὴν γῆν πάθη]’ (96c), even reading Anaxagoras (Pl. 26d5n.) in the hope, alas unfulfilled, of finding out more about such matters (97b–99c). Moreover, in Xen. *Mem.* 4.7.7, Socrates gives arguments against Anaxagoras that debate the detail of his theories about the celestial, and do not confine themselves to arguing that theorising about the celestial is in general misconceived: ‘When he said that fire and sun are the same, he forgot that people can gaze on fire with ease, but cannot look at the sun, and that when sun shines on people, their skins get darker, but not when fire shines on them. He forgot also that not one of the things that sprout from the earth can grow properly without the rays of the sun, whereas all of them perish when heated by fire. And in saying that the sun was a fiery stone, he forgot also that when a stone is in a fire, it neither shines nor lasts long, whereas the sun abides, for the whole of time, the shiniest thing of all.’

19d1–2 ἀξιῶ ὑμᾶς ἀλλήλους διδάσκειν τε καὶ φράζειν: such requests were common in Athenian courts. Other examples include: And. 1.46 ‘Those of you who were present, gentlemen, bring these facts to mind and inform [διδάσκετε] the others of them’; Dem. 47.44 ‘I ask those of you who were on the Council during Agathocles’ term of office to tell [φράζειν] the people sitting next to them that what I am saying is true’; Lys. 10.1 ‘I don’t expect to have any shortage of witnesses, gentlemen of the jury, for I can see that many of you who are judging this case were among those present when . . .’. **d3** φράζετε οὖν: this ‘resumptive οὖν’ (GP 428–9), together with the echo of ἀξιῶ . . . φράζειν, indicates that Socrates is returning to the main point after his parenthetical remark. **d7** ἀλλὰ γάρ: see Pl. 19c7n. **οὔτε τούτων οὐδὲν ἐστίν, οὐδέ γε** ‘not one of these things is true, nor for that matter . . .’. This arrangement of οὔτε and οὐδέ γε builds up to a climactic denial, as shown in e.g. Pl. *Rep.* 499b οὔτε πόλις οὔτε πολιτεία οὐδέ γ’ ἀνὴρ, 608b οὔτε τιμὴ . . . οὔτε χρήμασιν οὔτε ἀρχῇ οὐδεμιᾷ οὐδέ γε ποιητικῇ.

19e1 παιδεύειν ἐπιχειρῶ ἀνθρώπους καὶ χρήματα πράττομαι: this talk of ‘educating people’ and ‘charging money’ reformulates charges formulated in the imaginary indictment at Pl. 19b4–c1 as ‘making the weaker argument stronger’ and ‘teaching these things to others’. For rhetoric was the central element in the higher education or παιδεία purveyed by sophists like Gorgias, Prodicus, and Hippias; and at Pl. 33a1–b6 Socrates will distinguish teaching in particular from imparting knowledge in general, and will equate being a teacher with imparting knowledge for money.

e2 ἐπεὶ is elliptical for ‘which is a pity, since’. There are two such ellipses in Pl. *Prt.* 335c ἐγὼ δὲ τὰ μακρὰ ταῦτα ἀδύνατος, ἐπεὶ ἐβουλόμην ἂν οἷός τ’ εἶναι (‘I can’t cope with this long stuff, *which is a pity*, since I would have liked to be able to’) and εἰμι ἐπεὶ καὶ ταῦτ’ ἂν ἴσως οὐκ ἀηδῶς σου ἤκουον (‘I’m off, *which is a pity*, since I might well have enjoyed hearing this from you’). Perhaps in actual speech, such an ἐπεὶ was preceded by some gesture meaning ‘It’s a pity.’ See Pl. 38b3n. on other ellipses.

e3 Γοργίας: Gorgias ‘made the most money of anyone we recall’ (Isoc. 15.155), ‘one hundred minas from each of his pupils’ (D.S. 12.53.2). 1 talent = 60 minas, 1 mina = 100 drachmas, 1 drachma = 6 obols; there was an allowance of 3 obols for one day’s service on a jury (e.g. Ar. *Knights* 51) or in the Assembly (Arist. *Ath.* 41.3); a cripple incapable of work, and with an estate of less than 3 minas, got a maintenance grant of 2 obols a day (Arist. *Ath.* 49.4). For other sums of money, see the next two notes, Pl. 20a5–6n., 20c1, 23c1–2n., 26e1, 36b1, 38b8 and Xen. 2.7n.

Πρόδικος: admission to the cheapest of Prodicus’ lectures cost one drachma, and admission to the most exciting cost fifty (Pl. *Cra.* 384b–c, Arist. *Rh.* 1415b16).

e4 Ἰππίας: in Pl. *Hp. Ma.* 282e, Hippias boasts that while in Sicily ‘in a very short time, I made much more than one hundred and fifty minas, and more than twenty minas from one single tiny little spot, Inycum’.

e4–20a3 τούτων γὰρ ἕκαστος κτλ: similar descriptions of the life of a sophist are given by Socrates in Pl. *Thg.* 127e–128a, and by Protagoras in Pl. *Prt.* 316c–d. The main difference is that Protagoras, himself a sophist, does not mention the financial side of things.

20a1 τούτους: the young men.

πείθουσι: Socrates’ syntax is loose. The verb is plural, as if its subject were Gorgias, Prodicus and Hippias, in spite of the intervening singular ‘each of them is able’.

a2 συνουσίας: like the English ‘intercourse’, this word shifts between associations in general and sexual associations in particular. A context like the present can bring the sexual implications of the word into prominence, both because the attraction that young men felt for sophists could seem sexual (e.g. Pl. *Prt.* 317d), and because young men traditionally were educated by their lovers (e.g. Pl. *Hipparch.* 229c, Aeschin. 1.140, on the educational

effects of the love between the tyrannicides Harmodius and Aristogeiton). **α3 ἐπεί και ἄλλος ...**: this amounts to 'The reason why I have mentioned those three stellar examples is that there is actually a fourth ...' **α3 δν ... 4 ἡσθόμην**: a genitive can also be used for the object of αἰσθάνομαι, as in 22c5 ἡσθόμην αὐτῶν. There is no difference in meaning; thus Arist. *De Anima* describes the objects of αἰσθάνομαι as both τῶν ὄντων (409b25) and τὰ ὄντα (410b16). **α5-6 Καλλία τῷ Ἱππονίκου**: Callias inherited the enormous wealth of his father Hipponicus (on whom see Xen. 2.7n.). His extravagant expenditures on sophists are mentioned also in Pl. *Cra.* 391c and Xen. *Smp.* 1.5. He was the host of the lavish gatherings described in Pl. *Prt.* and Xen. *Smp.* By 387 BC he had reduced his fortune to less than two talents (Lys. 19.48; to calibrate this sum, see Pl. 19e3n. on Γοργίας); by the time he died, he was 'unable to afford the daily necessities' (Ath. 12.537c). **α6 ἐστὸν γὰρ αὐτῷ δύο υἱέ**: one of these sons was another Hipponicus (And. 1.126). The other may have been the Protarchus son of Callias with whom Socrates talks in Pl. *Phlb.* **α6-7 ἦν δ' ἐγώ** 'I said'. ἦν is the first person singular imperfect of ἡμί 'I say', a verb rarely used in Attic except in this standard phrase and in the equally standard ἦ δ' ὅς 'he said'. **α7 εἰ μὲν σου τῷ υἱῇ πῶλῳ ἡ μόσχῳ ἐγενέσθην**: as Pl. 25b1-5 also illustrates, Socrates liked comparisons between animal husbandry and looking after human beings. As Xen. *Mem.* 1.2.32 and 37-8 show, those with a more inflated opinion of themselves found such comparisons offensive.

20b3-4 τίνα αὐτοῖν ἐν νῶι ἔχεις ἐπιστάτην λαβεῖν; Aeschin. fr. 62 SSR has Socrates discuss with Callias the education of his son, and recommend that the boy be sent to the courtesan Aspasia. **β4-5 ἀνθρωπίνης τε και πολιτικῆς**: the human being is, after all, as Aristotle often tells us, by nature a political animal (e.g. *Pol.* 1253a2-3). **ἐπιστάτην ... ἐπιστήμων**: Plato likes to pun on the words for knowing and being put in charge of, presumably because such puns remind us that knowledge is the proper qualification for being put in charge of something: there are more such puns in *Prt.* 312d, *Rep.* 443c, *Chrm.* 174d-e, *Plt.* 261c. **β6-7 ἦ δ' ὅς ... ἦν δ' ἐγώ**: see 20a6-7n. **β7 πόσου**: the genitive is the usual case in which to express a price; see Pl. 28a4n. **β7-20c1 Εὐνῆος ... Πάριος, πέντε μνῶν**: the lack of connecting particles (contrast the καίς connecting the questions to which these are answers) is a device that Arist. *Rh.* 1413b17-22 and Demetrius *On Style* 193-4 describe as particularly 'stagey [ὑποκριτική]'; for other uses of asyndeton, see Pl. 33c2-4n. Evenus of Paros is described in Pl. *Phd.* 60d-61c as a poet and a philosopher, and in Quintilian 1.10.17 as maintaining that literature is subordinate to music and as offering instruction in both arts. Some fragments of his poetry are gathered in *IEG*; Pl. *Phdr.* 267a records some literary devices

and terminology that he invented. A complication is that according to Eratosthenes (*FGH* 241 fr. 3) there were two elegiac poets both called Evenus, both from Paros. To calibrate the sum of five minas, see Pl. 19e3n. on Γοργίας.

20c1 ἔχοι ... **c2** διδάσκει: the optative ἔχοι suggests that Socrates has no direct knowledge that Evenus has this skill; the indicative διδάσκει suggests that Socrates does have direct knowledge that five minas is a bargain price for instruction in this skill. Compare the shifting moods in Pl. *Prt.* 335b ‘I realised ὅτι οὐκ ἤρεσεν ... καὶ ὅτι οὐκ ἐβλήσοι’ and *Euthphr.* 16a–b ‘showing him ὅτι ... γέγονα καὶ ὅτι οὐκέτι ... αὐτοσχεδιάζω οὐδὲ καινοτομῶ ... καὶ ... ὅτι ... βιωσοίμην’, where the optatives express future facts, of which Socrates’ knowledge is only inferential, and the indicatives express past and present facts, of which his knowledge is direct. **c2** ἁμελῶς literally means ‘harmoniously’, and so is a neat metaphor for congenial pricing by a teacher of, among other things, music. **c3** ἀλλ’ οὐ γάρ: see Pl. 19c7n.

20c5–22e5: What Led to Socrates’ Reputation

There is however something distinctive about Socrates. The Delphic oracle asserted that nobody was wiser than he was. This puzzled him, since he was conscious of no special expertise, but was certain that the oracle would never assert a falsehood. So to find out what the oracle meant, and to vindicate its truthfulness, Socrates set out to test the wisdom of others. He questioned all sorts of people thought by themselves and by others to be especially wise, but his questions kept revealing that they were in fact just as ignorant of any important matter as Socrates himself. Socrates’ wisdom, such as it is, consists therefore in the fact that, unlike those whom he questioned, he does not imagine that he understands anything important.

20c5 ὑπολάβοι ἂν οὖν τις ὡμῶν ἴσως: orators more grand than Socrates use such formulae to introduce an imaginary objection: thus Xen. *HG* 6.1.7 τάχα οὖν ὑπολάβοι ἂν τις, Dem. 24.154 ἴσως μὲν οὖν ἂν τις ὑπολάβοι, Aeschin. 3.21 ὑπολάβοι ἂν τις. For other ways of envisaging an objection, see Pl. 28b3n. **c5–6** τὸ σὸν τί ἐστι πρᾶγμα: ‘What is it that you do?’ See LSJ s.v. πρᾶγμα II.4.b. The same question, in more or less the same words, is raised twice by Alcibiades: Pl. *Alc. Ma.* 104d ‘I wonder ὅτι ποτ’ ἐστι τὸ σὸν πρᾶγμα’, and Pl. *Smp.* 217c ‘I decided that I had to find out τί ἐστι τὸ πρᾶγμα.’ **c6–8** σοῦ γε οὐδὲν τῶν ἄλλων περιττότερον πραγματευομένου ... εἰ μὴ τι ἐπραττες ἄλλοιον ἢ οἱ πολλοί: these two clauses mean almost the same thing. The difference is that the former, being negated by οὐδέν, means ‘when you were doing nothing special’, while the latter means ‘if ...’. Such an echo, at the end of the sentence, of its starting point is a favourite mannerism of Plato’s. Other examples

include 27d4–7 εἴπερ δαίμονας ἡγοῦμαι ... ἐπειδήπερ γε δαίμονας ἡγοῦμαι, *Crat.* 507c–d τὸν βουλούμενον, ὡς ἔοικεν, εὐδαίμονα εἶναι ... εἰ μέλλει εὐδαίμων εἶναι, *Pril.* 344c7–8 οὐ τὸν κείμενον τις ἂν καταβάλῃ ... d1 τὸν δὲ κείμενον οὐ.

20d1 ἵνα μὴ ἡμεῖς περὶ σοῦ αὐτοσχεδιάζωμεν ‘so that we can come to a properly deliberated conclusion about you’; αὐτοσχεδιάζω means ‘improvise, make it up as one goes along’. d2 ὑμῖν πειράσσομαι ἀποδείξει: this very phrase recurs in *Lys.* 23.1; variants of it are frequent in other orators (e.g. *Ant.* 5.19 πειράσσομαι ἑμαυτὸν ἀνατίον ἐπιδείξει, *Isae.* 9.1 πειράσσομαι δ’ ὑμῖν ἐπιδείξει, *Dem.* 20.11 πειράσσομαι δεῖξει, *Aeschin.* 3.238 πειράσσομαι μεγάλῳ σημείῳ διδάξει). d3 ὄνομα ‘reputation’. d4–5 πᾶσαν ὑμῖν τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἐρῶ: Socrates repeats his promise from *Pl.* 17b7–8. Such a promise is almost a cliché: *Dem.* 23.187 πρὸς ὑμᾶς ἅπασαν ἐρῶ τὴν ἀλήθειαν and 39.3 πᾶσα γὰρ εἰρήσεται ἡ ἀλήθεια. d5–6 διὰ σοφίαν τινὰ ... ποῖαν δὴ σοφίαν ταύτην; it is not uncommon in dialectic for one speaker to interrupt another with such a request for clarification: see e.g. *Pl. Laws* 821b καταπευδόμεθα ... τὸ ποῖον δὴ ψεῦδος;., *Rep.* 503e–504a τὰ μέγιστα μαθήματα ... ἀλλὰ ποῖα δὴ λέγεις μαθήματα μέγιστα;., and *Rep.* 429c σωτηρίαν ... ποῖαν δὴ σωτηρίαν;. There seems to be no parallel in oratory for a speaker’s interrupting himself with such a request, as Socrates does here. See also *Pl.* 27b7–c8, where Socrates attempts to make his speech more like dialectic by imagining remarks from Meletus.

20e1 οὓς ἄρτι ἔλεγον: the anonymous τις in 19c5, Gorgias, Prodicus and Hippias in 19e3–3, and Evenus in 20b7. e1–2 μείζω τινὰ ἢ κατ’ ἀνθρώπων σοφίαν σοφοὶ εἶναι: Socrates’ point is that *if* these people were wise, then it would be with a wisdom greater than the human; hence his optative εἶναι, to avoid saying that these people are in fact wise. e4 μέγα λέγειν: like its literal English translation ‘talking big’, this idiom means boasting; unlike its literal English translation, this idiom is grand enough for epic, choral lyric, and tragedy (e.g. *Hom. Od.* 3.227, *Pind. N.* 5.14, *Eur. Heracles* 1244). e5 οὐ γὰρ ἐμὸν ἐρῶ τὸν λόγον ὃν ἂν λέγω: this is reminiscent of a famous phrase from Euripides’ lost play, *Melanippe the Wise* fr. 484 *TrGF* οὐκ ἐμὸς ὁ μῦθος, ἀλλ’ ἐμῆς μητρὸς πάρα. A reminiscence of this phrase is unfortunate, since the myth which its speaker has received from his mother concerns heaven and earth and the origins of life – topics in which Socrates declares he has no interest. There is an outright quotation of the same passage in *Pl. Smp.* 177a. Presumably the reminiscence of the phrase here is deliberate on the part of Plato, but not on that of Socrates. ἀξιόχρεων is the masculine accusative singular of ἀξιόχρεως ‘trustworthy’, agreeing with e5–6 τὸν λέγοντα: i.e. the originator of the λόγος that Socrates has just mentioned. e7 τὸν θεὸν τὸν ἐν Δελφοῖς: this is a standard way of referring to Apollo in his capacity as oracle, and recurs at

Thuc. 1.134.4, Hdt. 1.50.1, Xen. *Mem.* 4.3.16. *Χαιρεφῶντα*: he appears in Pl. *Grg.* and *Chrm.* In Ar. *Clouds* 143–68, he and Socrates together investigate how many flea-feet fleas can jump, and through which end – mouth or rear – gnats buzz. His strikingly pale complexion led to repeated jokes about his cadaverous appearance (Ar. *Clouds* 503–4, *Wasps* 1413, *Birds* 1553–64). *γάρ* indicates that Socrates is enlarging on the evidence given by Apollo. Such a *γάρ* is called ‘explanatory’, and ‘is most commonly found ... after τεκμήριον δέ, σημεῖον δέ, and similar expressions’ (GP 58–9); here it is found after μάρτυρα in 20e6.

21a1 ὅμων τῷ πλήθει ἑταῖρος: that is, Chaerephon took the democratic side in Athenian politics. The term ἑταῖρος (‘comrade’) to indicate political loyalty is standard (Pl. *Grg.* 510a τῆς ὑπαρχούσης πολιτείας ἑταῖρον), as is the term πλήθος (‘mass’) to indicate the Athenian people (Pl. *Pl.* 291d ἡ τοῦ πλήθους ἀρχή, δημοκρατία τοῦνομα κληθεῖσα). For the description of the mass as ὅμων (‘your’, or ‘consisting of you’), see Pl. 31c6n. on τὸ πλήθος τὸ ὁμότερον. a2 συνέφυγε τὴν φυγὴν ταύτην καὶ μεθ’ ὅμων κατήλθε: Socrates alludes to the events of 403 that are described in Xen. *HG* 2.4 and Arist. *Ath.* 38: an oligarchic junta (the Thirty: see Pl. 32c4–5) held power in the city of Athens, and democratic forces gathered in exile in the Piraeus, before they were able to return to the city. Because the jury are the ‘men of Athens’ (Pl. 17a1), this exile and return can be described as that of the jurors. Similar are the second person plural verbs ἐφεύγετε and κατήλθετε in Lys. 12.96 and 11.1 for the same exile and return. If ταύτην is not a corruption of τὴν αὐτήν, then it presumably is used ‘of what is familiar’ (LSJ s.v. οὗτος C.1.3.b): ‘the exile we all remember’. a2–3 ἴστε δὲ οἷος ἦν Χαιρεφῶν, ὡς σφοδρὸς ἐφ’ ὅτι ὁρμήσειν: Chaerephon shows the same character in Pl. *Chrm.* 153a–b, where Socrates describes how he entered a very crowded gymnasium: ‘and Chaerephon, madman that he is, leapt up from the middle of the crowd and ran to me and grabbed me by the hand and said “Socrates! How did you survive the battle?”’ a4 ἤρετο γὰρ δὲ εἰ τις ἑμοῦ εἴη σοφώτερος: the more usual pattern was to consult the oracle in the hope that it would declare that one was oneself in some way supreme, and then to get the answer that someone else was supreme in that way. Thus a rich man from Magnesia who regularly made large sacrifices asked ‘Who offers the most acceptable sacrifices?’, and got the answer ‘Clearchus of Methudrion’ (Theopompus *FGH* 115 fr. 344); Gyges asked whether any mortal was happier than him, and got the answer ‘Yes, Aglaus of Psophis’ (Valerius Maximus 7.1.2); Chilon (or perhaps Anacharsis) asked ‘Who is wiser than me?’ (or perhaps ‘Is anyone wiser than me?’), and got the answer ‘I declare that Myson of Chen in Oeta is better fitted out than you with sturdy wits’ (D.L. 1.30 and 106).

(See Fontenrose (1978) for a catalogue of responses from the Delphic oracle, both real and fictive.) 25-6 ἀνέλεν οὖν ἢ Πυθία μηδὲνα σοφώτερον εἶναι: according to Xen. 14.6-7, the answer was that 'nobody was more free-spirited, more just or more temperate than' Socrates. If Socrates had negated this infinitive of reported statement with the more usual οὐ, that would have reported a simple denial. By negating it with μή instead, he suggests that the denial had a certain resolve: that nobody is wiser than Socrates is how the oracle insists things are to be. This is why μή is common when reporting oaths, verdicts and (as here) oracular responses. 26 ὁ ἀδελφός ... αὐτοῦ: i.e. Chaerecrates. Xen. *Mem.* 2.3 describes how Socrates healed a rift between the two brothers. 26-7 ὑμῖν ... μαρτυρήσει: here we must imagine a brief pause in which Chaerecrates steps forward to confirm what Socrates has said; there is a longer pause for witnesses at Pl. 32e1.

21b3 τί ποτε λέγει ὁ θεός, καὶ τί ποτε αἰνίττεται; the god has given a simple 'no' to the simple yes/no question 'Is anyone wiser than Socrates?' It is therefore, on one level, perfectly clear what the god is saying (and certainly much clearer than was usual with oracular pronouncements). The puzzle was rather how the god could be saying what he did and be telling the truth. 23-4 ἐγὼ γὰρ δὴ οὔτε μέγα οὔτε μικρὸν σύνοιδα ἑμαυτῷ σοφός ὢν 'I am conscious that I am not wise in any respect whatsoever.' The pair of polar expressions μέγα and μικρὸν indicate generality (Pl. 30a3-4n.). Socrates makes the same claim in Pl. 22d1-2 'I am conscious of knowing nothing to speak of.' They are the same claim, since to be σοφός is not simply to know something, but to know something important, as shown in Pl. *Rep.* 428c-429a on how the ἐπιστήμη of wise rulers is 'the only one among all the other ἐπιστήμαι that deserves to be called σοφία', and in Arist. *Met.* 1059a18 'σοφία is a sort of ἐπιστήμη that concerns first principles.' 25 οὐ γὰρ δήπου ψεύδεται γὰρ: i.e. the god's remark must be a riddling statement of a truth, since it cannot be a lie. See GP 268 on the use of this combination of particles in 'supporting a positive statement by an appeal to the impossibility of its opposite'. οὐ γὰρ θεμὶς αὐτῷ: it is unwise to use such an argument when accused of not accepting the gods that the city accepts. For this argument goes against usual Greek beliefs. Thus Pind. *Pythians* 9.42-3 has Cheiron say to Apollo 'Your honeyed passion made you turn, and speak those words askew, even you, whom falsehood cannot in holiness touch [τὸν οὐ θεμὶτόν ψεύδει θιγεῖν]'; Xenophanes DK 21 B 12 complains that Homer and Hesiod ascribed to gods ἀθεμίστια ἔργα, one of which was deceiving one another; and Aesch. fr. 350 *TrGF* (from a play staged by public authority in the city of Athens) has Thetis complain to Apollo that he gave her a false prophecy, which would mean that some

falsehood is told, if not by the god Apollo, then by the goddess Thetis. b6 ἡπόρουσιν: the god had on Socrates the effect that Socrates came to have on others: see 23d4n.

21c1 ὡς ἐνταῦθα εἶπερ που ἐλέγξων τὸ μαντεῖον 'on the understanding that here, if anywhere, I would refute the oracle'. And hence Socrates will vindicate the oracle if he attempts to refute it here, and fails. Socrates' attempts to refute the oracle therefore imply no disrespect. Even so, it may be risky to talk about refuting oracles when charged with irreligion. c2-3 σὺ δ' ἐμὲ ἔφησθα: it is not quite clear how this should be filled out (cf. Pl. 36b6n.) to give a full sentence. Socrates ought to mean 'You said that nobody is wiser than me' (Pl. 21a6); but the immediate context suggests something more like 'You said that I am wiser than him.' c3-5 διασκοπῶν ... καὶ διαλεγόμενος ... ἔδοξέ μοι: it is as if Socrates originally planned to follow his nominative participles ('as I scrutinised the man ... and talked to him') with a main verb of which they could be the subject, such as ὤμην, but then changed plan to have the nearly synonymous ἔδοξέ μοι instead. Such changes can occur even in fairly formal discourse: e.g. Hdt. 8.87.2 ἡ οὐκ ἔχουσα διαφυγεῖν ... ἔδοξέ οἱ τότε ποιῆσαι ('she, not being able to escape, ... the following plan came to her'). c4 τις τῶν πολιτικῶν 'one of the politicians', by contrast with πολιτικός τις ('a politician'). The genitive plural indicates membership in a recognisable group. Socrates denies that he belongs to this group in Pl. *Grg.* 473c οὐκ εἰμι τῶν πολιτικῶν. In Pl. 24a1 he calls this group τῶν ῥητόρων.

21d2 τοῦτου μὲν: the δέ clause that would contrast with this is too obvious to be spelled out. There is another such omission of the obvious at Pl. 41b1. d3-4 κινδυνεύει μὲν γὰρ ἡμῶν οὐδέτερος οὐδὲν καλὸν κάγαθόν εἶδέναι: this is compatible with Socrates' claims to know things in Pl. 29b5-7 and 37b7-c1; it merely implies that the things he does know (like 'Disobeying superiors is bad') are not particularly impressive. d4-5 ὥσπερ οὖν: see GP 421: 'οὖν, following περ, is sometimes used after relative adjectives and adverbs (in particular ὥσπερ) ... to stress the correspondence between idea and fact, the objective reality of something which in the main clause is merely supposed.' d5-6 σμικρῶι τινι αὐτῶι τοῦτῶι σοφώτερος: for the idea that such awareness of one's intellectual limits is itself a modest form of wisdom, compare Ar. *Clouds* 841-2 (quoted in Pl. 17a2n. on ἐμαντοῦ ἐπελαθόμεν) on what can be learnt in Socrates' school. Contrast Pl. *Thl.* 173c-e on consummate philosophers: 'Right from their youth, they do not know the way to the marketplace, nor the location of a lawcourt or council chamber, or any other public meeting place; they neither see nor hear laws and decrees, whether written or spoken'; in fact the consummate philosopher is so

ignorant of such trivia that 'in the case of all these things, he doesn't even know that he doesn't know them [ταῦτα πάντ' οὐδ' ὅτι οὐκ οἶδεν, οἶδεν]'; instead, 'his intellect wings its way, as Pindar put it, "beneath the earth" [τῶς τε γὰρ ὑπένερθε] and "above the heaven" [οὐρανοῦ θ' ὑπερ]'; that is, he studies things that, in Pl. 18b6-7 and 19b4-c5, Socrates denies ever studying. δ6 & μὴ οἶδα: the μὴ marks this relative clause as general and indefinite, so that it amounts to 'those things, whatever they may be, that I do not know'. Contrast the οὐ in Pl. *Meno* 84b δ οὐκ ᾔδει 'that identified thing which he did not know'.

21ε3-4 αἰσθανόμενος μὲν καὶ λυπούμενος καὶ δεδιώς ὅτι ἀπηχ-
θανόμην 'noticing with displeasure and apprehension that I was making
myself very unpopular'. αἰσθανόμενος μὲν ... ὁμῶς δὲ ἀναγκαῖον
ἔδοκει: the particles μὲν and δέ normally mark 'a grammatically co-ordi-
nated antithesis', but a 'transition from participial to finite construction
[as here] is often found' (*GP* 369). There is a similar lack of coordination
in Pl. 29d7-e2. ε4-5 τὸ τοῦ θεοῦ: this is a respectfully periphrastic way
of referring to the god himself, and is grandiose enough for tragedy: e.g.
Eur. *Tr.* 43 τὸ τοῦ θεοῦ τε παραλίπων τό τ' εὐσεβές ('neglecting both the god
and piety'). ε5 περὶ πλείστου ποιείσθαι 'treat as most important'; see
Pl. 30a2-3n., Xen. 22.19-20n. on περὶ παντός ἐποιεῖτο.

22α1 νῆ τὸν κύνα: Plato's Socrates swears 'by the dog' (in full 'by the dog,
the god of the Egyptians': Pl. *Grg.* 482b) fourteen times; a slave swears this
oath in Ar. *Wasps* 83; Xenophon's Socrates does not swear by the dog at all,
and indeed declares that he never swears by any god apart from the
Olympians (24.33-4). An oath by the dog is perhaps tactless from some-
one charged with introducing novel supernatural beings. Such oaths were
said to have been required by Rhadamanthys (Socrates *FHG* 461 fr. 3),
the great judge of olden days (Pl. 41a3), when 'their greatest oath, in all
they said, was "dog", and then "goose"; and they would not talk of gods'
(Cratinus fr. 249 *PCG*). Such oaths can then be construed as piously
avoiding casual blasphemy; but they can also be chosen by those who
wish to perjure themselves safely (like the cheat who swears by the goose
in Ar. *Birds* 521). α2 ἡ μὴν: this pair of particles marks a very confident
assertion, and 'is most frequently employed in oaths and pledges' (*GP*
350). α3 ὀλίγου δαίν: see Pl. 17a2n. on ὀλίγου. α5-6 τὴν ἐμὴν
πλάνην: this compares Socrates to Odysseus, 'who wandered [πλάγχθη]
far and wide' (Hom. *Od.* 1.1-2); Pl. *Prt.* 315c-d has another comparison
between Socrates and Odysseus. α6 ὥσπερ πόνους τινάς: this com-
pares Socrates to Heracles, who 'performed many labours' (Ar. *Clouds*
1049 πλείστους πόνους πονῆσαι, Soph. *Phil.* 1419 ὅσους πονήσας ...
πόνους); Pl. *Euthd.* 297c-e, and *Phd.* 89c have other comparisons between
Socratic dialectic and the labours of Heracles. πονοῦντος is a possessive

genitive, linked with ἐμὴν in Pl. 22a5; we may think of it as agreeing with the ἐμοῦ 'of me' to which that ἐμὴν is more or less equivalent. α6-7 ἵνα μοι καὶ ἀνέλεγκτος ἡ μαντεία γένοιτο: the idea is like that of Pl. 21b6-c3: Socrates wanted to prove the oracle irrefutable, but could do so only by subjecting it to prolonged and strenuous attempts at refutation and finding that they all failed. α7-22b1 τοὺς ποιητὰς τοὺς τε τῶν τραγωιδιῶν καὶ τοὺς τῶν διθυράμβων: of all the types of poetry composed and performed in Socrates' time, the most grandiose were tragedy and dithyramb.

22b2 ἐπ' αὐτοφώρῳ is a metaphor from catching a thief (φῶρ) in the act. It was as clichéd as the English metaphor 'red-handed' from catching a murderer with blood on his hands. β3-4 τὰ ποιήματα ἃ μοι ἰδόκει μάλιστα πεπραγματεῦσθαι αὐτοῖς: we can only guess what Socrates means by the poems to which the poets had, he thought, devoted most effort. Perhaps, given the way that he has just singled out the poets who composed tragedies and dithyramb, he means poems in the most elevated style. β4 διηρώτων ἄν 'I kept on interrogating'. The bare imperfect ἦρώτων would mean 'I kept asking'; διὰ intensifies the asking (turning 'ask' to 'interrogate'); ἄν emphasises its frequency (turning 'kept' to 'kept on'). β6 ὥς ἔπος γὰρ εἶπεῖν: cf. Pl. 17a3n. ὀλίγου: see Pl. 17a2n. on ὀλίγου. οἱ παρόντες 'the bystanders'. The poets are therefore gratuitously humiliated when Socrates discovers how ignorant they are; for Socrates' ostensible purpose of testing the oracle by examining poets does not require the presence of anybody other than Socrates and the poet under examination.

22c1-2 οὐ σοφαὶ ποιοῖεν ἃ ποιοῖεν, ἀλλὰ φύσει τινί: contrast Pl. *Meno* 98c-d, where Socrates says that not only knowledge (ἐπιστήμη) but also correct belief (ὀρθὴ δόξα) can result in successful action, and stresses that neither comes by nature. c2-3 ἐνθουσιάζοντες ὥσπερ οἱ θεομάντιες καὶ οἱ χρησμοῖδοι: καὶ γὰρ οὗτοι λέγουσι μὲν πολλὰ καὶ καλὰ, ἴσασι δὲ οὐδὲν ὧν λέγουσι: Pl. *Meno* 99c has Socrates claim that the great statesmen of Athens are 'in point of wisdom [φρονεῖν] no better than fortune tellers and diviners [οἱ χρησμοῖδοι τε καὶ οἱ θεομάντιες]; for they too [καὶ γὰρ οὗτοι], when a god enters them [ἐνθουσιάζοντες], say lots that is true [λέγουσιν μὲν ἀληθῆ καὶ πολλὰ], but know nothing of what they say [ἴσασι δὲ οὐδὲν ὧν λέγουσιν]'. Not so close verbally, but still making similar points about understanding, inspiration and poetry, are Pl. *Ion* 533e, *Laws* 719c, *Phdr.* 245a. c5-6 ἡισθόμεν αὐτῶν ... οἰομένων ... σοφωτάτων εἶναι ἀνθρώπων: this reports as indirect speech οἶονται ... σοφώτατοι εἶναι ἀνθρώπων (a construction paralleled at Pl. *Euthd.* 305c), which itself reports as indirect speech σοφώτατοι ἔσμεν ἀνθρώπων ('we are the wisest of men'). For the object of αἰσθάνομαι in the genitive, see 20a3n.

22d1 *τελευτῶν* is a participle of *τελευτάω* 'I complete'; such a participle is the idiomatic way of saying 'in the end'. *τούς χειροτέχνας*: Socrates' account of his dealings with the craftsmen, and the contrasts he draws between himself and them, hardly suggest that he was a craftsman himself (see Xen. 30.1-2n.); yet he was a stonemason according to a direct statement in Aristoxenus (*Life of Socrates* fr. 51 Wehrli), supported by hints in Plato (*Euthphr.* 11b and *Alc. Ma.* 121a have Socrates call the sculptor Daedalus an 'ancestor'; cf. *Smp.* 186e, where a physician calls the physician Asclepius an ancestor). We can make a consistent story out of all this, if we focus on his talk about 'the good artisans' in Pl. 22d6. To refute the oracle by finding a craftsman wiser than himself, Socrates will naturally have looked among the good craftsmen; and one who does not claim to be more than an ordinary craftsman can quite properly contrast himself with those who are good. d1-2 *ἐμαυτῷ γὰρ συνήδη οὐδὲν ἐπισταμένῳ*: dative, agreeing with *ἐμαυτῷ*, which is dative because of the *συν* in *συνήδη*. Contrast Pl. 21b3-4 *ἐγὼ ... σύνοιδα ἐμαυτῷ σοφὸς ὢν* where the participle is in the nominative, to agree with *ἐγὼ*, the subject of *σύνοιδα*. d2 *ὥς ἵππος εἰπῆν*: see Pl. 17a3n. With this qualification, Socrates is saying modestly 'I knew that I did not know anything much.' Without this qualification, Socrates would be saying stupidly 'I knew that I knew nothing.' d2-3 *πολλὰ καὶ καλὰ ἐπισταμένους*: which is of course compatible with not knowing even one thing which is *καλὸν κάγαθόν* (Pl. 21d3-4), so long as a thing can be *καλὸν* without being *ἀγαθόν*. d5-6 *ταῦτόν μοι ἔδοξαν ἔχεν ἀμάρτημα ὅπερ καὶ οἱ ποιηταὶ καὶ οἱ ἀγαθοὶ δημιουργοί*: this redundant use of *καὶ* (lit. 'I thought the good craftsmen too make just the same mistake as the poets too') is 'almost confined to prose, and is commonest in Plato and Xenophon' (GP 324).

22e1-2 *ὥστε με ἐμαυτὸν ἀνερῶτῶν ὑπὲρ τοῦ χρησμοῦ*: when he talks of putting this question to himself 'on behalf of the oracle', Socrates is talking of the sort of thought experiment envisaged in e.g. Pl. *Alc. Ma.* 105a, Xen. *Mem.* 1.2.16, Men. *Theophroroumene* fr. 1 Sandbach, where someone's values are tested by asking: 'How would you choose if a god offered you the option of ...?' 22e2-3 *μήτε τι σοφὸς ὢν τὴν ἐκείνων σοφίαν μήτε ἀμαθὴς τὴν ἀμαθίαν* 'without any of their wisdom and without their folly'. We must understand *ἐκείνων* with *ἀμαθίαν* as well as with *σοφίαν*. In Plato, *ἀμαθία* is always worse than simply not having knowledge. It means 'false belief [*ψευδὴ δόξαν*]' (*Tht.* 170b), 'getting things wrong [*ψεύδεσθαι τῶν πραγμάτων*]' (*Euthd.* 286d), or 'having a false belief and being wrong about things that matter a lot' (*Prt.* 358c).

23a1-24b2: Socrates' 'Wisdom' and his Reputation

The Delphic oracle, Socrates guesses, uses him to bring home a message about the nature of wisdom: the closest that human beings can come to wisdom proper is an awareness of how little they in fact know. People resent having this message brought home to them, and that is why he has been so defamed.

23a2 οἶαι intensifies the superlatives χαλεπώταται and βαρύταται; see Pl. 34C4n. a3 ὄνομα δὲ τοῦτο λέγεσθαι, σοφός εἶναι: because the word σοφός is here quoted, it need not be integrated into the syntactic structure of the sentence, and so can remain in the nominative. The construction is standard enough to recur at e.g. Xen. *Oec.* 6.14 τοὺς ἔχοντας τὸ σεμνὸν ὄνομα τοῦτο τὸ καλὸς τε κάγαθός. The word εἶναι occurs here because ὄνομα λέγεσθαι is in effect ὀνομάζεσθαι, and Greek verbs of naming can take indirect speech constructions, as if they were verbs of stating (as at e.g. Xen. 13.30-1). a5 τὸ δὲ 'but in fact' (LSJ s.v. ὁ, ἡ, τό A.VIII.3). a5-6 κινδυνεύει, ὦ ἄνδρες, τῷ ὄντι ὁ θεὸς σοφός εἶναι: likewise, in Pl. *Phdr.* 278d, Socrates tells Phaedrus that the term σοφός ('possessor of wisdom') is proper only to a god, while for even the least ignorant human beings a better term would be something like φιλόσοφος ('aspirer to wisdom'). a7 ὀλίγου τινὸς ἄξια ἐστὶν καὶ οὐδενός 'is worth little or nothing'; see GP 92, and Pl. *Hipparch.* 226d-e πᾶν μικρὰ καὶ ὀλίγου ἄξια καὶ οὐδενός. a7-b2 φαίνεται τοῦτον λέγειν τὸν Σωκράτη, προσκεχρησθαι δὲ τῷ ἐμῷ ὀνόματι, ἐμὲ παράδειγμα ποιούμενος 'I think that he speaks of the Socrates you can see before you, and uses my name, by way of treating me as an example', in order to get across an entirely general message.

23b2 ὦ ἄνθρωποι: this haughty form of address is used by gods to mortals (Pl. *Smp.* 192d), legislators to subjects (Pl. *Cra.* 408b) and doormen to those to whom they are refusing admittance (Pl. *Prt.* 314d). Litigants by contrast never use this phrase to address jurors; they use the more polite ὦ ἄνδρες instead. b4 ταῦτα is short for διὰ ταῦτα ('for this reason') as in e.g. Pl. *Prt.* 346c; essentially the same construction is found also with the singular, at e.g. Soph. *Oedipus Tyrannus* 1005 τοῦτ' ἀφικόμην, ὅπως ('I came for this reason, in order to'). περιών: see Pl. 19b5n. on περιεργάζεται. b5 ἄν is short for ἕαν. b6 τῷ θεῷ βοηθῶν: others use this phrase for saving temples and their contents from sacrilege (Ar. *Lys.* 303, Demos. 18.155, Aeschin. 3.109); when Socrates uses it for showing that the god is no liar, he evinces once more (see Pl. 21b5n.) his unusual concern for truthfulness. b7-23c1 οὔτε τι τῶν τῆς πόλεως πράξαι μοι σχολὴ γέγονεν ἄξιον λόγου οὔτε τῶν οἰκείων: contrast the values on which other Athenians prided themselves, as expressed by Pericles in Thuc. 2.40.1-2: 'There is no shame in acknowledging that one is poor

[πένεσθαι]; but it is quite shameful not to make an effort to escape poverty. Some busy themselves with matters both private [οικείων] and public [πολιτικῶν]; others, who have to focus on their work, are not deficient in their appreciation of matters public. For we are unique in supposing that someone who avoids both is not easy-going, but useless.'

23c1-2 ἐν πενίαι μυρίαί εἰμι: in Xen. *Oec.* 2.3 Socrates estimates that his entire estate is worth five minas (to calibrate this sum, see Pl. 19e3n. on Γοργίας). He was rich enough to serve as an infantryman (Pl. *Smp.* 219e-221b; those richer still served as cavalry; those poorer served as sailors), but not so rich as to avoid the carping of Eup. fr. 386 PCG: 'I also loathe Socrates, the beggar and chatterer, who has thought of [πεφρόντικεν; see Pl. 18b7n. on τὰ τε μετέωρα φροντιστής] everything else, but does not know where his next meal is coming from.' (Later authors make Socrates richer: Demetrius of Phalerum *SSR* 1.B.53 says that Socrates owned, in addition to his house, 70 minas lent at interest to Crito; and Libanius *Apology* 17, without citing authority, says that Socrates inherited 80 minas from his father, and lost them by bad investment.) c4-5 χαίρουσιν ἀκούοντες ἐξαταζομένων: for the genitive with ἀκούω, see Pl. 17b7-8n. Contrast the dative in Pl. 33c3 ἀκούοντες χαίρουσιν ἐξαταζομένοις. c5 αὐτοῖς: that is, they do this 'themselves', not because Socrates has told them to do it.

23d1 ἐμοὶ ὀργίζονται, ἀλλ' οὐχ αὐτοῖς: in Pl. *Thl.* 168a-b Socrates imagines receiving advice on how to refute people fairly: 'If you do this, your associates will blame themselves for their muddle and perplexity, not you . . . But if, like most people, you do the opposite, then you will get the opposite result.' d2 Σωκράτης τίς ἐστι: see Pl. 18b6n. for this use of the indefinite pronoun τίς. The indefinite pronoun here looks like the interrogative τίς, since it has borrowed an accent from the enclitic ἐστι that follows. διαφθείρει τοὺς νέους: see Introduction, section 5. d3 ὅτι ποιῶν καὶ ὅτι διδάσκων: indirect questions. Understand with them διαφθείρει τοὺς νέους from the previous sentence, and translate 'what the activities and lessons are whereby he corrupts the young'. d4 ἀπορεῖν: in Ar. *Clouds* 703, 743, intellectual ἀπορία is represented as a typical upshot of talking with Socrates. In Pl. *Meno* 84a-d, Socrates gives a detailed account of how and why ἀπορία is valuable. d4-5 τὰ κατὰ πάντων τῶν φιλοσοφούντων πρόχειρα ταῦτα λέγουσιν: compare Xen. *Mem.* 1.2.31 on how Critias, when he became one of the Thirty Tyrants, 'legislated against teaching the art of rhetoric. He was hostile to Socrates, and had no way to get at him; instead, he brought against him the reproach that the masses bring against philosophers in general, and attacked his reputation with the masses.' d5-7 "τὰ μετέωρα καὶ τὰ ὑπὸ γῆς" καὶ "θεοὺς μὴ νομίζειν" καὶ "τόν ἦττω λόγον

κρίττω ποιεῖν": for these charges, and how they could be invoked against intellectuals generally, see Pl. 18b7-c2 and nn.

23e4 Λύκων: the comic playwrights mocked him (Ar. *Wasps* 1300 has him on a list of those who get drunk and violent), his wife (in Ar. *Lys.* 270, she is the first to be blamed for a rebellion that has broken out among the women), and his son Autolycus (after whom Eupolis named at least one play). We may speculate that Lycon felt that Autolycus had been corrupted by Socrates. At any rate, at the party described in Xen. *Smp.*, Autolycus falls under Socrates' spell, and on leaving the party exclaims 'By Hera, Socrates, you do strike me as a really proper gentleman [καλός γε κάγαθός ... ἄνθρωπος]' (Xen. *Smp.* 9.1; the party was given by Callias (Pl. 20a5n.), and among the guests was Hermogenes (Xen. 2.7n.)). Μίλητος μὲν ὑπὲρ τῶν ποιητῶν ἐχθόμενος: the father of our Meletus was also called Meletus (D.L. 2.40), and it is chronologically possible that Meletus the father was the poet Meletus, author of erotic poems (Epicrates fr. 4 *PCG*), drinking songs (Ar. *Frogs* 1302), and tragedies (Ar. fr. 156.9-10 *PCG*). e4-24a1 Ἄνυτος δὲ ὑπὲρ τῶν δημιουργῶν: Anytus' father made his way from rags to riches by 'wisdom and hard work' (Pl. *Meno* 90a, Arist. *Alh.* 7.4), presumably in the tanning trade: at any rate, it was as a tanner that Anytus educated his own son (Xen. 29.30). See Xen. 29.28n. on οἷτι κτλ for other accounts of what motivated Anytus to prosecute Socrates.

24a1 Λύκων δὲ ὑπὲρ τῶν ῥητόρων: beyond the fact that he was prominent enough to be accused of taking bribes to betray Naupactus to the Spartans (Metagenes fr. 10 *PCG*), we know of nothing to connect Lycon to 'the orators', that is, to the people who made a habit of addressing the Assembly, and who were the nearest thing in Athens to a separate class of politicians (e.g. Pl. 32c1, Thuc. 8.1.1, Ar. *Th.* 382, *Lys.* 22.2). a1-2 ὅπερ ἀρχόμενος ἐγὼ ἔλεγον: in 19a1-5. a4 ταῦτ' ἔστιν ὑμῖν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τάληθ' 'There you are, men of Athens, you now have the truth.' a5 οὐδ' ὑποστειλάμενος: such promises to hold nothing back are an oratorical commonplace (e.g. Isoc. 8.41 οὐδὲν ὑποστειλάμενος, Dem. 19.237 μηδὲν ὑποστελλόμενον, Aeschin. 2.70 οὐ γὰρ ἂν ὑποστειλαίμην). a6 ὁ καὶ τεκμήριον: the antecedent of the relative pronoun is the entire preceding clause (Xen. 1.4n.): the fact that there is such hatred for Socrates is moreover evidence that ...

24b3-26b4: Corrupting the Young

Socrates interrogates Meletus. If Meletus knows so much about corrupting the young, he should be able to specify who benefits them. After some struggle, Meletus finds

himself saying that everyone except Socrates benefits the young, and that Socrates alone corrupts them. Socrates points out how unusual this is: with other kinds of thing, it takes a rare expertise to benefit them. Socrates asks moreover why he, or anyone, should be thought to corrupt his associates voluntarily. The corrupt can be expected to harm their associates, but nobody voluntarily brings harm upon himself. Why then does Meletus treat him as guilty of a voluntary error, demanding punishment, rather than as guilty of an involuntary error, demanding instruction?

24b3 μὲν οὖν: this pair of particles 'sums up and rounds off the old topic, while the δέ clause introduces the new one' (GP 472), as also in Pl. 39d8. **b7** λάβωμεν αὐτὴν τούτων ἀντωμοσίαν: by contrast with the deposition of the original accusers, which Socrates presented in Pl. 19b4-c1. **b8** τοὺς τε νέους διαφθείρονται: see Introduction, section 5. **b8-24c1** θεοὺς οὓς ἡ πόλις νομίζει οὐ νομίζοντα, ἔτιρα δέ δαιμόνια καινά: see Introduction, section 4.

24c1 ἔγκλημα: this is the technical term for that part of the deposition which stated the charges against Socrates, by contrast with the τίμημα, or that part which proposed a penalty. **c4** σπουδῇ χαριεντίζεται is oxymoronic: 'being frivolous in earnest'. ραιδίως 'casually', 'thoughtlessly' as in Pl. 31a5. **c5** εἰς ἄγωνα καθιστάς: this is the standard phrase for bringing someone to trial, and used in all the orators (e.g. And. 1.10, Ant. 5.19, Dem. 22.2, Isae. 1.5, Isoc. 15.33, Lys. 3.20). **c6** ἐμῆλθην: Socrates makes other puns on the name of Meletus, in Pl. 24d5, 24d9, 25c3, and 26b3. Plato's Socrates loves punning on proper names: see *Prt.* 336b (καλῶ, Καλλία), 361d2-3 (Προμηθεύς, προμηθεύμενος); *Smp.* 174b (ἀγαθῶν, Ἀγάθωνι), 185c (Παυσανίου, παυσαμένου), 198c (Γοργίου, Γοργόνος); *Rep.* 614b (ἄλκιμου, Ἀλκίνου); *Grg.* 481b (δήμου, Δήμου); *Phd.* 80d (αἰδῇ, Ἀίδου); *Hp. Ma.* 281d (Βίας, ἀναβίωτη).

24d1 περὶ πολλοῦ ποιῆι 'treat as important'; see Pl. 21e5n. οἱ νεώτεροι: this may be a little dig at Meletus' youth: a young man himself (Pl. *Euthphr.* 2b), he is concerned about those even younger. There are more digs at Meletus' youth in Pl. 25d8-e4. **d5** μέλον is an accusative absolute. For the pun on Meletus' name, see Pl. 24c6n. **d6** εἰσάγεις is the standard term for bringing someone to court. τὸν δὲ δὴ βελτίους ποιοῦντα ἴθι εἰπὶ: Socrates' argument, that if Meletus knows who harms people he should know who benefits them, relies on a principle about knowledge of opposites that Aristotle summarised as τῶν ἐναντίων ἔστι μία ἐπιστήμη (e.g. *Analytica posteriora* 48b5), and that Plato invokes in various forms in *Phd.* 97d, *Ion* 531e, *Cri.* 44d, *Euthphr.* 6e. The utterly incontestable version of this principle is 'If you have a technique for telling whether something is or isn't so-and-so, then you have a technique for telling

whether something is or isn't not-so-and-so.' But the incontestable version will not serve Socrates' purposes here. This is for two reasons: first, because we can know in a particular case that something is harmful even if we do not have a general technique for telling whether things are or are not harmful; and second, because being beneficial means more than just not being harmful. We can, for example, know that decapitation will kill the patient, even if we do not know what will cure. **d7** μήνυσον: Socrates is being mischievous: the verb μηνύω was widely used for informing on wrongdoers or denouncing them to the authorities (e.g. Pl. *Laws* 914a, *IG* 11.ii.1128.29); Pl. 32d2 ἐνεδειξάμην is more such mischief. **d7-8** ὁραῖς, ὦ Μέλητε, ὅτι σιγαῖς καὶ οὐκ ἔχεις εἰπεῖν; the prolonged pause between this sentence and its predecessor explains why it needs no connective particle. ὁραῖς is the idiomatic way to point out something obvious, but not necessarily, in any literal sense, visible; hence Xen. 4.15, and Ar. *Frogs* 1136 'ὁραῖς that you're talking drivels?' **d8** ἱκανὸν τεκμήριον 'sufficient evidence', that is, evidence sufficient to amount to proof. Contrast μέγα τεκμήριον ('weighty evidence'), as in Pl. 32a3 and 40c1-2: 'sufficient' is better than merely 'weighty', to judge by Pl. *Hp. Mi.* 372b-c, which describes some evidence as ἱκανόν, and asks what evidence could be μείζον. **d9** μεμέληκεν: see Pl. 24c6n. on ἐμέλησεν.

24e1 ὦ βέλτιστε: a highly polite form of address, commonly used to soften a rebuke. See also Pl. *Phdr.* 263d-e, on when and why to call a fool ὦ ἄριστε, and Pl. 25c5n. **e1-2** τίς ἄνθρωπος, ὅστις πρῶτον καὶ αὐτὸ τοῦτο οἶδε, τοὺς νόμους; 'What individual human being, who, to begin with, knows in particular the very thing you just mentioned, the laws?' Socrates says 'to begin with' to grant that anyone who is going to improve the young will no doubt need more than just a knowledge of the laws. By pressing his question in these terms, Socrates refuses to allow Meletus a thought favoured by democratic Athenians: what improves us is law, and law is different from individual human beings. A particularly striking example is Lys. 1.26: the speaker is on trial for murdering someone he found committing adultery with his wife, but he does not talk about crimes of passion or the like; instead, he declares that he told his victim 'It is not I who will kill you, but the law of the city, which you transgressed and thought less important than your pleasure, and it was your choice to commit such an offence against my wife and my children, rather than obey the laws and be orderly.' **e3** οὗτοι, ὦ Σώκратες, οἱ δικάσται 'These people here, Socrates, the jurors.' Not 'these jurors' as opposed to others. **e7** ἅπαντες: Arist. *Pol.* 1281a39-b15 and 1282a14-23 gives some arguments that a composite body can be wiser than any of its components. If Meletus had any sense, he could use such arguments to maintain that all the jurors taken together know how to

benefit the young, without having to make the improbable claim that each of the jurors has this knowledge. *eg νή τήν Ἥραν*: this oath was pretty well confined to Socrates and Socratics, who use it nineteen times in Plato and Xenophon, and once in D.L. 2.83. It is not found in tragedy, comedy or oratory.

25a1 ἀκροαταί: these are the people who attend trials without having any official part in them as juror, witness, or litigant. Such attendance could be represented as a civic responsibility: the speaker of *Lys.* 10.11 affects disgust that his rival has been too lazy even to attend the murder trials in the court of the Areopagus. a3 βουλευταί: these are the Council of five hundred citizens who managed public affairs from day to day. Their composition and duties are described in *Arist. Ath.* 43.2-49.5. See *Pl.* 32b1-c3 for how Socrates conducted himself when he was on the Council. a5 ἐκκλησιασταί: members of the supreme authority in Athens, the Assembly to which all citizens belonged. a8-g πάντες... Ἀθηναῖοι καλοὺς κάγαθοὺς ποιοῦσι πλὴν ἐμοῦ, ἐγὼ δὲ μόνος διαφθείρω: in *Pl. Meno* 92e, Anytus says that any decent Athenian can teach virtue better than any sophist; in *Pl. Prt.* 320d-328d, the sophist Protagoras gives a brilliant explanation of how everyone teaches everyone to be virtuous, much as everyone teaches everyone Greek. a10 πᾶν σφόδρα ταῦτα λέγω: on the vehement exaggeration here, see *Pl.* 26b7n. a11 πολλήν γέ μου κατέγνωκας δυστυχίαν: one imputes something in the accusative to someone in the genitive. *Isoc.* 2.12 has a similar thought, similarly expressed: 'And do not suppose that we human beings are so greatly unfortunate [μηδὲ καταγνώις τῶν ἀνθρώπων τοσαύτην δυστυχίαν], that while for the beasts we have found arts whereby we tame their spirits and increase their value, we are useless at making ourselves virtuous.' καὶ μοι ἀποκρίναι: the aorist demands a translation like 'answer me this', by contrast with the present ἀποκρίνους ('answer my questions') at *Pl.* 25d2.

25b1 ἵππους: see *Pl.* 20a7n. for such comparisons with animals. b2 εἶναι: understand δοκοῦσιν, from δοκεῖ in 25b1. b3-4 εἰς μὲν τις ὁ βελτίους οἶός τ' ὢν ποιεῖν κτλ: Socrates has a similar thought in *Pl. Cri.* 47b-48a, where he argues that when it comes to bodily health and physical training, experts are rare, and that we will therefore damage ourselves by following popular opinions on such matters; his purpose is to argue that in matters of moral well-being too, we must defer not to the masses but to the expert, and therefore that he should not be impressed by mass opinion as expressed in the jurors' condemnation of him. b6 ἐάντε... οὐ φῆτε ἐάντε φῆτε: because the phrase οὐ φημι is all but a compound verb for 'deny', φῆτε here need not be negated with μή, even though this is the

protasis of a conditional. Lys. 13.76 ἐὰν μὲν οὖν φάσκηι . . . ἐὰν δ' οὐ φάσκηι shows that such a construction is regular.

25c1 ἀλλὰ γάρ: see Pl. 19c7n. c1-2 ἱκανῶς ἐπιδείκνυσαι ὅτι οὐδὲ πώποτε ἐφρόντισας τῶν νῶν: since Meletus' failure to think about the young hardly shows that Socrates is innocent of corrupting them, we might object that this is irrelevant. The reply to the objection would be that Meletus has presented no witnesses to support his claim that Socrates corrupts the young (Pl. 34a4-5), and therefore can only be inviting the jurors to accept his claim on trust; but jurors should not trust claims made by those who fail to think about the subjects of those claims. c2-3 τὴν σαυτοῦ ἀμέλειαν, ὅτι οὐδὲν σοι μεμῆλκεν: see Pl. 24c6n. ὅτι ἐμέλησεν. c4 ὦ πρὸς Διὸς Μέλητε: a vocative at the end of such a phrase is, as Pl. 26e3 shows, an optional extra. c5 ὦ τάν: this idiomatic form of address is typically used, as here, in reproof. If it offends Meletus, it offends not by being brusquely hostile, but by being, like Pl. 24e1, patronisingly polite. (It is used in reproof by a very deferential young man in Soph. *Phil.* 1387, and by a slave to a noble in Eur. *Heracleidae* 688.) ἀποκρίναι 'answer my question'. See Pl. 25a11n. c6 κακὸν τι ἐργάζονται τοὺς αἰεὶ ἐγγυτάτω αὐτῶν ὄντας 'at any given time harm those who are at that time nearest them', and not, in spite of what the word order might suggest to an English speaker, 'harm those who are at all times nearest them'. Pl. 37c2 is another such use of αἰεὶ.

25d2 ἀποκρίνου: this present imperative means 'you've got to give answers'; by contrast with the aorist ἀποκρίναι at Pl. 25a11 and c5. ὁ νόμος κελεύει ἀποκρίνεσθαι: the law is given verbatim in Dem. 46.10 τοῖν ἀντιδίκωιν ἐπάναγκες εἶναι ἀποκρίνασθαι ἀλλήλοισι τὸ ἐρωτώμενον, μαρτυρεῖν δὲ μὴ ('The two rival litigants must answer one another's questions, but must not give testimony.'). d5 εἰσάγεις δεῦρο: see Pl. 24d6n. d6 ἰκόντα ἢ ἄκοντα: the two key words, giving the alternatives between which Meletus must choose, are placed prominently at the end of the question. d8-9 σύ . . . ὦ: see Pl. 17c3-4nn. d9-25e1 οἱ μὲν κακοὶ κακὸν τι ἐργάζονται αἰεὶ τοὺς μάλιστα πλησίον ἑαυτῶν: this is improbable in itself (is every Fagin who trains boys to pick strangers' pockets harmed by the boys that he corrupts?), and in any case denied by Socrates himself at Pl. 30c8-d5.

25e2 ἐγὼ δὲ δὴ εἰς τοσοῦτον ἀμαθίας ἤκω ὥστε καὶ τοῦτ' ἄγνοω: ignorance does not always excuse, as Arist. *Nicomachean Ethics* 1110b18-1111a21 explains. Perhaps if Meletus had taken more care about these matters, he could have made this objection. e3-4 κινδυνεύσω κακὸν τι λαβεῖν ὑπ' αὐτοῦ 'there is a good chance that he will do me some harm'. This is much more plausible than any claim that bad associates are certain to do one

harm. But the plausibility comes at a price: people willingly incur risks of harm when they would not willingly incur its certainty. **e5-26a1** οἶμαι δὲ οὐδεῖ ἄλλον ἀνθρώπων οὐδένα: understand πείσεσθαι, from πείθομαι in the previous clause.

26a2-3 τῶν τοιούτων ἀμαρτημάτων: the genitive is the usual case in which to give a criminal charge: Pl. *Euthphr.* 5c ἀσεβείας ἐγράψατο ('accused of impiety'), And. 1.74 ὅποσοι κλοπῆς ἢ δώρων δόλοιν ('those convicted of theft or bribery'). **a4** μάθω: this verb is in effect the passive of διδάσκω. **δ** γε ἄκων ποιῶ 'what I am doing unintentionally'; **δ** is neuter. **a6-26b1** τοὺς κολάσειως δεομένους ἀλλ' οὐ μαθήσεως: if Meletus had given more thought to these matters, he could have invoked Protagoras' theory of punishment (Pl. *Pr.* 324a-c, 325a-c) and objected that what people call punishment actually is, when properly justified and executed, instruction.

26b1 ἀλλὰ γάρ: see Pl. 19c7n. **b3** ἐμίλησιν: see Pl. 24c6n. on ἐμίλησεν.

26b4-28b2: Supernatural Beings and Gods

Socrates continues to interrogate Meletus. Socrates, according to one of the charges, does not acknowledge the gods whom the city acknowledges: does he acknowledge any others instead? Meletus promptly says that Socrates acknowledges no gods whatsoever. But this, argues Socrates, contradicts another of the charges: the charge that Socrates introduces novel δαιμόνια. For one can hardly acknowledge horsey items without acknowledging horses. Likewise, one can hardly acknowledge δαιμόνια without acknowledging δαίμονες. Moreover, δαίμονες are either gods themselves or the offspring of gods. Either way, to acknowledge δαίμονες is to acknowledge gods. So Socrates, according to Meletus, does acknowledge some gods after all, as well as acknowledging no gods whatsoever.

26b7 πάνυ μὲν οὖν σφόδρα ταῦτα λέγω: Meletus exaggerates vehemently, as also at Pl. 25a10; on the liability of young men to exaggerate vehemently, see Pl. 17c4n.

26c2 καὶ αὐτὸς ἄρα νομίζω εἶναι θεούς: we might object on Meletus' behalf that Socrates could be insincere, and teach people to believe in gods without believing in gods himself. A reply to this objection might be that to teach people to acknowledge gods is itself some acknowledgement of those gods. Whether the objection should carry more weight, or the reply, will depend on what νομίζειν εἶναι θεούς amounts to: thinking privately that there are such beings, or doing things publicly that express some acknowledgement of them. **c7** τὸ παράπαν οὐ νομίζεις θεούς: it is not clear why Meletus should say this, rather than that Socrates acknowledges gods, only

not those acknowledged by the city. Perhaps, in spite of the warnings in Pl. 18a7–19d7, Meletus trusts Ar. *Clouds*, where Socrates offers many explanations of meteorological phenomena without once invoking the plans and intentions of Zeus, or indeed of anyone else (367–411), and where, because of these explanations, Socrates is equated with the notorious atheist Diagoras of Melus (828–30). Or perhaps Meletus is simply given to vehement exaggeration (Pl. 26b7n.).

26d1 ὦ θαυμάσιε: in the classical period, this form of address is used only by characters in Plato. It has something of the tone of, and might as well be translated by, ‘You amaze me.’ ἵνα τί; understand γένηται or the like. The phrase amounts to ‘why?’; it is equally idiomatic when used as here, and when used as an entire self-standing sentence (e.g. Dem. 19.257). d1–2 οὐδὲ ἥλιον οὐδὲ σελήνην ἄρα νομίζω θεοὺς εἶναι, ὥσπερ οἱ ἄλλοι ἄνθρωποι; it might have helped Socrates’ defence more if he had spoken instead of gods with temples in Athens. Indeed, the consensus was that belief in the divinity of the sun and the moon was not merely not particularly Athenian, but not even particularly Greek. Thus Hdt. 1.131.1–2 says that Persians worship the sun and the moon, and do not share the Greeks’ belief in anthropomorphic gods; in Ar. *Peace* 405–413 the sun and the moon are described as rivals to the Olympians, hostile to the Greeks, and worshipped by barbarians; Pl. *Epinomis* 988a proposes the worship of astronomical divinities, and acknowledges that its proposals are derived from the barbarians; in Pl. *Cra.* 397c–d, Socrates says ‘I think that the original human inhabitants of Greece believed in only those gods that these days most barbarians believe in: sun and moon and earth and stars and sky.’ See also Pl. *Laws* 898d–899b on the divinity of the sun and other heavenly bodies (or at least of the souls that control such splendid bodies): the proof of their divinity (rather than of the existence or divinity of the Olympians like Zeus) is the first and easiest refutation of atheism. d3 ὦ ἄνδρες δικάσται: this is not how Socrates has addressed the jurors: see Pl. 17a1n. d3–4 τὸν μὲν ἥλιον λίθον φησὶν εἶναι, τὴν δὲ σελήνην γῆν: some argued that stones and rocks cannot be divine, since they cannot care for human affairs or be rational (Pl. *Laws* 886d–e, 966e–967d). Nevertheless, since Athenians actually worshipped Earth the Nurse of Youth (e.g. Ar. *Th.* 300), it is puzzling that they should suppose Socrates denies the divinity of things he says are earth or rock. d5 Ἀναξαγόρου: Anaxagoras had philosophical interests quite opposed to those of Socrates: ‘The story goes that when somebody was puzzling about such matters [sc. definitional questions about value, like τί τὸ εὖ;], and asking why one would choose to be born rather than not born, Anaxagoras said “In order to contemplate the heavens and how the entire ordered universe is arranged”’ (DK 59 A 30). He successfully predicted the fall of a meteorite, and conjectured

that meteorites are fallen fragments of the sun; the sun, he inferred, is itself a rocky mass (DK 59 A 1.10 and A 12). Socrates objects to this inference in Xen. *Mem.* 4.7.7, quoted in Pl. 19c7–d1n. δ6 οἱ αὐτοὺς ἀπείρους γραμμάτων: basic literacy was widespread in Athens (theatre audiences enjoyed recognising a name from an illiterate's description of the shape of its letters: Eur. fr. 382 *TrGF*, Agathon fr. 4 *TrGF*, Theodectas fr. 6 *TrGF*). Of course, basic literacy alone would not provide familiarity with the details of Anaxagoras' thought. But we may imagine that people knew that Anaxagoras thought that the sun is a stone, in the way that people know that Einstein thought that $e = mc^2$. ὥστε οὐκ εἰδέναι ...: Socrates here reports the thought 'They are so illiterate that they do not know ...'. In direct speech the ὥστε clause would be ὥστε οὐκ ἴσασιν ..., with an indicative, negated by οὐ, to indicate the actual upshot of their illiteracy, rather than the construction with an infinitive, negated by μή, to indicate the upshot towards which their illiteracy naturally tends. Socrates reports this thought in indirect speech introduced by οἱ earlier in the sentence. The infinitive results from continuing into the subordinate clause introduced by ὥστε the accusative and infinitive construction governed by οἱ. Cf. Xen. 3.13n. δ7 τὰ Ἀναξαγόρου βιβλία: Anaxagoras is said to have been the first to 'issue' a book (ἐκδοῦναι: DK 59 A 1.11 and A 36); contrast the way that Heraclitus 'deposited' (ἀνέθηκε: DK 22 A 1.6) his book in the temple of Artemis in his home town Ephesus. Socrates' familiarity with books (which is confirmed in Xen. *Mem.* 1.6.14) might itself have suggested a suspicious intellectuality: books are the props of Euripides in Ar. *Frogs* 943, 1409; and Ar. fr. 506 *PCG* says 'This man has been corrupted [the verb is διαφθείρω, as in the charge 'Socrates corrupts the young'], whether by a book, or by Prodicus [Pl. 19e1n.], or at least by one of the chatterers [τῶν ἀδολεσχῶν, a phrase used in Ar. *Clouds* 1485 for Socrates and his school].' δ8–26e1 εἰ πᾶν πολλοῦ δραχμῆς 'for a drachma at most'; literally 'for a drachma if for very much'. To calibrate this sum, see Pl. 19e3n. on Γοργίας. For the construction, see Pl. 28a4n. and Pl. *Alc. Ma.* 123c ἄξις μνῶν πεντήκοντα εἰ πᾶν πολλοῦ ('worth fifty minas at most').

26e1 ἐκ τῆς ὀρχήστρας: 'the Dancefloor' was part of the market place, near statues of Harmodius and Aristogeiton (Timaeus *Lexicon Platonicum* s.v. ὀρχήστρα, Arist. *Rh.* 1368a18). Here books were sold, along with perfumes and other fripperies (Eup. fr. 327 *PCG*). ε1–2 Σωκράτους καταγελᾶν, ἐὰν προσποιῇται ἑαυτοῦ εἶναι: we might object that Socrates could teach these ideas without claiming them as his own. But that objection would ignore the way that people gloried in the difference between their ideas and those of others: see e.g. Hecataeus *FGH* 1 fr. 1 'Thus saith Hecataeus of Miletus: these things I write down, as they seem to me to be

true; for the theories of the Greeks are, to my mind, many and ridiculous'; Emp. DK 31 B 8 'I'll tell you something else: there is no birth of any mortal thing, nor any end in destructive death. There is only mixing, and separation of mixed things. And "birth" is the name that people give them'; Hipp. *Regimen* 3.69 'This discovery is glorious for me, who discovered it, and advantageous for those who have learnt it; but not one of my predecessors so much as attempted to understand it, although I judge it to be of great value by comparison with all other things.' ε2 ἀποπα: this argument might backfire. The outlandishness of these ideas might not stop them being the ideas of Socrates, whose ἀποπα is the leading theme of Alcibiades' speech in his praise (Pl. *Smp.* 215a, 221d), and the subject of frequent remarks from other interlocutors (e.g. Pl. *Chrm.* 173e, Pl. *Alc. Ma.* 106a, Pl. *Phdr.* 230c, Pl. *Grg.* 494d, Xen. *Mem.* 2.3.15). ε3 ὡ πρός Διός: compare Pl. 25c4 (where there is a name in the vocative used after such a phrase) and Pl. *Sph.* 221d (where there is not). ε5 ἀπιστός γ' εἰ... σαυτῶν: in Pl. *Grg.* 472b-c, Socrates talks of getting his interlocutor to testify against himself, and suggests that this is the only kind of testimony worth having. καὶ ταῦτα 'and what's more'; see LSJ s.v. οὔτος VIII.2. ε7-27a1 ὕβρει τινὶ καὶ ἀκολασίαι καὶ νεότητι: Socrates invokes a widely accepted thought that these qualities go together. Pl. *Euthd.* 273a-b 'a youngster from Paeania, a really decent chap at heart, except to the extent that, being young, he's given to presumption [ἔσθον μὴ ὑβριστῆς διὰ τὸ νέος εἶναι]'; Soph. fr. 786 TrGF 'The presumption of adolescents does not continue right through to the age of discretion; while they are young, it both flowers and then fades.' See Pl. 17c4n. for other invocation of prejudices against the young.

27a1-2 διαππειρωμένω: when he suggests, here and at Pl. 27e4, that Meletus is 'testing', Socrates talks of a practice for which his own circle was notorious. In Ar. *Clouds* 477, the Clouds tell Socrates, with reference to a new recruit, 'Set his mind in motion, and test [ἀποπειρῶ] his intellect'; in Pl. *Thl.* 157c, Theaetetus tells Socrates 'I can't work out whether you are saying what you think, or testing me [ἀποπειρᾷ]'; in Pl. *Prt.* 349c Socrates tells Protagoras, as a tactful way of allowing him to deny what he earlier asserted, 'I wouldn't be surprised if you were saying this to test [ἀποπειρώμενος] me back then.' α2 Σωκράτης ὁ σοφὸς δῆ: GP 234-5 translates this by 'Socrates the "Wise"', and explains that 'δῆ often denotes that words are not to be taken at their face value, objectively, but express something merely believed, or ironically supposed, to be true.' α7 ἢ 'in which way'; see Xen. 7.31n.

27b1 ὅπερ κατ' ἀρχὰς ὑμᾶς παρητησάμην: in Pl. 17c5-d2. b3-4 ἔστιν ὅστις ἀνθρώπων, ὃ Μίλητε, ἀνθρώπεια μὲν νομίζει πράγματ' εἶναι, ἀνθρώπους δὲ οὐ νομίζει: this is the first step of an ἐπακτικός λόγος

('inductive argument'), an argument that attempts to establish a generalisation from instance after instance of that generalisation. This style of argument was, according to Arist. *Met.* 1078b28, one of Socrates' two most distinctive contributions to philosophy. Examples are legion, both in Plato and beyond: eg. Ar. *Clouds* 1084-1104, Xen. *Oec.* 1.7-15. b4-5 ἀποκρινέσθω ... καὶ μὴ ἄλλα καὶ ἄλλα θορυβεῖτω: presumably Meletus, instead of giving a proper answer, was jeering, or blowing raspberries, or something of the sort. b7 "οὐκ ἔστιν, ὦ ἄριστε ἀνδρῶν": Socrates, in dealing with a sulky interlocutor, has to do some of his answering for him. There are parallels in Pl. 27c8 "ἔχει δὲ" and Pl. *Crg.* 506c-507b. There are even more drastic departures from Socrates' ideal of question-and-answer in Pl. *Thl.* 179d-183c and *Sph.* 246c-247c, justified on the grounds that the proponents of the views under discussion are too wild to submit to questioning. b7-8 σὺ βούλει ... ἐγὼ ... λέγω: with these inflected verbs, the pronouns are not syntactically necessary; their presence therefore emphasises the contrast between second and first person; and the emphasis is accentuated by the place of the pronouns towards the front of their clauses.

27c4 ὡς ὠνησας 'How kind of you!' The turn of phrase is colloquial enough for comedy: Ar. *Lys.* 1033 νῆ Δι' ὠνησάς γε με. ὑπὸ τούτων ἀναγκάζομενος: Socrates gestures towards the jurors, who will – some or all of them – have shouted to Meletus to answer the question. There was no higher authority than the jurors to enforce proper procedure. c6 ἀλλ' οὖν δαίμονιά γε νομίζω 'still, I do at least acknowledge supernatural beings'; see GP 444 for this use of the particles ἀλλ' οὖν ... γε. c8 "ἔχει δὲ": see Pl. 27b7n.

27d1-2 τοὺς δὲ δαίμονας οὐχὶ ἦτοι θεοὺς γε ἡγοῦμεθα ἢ θεῶν παῖδας: Greeks had no consensus on the relation between δαίμονες and θεοί. The two terms are used apparently interchangeably of Dionysus in Hdt. 4.79.4, and of Poseidon in Eur. *Tr.* 49; and in Xen. 14.5 Socrates calls Apollo a δαίμων. Others however, in particular philosophers, liked to distinguish: thus in Pl. *Smp.* 202d-204a, δαίμονες are intermediate between θεοί and mortals; and according to Xenocrates 'the nature of δαίμονες contains the passivity of a mortal and the power of a god' (fr. 222 Parente). d4-5 εἰ μὲν θεοὶ τινεῖς εἰσιν οἱ δαίμονες 'if δαίμονες are gods of a sort'. But Socrates needs some hypothesis other than this for his reasoning to work. For the reasoning 'Socrates acknowledges that δαίμονες exist; δαίμονες are gods of a sort; so Socrates acknowledges that gods exist' is no better than 'Mr Gosse, who thought each species specially created some six thousand years ago, acknowledged the existence of horses; horses are a species that evolved some five million years ago; so Mr Gosse acknowledged the existence of a species that evolved some five million years ago.' It would be

an improvement to reason instead 'Socrates acknowledges that δαίμονες exist; Socrates acknowledges that δαίμονες are gods of a sort; so Socrates acknowledges that gods exist.' But even that reasoning is imperfect; for people do not always acknowledge all the consequences of what they acknowledge. δ6 θεοὺς οὐχ ἡγούμενον φάναι με θεοὺς αὐ ἡγεῖσθαι πάλιν: the supposed absurdity of this claim had not stopped Ar. *Clouds* from making it: in 247-8, Socrates says that he and his school accept no divinities; in 252-3, he says that Clouds are their δαίμονες; in 297, he says that Clouds are divinities; in 316, he says that Clouds are great divinities; and in 365, he says that Clouds alone are divinities. δ6-7 ἐπειδήπερ γε δαίμονας ἡγοῦμαι: for the echo of εἴπερ δαίμονας ἡγοῦμαι, see Pl. 20c6-8n. δ7 εἰ δ' αὖ οἱ δαίμονες θεῶν παῖδες εἰσιν νόθοι: bastard children did not fully share in the status of their fathers. The hypothesis that δαίμονες are the bastard children of gods corresponds therefore to the element in Greek thought that distinguished between δαίμονες and θεοί. But even with this hypothesis, Socrates' reasoning is no better than it was with 'if δαίμονες are gods of a sort'. For 'Socrates acknowledges that δαίμονες exist; δαίμονες are the bastard children of gods; so Socrates acknowledges the existence of gods' is no better than 'Socrates acknowledges the existence of salt; salt is the chloride of sodium; so Socrates acknowledges the existence of sodium.' δ8 ὧν δὴ καὶ λέγονται: the pair of particles here emphasises that this is what is said, while hinting that perhaps what is said is not entirely true.

27e2-3 ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ τις ἵππων μὲν παῖδας ἡγοῖτο ἢ καὶ ὄνων, τοὺς ἡμιόνους, ἵππους δὲ καὶ ὄνους μὴ ἡγοῖτο εἶναι 'as if someone thought there were offspring of horses, or offspring not just of horses but also of asses too, namely mules, but did not think that there were horses and asses'. The mention of asses and mules corresponds to the hypothesis that δαίμονες are bastard children of θεοί. ε4 ἀποπειρώμενος: see Pl. 27a1-2n. ἡμῶν: i.e. Socrates and the other people listening (Pl. 27a3-4). ε5 ἐγκαλοῖς: see Pl. 24c1n. on ἐγκλημα, the noun cognate with this verb. ε6-28a2 ὥς οὐ τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἐστιν κτλ 'that belief in δαιμόνια does not always go along with belief in θεῖα, and that someone who believes in both these things will have it that there are neither δαίμονες nor θεοί nor ἥρωες'; here 'will have it that' translates, or perhaps overtranslates, the note of resolve or insistence (Pl. 21a5-6n.) implicit in negating the reported statement with μή. *Cra.* 398c-d says that ἥρωες are half-divine (ἡμίθεοι, as in Pl. 28c1), one parent divine, the other human. So it is perhaps understandable that Plato should like to mention δαίμονες and θεοί and ἥρωες all in one breath (which he does another six times elsewhere). But apart from that liking, there is no reason to mention ἥρωες here.

28a3 ἀλλὰ γάρ: see Pl. 19c7n. 23-5 ὡς μὲν ἐγὼ οὐκ ἄδικῶς κατὰ τὴν Μελήτου γραφὴν κτλ: no doubt Meletus has been proved too muddled for the jury to take his word that Socrates is guilty. But what about his fellow prosecutors Anytus and Lycon and the witnesses whom the prosecution had called (see Xen. 24.29n.)? Have they said nothing that calls for an answer from Socrates? 24 οὐ πολλῆς μοι δοκεῖ εἶναι ἀπολογία: cf. Pl. 20b7n. and the genitives πέντε μῶν Pl. 20c1, δραχμῆς Pl. 26e1, σιτήσεως Pl. 37a2, to express what things cost or are worth or are valued at. ἀλλὰ ἱκανά: this turn of phrase would be at home in polished rhetoric, to judge by Dem. 56.26 περὶ μὲν οὖν τούτων ἱκανά μοι τὰ εἰρημένα, Lys. 31.34 ἱκανά μοι νομίζω εἰρῆσθαι, Isoc. 21.16 περὶ μὲν οὖν τούτων ἱκανά τὰ εἰρημένα, Isae. 11.19 ἐγὼ μὲν γὰρ ὡς εὖ φρονοῦσιν ὑμῖν ἱκανά τὰ εἰρημένα νομίζω. 25 καὶ ταῦτα 'even these'; i.e. 'short though they are, these remarks' make an adequate response to the charges of Meletus. ἐν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν: in Pl. 23a1-3. 26 καὶ πρὸς πολλούς: Socrates means, not that he feels hostility towards many people, but that many people feel hostility towards him. For πρὸς with the accusative is the most general term for being related in some way or other (Arist. *Categories* 6a36-8b24), and one is related to things even when one is on the receiving end; hence Pl. 21c4 πρὸς ὃν ... τοιοῦτόν τι ἔπαθον, 'who had such an effect on me'. 26-7 τοῦτ' ἐστὶν δ' ἐμὲ αἰρήσει ἔάνπερ αἰρήῃ 'this is what will bring me down if bring me down it will'. Like its English counterpart, this phrase has the form of a tautology, but the protasis that threatens to make it tautological has a different purpose: evading the objection 'The prejudice against you certainly is the most dangerous thing you have to face, but maybe it won't actually bring you down' - an objection that would actually grant the main point that Socrates wishes to make here.

28b2 οὐδὲν δὲ δεινὸν μή: this way of saying 'there's no fear that ...' was a turn of phrase that Plato much liked, but does not seem to be found apart from him and his imitators (*Phd.* 84b, *Grg.* 520d, *Rep.* 465b, *Ep.* 7.344d-e). ἐν ἱμοῖ στή: 'these things will come to a standstill in me'; i.e. I will be the last to be brought down by the prejudices of the many.

28b3-30c2: Shame, Fear, and Duty

Socrates sees nothing disgraceful in what he does, even though he now risks a death sentence for doing it. The real disgrace would be, for fear of death, to abandon the post assigned him by the Delphic oracle, a post in which, by the sort of questioning that has led to his trial, he encourages everyone to devote themselves to virtue above all other things. His model is the epic hero Achilles. And it would be absurd for one who has faced death on the battlefield when fighting for his city to be afraid of death now.

28b3 ἴσως ἂν οὖν εἴποι τις: this expression, and variants on it, can be found in the most elevated rhetoric, to judge by Pl. 37e4, and Xen. *Cyr.* 7.5.46 ἴσως ἂν οὖν εἴποι τις, Dem. 23.64 ἴσως εἴποι τις ἂν, Isoc. 25.7 ἴσως οὖν εἴποι τις ἂν. b3-4 εἴτ' οὐκ αἰσχύνῃ, ὦ Σώκρατες, τοιοῦτον ἐπιτήδευμα ἐπιτηδεύσας ἐξ οὗ κινδυνεύεις νυνὶ ἀποθανεῖν; such appeals to the disgrace of being executed were common enough to have a stock response, as recommended in Arist. *Rh.* 1397b25-6: 'If the fact that generals are often put to death does not make them base, then the same applies to sophists too.' See also Xen. 26.4-6n. b5-6 ὦ ἄνθρωπε: a brusque form of address, at home in dismissive reproofs, such as Pl. *Rep.* 329c 'Mind your language, ὦ ἄνθρωπε', Ar. *Clouds* 644 'You're talking nonsense, ὦνθρωπε', Ar. *Ach.* 1113 'ὦνθρωπε, would you mind not speaking to me?' b7 δτου τι καὶ μικρὸν ὄφελος: this turn of phrase was a favourite of Plato's (*Cri.* 46a εἴ τι καὶ μικρὸν ἡμῶν ὄφελος ἦν, *Laws* 663d οὐ τι καὶ μικρὸν ὄφελος, and *Laws* 630c, 647a, and 856c οὐ καὶ μικρὸν ὄφελος), but is not used by any other extant author of classical times. b7-8 ἐκείνο μόνον σκοπεῖν ὅταν πράττει, πότερον δίκαια ἢ ἄδικα πράττει: in other dialogues, Socrates allows for other values to be taken into account when acting; for instance, it is worth aiming for a healthy life (Pl. *Cri.* 47d-e), and for a life in which one is not a victim of injustice (Pl. *Grg.* 469b-c), if one can obtain these things without committing injustice. And there is no obvious reason why Socrates should not here, in exactly the same way, allow for other values; for instance, he could still maintain much that he maintains at 30c6-d5, while allowing that death, exile, and the loss of civic rights are bad things, so long as he holds that they are not so bad that it is worth committing injustice to avoid them. b8-28c1 πότερον ... πράττει ... ἀνδρὸς ἀγαθοῦ ἔργα ἢ κακοῦ: there seem to be virtues incompatible with considering this question when one acts. For example, it would be absurd to ask oneself 'If I do this, will it be the act of a generous man who, without thought of self, does deeds of spontaneous kindness?' There is however no incongruity in thinking thus about justice: there is nothing wrong with a judge taking a decision because he thinks justice requires him to take that decision. So if the only question to consider when one acts really is, as Socrates has said, 'Would it be just to do this?', then it is not so strange after all to suppose that 'Would this be the act of a good man?' is simply another formulation of this same question. Cf. Pl. 32e3, where Socrates talks about the importance he attaches to 'acting as befits a good man'.

28c1 τῶν ἡμιθέων: this name is given in Hesiod *Works and Days* 159-65 to the 'divine race of heroic men' who fought at Troy. Those who are even in part divine must be models for us all; thus Pl. *Rep.* 388a-b and 391a-c argue that Homer must have gone wrong when depicting Achilles, the offspring of the goddess Thetis, as behaving badly. c2 ὁ τῆς θετῆδος

ύός: the conversation between Thetis and her son Achilles that Socrates is about to relate was related in Hom. *Il.* 18.65–138. The same conversation is cited approvingly also by Phaedrus in Pl. *Smp.* 179e–180a, but with a different spin put on it. Achilles' readiness to vindicate his friend Patroclus, even at the cost of his own life, was a standard theme for orators seeking to praise noble action: see Arist. *Rh.* 1358b38–1359a5.

c2–3 τοσοῦτον τοῦ κινδύνου κατεφρόνησεν παρὰ τὸ αἰσχρὸν τι ὑπομεῖναι 'thought so little of the risks by comparison with submitting to disgrace'.

c4–5 θεὸς οὔσα: the distinctively feminine form θεά is used in Attic prose rarely, and then only when there is some special point to be made by using it (the sex matters, as in Pl. *Cra.* 398d ἐρασθέντος ἡ θεοῦ θνητῆς ἢ θνητοῦ θεᾶς; all divinities must be included for sure, as in Pl. *Smp.* 219c εὖ γὰρ ἴστε μὰ θεούς, μὰ θεάς).

c5–6 εἰ ... ἀποκτενεῖς: the prediction of Homer's Thetis is unconditional: *since* Achilles will kill Hector, his own death soon after is assured. When Socrates' Thetis expresses this condition with εἰ and a future indicative, she encourages Achilles to leave it unrealised; she would express it with εἰ and ἄν and a subjunctive instead, if encouraging him to realise the condition. This contrast between the two ways of expressing a condition is displayed in Isoc. 6.107 'If [ἦν i.e. εἰ ἄν] we are willing [ἐθέλωμεν] to die for the sake of justice, then not only will we gain a good reputation, but also it will be possible for us to lead our lives securely thereafter; whereas if [εἰ] we are going to be scared [φοβησόμεθα] of the risks, then we will bring many troubles upon ourselves', and in Dem. 22.37 'Just think of how much better it is for you to condemn him than not. If [εἰ] you acquit [ἀπογνώσεσθε] him, the council will be dominated by the orators; but if [ἄν i.e. εἰ ἄν] you condemn [καταγνώτε], by ordinary folk.'

c6–7 αὐτίκα γάρ τοι ... μεθ' Ἑκτορα πότμος ἐτοῖμος: this is almost a verbatim quotation from Hom. *Il.* 18.96 αὐτίκα γάρ τοι ἔπειτα μεθ' Ἑκτορα πότμος ἐτοῖμος.

c7 ὁ δέ: at this point Socrates makes a fresh start to the sentence that began with φαῦλοι at 28c1, and has since lost its way in the multiple layers of subordinate clause.

28d1 δαίσας: Homer gives no hint that Achilles is motivated by fear. In Pl. *Phd.* 68d, Socrates suggests that those who put up with death because they fear something else more (and that means all who put up with death, apart from philosophers) are not really manly after all: 'it is absurd that fear and cowardice should make someone manly'.

d2 αὐτίκα ... τεθναίνην: a verbatim quotation from Hom. *Il.* 18.98.

d3 δίκην ἐπιθεῖς τῷ ἀδικοῦντι: justice is a distinctively Socratic addition to the story, and in Homer was not among Achilles' motives. Such additions to Homer's story were not unusual: when praising Eros in Pl. *Smp.* 179e–180a, Phaedrus elaborates on Homer by making Achilles' motives erotic.

ἵνα μὴ ἐνθάδε μένω καταγέλαστος: Homer has fear of laughter motivate some of his

heroes (*Il.* 4.176-82, 8.148-50), but not Achilles. Plato's Socrates is elsewhere very scornful of those who let themselves be laughed out of things (out of prophesying *Euthphr.* 3c, out of being the oldest pupil in the class *Euthd.* 272c, out of proposing that women should, like men, strip for exercise *Rep.* 457a-b). d3-4 παρὰ νηυσὶ κορωνίσιν ἄχθος ἀρούρης: our texts of Homer have here (*Il.* 18.104) a slightly different phrase: παρὰ νηυσὶν ἐτώσιον ἄχθος ἀρούρης. Elsewhere however they contain eight occurrences of the formula παρὰ νηυσὶ κορωνίσιν. d6 οὕτω γὰρ ἔχει: see Pl. 17d2n. d6-g οὐ ἂν τις ἑαυτὸν τάξει ἡγησάμενος βέλτιστον εἶναι κτλ: in Pl. *Cri.* 46b Socrates again invokes this thought that one should maintain, even in the face of death, the stance one has chosen as best; he there applies this thought to maintaining conclusions of which he has earlier been persuaded by reasoning. d7 ἄρχοντας: this has to mean something like 'a legitimate ruler' rather than just 'someone in power' if we are to square what Socrates says here about obedience to ἄρχοντες with his disobedience to what in Pl. 32d4 he calls the ἀρχή of the Thirty Tyrants. d7-g ἐνταῦθα δεῖ, ὥς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, μένοντα κινδυνεύειν, μηδὲν ὑπολογιζόμενον μήτε θάνατον μήτε ἄλλο μηδὲν πρὸ τοῦ αἰσχροῦ: for both the thought and the wording, compare Pl. *Cri.* 48d on why Socrates should not escape from gaol unless justice allows it, even though staying means death: μή οὐ δέη ὑπολογίζεσθαι οὐτ' εἰ ἀποθνήσκοιν δεῖ παραμένοντας καὶ ἡσυχίαν ἄγοντας, οὔτε ἄλλο ὅτιοῦν πάσχειν πρὸ τοῦ ἀδικεῖν. If to commit injustice is the only disgrace, then these two thoughts are consistent, indeed identical, with one another.

28e1-2 οἱ ἄρχοντες . . . οὓς ὑμεῖς ἐλεσθε ἔρχειν μου: although most other officials in Athens were chosen by lot, military commanders were elected (Arist. *Ath.* 43.1, 61). Socrates uses the second person plural of the electors here and in Xen. 20.7, because the electors are the citizens of Athens, and the citizens of Athens are now hearing his case (Pl. 17a1). e2 ἐν Ποτειδαίαι: this city was the site of a battle in 431, when Socrates saved the life and weapons of Alcibiades (Pl. *Smp.* 220d-e). The battle is mentioned in Pl. *Chrm.* 153b-c, and described by Thuc. 1.62-3. ἐν Ἀμφιπόλει: this city was the site of a battle in 422, described by Thuc. 5.6-10. e2-3 ἐπὶ Ἀθλίῳ: not a city but the location of a temple (whence ἐπὶ rather than ἐν), site of a battle in 424, described by Thuc. 4.93-6. How calm Socrates kept in this battle is described in Pl. *La.* 181b and *Smp.* 220e-221c. e3 τότε μὲν: this reminds us that we are still in the μὲν clause that Socrates announced with ὅτε μὲν in 28e1. When a second μὲν is used to give such a reminder, it often goes with a demonstrative reminding us of what went with the first μὲν in the clause, as τότε here reminds us of ὅτε; see GP 385. ἔμμενον ὥσπερ καὶ ἄλλος τις: in fact, not all Athenians were as steadfast as Socrates. Athenian ranks broke in

all three of the places that Socrates has mentioned, and broke so badly at Amphipolis and Delium that the Athenians were outright losers of those battles.

29a1 ἐνταῦθα δέ: the demonstrative with the repeated δέ, like Pl. 32d3 τοῦτου δέ, reminds us that we are still in the δέ clause that began with τοῦ δέ θεοῦ τάττοντος in 28e4; see GP 184-5 and Pl. 28e3n. οὐ τότε μὲν. a1-2 λίποιμι τὴν τάξιν: the obloquy attached in any warfare to cowards and deserters attached with particular strength in hoplite warfare to those who abandoned their place, shoulder to shoulder with their comrades, in the line of battle. For a hoplite was protected by the shield of the hoplite on his right (see Thuc. 5.71.1); and, as a rule, a breach in the line of battle meant defeat. Hence men who left the line of battle could be regarded with suspicion, even if the notional purpose was to engage as an individual more closely with the enemy (Hdt. 9.71.3, Thuc. 4.126.5). a2 τῶν is short for τοῖ ἀν. a4-5 οἰόμενος σοφὸς εἶναι οὐκ ὦν ... δοκεῖν σοφὸν εἶναι μὴ ὄντα: the general rule is that the complement of an occurrence of the verb εἶμι has the same case as its subject. The subject of an infinitive is normally accusative. That is why indirect speech constructions using the infinitive are normally accusative and infinitive (hence σοφὸν εἶναι here). This norm can be overridden to make the subject of the infinitive have the same case as the subject of the verb introducing the indirect speech, when those two subjects are the same (hence οἰόμενος σοφὸς εἶναι here, and οἰομένων ... σοφωτάτων εἶναι in Pl. 22c5). The reason for the change from οὐ to μὴ between οὐκ ὦν and μὴ ὄντα is that the first participle describes a definite individual who, supposedly, thinks he is wise without being so, whereas the second speaks in a general way of the characteristic of thinking one is wise without being so. a6-7 οἶδε μὲν γὰρ οὐδεὶς τὸν θάνατον οὐδ' εἰ τυγχάνει τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ πάντων μέγιστον ὃν τῶν ἀγαθῶν: hence Socrates' argument in Pl. 40c4-41c7 that death is a good thing does not give us knowledge of its conclusion, but at best grounds for hoping that its conclusion is true. a7-29b1 δεῖδασι δ' ὥς εὖ εἰδότες ὅτι μέγιστον τῶν κακῶν ἐστὶ: presumably the idea is that, in order to avoid death, they do things that would not be justified if they merely suspected, but did not know, that death was the greatest of evils, or if they knew that death was an evil, but perhaps not the greatest.

29b1-2 ἀμαθία ... ἢ ἐπονείδιστος: Plato uses the same words for the same thing in *Alc. Ma.* 118a. b4 τῷ ... τοῦ 'in anything ... than anybody'; these are forms of the indefinite pronoun, as the lack of accents shows. b6 τῷ βελτίονι καὶ θεῷ καὶ ἀνθρώπῳ: what would make a human being better than Socrates? A greater degree of wisdom would no doubt be sufficient, but it can hardly be necessary, if Socrates is to be consistent with what he said in Pl. 28e1-4 about the

obedience due to properly elected commanders. b6-7 *ὅτι κακὸν καὶ αἰσχρὸν ἴσθι*: knowledge on this matter, like the knowledge which Socrates claims at Pl. 37b7-c1 and Pl. *Euthd.* 293b, is perfectly consistent with the ignorance on matters of greater moment acknowledged in Pl. 21d3-4. b7-29c1 *πρὸ οὖν τῶν κακῶν ὧν οἶδα ὅτι κακά ἴσθιν, ἃ μὴ οἶδα εἰ καὶ ἀγαθὰ ὄντα τυγχάνει οὐδέποτε φοβήσομαι οὐδὲ φύξομαι* 'I will never fear or flee things that for all I know might actually be good, rather than bad things that I know to be bad.' Socrates invokes the same principle in Pl. 37b5-c1. The principle seems implausible once we allow for degrees of goodness, badness and probability. For it implies that I should not do what is sure to be slightly bad, in order to avoid something that has a 10 per cent chance of turning out to be slightly good, and a 90 per cent chance of turning out to be extremely bad. In Pl. *Phd.* 69a-b, Socrates speaks scornfully of those who make such calculations.

29c2 *Ἀνύτωι*: as a *συνήγορος* of Meletus, Anytus will have given another speech for the prosecution. c2-3 *τὴν ἀρχὴν οὐ δὲν ἐμὲ δεῦρο εἰσελθεῖν*: i.e. that at the very start of legal proceedings against him, Socrates should have gone into exile instead of staying to stand trial (as Socrates' friend Crito urges upon him in Pl. *Cri.* 45e). Such an exile would have meant loss of his property, to judge by *SEG* XII.100.8-16, recording the confiscation and sale of a house belonging to someone 'who did not stay for his trial'. c3-5 *ἐπειδὴ εἰσῆλθον, οὐχ οἶόν τ' εἶναι τὸ μὴ ἀποκτεῖναι με, λέγων κτλ*: there is just such an argument in Aeschin. 1.192: 'If he is going to be acquitted [*ἀποφεύξεται*], then it would have been better if the case had never come to court. For there are some who feared the law and the reputation of the courts before Timarchus was brought to trial, but if the man who wins the prize for being disgusting, the man who is most notorious for it, comes to trial and wins the case [*εἰσελθὼν περιγενήσεται*], then he will encourage many in their crimes.'

29d1-2 *εἰ οὖν με, ὅπερ εἶπον, ἐπὶ τούτοις ἀφίστημι*: Socrates imagines a similar question at Pl. 37e4-38a1. The difference is that there, after he has been convicted, he imagines someone asking him why he does not propose as his punishment that he abstain from philosophy, while here he imagines the jury proposing to acquit him, on condition that he abstains from philosophy. Athenian law would have permitted Socrates to make the proposal imagined in Pl. 37e4-38a1, and forbidden the jury to make the proposal imagined here. d3-4 *πείσομαι δὲ μάλλον τῷ θεῷ ἢ ὑμῖν*: Socrates' readiness here to disobey the imaginary and procedurally quite improper offer from the jury is fully compatible with his insistence in Pl. *Cri.* 51a-54e on the supreme authority that the Laws of Athens have over him. Among the reasons that he there gives for that supreme

authority is that the Laws allow him to try to persuade them to change their mind (52a) – something he would be forbidden to do under the imaginary offer from the jury. **d4** οὐ μὴ παύσωμαι: οὐ μὴ with aorist subjunctive is equivalent to οὐ with future indicative, except that it makes a much more emphatic denial. **d6** Ἀθηναῖος ὢν, πόλεως: it is as if Ἀθηναῖος were a phrase that meant ‘belonging to Athens’ or ‘coming from Athens’; such a phrase would have the name for Athens in the genitive; and that would require πόλεως to be genitive in agreement. **d7** τῆς μεγίστης καὶ εὐδοκίμωντάτης: Athenians like to boast of their city in this way: in Thuc. 2.64.3 Pericles calls it ‘biggest and richest in all things’; in Thuc. 6.89.6 Alcibiades calls it ‘biggest and most free’; Dem. 9.3 says ‘we have the biggest city, the most resources, the finest reputation’; Isoc. 4.23 says ‘our city is agreed to be oldest, biggest and most notable among the entire human race’; and when Athenian emissaries are trying to intimidate Melians in Thuc. 5.111.4, they describe their city simply as ‘the biggest’. At the time of Socrates’ trial, when Athens had recently been besieged, defeated and occupied, it might have been tactless to remind Athenians of such boasts.

29e1 οὐκ αἰσχύνῃ: the idea is that even those who are otherwise unpersuadable might be persuaded by appealing to their sense of shame. Socrates imagined such an attempt to persuade him in Pl. 28b3-4. **e2-3** φρονήσεως δὲ καὶ ἀληθείας καὶ τῆς ψυχῆς ὅπως ὡς βελτίστη ἔσται οὐκ ἐπιμελεῖ: the supreme importance of care for the soul is argued in more detail in Pl. *Alc. Ma.*: ‘a human being is nothing other than his soul’ (130c) and so anyone who cares for anything other than his soul is caring, not for himself, but at best for something that belongs to him (131a-d). Isoc. 15.290 shows that such thoughts were endorsed also outside Socratic circles: ‘He who has right and proper charge of his youth, and is making a good start to life, must take care for himself more than for his possessions, and must not search eagerly to rule over others before he has found someone to supervise his own thoughts, and must not take pleasure or pride in other goods as much as in those that education produces in the soul.’ **e3** οὐκ ἐπιμελεῖ οὐδὲ φροντίζει: to be grammatically parallel with the μέν clause, these should be participles like ἐπιμελούμενος in Pl. 28e1. There is a similar failure to be exactly parallel in Pl. 21e3-4.

30a1 ἐλέγξω: see Pl. 18d5n. **a2** περὶ ἐλαχίστου ποιεῖται ... **a3** περὶ πλείονος ‘treats as least important ... as more important’; see Pl. 21e5n. **a3-4** καὶ νεωτέρω καὶ πρεσβυτέρω ... καὶ ξένω καὶ ἰσθμῷ: such pairs of polar expressions are a favourite way to indicate generality. Other examples include Pl. 21b3-4, Pl. *Grg.* 515a ἡ ξένος ἢ ἰσθμός, ἡ δοῦλος ἢ ἐλεύθερος, Xen. *Oec.* 6.17 καὶ ἀνδρῶν καὶ γυναικῶν καὶ ξένων καὶ ἰσθμῶν. **a4-5** μᾶλλον δὲ τοῖς ἰσθμοῖς, ὅσωι μου ἡγυιτέρω ἐστὶ

γίνεαι: the jurors are the citizens of Athens (Pl. 17a1), and the citizens of Athens like to think of themselves as sharing a common descent from the soil of Attica (hence the patriotic rhetoric of which Dem. 60.4 is a sample and Pl. *Mnx.* 237b-c a parody). a6-7 τῷ θεῷ ὑπηρεσίαν: τῷ θεῷ is dative, because the verb ὑπηρετῶ takes a dative; see Pl. 18b7n. on τὰ τε μετέωρα φροντιστής. In Pl. *Euthphr.* 13d-14b, Euthyphro defines piety as a sort of assistance to the gods, but is unable to specify what the task is in which pious people give the gods this assistance. a7 περιέρχομαι: see Pl. 19b5n. on περιεργάζεται.

Job 1-2 σωμάτων ... χρημάτων ... ψυχῆς: this threefold division of possible objects of concern was common among followers of Socrates (it recurs in e.g. Xen. *Oec.* 1.13 and Critias, fr. 6.17-18 *IEG*). It is however Plato who is most insistent that, of these three, our souls should be our greatest concern (*Laws* 697b, *Phdr.* 241c, *Alc. Ma.* 130e-131b). b3-5 οὐκ ἐκ χρημάτων ἀρετὴ γίγνεται, ἀλλ' ἐξ ἀρετῆς χρήματα καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ἀγαθὰ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἅπαντα καὶ ἰδία καὶ δημοσία: does Socrates tell his fellow citizens that people acquire money and other goods by being virtuous, or that only if people are virtuous will money and other things be any good to them? For the former contention, cf. Arist. *Rh.* 1362b2-4: 'virtues must be a good thing ... for they are productive of good things' and *Pol.* 1323a40-41: 'People acquire and preserve, not virtues by externals [which Aristotle has just explained as "wealth, property, power, reputation and the like"]', but externals by virtues.' For the latter contention, cf. Pl. *Meno* 88c-d: 'So if virtue is among the contents of the soul and is bound to be beneficial, then it has to be prudence; for all other attributes of the soul are, in and of themselves, neither beneficial nor harmful, but they become beneficial or harmful by the addition of prudence or folly. By this reasoning, virtue - which is, after all, beneficial - has to be some sort of prudence ... And as for the other things that we were describing just now - wealth and the like - as sometimes good, sometimes bad: is it not the case that ... the soul makes these too in their turn beneficial when its use and control of them are correct, and harmful when incorrect? ... And is it not the prudent soul that controls correctly, and the imprudent one that controls erroneously?' The former contention is not as exceptionlessly true as the latter; but it is true enough when reasonably construed (cf. Pl. *Rep.* 612a-613e and *Phlb.* 40a-b on how virtue is likely to pay); it can be appreciated without the subtle argument needed to appreciate the latter; and it can be (as it is by Aristotle) used to urge us to focus our efforts on virtue rather than on wealth. So perhaps it is the former contention that Socrates habitually makes to his fellow citizens. b5-6 εἰ μὲν οὖν ταῦτα λέγων διαφθείρω τοὺς νέους, ταῦτ' ἂν εἴη βλαβερὰ· εἰ δὲ τίς μέ φησιν ἄλλα λέγειν ἢ ταῦτα, οὐδὲν λέγει: a gross overtranslation will bring out the difference

between what is insinuated by the first apodosis, with *ἄν* and the optative, and what is insinuated by the second, with the indicative: 'If in saying these things I corrupt the young, then these things would be harmful (which in fact they are not, and I do not corrupt the young in saying them); but if someone maintains that I say things other than these, then what he says is rubbish (and indeed some people do say such rubbish; for people say all sorts of fanciful things about what I tell the young).' *b6-7* πρὸς ταῦτα 'in the face of these facts'; marking the transition from a defiant statement to an imperative, as in e.g. Aesch. *Prometheus Bound* 992, Soph. *Ant.* 658, Thuc. 4.87.5, Eur. *Med.* 1358, Ar. *Ach.* 659.

30c1 ἐμοῦ οὐκ ἂν ποιήσοντος ἄλλα: this genitive absolute represents οὐκ ἂν ποιήσω ἄλλα ('there is no prospect of my doing otherwise') and so retains the *ἄν*. *c1-2* πολλάκις τεθνάναι: talk of 'dying many deaths' is too plain for orators, who tend to produce fancier variations on the theme: 'dying thrice' (Isoc. 12.214), 'dying twice for every single thing he has done' (Lys. 12.37), 'dying many deaths for every single thing he has done' (Lys. 28.1), 'dying ten thousand deaths' (Dem. 9.65).

30c3-31c3: Socrates the Godsend

Socrates has been sent to sting the city of Athens into a concern for virtue, like a gadfly stinging a sluggish but thoroughbred horse into life. If he is put to death, then the city will be harmed, for it will revert to its torpid vices. But neither death, nor any other sentence to which the trial might lead, can in fact harm Socrates. He is under some sort of divine protection from being harmed by the inferiors to whom the gods have sent him. And that it is indeed the gods who have sent him may be inferred from the fact that he does what he does without any humanly comprehensible reward.

30c3-4 ἐμείνατέ μοι οἷς ἰδεθήην ὑμῶν: at Pl. 17d2 and 20e4. *c4* μὴ θορυβεῖν ἐφ' οἷς ἂν λέγω ἄλλ' ἀκούειν 'whatever I say, not to heckle, but listen'. *c4-5* καὶ γὰρ ... μέλλω γὰρ: each of these γὰρ clauses explains Socrates' request for silence. His request for silence has as its purpose the benefit of the jurors, and as its stimulus the fact that the jurors may be about to get noisy. *c6-8* ἐάν με ἀποκτείνητε τοιοῦτον ὄντα οἷον ἐγὼ λέγω, οὐκ ἐμὲ μείζω βλάψετε ἢ ὑμᾶς αὐτοὺς: by itself, this does not go beyond Socrates' claim in Pl. *Grg.* 469a-c that it is better to suffer than commit an injustice; for it is compatible with the thought that victims of injustice are harmed, though never so much as to make it worth avoiding that harm by becoming a perpetrator of injustice. *c8-30d1* ἐμὲ μὲν γὰρ οὐδὲν ἂν βλάψειεν οὔτε Μίλητος οὔτε Ἄνυτος: this does go beyond Pl. *Grg.* 469c, where Socrates says that while it is better to be a victim of injustice than a perpetrator, it is better still to be neither.

30d1-2 οὐδὲ γὰρ ἂν δύναίτο—οὐ γὰρ οἶομαι θεμιτὸν εἶναι ἀμείνονι ἀνδρὶ ὑπὸ χειρόνος βλάπτεσθαι: with this inference, contrast Pl. *Phd.* 61c-e where Socrates, in full awareness that people sometimes commit suicide, insists that it is not θεμιτόν, and compare Pl. 21b5, where Socrates infers that a god will not lie, because it would not be θέμις. Perhaps Socrates thinks that all the dealings of a good man are fully controlled by gods (cf. Pl. 41d1-3), and that when something is fully controlled by gods, then it can go only as θέμις requires. d3 ἀτιμώσκειν is from ἀτιμώω 'inflict the punishment of ἀτιμία, i.e. privation of civic rights'. The variant ἀτιμάσκειν would be from ἀτιμάζω, a more general word for dishonouring. d3-4 ταῦτα οὗτος μὲν ἴσως οἶται . . . μεγάλα κακά, ἐγὼ δ' οὐκ οἶομαι: in Pl. 37b6-e7, Socrates declares that he knows exile to be an evil, and that he therefore will not propose it as a punishment. That is obviously consistent with what he says here (not all evils are great evils); but it is not so obviously consistent with his statement in Pl. 30c7-d3 that Meletus cannot harm him, but can drive him out of Athens. Perhaps Socrates thinks that he can be harmed only by his own wrong choices, and that nobody else, and in particular no bad man like Meletus, can make him choose wrongly; if Socrates is right to think that, then being driven into exile cannot harm him, even if a chosen exile would. d6 πολλοῦ δέω: see Pl. 17a2n. on ὀλίγου.

30e2-3 ἐὰν γὰρ με ἀποκτείνητε, οὐ ραϊδίως ἄλλον τοιοῦτον εὐρήσετε: presumably he means 'you will not easily find another interrogator sent by the god, in the way that I have been'. This is consistent with Socrates' warning at Pl. 39c5-d3 that the jurors will, after his death, still be subject to interrogation, by interrogators whom at the moment he is holding back. e3 ἀτεχνῶς: see Pl. 17d3n. εἰ καὶ γελοιότερον εἰπεῖν 'even if this is a bit of a funny thing to say'. e3-4 προσκείμενον τῇ πόλει ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ: in such a context, πρόσκειμαι is more or less the passive of προστίθημι. Cf. Pl. 17a1 πεπόνθατε ὑπὸ and Xen. *Mem.* 4.4.21 τοὺς ὑπὸ τῶν θεῶν κειμένους νόμους ('the laws laid down by the gods'). e4 μεγάλωι: see Pl. 29d7n. on how Athenians liked to boast of the size of their city. e5 μύωπος: other analogies in Plato for the pain of being interrogated by Socrates are snakebite (*Smp.* 218a), birthpangs (*Thl.* 151a), and electric shock (*Meno* 80a).

31a1 ὑμᾶς ἐγείρων καὶ πείθων καὶ ὀνειδίζων ἕνα ἕκαστον: as opposed to addressing the Athenians collectively, when gathered in the Assembly; cf. Pl. 31c4-6. a3 ἐὰν ἐμοὶ πείθησθε, φείσεσθέ μου: this polite idiom turns what would have been a brusque imperative ('spare me') into a scarcely contestable indicative ('if you do as I ask, you'll spare me') that makes the same request, and insinuates, by its use of this construction rather than any of the constructions for contrary-to-fact conditionals, that

the request will be met. The idiom is found also in comedy (e.g. Ar. *Frogs* 1134) and oratory (e.g. Lys. 34.4-5). α4 ἴσως τάχ' ἂν ἀχθόμενοι: by using two expressions for 'perhaps', Socrates tries to represent the jurors' irritation with him as a very remote contingency. α5 ῥαιδίως 'casually' as in Pl. 24c4.

31b2 τὸ ἐμὲ τῶν μὲν ἑαυτοῦ ἀπάντων ἡμεληκέναι: his neglect of all that belongs to him is, in the light of the distinction between Socrates himself and his belongings (Pl. 29e2-3n.), fully compatible with a very thorough care for himself. β6 εἶχον ἂν τινα λόγον: as in Pl. 34b2, λόγον ἔχω here means not just 'what I am doing has some explanation', but 'what I am doing has some explanation of a not particularly high-minded kind'.

31c1 τοῦτό γε οὐχ οἶοί τε ἐγένοντο ἀπαναισχυνηταί: reasons other than a vestigial sense of shame might have kept the prosecution from claiming that Socrates received pay for what he did. Most obviously, what payment if any Socrates received is hardly relevant to the charges that they brought. But it is not uncommon for litigants to say 'even my rivals are not so shameless as to' for 'my rivals do not': thus Isae. 6.54 οὐ γὰρ δὴ τοῦτό γε ἐρεῖ, καίπερ ἀναισχυντος ὦν, Isoc. 14.11 οἶμαι δὲ περὶ μὲν τούτων οὐ τολμήσειν αὐτοὺς ἀναισχυνητεῖν. c2 μισθόν: in a conversation with Antiphon the sophist (Xen. *Mem.* 1.6.13), Socrates compares the sale of wisdom to the sale of sexual favours. c3 τὴν πινίαν: see Pl. 23c1-2n.

31c3-33b6: Socrates in Public Life

In spite of his divine mission to the city of Athens, Socrates has, so far as he can, avoided public life. This is because, in public life, he would not have lasted long enough to carry out his mission. For on the occasions when he did engage with the ruling powers of Athens – both under democracy and under oligarchy – Socrates so angered them by refusing to collaborate with their injustices that he was lucky to escape death. But his refusal to engage in public life does not mean that he is a teacher of any esoteric doctrine kept hidden from all save paying pupils: anyone may, for free, join in his conversations.

31c4 ἴσως ἂν οὖν δόξειεν ἄτοπον εἶναι: orators too use such phrases to anticipate objections: Isoc. 8.63 ἀληθὲς μὲν ἐστὶ τὸ ῥηθησόμενον, ἴσως δ' ἂν ἀκούσασιν ὑμῖν δεινὸν εἶναι δόξειεν, Dem. *Exordia* 13.1 ἴσως ἐπιφθονοὺν ἂν τισιν, ὧς ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, δόξειεν εἶναι. See Pl. 28b3 for another way of anticipating objections. c5 περιῶν: see Pl. 19b5n. on περιεργάζεται. c6 τὸ πλῆθος τὸ ὑμέτερον: this phrase is customary in addressing a jury or assembly; it is used by, among others, Cleon in Thuc. 3.37-5, Ant. 5.8, Lys. 19.19, Dem. 24.111, Aeschin. 3.65. A variant on it is 21a1 ὑμῶν τῷ πλῆθει.

31d1 θεῖόν τι καὶ δαιμόνιον: if a noun is needed to go with these neuter adjectives, then the obvious one would be σημεῖον, as in Pl. 41d6. d1-2 ἐν τῇ γραφῇ ἐπικωμωιδῶν: a suggestion that the charges cannot be serious is made in these terms elsewhere too (Lys. 20.18 'The prosecutor, I suppose, was in not in earnest, but jesting, when he spoke of my violence; nor did he intend to persuade you that that is what I am like; rather, he intended to present some comic travesty of me [ἐμὲ κωμωιδεῖν βουλόμενος], as if that were a fine thing to do.'). Here the suggestion gets special force from the fact that Socrates has long been the subject of literal comedy (Pl. 18d2 and 19c2). d2 ἐμοὶ δὲ τοῦτ' ἔστιν ἐκ παιδὸς ἀρξάμενον 'It has been with me since boyhood.' This 'supernatural sign' therefore is not simply the way in which his own mature intuitions present themselves to him. d3 φωνή τις: a 'voice of a sort', rather than just a voice; for one thing, only Socrates can hear it; for another, there is no mouth from which it comes. d3-4 δταν γίνηται, αἰ ἀποτρέπει με τοῦτο δ' ἂν μέλλω πράττειν, προτρέπει δὲ οὕποτε: Socrates gives similar accounts of vetoes from this supernatural voice in Pl. 40a3-b6, and in Pl. *Euthd.* 272e: 'I had it in mind to get up. But as I got up, the customary supernatural sign occurred. So I sat back down again.' When Socrates has it in mind to omit to do something, the voice's veto can amount to something like a command, as in Pl. *Phdr.* 242b-c 'I was just about to ford the river, when the supernatural sign that is accustomed to occur occurred (it always holds me back from what I am about to do), and on the spot I thought I heard a voice forbidding me to leave before making atonement, as if I had somehow sinned against the divine.' The crucial thing in these accounts, as also in Xen. 4.18-19, and *Mem.* 4.8.5, is that the voice operates, not spontaneously, but only to speak against plans that Socrates has formed. Contrast [Pl.] *Thg.* 128d-129e, where Socrates repeats his claims that the voice speaks only to veto, and then adds that it once spoke to veto a plan of someone else's; Xen. 12.23-4, where Socrates says that the voice indicates what he should do; and Xen. *Mem.* 1.1.4, which claims that the voice gave Socrates all sorts of instruction, both positive and negative, to pass on to his associates, without suggesting that any of it was in response to plans that anyone had formed. d5 τὰ πολιτικά πράττειν: it is, of course, possible to speak of 'political activity' in a wider sense, so that it includes, not only such things as addressing the Assembly and holding public office, but also encouraging one's fellow citizens to do such things better. In this wider sense, Socrates allowed, indeed insisted, that he engaged in political activity. Hence Pl. *Grg.* 521d 'I suppose that there are few other Athenians, if any, who undertake the genuine art of politics [ἐπιχειρεῖν τῇ ὡς ἀληθῶς πολιτικῇ τέχνῃ], and that I am the only one around nowadays to engage in political activity [πράττειν τὰ πολιτικά μόνος τῶν νῦν]'; and Xen. *Mem.* 1.6.15 'How would I have the greater

engagement in political activity [μᾶλλον τὰ πολιτικά πράττοιμι]? By engaging in it all by myself? Or by taking care that there be as many people as possible who are fit to engage in it?' d6-31-e1 εἰ ἐγὼ πάσαι ἐπιχειρήσα πράττειν τὰ πολιτικά πράγματα, πάσαι ἂν ἀπολώλη; according to one calculation concerned with 41 of those who were most active in Athenian politics, 'only 19, less than half, avoid some kind of political catastrophe at the hands of (or, in the case of voluntary exile, because of fear of) their fellow citizens' (Knox 1985: 143; Knox's figures exclude both assassinations by oligarchs, like those mentioned in Thuc. 8.65.2, and executions by the δῆμος of more obscure politicians, like the six commanders mentioned in Xen. *HG* 1.7.34 and the nine treasury officials mentioned in Ant. 5.69).

31e2 καὶ μοι μὴ ἄχθεσθε λέγοντι τάληθῃ: such a request is a cliché of the orators. Examples include Ant. 5.46 καὶ μὴ μοι ἄχθεσθε, ἂν ὑμᾶς πολλάκις ταῦτά διδάξω, Lys. 2.1.16 μηδεὶς ὑμῶν ἄχθεσθῃ, Lyc. 1.28 καὶ μὴ μοι ἄχθεσθῆτε ὧ ἄνδρες, Dem. 19.227 ἀξιῶ δὲ μηδὲν ἄχθεσθαί μοι λέγοντι τάληθῃ.

32a1-2 ἀναγκαῖόν ἐστι τὸν τῷ ὄντι μαχοῦμενον ὑπὲρ τοῦ δικαίου, καὶ εἰ μέλλει ὀλίγον χρόνον σωθήσεσθαι, ιδιωτεύειν: the jurors' condemnation of Socrates might be taken as itself some vindication of this claim. a3 μεγάλα... τεκμήρια: see Pl. 24d8n. a4 οὐ λόγους ἄλλ' ὁ ὑμεῖς τιμᾶτε, ἔργα: from the middle of the fifth century onwards, the distinction between λόγος and ἔργον (words and deeds, theory and practice, fiction and fact) became a great favourite. People generally had the preference for deeds over words that Socrates here imputes to the jury. Socrates may be distancing himself from that preference when he imputes it to the jury with ὁ ὑμεῖς τιμᾶτε ('what *you* respect'). He certainly distances himself from it in Pl. *Phd.* 99d-100a, when he proposes a philosophical method that disdains ἔργα in order to investigate reality in λόγοι. a5 οὐδ' ἂν ἐνὶ 'no one whatsoever'. Splitting the two elements of οὐδενὶ makes it much more emphatically negative. a6 μὴ ὑπεύκων δὲ ἅμα κἂν ἀπολοίμην 'even if my failure to yield meant immediate death'; literally 'even if, when not yielding, I were to perish simultaneously'. A phrase meaning something like this is evidently what the context requires, and this text is the easiest way to get such a phrase from our evidence. a6-7 ἐρῶ δὲ ὑμῖν φορτικά μὲν καὶ δικανικά, ἀληθῆ δέ: cf. the complaint of Callicles to Socrates in Pl. *Grg.* 482e 'You keep saying you are seeking the truth, but in fact you bring the discussion round to the vulgar [φορτικά] and populist [δημηγορικά] sort of stuff that...'.
 32b1 ἐβούλευσα 'I have been a member of the Council.' See Pl. 25a3n. The events of his term in office that Socrates is about to mention are mentioned also in Pl. *Grg.* 473e-474a, Arist. *Ath.* 31.1, and Xen. *Mem.*

1.1.18 and 4.4.2, and narrated in detail in Xen. *HG* 1.7. b1-2 *ἔτυχεν ἡμῶν ἡ φυλὴ Ἀντιοχίς πρυτανεύουσα*: the citizens of Athens were divided into ten tribes, by a neat arrangement that united citizens from different parts of Attica (Arist. *Ath.* 21). The five hundred members of the Council were selected by lot, fifty from each of the tribes (Arist. *Ath.* 43.2). The tribes took it in turns to administer the affairs of the Council and supply chairmen for meetings of the Council and the Assembly; a randomising procedure (hence *ἔτυχεν*) decided which tribe's turn it was (Arist. *Ath.* 43.2-44.3). b2 *ὑμεῖς*: the jury are the 'men of Athens' (Pl. 17a1n.). b2-3 *τοὺς δέκα στρατηγούς τοὺς οὐκ ἀνελόμενους τοὺς ἐκ τῆς ναυμαχίας*: the Athenians elected ten men – one per tribe – to be their military commanders (Arist. *Ath.* 61.1); these men were called *στρατηγοί* ('generals'), but were just as likely to be admirals, commanding naval forces. In 406 BC, some Athenian ships were disabled at the Battle of Arginousae, and the commanders failed to ensure the recovery of these ships and their crews (Xen. *HG* 1.6.35). The Athenians recalled to Athens the eight commanders whom they held responsible for the failure; six of them returned for trial (Xen. *HG* 1.7.1-2). b3 *ἀθρόους κρίνειν*: that is, in just one vote to decide on the case of them all. The normal procedure (except under tyranny: Lys. 12.52) was to decide each defendant's case in a vote of its own. b4 *παρὰ νόμῳ, ὥς ἐν τῷ ὑστέρῳ χρόνῳ παῖσιν ὑμῖν ἔδοξεν*: according to Xen. *HG* 1.7.35, our most detailed source, this was 'not long after'. b4-5 *ἐγὼ μόνος τῶν πρυτάνεων*: according to Xen. *HG* 1.7.14-15, some of the others initially sided with Socrates, but they were then intimidated into acquiescence with the popular view. b5 *ἡναντιώθη ὑμῖν μηδὲν ποιεῖν παρὰ τοὺς νόμους* 'I was opposed to your acting contrary to the laws.' The *μηδὲν* looks illogical but is idiomatic: opposition is described by saying what results if it is successful. The same happens when refutation is described in Pl. *Grg.* 508a-b *ἐξελεγκτέος δὲ οὗτος ὁ λόγος ἡμῖν ἔστιν, ὥς οὐ δικαιοσύνης καὶ σωφροσύνης κτήσεται εὐδαίμονες οἱ εὐδαίμονες* (the theory to be refuted is that virtue *does* make us happy, but there is an *οὐ* nevertheless), and 467a *πῶς ἂν οὖν οἱ ῥήτορες μέγα δύναιντο ἢ οἱ τύραννοι ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν, ἂν μὴ Σωκράτης ἐξελεγχθῇ ὑπὸ Πύλου ὅτι ποιοῦσιν ἅ βούλονται*: (Socrates has maintained that orators and tyrants do *not* always do what they want, but nevertheless there is no *οὐ*). For another idiomatic but apparently illogical negation, see Pl. 38d7. b6 *ἐνδεικνύναι με καὶ ἀπάγειν*: summary denunciation before a magistrate (*ἐνδείξις*), followed by arrest (*ἀπαγωγή*) and detention, was a procedure available for use in response to certain gross and evident breaches of the law (e.g. Dem. 24.146, Arist. *Ath.* 29.4).

32c1 *τῶν ῥητόρων*: see Pl. 24a1n. c4-5 *οἱ τριάκοντα*: the Thirty were a junta who had control of Athens for a period in 404-403 BC. That the

Athenians should be ruled by such an oligarchy was one of the peace terms imposed upon them by the victorious Spartans. Xen. *HG* 2.3.1–2.4.23 and Arist. *Ath.* 34.2–38.1 describe the period at length. The incident that Socrates is about to narrate is mentioned also in [Pl.] *Ep.* 7.324e–325a and Xen. *Mem.* 4.4.3. c5 *πέμπτον αὐτόν* ‘as leader of a group of five’; see LSJ s.v. αὐτός 1.6. One of the five was called Meletus (And. 1.94), and it would be pleasant to identify him with the Meletus who prosecuted Socrates. Nevertheless, the lack of evidence that any Socratic ever made anything of this identification is strong evidence against it. τὴν θόλον: a rotunda next to the Agora, and a centre of power even under the democracy: it was where the πρυτάνεις (the officials whose turn it was to supervise the government of Athens) would eat (Arist. *Ath.* 43.3) and, in times of emergency, sleep (And. 1.45). c6 *Σαλαμίνιος*: the Thirty arranged a particularly memorable series of murders of citizens from Salamis (Lys. 12.52 and 13.44). *Λέοντα τὸν Σαλαμίνιον*: ‘who, both in fact and by reputation, was a decent man, guilty of no wrong’ according to a moderate oligarch in Xen. *HG* 2.3.39. *ἵνα ἀποθάνῃ* ‘so that he could be killed’. Here, as also in e.g. Lys. 10.4 *ὁ πατήρ ὑπὸ τῶν τριάκοντα ἀπέθνησκε* (‘my father was killed by the Thirty’), ἀποθνήσκω is more or less the passive of ἀποκτείνω. See Pl. 17a1n. c7 *οἷα δὲ καὶ ἄλλοις ἐκείνοι πολλοῖς πολλὰ προσέταττον*: likewise in Lys. 25.15, the speaker finds it worth boasting that ‘In the darkest days of the city, I so conducted myself that if everyone had taken the same attitude as me, there would not have been any dark days for any of you. It will be made plain to you that under the oligarchy I never arrested anyone, I never settled scores with any of my enemies.’ We may wonder how many of the jurors trying Socrates could make such a boast. c7–32d1 *βουλόμενοι ὡς πλείστους ἀναπλῆσαι αἰτιῶν*: Lys. 12.93 describes their policy and motives thus: ‘They became so contemptuous that, rather than try to win your loyalty by sharing in good things, they thought to have you on their side by making you partners in their disgrace.’

32d1 *οὐ λόγῳ ἀλλ’ ἔργῳ*: see Pl. 32a4n. d2 *ἐνεδιξάμην*: Socrates mischievously uses a technical term for a procedure for dealing with gross illegality (Pl. 32b6n.). There is more such mischief in Pl. 24d7 *μήνυσον*. εἰ μὴ ἀγροικότερον ἦν εἰπεῖν: blunt speech is one mark of the yokel (e.g. Ar. fr. 901 *PCG* ἀγροικός εἰμι τὴν σκάφην σκάφην λέγω); for other marks, see Thphr. *Char.* 4. The species of bluntness for which Socrates apologises here is presumably readiness to mention one’s merits (as in Isoc. 5.82 ‘Even if some will call the assertion ἀγροικότερον, I do claim to have sound judgement and a good education.’); at any rate, there is nothing coarse about his diction. d3 *τούτου δέ*: on the demonstrative when δέ is repeated, see Pl. 29a1n. d4–5 *ἐμὲ γὰρ ἐκείνη ἡ ἀρχὴ οὐκ*

ἐξέπληξεν, οὕτως ἰσχυρά οὕσα, ὥστε ἄδικόν τι ἐργάσασθαι 'Their rule, strong though it was, did not panic me into any unjust deed.' The οὕτως is not linked with the ὥστε. Compare Pl. *Phd.* 66d, which has ἐκπλήττει, ὥστε, but no οὕτως.

32e1 τούτων ὑμῖν ἔσονται πολλοὶ μάρτυρες: here (as at Pl. 21a7) we must imagine a pause in which the witnesses step forward to confirm what Socrates has said. If this text were presented in accordance with the usual conventions for presenting oratory, the word ΜΑΡΤΥΡΕΣ would be inserted here. e2 ἂν goes with διαγενέσθαι not with οἰεσθαι. Translate 'Do you think I would have lasted ...?' τοσάδε ἔτη: seventy years, to be precise; see Pl. 17c3-4n. e3 πράττων ἀφίως ἀνδρὸς ἀγαθοῦ: see Pl. 28b8-c1n. ἐβοήθουν τοῖς δίκαιοις 'I gave my support to the demands of justice'; contrast Pl. *Rep.* 362d βοηθεῖν δικαιοσύνη, for vindicating justice from the objection that injustice is better. e4 περὶ πλείστου ἐπιουμένην: see Pl. 30a1-2n. πολλοῦ γε δεῖ: see Pl. 17a2n. on ὀλίγου.

33a2 τοιοῦτος φανοῦμαι: the future tense here makes this mean 'if you check, it will be clear to you that this is what I am like'; compare the future οὐχ ἔξετε for 'you can't, as you will find out if you try' in Pl. *Pr.* 354d-e. a4-5 οὐς δὲ διαβάλλοντες ἐμέ φασιν ἐμούς μαθητάς εἶναι: Xen. *Mem.* 1.2.12-39 gives an elaborate argument that Socrates cannot be blamed for the bad behaviour of Critias ('the most covetous and violent of all under the oligarchy') and Alcibiades ('the most unrestrained and insolent of all under the democracy'), and in particular that his dealings with them cannot possibly have been 'education'; the argument evidently responds to the slanders that Socrates had these men for pupils that are echoed in Isoc. 11.5 and Aeschin. 1.173. Who first circulated such slanders we do not know. And φασιν suggests that Socrates had in mind as the source of the slanders nothing more definite than rumour or gossip. a5 ἐγὼ δὲ διδάσκαλος μὲν οὐδενὸς πώποτ' ἐγενόμην: not everyone who διδάσκει is a διδάσκαλος, for a διδάσκαλος is someone who διδάσκει professionally. This is why Socrates, who is no διδάσκαλος, can say that he intends to teach the jury something (Pl. 21b1), and that teaching the jury is the rightful task for a litigant (Pl. 35c2). See also Xen. *Mem.* 4.7.1-2, quoted in Xen. 20.3n. on ὁμολογῶ ... περὶ γε παιδείας. a6 τὰ ἑαυτοῦ πράττοντος 'minding my own business'. Popular cliché held this to be a good thing (Xen. *Mem.* 2.9.1, Lys. 26.3), to be equated with justice (Pl. *Rep.* 433a-b) or with moderation (Pl. *Chrm.* 161b). a7-33b1 οὐδὲ χρήματα μὲν λαμβάνων διαλέγομαι μὴ λαμβάνων δὲ οὐ 'and this is not the case either [οὐδέ, with the δὲ to show that this denial is additional to 'I have never begrudged anyone', and the οὐ to negate the whole of both the μὲν and the δὲ clauses to follow]: that if I get money I talk, but if I don't [μὴ, since this use of the participle amounts to the protasis of

a conditional] get money, then I do not [οὐ, negating only the apodosis of this conditional] talk'.

33b1-2 ἀλλ' ὁμοίως καὶ πλουσίῳ καὶ πένητι: Socrates' refusal to discriminate between those who can and those who cannot pay him fees shows that he is no sophist: the Eleatic Stranger defines a sophist as 'a hunter, for financial gain, of rich young people' (Pl. *Sph.* 231d, cf. 223b), and Xen. *Cynegética* 13.9 says 'Sophists hunt the rich and young; philosophers are impartial and friendly to all.' **b2** παρέχω ἑμαυτὸν ἐρωτᾶν: offering to answer questions from all comers does not distinguish Socrates from the sophist Gorgias, whom he describes in Pl. *Meno* 70c 'putting himself forward for questioning [αὐτὸς παρέχων αὐτὸν ἐρωτᾶν], by any Greek who likes on any topic anyone likes, and giving answers to absolutely everyone', or from the sophist Hippias, who says in Pl. *Hp. Mi.* 363d 'I put myself forward [παρέχω ἑμαυτὸν] . . ., giving answers to anyone who likes, whatever question anyone asks.' What does distinguish Socrates from sophists is instead that he prefers to confine himself to question-and-answer, and does not like delivering or listening to prolonged speeches (e.g. Pl. *Prt.* 334c-335c and *Grg.* 465e-466a). **b2-3** καὶ ἐάν τις βούληται ἀποκρινόμενος ἀκούειν ὧν ἂν λέγω: this phrase needs filling out from context (cf. Pl. 36b6n.), and amounts to 'and if anyone wants to give the answers, and thus hear what I have to say, then I put myself forward for that too'. Socrates was in fact much keener on having others give the answers than on giving them himself. Thus the complaints of Thrasymachus in Pl. *Rep.* 336c 'But if you really do want to know what justice is, then don't simply ask questions, or try to impress people by refuting any answer that anyone gives, knowing as you do that it is easier to ask than to answer. Instead, give me an answer yourself, and tell me what you say justice is', and of Hippias in Xen. *Mem.* 4.4.9 'In heaven's name no, I'm not going to tell you, not before you tell me what you think justice is. You content yourself with making mock of others, asking everyone questions and catching them out, and refusing yourself to submit a theory to anyone or declare a view about anything.' **b4-5** μήτε ὑπεσχόμεν μηδὲν μηδὲν πώποτε μάθημα μήτε ἰδίδασκα: here ὑπισχεῖσθαι is not just to undertake, but to profess in something like the sense in which professors profess their subjects (as at e.g. Pl. *La.* 182d-e, Xen. *Mem.* 1.2.3); so too a μάθημα is not just any stray fact that might be known, but an organised body of knowledge (as at e.g. Isoc. 15.261, where astronomy and geometry are typical μαθήματα). The negations here are all with μή because Socrates is speaking quite generally: he disclaims responsibility, not just for some identifiable individuals, but for absolutely anyone with whom he has had dealings, to not one of whom has he ever offered or given formal instruction.

33c1-34b5: Socrates and Young Men

Young men enjoy hearing Socrates carry out his mission to expose the errors of those who mistakenly think they are wise. Many of these young men, and their kin, are present in the court. Yet Meletus cannot get any of them to step forward and testify that he or his kin has been corrupted by Socrates.

33c2-4 ἀκηκόατε κτλ: this and the next two sentences are asyndetic. Arist. *Rh.* 1420a6-8 recommends asyndeton for the end of a speech (he gives the example εἴρηκα, ἀκηκόατε, ἔχετε, κρίνατε; Lys. 12.100 has παύσομαι κατηγορῶν. ἀκηκόατε, ἐωράκατε, πεπόνθατε, ἔχετε δικάζετε); Socrates will nevertheless continue his speech for several minutes more. For other uses of asyndeton, see Pl. 20b7-c1n. c2-3 πᾶσαν ὑμῖν τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἐγὼ εἶπον: as Socrates promised at Pl. 17b7-8 and 20d4-5. For such phrases in oratory, see Isoc. 15.50 ἀκηκόατε πᾶσαν τὴν ἀλήθειαν, and Thuc. 6.87.1 εἰρήκαμεν δ' ὑμῖν πᾶσαν τὴν ἀλήθειαν. c3 ὅτι κτλ: i.e. 'the reason they enjoy my company is because'. ἀκούοντες χαίρουσιν ἐξεταζόμενοι: the verb χαίρω has a dative for those in whom delight is taken. Although the syntax is different, the meaning is the same as Pl. 23c4-5 χαίρουσιν ἀκούοντες ἐξεταζομένων, where the verb ἀκούω takes a genitive for those who are heard. c5 ἐκ μαντείων: since these are just one entry in a list of the varied ways in which gods communicate with human beings, these presumably are oracles in the narrowest of senses; but then it is not clear what, apart from the Delphic oracle described in Pl. 21a3-6, justifies the plural. c5-6 ἐξ ἐνυπνίων: in Pl. *Phd.* 60e Socrates says 'I have often had the same dream come to me in times gone by. It looked different on different occasions, but it said the same thing. "Socrates," it said, "make music and don't slack." And formerly, I used to suppose that it was urging me to do the very thing that I was doing, like people urging on runners: the dream telling me to do the very thing that I was doing, make music, on the understanding that philosophy is the greatest music, and that this is what I was doing.' (More recently, continues Socrates, he decided that the dream might be telling him to make music in a more straightforward sense.) c6 παντὶ τρόπῳ: Ar. *Birds* 716-22 gives an extensive list of the ways in which gods were thought to communicate with human beings. In addition to what Plato tells us of the Delphic oracle, dreams, and the voice of the δαιμόνιον, we are told in later sources that Socrates' δαιμόνιον also communicated with him through visions, sneezes, and the apparently random encounters that people called σύμβολοι (Apuleius, *On the God of Socrates* 166, Plu. *On the Supernatural Being of Socrates* 581a-b and *Nicias* 13.9). θεία μοῖρα: this phrase, although not documented earlier, became a favourite among authors of Socratic literature (cf. e.g. Pl. *Phdr.* 244c, [Pl.] *Thg.* 128d, [Pl.] *Dem.* 379d, Xen.

Mem. 2.3.18, Aeschin. fr. 53 SSR). Perhaps this is because it was a favourite of Socrates himself.

33d4 ἀναβαίνοντας: that is, as at Pl. 17d3, getting up on the platform where people stand to address the jury. d5 τῶν οἰκείων τινάς τῶν ἐκείνων 'some of their kinsfolk'. Here τῶν οἰκείων is partitive genitive with τινάς ('some of the kinsfolk'); the genitive ἐκείνων is a separate construction ('belonging to them'); the second τῶν shows that these two are to be combined, with ἐκείνων as an attribute of οἰκείων ('some of the kinsfolk belonging to them'). d6 ὅτι ἐμοῦ τι κακὸν ἐπεπόνθεσαν: cf. Pl. 17a1. d7-8 πάντως δὲ πάρεσιν αὐτῶν πολλοὶ ἐνταυθοῖ οὓς ἐγὼ ὀρώ: those whom Socrates says he can see and names do not include anyone connected with Alcibiades or Critias (see Pl. 33a4-5n.). d8 Κρίτων: a close friend of Socrates, he has speaking parts in Pl. *Cri.*, *Euthd.*, and *Phd.*, and Xen. *Mem.* 2.9. In Pl. *Cri.*, he bribes the gaoler to let him into Socrates' gaol (43a), and offers to pay bribes to get Socrates let out (45b).

33e1 Κριτοβούλου: another close friend of Socrates, he was present at Socrates' death (Pl. *Phd.* 59b). He has speaking parts in Xen. *Smp.*, *Oec.*, and *Mem.* 1.3.8-15 and 2.6. According to Xen. *Oec.* 2.3, he was at least one hundred times richer than Socrates. Λυσανίας: of whom we know no more than we are told here. e2 Αἰσχίνου: another friend of Socrates, author of Socratic dialogues (frs. 41-100 SSR) and present at Socrates' death (Pl. *Phd.* 59b). He was notorious for his poverty (fr. 6 SSR); and so his juxtaposition here with Critoboulus illustrates Socrates' claims at Pl. 33b1 about his readiness to talk to both rich and poor alike. Ἀντιφῶν: of whom we know no more than we are told here. e3 Ἐπιγίνους: present at Socrates' death (Pl. *Phd.* 59b); he has a speaking part in Xen. *Mem.* 3.12. e4 Νικόστρατος Θεοζοτίδου, ἀδελφὸς Θεοδότου: we know no more about any of these three than we are told here. Their juxtaposition with the more famous helps show that Socrates will talk to all and sundry. e5 ἐκεῖνος: i.e. Theodotus. αὐτοῦ: i.e. Nicostratus.

34a1 Παράλιος: he is named in IG II.ii.1400.3. From this inscription, we can correct the misspellings of his name in our manuscripts. Δημοδόκου: older than Socrates, he had occupied with great honour all the most important offices of Athens ([Pl.] *Thg.* 127e), and is presumably the commander mentioned in Thuc. 4.75.1. He is the silent addressee of a prolonged harangue in [Pl.] *Dem.*, and has a speaking part in [Pl.] *Thg.*, where he, Socrates and Theages discuss what is to be done about Theages' education. Θεάγης: according to Socrates in Pl. *Rep.* 496b-c, Theages would have abandoned philosophy for a career in politics if his health

had allowed it. α1-2 Ἀδείμαντος: he has speaking parts in Pl. *Prm.* and *Rep.* α2 Ἀρίστωνος: of whom we know little more than his place in Plato's family tree. Πλάτων: this is one of only three times where Plato mentions himself in his dialogues. The other two are Pl. 38b7-10, where he joins Crito, Critoboulus, and Apollodorus in guaranteeing that a large fine can be paid for Socrates' offences, and *Phd.* 59b, where Phaedo says that Plato was too ill to be present at the death of Socrates. Αἰαντόδωρος: of whom we know no more than we are told here. α3 Ἀπολλόδωρος: see Xen. 28.21n. α5 ἐγὼ παραχωρῶ: Meletus is here offered the opportunity to take up some of the strictly limited time allotted to Socrates for his speech. Such offers were a favourite way to impress the jury with one's confidence in one's case: examples include Lys. 20.11 'let him give evidence during my speech', Dem. 18.139 'let him show this while my water is running', And. 1.26 'I'm offering anyone who wishes to take it up, the opportunity to show, during my own speech, that ... I'm falling silent, and standing aside [παραχωρῶ], in case someone wishes to mount the platform.'

34b2 λόγον ἔχουσιν: see Pl. 31b6n.

34b6-35d8: Parading the Family?

At this point in a trial, a litigant would often try to win sympathy by parading his children before the jurors. Socrates has children, but he will not parade them. That would not be dignified: what would the world think of the Athenians if it heard that those of them who, like Socrates, have some reputation for wisdom, nevertheless resort to such emotional pleas? And such pleas would be, not only undignified, but also unjust and impious. For the jurors have sworn on oath to judge the case, not on the basis of such pleas, but in accordance with the law. And that, Socrates concludes, is what they must now do.

34c3-4 ἐδεήθη τε καὶ ἰκέτευσεν τοὺς δικαστὰς μετὰ πολλῶν δακρύων, παῖδία τε αὐτοῦ ἀναβιβασάμενος: see Pl. 18d4n. on ἀναβιβασσάσθαι. Ar. *Wasps* gives in 563-74 a description of how such pleas were made, and in 976-8 a parody of them. Such pleas remained routine until long after the death of Socrates: Hyperides 3.41 ends a speech with 'I have now given you, Euxenippus, such help as was in my power. It remains to implore the jurors, and call forth the friends, and put the children on the platform.' Here is how Lys. 20.34 anticipated such pleas: 'If someone puts his children on the platform and weeps and wails, then I observe that you, gentlemen of the jury, take pity on his children in case they incur dishonour because of him, and that you remit the crimes of the fathers for the sake of the children, even though you have as yet no knowledge whether they will

turn out good or bad when they come to maturity. However, you are aware that we have always been on your side, and that our father has committed no crime. In consequence, you will be far more just if you do a good turn to people whom you have tried and tested, than to those of whose future character you have no knowledge.' c4 δτι intensifies the superlative μάλιστα; see Pl. 23a2n. c5-6 ἐγὼ δὲ οὐδὲν ἄρα τούτων ποιήσω 'yet I, as it transpires, am not going to do any of these things'. See GP 38: 'In reported speech, and after verbs of thinking and seeming, ἄρα denotes the apprehension of an idea not before envisaged.' In being too dignified to defend himself by the tears of his loved ones, Socrates is like the speaker of some sophists' defence speeches. Thus Isoc. 15.321: 'When other people are at risk [κινδυνεύοντας], and are getting to the end of their defence speech, I observe them pleading, begging [ικετεύοντας, δεομένους], putting their children, their friends, on the platform [τοὺς παῖδας, τοὺς φίλους ἀναβιβάζομένους]. I however consider no such thing proper for men of my age; and in addition to being of that mind, I would be ashamed to secure my safety by any means other than the discourses that I have previously pronounced and put in writing.' Likewise, Grg. DK 82 B 11a.33 has Palamedes say 'It remains for me to tell you something about yourselves, and once I have done this, I will end my speech in my defence. Wailing and entreaties and pleas from friends are effective when the trial takes place among a mob. But with you, who are both in fact and by reputation the leaders of the Greeks, it is not by my friends' assistance and entreaties and wailings that I need to persuade you; rather, I need to escape this charge by the means that is most clearly just, by informing you of the truth, not by trickery.' c6 καὶ ταῦτα: see Pl. 26e5n. κινδυνεύων, ὡς ἂν δόξαιμι, τὸν ἔσχατον κίνδυνον: Socrates maintains that for all that he or anyone else knows, death might even be a good thing (Pl. 29a6-7); this is why he does not say outright that in facing death he is facing the ultimate danger, but only that he is facing, 'as I might be thought', the ultimate danger.

34d2 οὐκ ἀξιῶ μὲν γὰρ ἔγωγε, εἰ δ' οὖν 'I'm not claiming that this is so; I'm only saying "if".' To bring out the force of adding οὖν to this δὲ clause, GP 460 says 'οὖν marks the opposed idea as essential.' d4-5 τὸ τοῦ Ὀμήρου, οὐδ' ἐγὼ ἀπὸ δρυὸς οὐδ' ἀπὸ πέτρης: Socrates alludes to Hom. *Od.* 19.163, where Odysseus is asked to say who his family are and where he comes from: οὐ γὰρ ἀπὸ δρυὸς ἔσσι παλαιφάτου οὐδ' ἀπὸ πέτρης. However Socrates' phrase occurs verbatim only in Hom. *Il.* 22.126, where, apart from the fact that it is used somehow in connection with Achilles, the meaning of the phrase is obscure. Perhaps the desire to compare himself to Achilles (as at Pl. 28c2-d5) has overridden any pedantry about exact quotation. d6 εἰς μὲν μιράκιον ἦδη: he was called Lamprocles. Xen.

Mem. 2.2 describes a conversation between him and his father. As a μειράκιον, he would be old enough to have left school (Pl. *La.* 179a, Xen. *Lac.* 3.1), but not much older. δύο δὲ παιδία: the two little children, together with their mothers, make a brief appearance at Pl. *Phd.* 116b; the one whose mother was Xanthippe was, at this date, so little as to be carried in her arms (Pl. *Phd.* 60a: Ξανθίππην ... ἔχουσιν ... τὸ παιδίον αὐτοῦ). According to Aristoxenus' *Life of Socrates* (fr. 54 Wehrli), these two little children would have been called Sophroniscus and Menexenus; but since Aristoxenus also says that they were both the children of Myrto, he is not wholly reliable.

34e2 πρὸς δ' οὖν δόξαν: see Pl. 17a2n. on δ' οὖν. e4 τηλικόνδε: seventy; see Pl. 17d3. καὶ τοῦτο τοῦνομα ἔχοντα: he is called 'wise'; see Pl. 23a3. εἴτ' οὖν ... εἴτ' οὖν: such an οὖν 'denotes indifference', according to GP 418, which adds, and explains, a translation: "whether, in point of fact", the implication being that the fact does not greatly matter for immediate purposes'.

35a1 ἀλλ' οὖν δεδογμένον γέ ἐστι 'still, the settled opinion at least is that'; see 27c6n. on the combination of particles. The implication of the perfect tense is that when people hear that Socrates behaves badly, they will not change their minds about his superiority to the average Athenian, but simply infer that the average Athenian behaves even worse. a2-3 εἰ οὖν ὑμῶν οἱ δοκοῦντες διαφέρειν ... τοιοῦτοι ἔσονται, αἰσχρὸν ἂν εἴη: in Pl. *Cri.* 47a-d, Socrates reproves Crito for supposing that we should bother with the opinions of people in general, however ignorant they are; instead, we should bother only with the opinions of people who understand things. To reconcile that reproof with what Socrates says here, it may suffice to reflect that people will show understanding rather than ignorance if they despise the Athenians for thinking highly of someone who makes emotional appeals in court. a4 οἷοις περ ἐγὼ πολλάκις ἰώρακα: hence Socrates must often have been among the audience (Pl. 25a1), even if this is his first time in court as a litigant (Pl. 17d2-3). a6-7 ὥσπερ ἀθανάτων ἰσομένων ἂν ὑμεῖς αὐτοὺς μὴ ἀποκτείνητε: Socrates' thought seems to be this: to avoid the death sentence, these people go to such disgraceful extremes as to suggest that they do not care at all about how or when they will die, and that instead they care only that the death sentence means death; but in that case, their purpose in avoiding the death sentence cannot be to die in a different way or at a different time; their purpose could only be that avoiding the death sentence would mean avoiding death altogether. Cf. Xen. 23.25-7, 27.15-17 and notes, and Hom. *Il.* 12.322-5, where one hero urges another not to avoid battle: 'If after making our escape from this war we were going to be ageless and deathless for ever,

then I would not myself be fighting in the front ranks, nor would I be urging you into battle that brings glory to men.'

35b1 τῶν ξένων: it is clear from e.g. Lys. 12.35 and Aeschin. 1.117 that foreigners, no less than Athenian citizens, were allowed to attend trials as ἀκροαταί (Pl. 25a1n.). Socrates' warning here has a parallel in Dem. 25.98, warning the jurors that they must vote the right way, to avoid disgracing themselves before foreign onlookers. b3-4 ταῦτα ... οὔτε ὑμᾶς χρὴ ποιεῖν τοὺς δοκοῦντας καὶ ὀπτηοῦν τι εἶναι 'those who have the slightest reputation [literally, 'those who seem in even any way to be anything'] should not do these things to you'. b4-5 ἂν ἡμεῖς ποιῶμεν: a protasis of this form insinuates that the reputable are all too likely to treat the jurors in this way. b6 τὰ ἐλαινὰ ταῦτα δράματα: for other complaints that an orator's opponent is melodramatic, see Dem. 18.127 and 19.189.

35c1-2 οὐδὲ δικάσιόν μοι δοκεῖ εἶναι δεῖσθαι τοῦ δικαστοῦ οὐδὲ δεόμενον ἀποφεύγειν: Xen. *Mem.* 4.4.4 represents concern for justice as Socrates' only motive for refusing to appeal to the jurors' emotions: 'When he was defending himself against the charge brought by Meletus, although other people in the lawcourts normally gratify the jurors by the way they talk and flatter and beg, in violation of the laws, and although through such means many have often been acquitted by the jurors, he refused to do in violation of the laws any of the things normal in the lawcourt; on the contrary, although he would easily have been acquitted by the jurors if he had made even a modest attempt at any of those things, he preferred death through obeying the laws to life through breaking them.' It may seem odd that Socrates can think that appealing to the jurors' emotions is unjust even though commonly done in the lawcourts. But Arist. *Rh.* 1354a21-6 shows that there was sufficient doubt about the practice for Socrates' attitude to be possible: 'Everyone thinks that the law should forbid it, and some actually put that into practice and prevent irrelevant talk, as in the Court of Areopagus, which is the right attitude to take. For one should not distort the juror by inducing him to anger or spite or pity. That would be like bending the ruler that one means to employ.' c3 κάθηται: this is as standard a term in Greek for what a court does as 'sit' is in English: see e.g. Ar. *Wasps* 825, And. 1.139, Dem. 19.239. c4-5 ὁμώμοκεν οὐ χαριεῖσθαι οἷς ἂν δοκῇ αὐτῷ, ἀλλὰ δικάσειν κατὰ τοὺς νόμους: Dem. 24.149-51 purports to quote the jurors' oath in full. It includes the clauses 'I will vote in accordance with the laws and the decrees of the Athenian people and of the Council of the Five Hundred' and 'I will listen equally to both accuser and defendant, and I will cast my vote on the issue that is the subject of the prosecution.' c5 ἡμᾶς: i.e. litigants. ὑμᾶς: i.e. jurors. c6 οὐδέτεροι ... ἡμῶν: i.e. neither litigants nor jurors.

35d3 εἰ πείθοιμι ὑμᾶς καὶ τῷ δεῖσθαι βιαζοίμην: in suggesting that persuading people to do things can be a form of violent coercion, Socrates borrows a conceit that was developed at length by the sophist Gorgias (DK 82 B 11.8-14). d4 ἀτεχνῶς: Socrates emphasises the aptness of the oxymoron that he is about to produce; see Pl. 17d3n. d5 πολλοῦ δεῖ: see Pl. 17a2n. on ὀλίγου. d7 ἐπιτρέπω καὶ τῷ θεῷ: Socrates is being more pious than most other litigants, who certainly did not usually end their speeches by talk about leaving things to divine judgement. Socrates is also being heroic. The injunction 'leave that to the gods' occurs three times in Homer (*Od.* 19.502, 21.279 and 22.289), each time in the mouth of Odysseus. For talking about 'the god' instead of 'the gods', cf. Pl. *Grg.* 512d-e, where Socrates says that any real man leaves it to the god how long he will live, and concerns himself only with how best to fill whatever span has been allotted him.

36a1-38b10: Socrates Proposes a Penalty

The jurors have voted to convict Socrates. The prosecution proposed that he be punished by death. It is now his task to propose an alternative punishment. He cannot propose what he deserves. For what he deserves, given his services to the city and his innocence of the charges on which he has been convicted, is free meals for life at public expense, like one who has brought honour on the city by victory in the Olympic Games. Nor can he propose any of the customary punishments: he does not have the money to pay any serious fine, and he can see no point in prison or in exile. He certainly will not accept any arrangements that require him to abandon the mission on which he has been sent. He therefore proposes to pay a fine that, while all he can afford, is nevertheless trivial. His friends offer him the money to pay a bigger fine, and this is what he eventually proposes.

36a1-2 τὸ μὲν μὴ ἀγανακτεῖν ... ἄλλα τί μοι πολλὰ συμβάλλεται: Socrates presents the main topic of his sentence using an infinitive with a neuter singular article, before going on to make a comment on that topic. Compare Pl. *Lysis* 295a καὶ τὸ ἔρᾶν ἔξαρνος εἰ οὐ λέγει ὁδε: ('as for being in love with the boy that he says: do you deny even that?'), Lyc. 91 τὸ γ' ἐλθεῖν τοῦτον, οἶμαι θεῶν τινα αὐτὸν ἐπ' αὐτὴν ἀγαγεῖν τὴν τιμωρίαν ('as for his coming, I suspect that some god brought him, precisely so that he could be punished'). With συμβάλλεται 'contribute to', it would have been smoother to use a preposition (like the εἰς in Xen. *Cyr.* 1.2.8 μέγα δὲ συμβάλλεται εἰς τὸ μανθάνειν σωφρονεῖν αὐτούς, or the πρὸς in Isae. fr. 5.1 μέγα γὰρ μέρος συμβάλλεται ... αὐτοῖς πρὸς τὸ δοκεῖν ἀληθῆ λέγειν). But perhaps Socrates has, after all, been too ruffled by the verdict for his syntax to be perfectly smooth. a5-6 εἰ τριάκοντα μόναι μετέπεσον τῶν ψήφων, ἀπεπεφεύγη ἄν: we may infer that 280 jurors voted to condemn, and 220

to acquit. This inference relies on the following facts: panels of 500 jurors were standardly convened for cases like that of Socrates (Arist. *Ath.* 68.1); jurors had to vote to be paid (Arist. *Ath.* 68.2); and a tied vote meant acquittal (Ar. *Frogs* 684–5, Aeschin. 3.252, Arist. *Ath.* 69.1). The following facts make the inference less than wholly secure: several panels of 500 were sometimes combined to make a single jury (e.g. Lys. 13.35); such a jury was sometimes supplemented with an extra juror, in order to avoid a tied vote in an important case (Dem. 23.28 with the note on it in *Lexicon Patmense*, ed. I. Sakkellion, 147.4–9, Dem. 24.9 and scholium, Photius *Lexicon s.v.* ἡλιαῖα); and one case is recorded in which only 499 jurors voted (IG II. ii.1641, side B). (D.L. 2.41 says that there were 281 more votes for condemnation than for acquittal. This probably results from the garbling, by D.L. or his scribes or his sources, of a figure of 280 votes for condemnation.) a6 ἀπεπεφύγη is pluperfect. The aorist ἀπεφύγον would focus on the event itself ('I would have got an acquittal'); the pluperfect focuses on the past state resulting from that event ('I would have been at liberty'). a6–8 Μίλητον ... καὶ νῦν ἀποπέφυγα, καὶ οὐ μόνον ἀποπέφυγα, ἀλλά: that is, Meletus put up such a poor show that Socrates has won the argument against him, and has won it by so large a margin that.... a8 ἀνέβη ἄνυτος καὶ Λύκων: a singular verb with more than one subject is idiomatic enough to be found also in e.g. Lys. 12.12 ἐπιτυγχάνει Μηλόβιός τε καὶ Μνησιθείδης, Xen. *An.* 2.4.16 ἔπεμψε μέ Ἀριστοῦ καὶ Ἀρτάοζος.

36b1 χιλίας δραχμάς: to calibrate this sum, see Pl. 19e3n. on Γοργίας. b1–2 τὸ πέμπτον μέρος τῶν ψήφων: apart from the 1,000 drachma fine, as mentioned here and at e.g. Dem. 21.47, And. 4.18, there were various other penalties to deter frivolous litigation, all imposed on litigants who failed to win at least a fifth of the jurors' votes (Isoc. 18.12, And. 1.33, Dem. 26.9). Even in the ideal law code of Pl. *Laws* 948a–b, a fifth of the jurors' votes is needed to escape similar penalties. b3–4 ἐγὼ δὲ δὴ τίνος ὑμῖν ἀντιτιμήσομαι: Pl. *Laws* 876b–c is extremely scornful about the procedure of ἀντιτίμησις, indeed about leaving any significant choice of punishments to jurors who, like those that tried Socrates, do not listen in silence. b4 ἢ δῆλον ὅτι τῆς ἀξίας: in saying that obviously he should propose what he merits, Socrates affects to misunderstand the point of the procedure. He is expected to propose a punishment less severe than that proposed by the prosecution, but still severe enough for there to be a reasonable chance that the jury will prefer it to what the prosecution proposed. That the misunderstanding is only affected becomes clear at Pl. 38bg, when he eventually does propose a penalty of something like the severity

expected. b5 παθεῖν ἢ ἀποτεῖσαι: this is the standard phrase of Athenian law (e.g. Xen. *Mem.* 2.9.6, Dem. 20.156, Aeschin. 1.15, Arist. *Ath.* 61.2), to cover all possible penalties: παθεῖν covers penalties inflicted on the malefactor's person, ἀποτεῖσαι covers penalties inflicted on the malefactor's estate. δτι μαθὼν 'all because'. This phrase presents a reason, while suggesting scornfully that the reason is inadequate; cf. Pl. *Prt.* 355d ὅμως δ' ἂν κακὰ ἦν, δτι μαθόντα χαίρειν ποιεῖ καὶ ὀπτιοῦν; ('would they nevertheless be bad, and all because they gave rise to enjoyment of whatever sort?'). Likewise τι μαθὼν: seeks a reason, while suggesting scornfully that no adequate reason can be given (e.g. Ar. *Clouds* 402, Dem. 29.20). b6 ἀμείλιχας ὥνπερ οἱ πολλοί: this phrase needs filling out from its context, and amounts to 'holding cheap the things that the masses hold dear'. There is comparably drastic filling out in Pl. 21c2-3, 33b2-3, 38b8-9 and 39c5, and Xen. 1.1.22.

36c5-6 μὴ πρότερον μήτε τῶν ἑαυτοῦ μηδενὸς ἐπιμελεῖσθαι πρὶν ἑαυτοῦ ἐπιμεληθεῖν: you are your soul, and so to care for yourself is to care for your soul (Pl. 29c2-3n.). According to Pl. *Alc. Ma.* 131a-d, your body is merely a thing that belongs to you, and material possessions are not even that, but are at one further remove from you yourself; in consequence, you do not care for yourself even by the medical skill that you might use in caring for your body; and still less do you care for yourself by the skills that you might use in caring for material possessions. c7-36d1 τῶν τῆς πόλεως ... αὐτῆς τῆς πόλεως: the contrast between what belongs to the city and the city itself recurs at Pl. *Alc. Ma.* 134b-c, in an argument that a happy city needs 'justice and temperance' not 'walls or triremes or dock-yards' or 'numbers or size' or 'power or empire'.

36d2-3 εἰ δὲ γὰρ κατὰ τὴν ἀξίαν τῆς ἀληθείας τιμᾶσθαι: this protasis is some sort of acknowledgement that (contrary to the suggestion of Pl. 36b4n.) Socrates is not in fact supposed to propose what he deserves. d3 καὶ ταῦτα: see Pl. 26e5n. d4 πένητι: on the poverty of Socrates, see Pl. 23c1-2n. d5 ἐπὶ τῇ ὑμετέρᾳ παρακαλεῖσσι 'for exhorting you'. Cf. Pl. 29d5 ὑμῖν παρακαλουόμενος. d6-7 ἐν πρυτανείᾳ σιτέσθαι: that is, to eat for free in the rotunda where the πρυτάνεις ate (Pl. 32c5n. on τὴν θόλον). When Socrates was in his forties, such an honour had been accorded to the eldest living descendant of the tyrant-slayers Harmodius and Aristogeiton, and to victors in the Olympian, Pythian, Isthmian and Nemean games (*IG* 1.iii.131). Intellectuals disliked such honours for athletes, and complained about them at length in Xenophanes DK 21 B 2, and Eur. fr. 282 *TrGF*. d7-8 ἱππῶν ἢ συνωρίδι ἢ ζεύγει νενίκηκεν Ὀλυμπίᾳσιν: Socrates talks of victory in the most prestigious events at the most prestigious games. Cf. Thuc. 6.16.2, where Alcibiades is arguing that

he should be given command of Athenian forces: 'The Greeks used to think they might get the better of our city in warfare, but now they have come to think her greater, even greater than her power warrants, because of my distinguished showing in the Olympic festival: I entered seven chariots – more than any private citizen had ever done before – and I was victorious, and got second and fourth places, and so organised everything as to deserve my victory.'

36c1 ὁ μὲν τροφῆς οὐδὲν δέσται: the victor in a chariot race was not the driver (who might well have been poor), but the owner (who was definitely rich).

37a4 περὶ τοῦ οἴκου καὶ τῆς ἀντιβολήσεως: Socrates alludes to what he said in Pl. 34c1-35b7, about refusing to make emotive appeals for mercy.

a5-6 πέπεισμαι ἐγὼ ἐκὼν εἶναι μηδένα ἀδικεῖν ἀνθρώπων 'I am convinced that I am guilty of no voluntary injustice against anyone.' In such words, one might make a straightforward profession of innocence, after detailed scrutiny of one's own actions and motives. But Socrates might instead be applying to himself in particular an entirely general thesis that he accepts on entirely general grounds. The thesis he formulates in Pl. *Grg.* 509e as μηδένα βουλόμενον ἀδικεῖν, ἀλλ' ἄκοντας τοὺς ἀδικοῦντας πάντας ἀδικεῖν. The grounds he gives in Pl. *Grg.* 467c-481b, and may be summarised as: any injustice that you do is involuntary unless you know what you do in doing it; if you know what you do in doing an injustice, then you know that in doing it you are harming yourself; if you know that in doing something you are harming yourself, then you do not do that thing; so if you do do an injustice, then you do it involuntarily. Some jurors perhaps know or have been told that Socrates argues for this entirely general thesis; certainly all jurors have at Pl. 25c4-26b1 heard him argue for a comparable thesis that people can never willingly corrupt their associates, and that they should therefore never be taken to court for such an offence. Jurors who are now reminded of such theses are liable to be alienated.

a6 ἐκὼν εἶναι: the apparently redundant εἶναι after ἐκὼν is idiomatic in denials and prohibitions (Phrynichus *Eclogae* 239), but seems not to have any further explanation.

ἀδικεῖν: the idea behind the present tense of ἀδικεῖν is that the ἀδικία persists until the penalty is paid; hence the contrast of tenses in Lys. 25.1 τοὺς μηδὲν ἀδικοῦντας καὶ τοὺς πολλὰ ἐξημαρτηκότας ('both those who are guilty of no offence and those who have done many wrongs').

a6-7 ὅμῃς τοῦτο οὐ πείθω· ὀλίγον γὰρ χρόνον ἀλλήλοις διελέγμεθα: in fact, unless the jurors' θόρυβος can be regarded as one side of a conversation, Socrates and the jury have spent no time at all conversing with one another. Socrates' optimism about what prolonged conversation can achieve becomes even more extreme at Pl. *Meno* 85c, where he claims that even those who are

never told anything about geometry can come to an exact knowledge of the subject, merely by being asked enough geometrical questions in a sufficiently prolonged conversation.

37b1-2 νόμος, ὥσπερ καὶ ἄλλοις ἀνθρώποις, περὶ θανάτου μὴ μίαν ἡμέραν μόνον κρίνειν ἄλλα πολλὰς: the Spartans had such a law (Thuc. 1.133.5). Both friend and foe suggest that Socrates had a greater admiration for the ways of the Spartans than might be expected in a loyal citizen of a city with whom they were so often at war. Thus Pl. *Cri.* 52e says that he kept saying that Sparta was well governed, and Ar. *Birds* 1281-3 describes a craze: 'In those days, they were all mad on being Spartan [ἐλακωνομένουν]: they grew their hair, they went hungry, they didn't wash, they Socratized [ἔσωκράτου], they carried swagger sticks.' Perhaps, by endorsing here laws which make capital cases spread over several days, Socrates reminds some jurors of his admiration for the Spartans, and in consequence irritates them. b3-4 πεπεισμένος δὲ ἐγὼ μὴδένα ἀδικεῖν: in Pl. 37a5-6, Socrates spoke rather of his conviction that he was guilty of no *voluntary* injustice against anyone. b4 πολλοῦ δέω: see Pl. 17a2n. on ὀλίγου. b6 φημι: Socrates alludes to what he affirmed in Pl. 29a6-b1. He uses the present tense because he is reaffirming now what he affirmed then. b7-37c1 ὧν εὖ οἶδά τι κακῶν ὄντων: Socrates' claim that he knows to be bad the possible punishments that he is about to list (imprisonment, fine, exile) is not obviously consistent with his claims in Pl. 30c8-d1 and 41d1-2 that his prosecutors can do him no harm; see Pl. 30d3-4n. on how these claims may nevertheless be reconciled.

37c1 δειμοῦ: Andocides once proposed a gaol sentence for himself, according to Lys. 6.21. But gaol was used more often to hold people until they were punished than as itself a punishment; thus Arist. *Pol.* 1321b40-1322a22 distinguishes the function of a gaoler from that of those who execute the sentences of courts. c2 δουλεύοντα τῇ αἰε καθισταμένῃ ἀρχῇ: 'enslaved, at any time, to those who are in office at that time'; Pl. 25c6 is another such use of αἰε. τοῖς ἑνδεκα: the Eleven and their powers are described in Arist. *Ath.* 52.1. c3 χρημάτων καὶ δεδέσθαι ἕως ἂν ἐκτίσω: such a formula is used in laws quoted in Dem. 24.63 and 105: ἐάν δ' ἀργυρίου τιμηθῇ, δεδέσθαι τέως ἂν ἐκτίσῃ ὃ τι ἂν αὐτοῦ καταγνωσθῇ ('and if a sum of money is specified as his penalty, then let him be held in prison until such time as he has paid in full whatever amount he has been condemned to pay'). c7 ὑμεῖς μὲν ὄντες πολῖται μού: Socrates is perhaps relying both on the thought that people are more likely to be allowed free speech by their fellow citizens than by strangers, and on the thought that Athenians are especially ready to allow free speech (Dem. 9.3, Xen. *Ath.* 1.12, Pl. *Grg.* 461d, Hdt. 5.78).

37d3 ἄλλοι δὲ ἄρα αὐτὰς οἴσουσι βραδίως; there is something passionate about the way that Socrates' thought erupts in this direct question. In strict and orderly syntax, this δὲ clause should, like the ὑμεῖς μὲν κτλ clause, be an indirect statement subordinate to λογίζεσθαι. πολλοῦ γε δέ: see Pl. 17a2n. on ὀλίγου. The use of this phrase to answer a rhetorical question has some parallels in oratory: Dem. 23.165, 29.40. d4 τηλικῶδε: seventy; see Pl. 17d3.

37e2-3 οἱ τούτων πατέρες τε καὶ οἰκεῖοι δι' αὐτοὺς τούτους: sc. 'will drive me out'. Their intolerance would make them very unlike the fathers and kin of the young Athenians who have listened to Socrates (Pl. 33c1-34b5). Meno speaks of the great tolerance of the Athenians in Pl. *Meno* 80b, soon after Socrates' questions have reduced him to bafflement: 'I think it a wise idea of yours not to sail off from here [i.e. Athens] and go to stay elsewhere: if you were to do as a stranger in another city what you have just done to me, you might well be arrested for sorcery.' e4 ἴσως οὖν ἂν τις εἴποι: see Pl. 28b3n. e4-5 σιγῶν δὲ καὶ ἡσυχίαν ἄγων, ὡς Σώκρατες, οὐχ οἶός τ' ἔσθι ἡμῖν ἐξελθὼν ζῆν; see Pl. 29d1-2n. on the difference between this question and the offer that in Pl. 29c5-d1 Socrates imagines the jurors making to him. On the connective δέ here, see Xen. 11.18n.

38a1 οὐ πείσεσθί μοι ὡς εἰρωνευομένω: in Plato, Socrates' interlocutors often accuse him of dissembling (Thrasymachus in *Rep.* 337a, Alcibiades in *Smp.* 216e, 218d, Callicles in *Grg.* 489e), and to be εἰρων is one of the qualities that in Ar. *Clouds* 449 Strepsiades hopes to gain by associating with Socrates. a3-4 περὶ ἀρετῆς τοὺς λόγους ποιεῖσθαι καὶ τῶν ἄλλων περὶ ὧν ὑμεῖς ἐμοῦ ἀκούετε διαλεγόμενου: Xen. *Mem.* 1.1.16 gives this list of Socrates' favourite topics of conversation: 'What is reverent? What is irreverent? What is fine? What is foul? What is just? What is unjust? What is temperance? What is madness? What is manliness? What is cowardice? What is a state? What is a statesman? What is rule over human beings? What is a ruler of human beings?' a5 ὁ δὲ ἀνεξέταστος βίος οὐ βιωτός ἀνθρώπων: a βίος that is not βιωτός (a life that is not worth living) is not simply a life that is bad; it is a life so bad that one would never choose it for oneself (*Grg.* DK 82 B 11a.20), a life so bad that one would rather be dead (e.g. *Soph.* *OC* 1692-3, Xen. *Mem.* 4.8.8, Aeschin. 2.5) or maybe even kill oneself (Dem. 60.31). Under the ideal constitution that Socrates proposes in Pl. *Rep.*, the life of all save a few people, the philosophical rulers, would be unexamined.

38b2-3 ὅσα ἐμελλον ἐκτεῖσειν 'as much as I would have had some chance of paying'. b3 νῦν δὲ οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν is elliptical for 'But in actual fact [what I have just suggested would be wrong]; this is because I have none.' Ellipses where a νῦν δέ is followed immediately

by a γάρ clause occur often in Platonic dialogues (other examples include *Euthphr.* 11e, 14c, *Smp.* 180e, *Prt.* 347a) but rarely elsewhere. They are evidently conversational in tone. Perhaps in actual conversation, the ellipse would be filled with some gesture. See Pl. 19e2n. on other ellipses. b3–4 εἰ μὴ ἄρα: see Pl. 17b4n. b5 μὲν ἀργυρίου: to calibrate this sum, see Pl. 19e3n. on Γοργίας. It amounted to one fifth of Socrates' entire estate (Pl. 23c1–2n). b7 Κρίτων: see Pl. 33d8n. Κριτόβουλος: see Pl. 33e1n. b8 Ἀπολλόδωρος: see Xen. 28.21n. b8–9 αὐτοὶ δ' ἐγγυᾶσθαι: this phrase needs filling out from its context, and amounts to 'and they say that they guarantee the payment of this sum'; cf. Pl. 36b6n. Athenian law seems to have specified three guarantors as a minimum (Ant. 5.17).

38c–39d: Socrates Addresses Those Who Voted against Him

The majority of the jurors vote for the death penalty. But Socrates has no regrets about how he has conducted his case. If he had been unscrupulous enough, he could have avoided losing his case. But as it is, he has managed to avoid something far worse: being vicious and unjust. Moreover, Socrates prophesies, not even his death will rid the Athenians of the likes of him: a new generation are coming who will test them more severely than he ever did himself.

38c1 οὐ πολλοῦ γ' ἔνεκα χρόνου: that is, the Athenians cannot hope that killing Socrates will bring them much time free from him, for he is so old that he will soon be dead anyway. c3 φήσουσι γὰρ δὴ σοφὸν εἶναι: indeed, people are already calling Socrates wise: see Pl. 23a3 and 34c4–35a3. c5 τοῦτο: i.e. Socrates' death. τὴν ἡλικίαν: Socrates is seventy years old: see Pl. 17d3.

38d1 θανάτου δὲ ἑγγύς: seventy years was traditionally reckoned to be the human lifespan (Solon fr. 27.17–18 *IEG*, Hdt. 1.32.2). d5 πολλοῦ γε δεῖ: see Pl. 17a2n. on ὀλίγου. d6–7 ἀπορία. . . τόλμης καὶ ἀναισχυντίας καὶ τοῦ μὴ εἶναι λέγειν: this apparently illogical μὴ is in fact idiomatic, and paralleled in Thuc. 2.49.6 ἡ ἀπορία τοῦ μὴ ἡσυχάζειν καὶ ἡ ἀγρυπνία ('lack of rest and sleeplessness'), Hipp. *On the Sacred Disease* 1 τὴν ἀπορίην . . . τοῦ μὴ γινώσκειν ('lack of knowledge'). For another idiomatic but apparently illogical negation, see Pl. 32b5. d7 ὑμῖν μὲν: Socrates interrupts himself before he can get to a contrasting δέ clause.

38e2 τότε: that is, when replying to the charges against him, and when proposing a penalty.

39a3 ὅπλα ἀφείς: a hoplite running from the enemy would abandon, as a now useless impediment, his heavy shield. Hence the words of the Spartan mother as she handed her son his shield and told him how to return from

the wars: 'Either with this or on it' (Plu. *Spartan Sayings* 241f). 25–6 *ἀλλὰ μὴ οὐ τοῦτ' ἢ χαλεπὸν* 'But perhaps it's not this that's hard.' This is a more tentative form of the denial *ἀλλ' οὐ τοῦτ' ἐστὶν χαλεπὸν*, just as e.g. Pl. *Cra.* 435c *ἀλλὰ μὴ ... γλίσχρα ἢ* is a more tentative form of the affirmation *ἀλλὰ γλίσχρα ἐστὶν*. Cf. Pl. *Meno* 89c *ἀλλὰ μὴ οὐ τοῦτ' ἢ διδακτόν* ('but perhaps this cannot be taught').

39b1 *θᾶπτον γὰρ θανάτου θεῖ*: the alliteration seems meant to give this phrase a sententious ring. Some authors so prized such alliteration as to use it more or less regardless of sense: cf. Heraclitus DK 22 B 25 *μ῀ροι γὰρ μείζονες μείζονας μοίρας λαγχάνουσι* ('greater deaths are allotted greater shares'), and Grg. DK 82 B 11.9 *δεῖ δὲ καὶ δόξηι δεῖξαι τοῖς ἀκούουσι* (which may mean something like 'proofs must be addressed not just to an audience in abstract, but in particular to the way they think' if it means anything at all). b1–3 *ἅτε βραδύς ὢν ... ὑπὸ τοῦ βραδυτέρου ἰάλων, οἱ δὲ ... ἅτε δεινοὶ καὶ ὀρεῖς ὄντες ὑπὸ τοῦ θάπτοντος*: the conceit is that, unlike his rivals, who are so quick that only a quick pursuer can catch them, Socrates is so slow that he can be caught by a slow pursuer. (We stretch the conceit beyond breaking point when we note that if slow pursuers can catch Socrates, then quick pursuers too can catch him, and moreover catch him quicker.)

39c1 *χρησμιωδῆσαι*: see Pl. 22c2–3 on how *χρησμιωδοί* do not speak from knowledge. It is not uncommon for a Socratic discourse to end in a less than fully rational way: hence the myths about the afterlife that conclude the discussion in Pl. *Phd.*, *Grg.*, and *Rep.* c2–3 *μάλιστα ἀνθρώποι χρησμιωδοῦσιν, ὅταν μέλλωσιν ἀποθανεῖσθαι*: see Xen. 30.33n., for Homeric examples, in both of which someone prophesies an unpleasant fate for the man who is about to kill him. The explanation usually given for prophecy on the point of death compared it with prophetic dreams: when freed from the body – whether by death or by sleep – the soul is at its most divine and therefore prophetic (e.g. Xen. *Cyr.* 8.7.21, Posidonius fr. 108 Edelstein and Kidd). c3–4 *οἱ ἐμὲ ἀπεκτόνατε*: when used of something that has not yet happened, the perfect tense indicates that its happening is wholly irrevocable. Hence the perfects in Xen. 29.28 *ἀπέκτονέ με*, Soph. *Aj.* 896 *οἶχωκ'*, ὀλωλα, διατεπρόρημαι, and Eur. *El.* 686–8 'If you take a fatal fall, then τέθηκα, and don't describe me as alive; for I will pierce my heart with a two-edged sword.' c5 *οἶαν ἐμὲ ἀπεκτόνατε*: this phrase needs filling out from its context, and amounts to 'the sort of vengeance that you have secured by sentencing me to death'; cf. 36b6n.

39d1–2 *πλείους ἴσονται ὑμᾶς οἱ ἐλέγχοντες*: presumably we are to think that Socrates now has in mind Plato and the other Socratics of his generation. Contrast Pl. 30e2–4, where Socrates warns the jury they will not easily

find another interrogator sent by the god, as he has been. **δὲ ὑμεῖς μᾶλλον ἀγανακτήσετε:** in this, Socrates proved a false prophet: at any rate, there is no sign that the Athenians ever got angry enough with his followers to put any of them to death. **δὲ ταῦτα μὲν οὖν:** see Pl. 24b3n.

39e1–42a4: Socrates Addresses Those Who Voted for Him

Socrates takes comfort from the fact that the supernatural voice, which so often speaks to veto his plans, has been silent all day. He infers that this is because the death sentence is to his benefit, and, more generally, that death is no bad thing. He then gives another argument for the same conclusion. Death might be a total and permanent cessation of consciousness – in which case, death is like a deep and dreamless sleep. Or death might instead be a transition to another and endless life, where one is governed by just judges and can talk with great figures from the past – in which case, death has all the attractions of Socrates' life in Athens, and more, together with none of the drawbacks. Either way, death is to be welcomed. At any rate, no harm can come to any good man, whether in life or in death; but whether life is better, or death, only God knows.

39e1 τοῖς δὲ ἀποψηφισαμένοις: are these the jurors who voted for acquittal, or the jurors who voted against the death penalty? To support the first construal is the fact that in Pl. 34d7–8, Socrates used ἀποψηφισασθαι without any object to mean vote for acquittal. To support the second construal is the fact that since Socrates has just addressed Pl. 38c1–39d9 to 'those who voted for the death penalty [καταψηφισαμένους θάνατον] for me' (38d2), we might supply the object θάνατον for ἀποψηφισαμένοις. The two construals differ if, as would not be unlikely, some jurors found Socrates guilty, but voted for a thirty mina fine rather than death. On the first construal, Socrates has nothing to say to such jurors; on the second, Socrates counts such jurors as his 'friends' and as 'true jurors' (Pl. 40a1–3), although they have found him guilty. This seems to tell more strongly against the second construal than against the first. (The two construals would differ also if some jurors had found Socrates innocent, but had then been so irritated by his subsequent behaviour as to vote for death rather than a thirty mina fine. According to a story in D.L. 2.42, there were at least eighty such jurors. On the first construal, Socrates addresses to such jurors both the severe words of Pl. 38c1–39d9, and the gentle words of Pl. 39e1–42a4; on the second, he addresses to them only the severe words of Pl. 38c1–39d9. This would tell strongly against the first construal, if there were any reason to believe in such jurors. But since neither Plato nor Xenophon betrays any awareness of them, we may suppose that they were a later invention.) **διαλεχθείην:** see Pl. 37a6–7n. on what Socrates hopes

can be achieved by conversation. e2 οἱ ἄρχοντες: the Eleven; see Pl. 37c2n. e2-3 καὶ οὕτω ἔρχομαι οἱ ἐλθόντα με δεῖ τεθνάναι: 'the court-house in which the trial had taken place' was, according to Pl. *Phd.* 58d 'next to the gaol' where Socrates spent his final days. e4 διαμυθολογήσαι: this verb suggests, appropriately enough, a comparatively loose and speculative kind of talk: thus Pl. *Grg.* 493a and *Phd.* 61e and 70b use μυθολογέω and its compounds for talk about life after death.

40a2 ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί: Meletus addressed the jury with this phrase in Pl. 26d3; Socrates by contrast has never used this phrase for the entire jury, and has instead addressed them forty-five times as ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι and sixteen times as plain ὦ ἄνδρες. The choice of phrase now turns out to be somewhat pointed. a5-6 ἐναντιουμένη, εἴ τι μέλλοιμι μὴ ὀρθῶς πρᾶξιν: see Pl. 31d3-4n.

40b1 νομίζεται ἰσχυρά κακῶν εἶναι: contrast Socrates' own thoughts as expressed in Pl. *Grg.* 522e (the ultimate evil is having a soul full of injustice) and Pl. *Phd.* 83c (the ultimate evil is obsession with bodily matters). b1-2 ἐξίοντι ἔωθεν οἰκοθεν: the superstitious were liable to find a particular significance in the first thing they encountered when going out in the morning: hence Ar. *Frogs* 196 'How unfortunate I am! What can I have come across when I went out?' and Eup. fr. 332 *PCG* 'As I went out, some ominous chap came across me; he looked the essence of unreliability.' b3 μέλλοντι: this dative goes with ἐμοί in 40b1, not with the nearer τῷ λόγῳ. b3-4 ἐν ἄλλοις λόγοις πολλαχοῦ δὴ με ἐπίσχε λέγοντα μεταξύ: without such a record of frequent vetoes, the current silence of the voice would have no significance at all. Even with such a record, the current silence might still not have great significance. Certainly the current silence would have greater significance if in the past the voice had, not just often, but always, issued a veto when Socrates was planning something bad for him. And even if the current silence were to have that greater significance, Socrates might still be planning something bad for him; for the voice might change its policy. The tentativeness with which Socrates is about to reason indicates that he has some sense of these complexities. b6 τί οὖν αἴτιον εἶναι ὑπολαμβάνω; ἐγὼ ὑμῖν ἱρῶ: a question, followed immediately by a promise to answer it, is a figure at home in the highest rhetoric (e.g. Dem. 4.20, 6.31). κινδυνεύει: here Socrates acknowledges that the silence of his supernatural sign is less than conclusive proof that the death sentence is a good thing for him. b7-40c1 οὐκ ἔσθ' ὅπως ἡμεῖς ὀρθῶς ὑπολαμβάνομεν, ὅσοι οἰόμεθα: the first person plurals show Socrates' solidarity with those who have this opinion, even though he does not share it himself. The impression is somewhat condescending. Cf. Pl. *Thl.* 210b, where Socrates, the avowedly sterile intellectual midwife (150c), says to someone from whom

he has been extracting definitions of knowledge 'So are we still pregnant [κυοῦμεν] and in labour [ὠδίνουμεν], my friend, with some idea about knowledge, or have we given birth [ἐκτετόκαμεν] to the lot?', and Soph. *OC* 1627-8, where the god coaxes Oedipus to make his departure and says 'You there, Oedipus; yes, you: why are we hesitating [μέλλουμεν] to depart? You have been delaying things for a long time.'

40c1-2 μέγα ... τεκμήριον: Socrates again acknowledges that his argument is less than conclusive; see Pl. 24d8n. This acknowledgement renders his argument here that death is a good thing compatible with his claim at Pl. 29a6-b5 not to know whether death is either good or bad, and compatible also with his claim at Pl. 42a3-4 that God alone knows whether death is better than life. c5 δυοῖν γὰρ θάτερόν ἐστιν τὸ τεθνάναι: a third possibility is suggested by Emp. DK 31 B 115.7-14: without either losing consciousness or leaving this world for another, the soul of someone who has just died moves immediately to another place within this world. c6 κατὰ τὰ λεγόμενα: here and at Pl. 40e5 and 41c6, Socrates is ostentatiously vague about who says these things. There may be some allusion to the Eleusinian mystery cult, which promised life after death for initiates, and seems to have had a jargon of 'things said' and 'things done' (λεγόμενα and δρώμενα) in the initiation ceremony (cf. Plu. *De defectu oraculorum* 421b-c, Galen *De usu partium* 576.5-7 Kuhn). But allusions to such cults are, for obvious reasons, more easily suspected than proved. For more on the Eleusinian cult, see Clinton (2010).

40d3-7 ἐγὼ γὰρ ἂν οἶμαι, εἰ ... δέοι ... δέοι ... οἶμαι ἂν: these repetitions betray a not entirely successful effort by Socrates to make his sentence orderly. The impression is of someone thinking things through as he is speaking.

40e1 μὴ ὅτι ἰδιώτην τινὰ 'not just any private individual'; cf. Pl. *Cra.* 427c ὅτι οὐδὲν πρᾶγμα, μὴ ὅτι τοσοῦτον ('any thing at all, not just one this big'). τὸν μέγαν βασιλέα: by the standards of ordinary Greeks, the Great King of Persia was the paradigm of human happiness. Thus you could make someone you were arguing with seem silly if you got him to deny that the King was happy (Arist. *SE* 173a26-27 τοῖς δὲ πολλοῖς ἄδοξον τὸ βασιλέα μὴ εὐδαιμονεῖν). In Pl. *Grg.* 470e Polus thinks he has caught Socrates in this way: 'Clearly, you'll deny that you know that the Great King is happy.' Socrates' reply shows that he disdains the standards of ordinary Greeks: 'And rightly so; for I do not know his relationship to justice and education.' e2 οὖν: a 'resumptive οὖν' (Pl. 19d3n.), taking us back to Socrates' main point, which he echoes from Pl. 40d2. e3-4 οὐδὲν πλείων ὁ πᾶς χρόνος φαίνεται οὕτω δὴ εἶναι ἢ μία νύξ: Socrates is remarking on how things seem to those who are

completely unconscious: to such people, nothing seems to be anything at all, and in particular therefore the whole of time does not seem to be any longer than a single night. The remark prevents a potential objection: 'One dreamless night may be fine; but would not an endless succession of them start to seem boring?' **e4-41a1** εἰ δ' αὖ οἷον ἀποδημήσθαι ἔστιν ὁ θάνατος ... τί μῆλλον ἀγαθὸν τούτου εἴη ἂν, ὃ ἄνδρες δικασταί; Socrates fails to consider the possibility that the dead take up residence in a place far worse than here – which is how the ghost of Achilles saw his new residence: 'I would rather be a hired farm hand, labouring for another, for a landless man who has little to live on, than be lord among all the corpses that have died' (Hom. *Od.* 11.489-91).

41a3-4 Μίνως τε καὶ Ῥαδάμανθυς καὶ Αἰακὸς καὶ Τριπτόλεμος: Minos, Rhadamanthys, and Aeacus regularly figure together as judges of the dead (Pl. *Grg.* 523e-524a, *Isoc.* 12.205, *Dem.* 18.127). Triptolemus seems to have had a special place in the Eleusinian mystery cult (Hom. *Hymn to Demeter* 474) and may be brought in here to hint at that cult; for other hints at the cult see Pl. 40c6n. These four names are all in the nominative, because they belong in the relative clause introduced by οἷπερ and are subjects of its verb λέγονται; they are not objects of εὐρήσει. The syntactic pattern is the same at Pl. *Prt.* 342b ἐξαρνοῦνται ... ὥσπερ οὗς Πρωταγόρας ἔλεγε τοὺς σοφιστάς, where the accusative τοὺς σοφιστάς belongs in the relative clause as object of its verb ἔλεγε. **a5-6** Ὀρφεὶ ... καὶ Μουσαίῳ καὶ Ἡσιόδῳ καὶ Ὀμήρῳ: these canonical four sources of wisdom are listed as such in Hippias DK 86 B 6, and described in more detail by Aeschylus in *Ar. Frogs* 1030-36: 'Consider how useful the good poets have been, right from the start. Orpheus revealed to us rituals and abstinence from slaughter; Musaeus, cures for disease and oracles; Hesiod, working the land, seasons for harvest, ploughing; and where did the divine Homer get his honour and glory, if not from the fact that he taught worthwhile things, lines of battle, noble deeds, arming men?' Pl. *Rep.* 364b-365a gives a scornful description of how profitably charlatans would use what they claimed were the works of Orpheus and Musaeus.

41b1 ἐγὼ μὲν: implicit is the contrast that others might be less eager than Socrates to meet the poets; see Pl. 21d2n. πολλὰκις θέλω τεθνάναι: Socrates is perhaps having some fun with this cliché (Pl. 30c1-2n.): if 'the things that are said' are true, then dying one death is quite sufficient to be able to meet the great poets. **b3** Παλαμήδης: see Xen. 26.6-7nn. Αἴαντι: like Palamedes, Ajax lost a case to Odysseus. The case concerned who was to inherit the arms of Achilles. When Ajax lost the case, he killed himself. Antisthenes fr. 53 SSR purports to give his losing speech. **b5-6** τὸ μέγιστον, τοὺς ἐκὰς ἐξετάζοντα καὶ ἱερυνῶντα ὥσπερ τοὺς ἐνταῦθα διάγειν: as described in Pl. 21b7-22c1, and

exemplified in Pl. 24c7-28a5. It is pleasing that Socrates should think a continuation of this aspect of life here the greatest thing to look forward to in life there. In Pl. *Phd.* 63e-67c he gives a very different account: philosophers in this life cannot achieve the wisdom which is the only thing that they value; death however, for all they know, might enable them to get some of what they value; so death cannot make things worse for philosophers, and might even make them better; so philosophers should not fear death. The explanation of the difference is that in the *Apology*, Socrates is satisfied with having and imparting the merely human wisdom of knowing one's intellectual limits, while in the *Phaedo*, Socrates values only an acquaintance with ideal forms like justice, beauty, and goodness (65d).

41c1-2 τὸν ἐπὶ Τροίαν ἀγαγόντα τὴν πολλὴν στρατιάν: Agamemnon. c2 Ὀδυσσεΐα: as the wiliest of all the heroes in Homer, and also winner in the unjust trials that led to the deaths of Palamedes and Ajax, he is perhaps particularly worth examining if we want to find out who is genuinely wise. Σίσυφον: he is perhaps worth examining for the same reasons as Odysseus: 'most cunning in his devices, like a god' (Pind. *Olympians* 13.52), and deviser of a clever trick to cheat Death (Pherecydes *FGH* 3 fr. 119), he nevertheless incurred severe punishment in the afterlife (Hom. *Od.* 11.593-600). c3 γυναῖκας: women, we are told by Alcibiades in Pl. *Smp.* 215d, are as profoundly affected as any man when they hear Socrates' arguments, whether direct from Socrates or relayed by another. Nevertheless, extant Socratic discourses represent only three women as having intellectual conversation with Socrates (Theodote in Xen. *Mem.* 3.11, Diotima in Pl. *Smp.* 201d-212b, Aspasia in Pl. *Mnx.* 235e-249d; see also Aeschin. fr. 70 SSR); and sometimes womenfolk even need to be removed before intellectual conversation can start (Pl. *Smp.* 176e and *Phd.* 60a). c4 ἀμήχανον ... εὐδαιμονίας: the general sense of this expression ('more happiness than one can cope with' or 'overwhelming happiness') is more easily given than any explanation of its grammar. c6 τὸν λοιπὸν χρόνον ἀθάνατοί εἰσιν: the alternative to death's being like an everlasting dreamless sleep is getting more and more specific, with no very evident justification. At any rate, Socrates has done nothing to rule out the possibility that when we die we leave this world for another, and that we will in due course move on – or back – from that other world. Such a possibility is present in the stories about death told in Pl. *Phd.* 113d-114c and *Rep.* 614b-621b. εἴπερ γε τὰ λεγόμενα ἀληθῆ – that's if the things said are in fact true'. If 'the things said' are the things said in the Eleusinian mystery cult (Pl. 40c6n.), then Socrates' hesitation to affirm them may indicate that he does not fully acknowledge the gods whom the city acknowledges. For even though the Eleusinian mystery cult was a

mystery cult, and not part of the public worship of Athens, it nevertheless had a status recognised in and protected by Athenian law (e.g. Thuc. 6.28.1 and 6.53.1-2). c8-41d1 ὅμῃς χρῆ, ὧς ἄνδρες δικάσται, εὐέλπιδας εἶναι πρὸς τὸν θάνατον, καὶ ἐν τῷ τοῦτο διανοεῖσθαι ἀληθείς: on the day of his death as described in Pl. *Phd.* 63b-c, Socrates expresses a similar mixture of hope and certainty, saying 'You should be well aware that I am hopeful of arriving among good men – not that I'd insist on that – that, however, I will reach gods who will be extremely good masters – you should be well aware that I would insist on this if I insisted on anything of this sort.' See also Pl. *Phd.* 114d-e and *Meno* 86b, where again Socrates is more eager to insist on the moral consequences of some metaphysical speculations than on the metaphysical speculations themselves.

41d1-2 οὐκ ἔστιν ἀνδρὶ ἀγαθῷ κακὸν οὐδὲν οὔτε ζῶντι οὔτε τελευτήσαντι: in Pl. 30d2-4 and 37b7-c1, Socrates seemed prepared to allow that there are evils, though not big ones, which could be inflicted on a good man; see Pl. 30d3-4n. on how to reconcile these apparently inconsistent thoughts. d4-5 ἀλλὰ μοι δῆλόν ἐστι τοῦτο, ὅτι ἤδη τεθνάναι καὶ ἀπηλλάχθαι πραγμάτων βέλτιον ἦν μοι: contrast Xen. 1.1-9.15, which says that Socrates reached this conclusion in advance of his trial, that in consequence he so conducted his defence that he would be sentenced to death.

41e2-3 τοὺς υἱὲς μου, ἐπειδὴν ἡβήσωσι: even the oldest son is still only a youth; see Pl. 34d6. e3-4 ταῦτά ταῦτα λυποῦντες ἅπερ ἐγὼ ὅμῃς ἐλύπου: on these pains, see Pl. 30e5n.

42a1-2 δίκαια πεπονθὼς ἐγὼ ἔσομαι ὅφ' ὅμῶν: see Pl. 17a1 and n. for πάσχω as the passive of ποιῶ. The suggestion of the future perfect πεπονθὼς ἔσομαι is that, in taking care of Socrates' sons as requested, the Athenians will not merely be acting justly (as the simple future δίκαια πείσομαι would say), but rather will have settled all accounts between themselves on the one hand and Socrates and his sons on the other. a2 ἀλλὰ γάρ: see 19c7n. a4 ἄδελον παντὶ πλήν ἢ τῷ θεῷ: compare Pl. 35d7-8, the unusually reverent ending to Socrates' rebuttal of the charges against him. Those familiar with strict monotheism may feel that the singular τῷ θεῷ is very different from e.g. the plural θεῶν of Pl. 41d3. Pagans were less sensitive to the difference, and readily spoke of god and of gods as if they were just the same: thus Pl. *Pr.* 322a 'Because of his kinship with god, man was the only animal to acknowledge gods', Soph. *Aj.* 1128-9 'A: I am saved by god . . . B: Do not now dishonour gods; it is gods who have kept you safe', and the stock reflection at the end of so many plays by Euripides 'Supernatural things take many forms; gods accomplish much that no-one hoped; the expected is not brought to pass, and god finds a way for the unexpected. That is how this story turned out.' See also Xen. 5.21n.

XENOPHON'S APOLOGY OF SOCRATES

1-9: Why Xenophon Writes his *Apology*

Socrates conducted his defence in so haughty a style as to make his conviction more or less inevitable. Earlier accounts of his trial have made this fact plain, but have given no explanation. The explanation can be learned from a conversation that Socrates had with Hermogenes before he was tried. It is that Socrates' supernatural voice prohibited him from preparing any defence. Socrates was eager to obey the prohibition: a successful defence would have meant some most undignified pleading; and it was better for him to be executed while in full possession of his powers than to be acquitted and decay into senility.

1.1 δέ is typically a connective. Its occurrence here at the start of the *Apology* may hint, especially in conjunction with μεμνησθαι καὶ a few words later, that the *Apology* is not a wholly self-sufficient work, and that we may take it as another instalment of the *Memorabilia*. There are similar connectives, to similar effects, at the starts of two of Xenophon's other works about Socrates: *Smp.* 1.1 ἀλλ' ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ τῶν καλῶν κάγαθῶν ἀνδρῶν ἔργα οὐ μόνον τὰ μετὰ σπουδῆς πραττόμενα ἀξιωμακρόνευστα εἶναι, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ ἐν ταῖς παιδιαῖς ('However, to my mind, it is not just the serious activities of true gentlemen that are worth recording, but also the things they do in fun.'), and *Oec.* 1.1 ἤκουσα δέ ποτε αὐτοῦ καὶ περὶ οἰκονομίας τοιαύδε διαλεγομένου ('But I once heard him in a conversation about household management too. It went like this.'). Aelius Aristides *Art of Rhetoric* 2.6.1.1 says that when a speech starts with particles like καίτοι, καὶ μὴν, ἀλλὰ τοίνυν, or ἀλλὰ μὴν, it has an air of nonchalance. 1.3 γεγράφασι μὲν οὖν περὶ τούτου καὶ ἄλλοι: the others who had written on this topic almost certainly include Plato. Crito (*Suda* s.v. Κρίτων Ἀθηναῖος) and Lysias (fr. 271, 272 Carey) are two further authors of the time to whom *Apologies* were ascribed. Perhaps Xenophon has them in mind too. Or perhaps this vague and plural phrase is simply a way of referring to Plato, while dismissing him as nothing special. 1.4 ὧς has for its antecedent the whole preceding phrase; similarly extensive are the antecedents of Pl. 242b δ, Xen. 3.14 ἤνπερ, Xen. 5.23 ὅπερ. 1.5-6 ἡδὲ αὐτῷ ἡγήτο ἀρετώτερον εἶναι τοῦ βίου θάνατον: Plato's Socrates too suggests that death is preferable to life (Pl. 40b6-41d5). But that is only after and in consequence of the events of his trial; it is not his motive for failing to make a more winning defence. Indeed, Plato's Socrates thinks himself obliged to help the court come to the right decision for the right reasons, and obliged therefore to make the most winning defence possible, so long as he keeps to what is true (Pl. 18a5-6) and relevant (Pl. 35b2-c6). 1.6-7 ἀφρονεστέρα αὐτοῦ φαίνεται εἶναι ἢ

μεγαληγορία 'his haughtiness of speech looks a bit stupid'. The comparative form ἀφρονεστέρα can mean something milder than ἀφρων, much as 'comparatively stupid' means something milder than 'stupid'; the idea behind both the Greek and the English idiom is that those who are more stupid than some may still not be plain stupid. The infinitive with φαίνομαι indicates that the reality is different from the way it looks; contrast Xen. 2.8n.

2.7 Ἑρμογένης: Hermogenes has speaking parts in Plato's *Cratylus* and Xenophon's *Symposium*, and according to Pl. *Phd.* 59b was among the friends present at Socrates' death. Xen. *Mem.* 4.8.4-10 gives another version of what Hermogenes said about Socrates' remarks about the trial. Ἱππωνίκου: Hipponicus was the richest Greek of his day (And. 1.130 and Isoc. 16.31). He inherited a fortune estimated at two hundred talents (Lys. 19.48). Among his investments were six hundred slaves mining silver, who brought him a net income of one mina a day (Xen. *Poroi* 4.15). To calibrate these sums, see Pl. 19e3n. on Γοργίας. When Hipponicus died in 424 (And. 4.13), Hermogenes did not inherit the fortune (Pl. *Cra.* 391c), which went instead to his legitimate half-brother, Callias (Pl. 20a5n.). 2.8 πρέπουσαν φαίνεσθαι: the participle with φαίνομαι indicates that the reality looks just the way it is; compare Xen. 13.34-6n. and contrast Xen. 1.6-7n.

3.12-13 οὐ γὰρ δοκῶ σοι ἀπολογεῖσθαι μελετῶν διαβεβιωκέναι: 'Is that [i.e. do you ask that question] because you do not think that I have spent my entire life practising my defence?' The infinitive ἀπολογεῖσθαι goes with μελετῶν; the infinitive διαβεβιωκέναι goes with δοκῶ. 3.13 ἐπεὶ δ' αὐτόν ἐρέσθαι: accusative and infinitive of indirect speech, governed by ἔφη in 2.9 (see Pl. 26d6n. on ὥστε οὐκ εἰδέναι). Since this is a subordinate clause, Xenophon could have retained the indicative of the direct speech (as in the parallel passage at Xen. *Mem.* 4.8.4 ἐπεὶ δὲ αὐτόν ἤρετο). Since αὐτόν refers back to the same person as the subject of ἔφη in Xen. 2.9, and thus to Hermogenes, Xenophon could have used a nominative and infinitive, and so made it clearer who was speaking to whom (as does Hdt. 9.16.1-2, reporting Thersander's report of a conversation between him and a Persian: ἔφη δὲ ὁ Θέρσανδρος . . . τὸν Πέρσην . . . εἰρῆσθαι [i.e. the Persian asked] . . . αὐτὸς δὲ ὑποκρίνασθαι [i.e. Thersander answered] . . . τὸν δὲ εἰπεῖν [i.e. the Persian said] . . .). But even where a nominative and infinitive is grammatical, an accusative and infinitive is no less so; examples include Pl. *Hp. Ma.* 282e οἶμαι ἐμὲ πλείω χρήματα εἰργάσθαι ἢ . . . ('I think I've made more money than . . .'). See Xen. 28.23n. on a similar freedom of choice between nominative or accusative and infinitive constructions with λέγεται. 3.14 ἥνπερ: for the antecedent of this relative pronoun, see

Xen. 1.4n. It is feminine by attraction into the gender of its complement μελέτην ... καλλίστην.

4.14-15 ἐπεὶ δὲ αὐτὸν πάλιν λέγειν: the parallel passage in Xen. *Mem.* 4.8.5 has an unambiguous nominative and infinitive αὐτὸς δὲ πάλιν εἰπεῖν. 4.15 οὐχ ὁρᾷς 'Don't you realise ...?' See Pl. 24d7-8n. 4.15-16 πολλάκις μὲν ... πολλάκις δέ: Xenophon loves anaphora of πολλ-. There is another example in Xen. 17.22-3. 4.16 λόγῳ παραχθίντες 'led astray by [the prosecution's] speech'. 4.17 ἐπιχαρίτως εἰπόντας 'when they have given a charming speech'. The phrase evinces disdain, like that of Isoc. *Epistle* 6.6, when it contrasts those who are mature enough to give sound advice with those who 'give a charming, elegant and polished [ἐπιχαρίτως καὶ μουσικῶς καὶ διαπεποντημένως] speech'. 4.18 ναὶ μὰ Δία 'Yes, by Zeus.' This oath is found often in prose and comedy, but is too conversational for tragedy. δῖς: in the parallel passage at Xen. *Mem.* 4.8.5, the supernatural sign only once stops Socrates considering his defence. But even two such vetoes are hardly evidence that the god means Socrates to lose his case and be sentenced to death. Contrast the inference Socrates makes in Pl. 40a3-c3: the god meant that Socrates be sentenced to death, since the god, although otherwise frequently intervening, did not forbid even one of the things that Socrates had done on the day of his trial. 4.18-19 ἐπιχειρήσαντός μου ... ἐναντιοῦταί μοι τὸ δαιμόνιον: according to Plato, the supernatural sign only ever did what it does here, that is, prohibit some action that Socrates was already setting himself to perform; according to Xenophon, it sometimes did other things too. See Xen. 12.23-4, and Pl. 31d3-4n.

5.21 τῷ θεῷ: there is no special significance to the singular here. In Xen. 8.6 Socrates will use the plural οἱ θεοὶ for the same divine power or powers. Likewise in Xen. *Mem.* 1.4.12-13, Socrates talks of gods first in the plural, then in the singular, and then in the plural, but evidently means the same divine power or powers throughout. See also Pl. 42a4n. 5.22-3 οὐδενὶ ἀνθρώπων ὑφείμην ἂν βέλτιον ἐμοῦ βεβιωκέναι 'I would not concede to any mortal that he has had a better life than me.' 5.23 ὅπερ: the antecedent of this relative pronoun is the whole clause from 5.23 ἦδειν to 5.24 βεβιωμένον. See Xen. 1.4n. ἡδιστον: the pleasures of virtue are a commonplace among the wise. Thus Virtue to Vice in Xen. *Mem.* 2.1.31 (= Prodicus DK 84 B 2.31) 'You have never heard the most pleasant of sounds - praise of yourself - and you have never seen the most pleasant of sights; for you have never seen any fine deed of your own.' Thus also a wise ruler to his subjects in Isoc. 3.59 'You must try to keep up, not with those who possess the most, but with those who have no bad

thing on their conscience [τούς μηδὲν κακὸν σφίσιν αὐτοῖς συνειδόμενους]; for that is the sort of soul with which one could pass most pleasantly through life.' **ἤδειν**: Socrates' knowledge of this fact about his life is consistent with the ignorance he proclaims in Pl. 21d2-6, so long as it is not knowledge of anything καλὸν κάγαθόν ('particularly worthwhile'). In Pl. *Thl.* 175b-c, he says that knowledge of particular details (such as 'What injustice have I done you or you me?') is of no interest to the philosopher, unlike knowledge of general truths (such as 'What is justice itself? What is injustice?'). **5.23-4** **ὁσίων μοι καὶ δίκαιώς ἅπαντα τὸν βίον βεβιωμένον**: the use of the perfect passive participle βεβιωμένον, with the agent given only by the dative μοι, puts the completed life itself in the centre of attention. The construction recurs in Xen. 25.3-4 τοῦ θανάτου ἔργον ὄξιον ἐμοὶ εἰργασμένον. **5.25** **γινώσκοντας**: this term here is perhaps better translated 'thinking' than 'knowing'. The same applies also to Xen. 7.3 γνώμας, 10.16 γνόντα, 11.19 γνοῦς, 23.21-2 ἐγίνωσκε, where again the focus is more on what people are thinking, and less on their thinking it rightly and rationally.

6.26 **ἀνάγκη ἔσται τὰ τοῦ γήρως ἐπιτελεῖσθαι**: the future ἔσται reminds us that Socrates, although seventy (Pl. 17d3), is not yet being forced to 'pay the debts of old age'; after all, he was still vigorous enough to be the father of two young children (Pl. 34d6). **6.28** **ἂν δὲ αἰσθάνωμαι χεῖρων γιγνόμενος**: the subjunctive αἰσθάνωμαι gives another reminder like that of ἔσται: Socrates' consciousness of increasing debility still lies in the future. **6.29** **πῶς ἂν ... ἐγὼ ἔτι ἂν ἡδέως βιοτεύοιμι**: it is slightly odd, both that Socrates' standard for choice here is pleasure, and that he does not think about pleasure in old age as the elderly Cephalus does, to Socrates' great approval, in Pl. *Rep.* 329b-d: an old man's loss of sexual and other appetites means that he 'is released from servitude to many crazed masters'; and 'if people are orderly and good-tempered, then even old age is only slightly troublesome; but if not, then both old age and youth work out awkward for them'. On the repetition of ἂν, see Pl. 17d4-18d1 n.

7.30 **ὁ θεός**: by the singular, Socrates does not mean anything different from what he means by the plural οἱ θεοὶ in Xen. 8.6; see Xen. 5.21 n. **προξενεῖ**: this metaphor represents the god as taking care of Socrates in something like the way that a πρόξενος took care of aliens: the πρόξενος of, say, Sparta in Athens, was an Athenian who would assist visiting Spartans, offering them hospitality and introducing them to those whom they wished to meet. **7.31** **τὸ ἡί ρᾱιστα**: i.e. 'to end my life [understanding with τὸ here the phrase καταλῦσαι τὸν βίον from earlier in the sentence] in the way in which [ἡί, as a feminine dative singular pronoun, has the gender, case, and number usual for a pronoun indicating a manner, like Pl. 22d4 ταύτηι, 27a7 ἡί, 40c4 τῇδε] it is ended with least trouble'. Socrates

alludes to the standard way of executing a death sentence on an Athenian citizen: poisoning by κώνειον ('hemlock'). The effect of this poison on Socrates is described in Pl. *Phd.* 117c–118a: it produced numbness rather than pain. Presumably it was because of such an effect that this poison was customary in Ceos, where old men would use it to kill themselves once they felt their powers fade (Ael. 3.37). Thphr. *Enquiry into Plants* 9.16.8–9 gives two ways of preparing κώνειον to give a swift and easy death. (Prepared in other ways, κώνειον can give a much more painful death, according to the purple passage in Nicander *Alexipharmaca* 186–94.) 7.31–2 ἄν γὰρ νῦν κατακριθῇ μου, δῆλον ὅτι ἐξεστὶ μοι κτλ: Socrates alludes to the two stages of the trial: if he is found guilty (κατακριθῇ), then he will have the opportunity (ἐξεστὶ), when the punishment is decided, to be punished with death as the prosecution proposed. In Xen. 23.22–5, we will be told that Socrates seized this opportunity by refusing to propose any alternative punishment. 7.32–1 τῇ τελευτῇ χρῆσθαι ἢ ῥαίστη μὲν ὑπὸ τῶν τούτου ἐπιμεληθέντων κέκριται: not all agreed that death by hemlock is the easiest. According to Jos. 2.232, the easiest death is death in battle; according to Dionysius of Halicarnassus, *Roman Antiquities* 2.76.5, it is death from old age. In Ar. *Frogs* 117–34, Heracles and Dionysus consider various ways to kill oneself, hemlock included, but Dionysus is such a coward that he refuses them all. 7.2 πλείστον δὲ πόθον ἐμποιοῦσα τῶν τελευτώντων: others have been led to seek their deaths by the very opposite thought, the thought that nobody will miss them when they're gone. 7.3 γυνώμαις: see Xen. 5.25n. 7.5 ἀπομαραίνηται 'fade away'. Socrates uses a verb that connotes a fairly gentle end.

8.6 οἱ θεοί: see Xen. 5.21n. on τῷ θεῷ. ἤναντιοῦντο is imperfect, because Socrates is talking of what happened on more than one occasion (Xen. 4.18 δὲ). 8.10 ὅ: the antecedent of this relative pronoun is γῆραι. πάντα τὰ χαλεπὰ: here and at Xen. 27.19 and Xen. 32.13 Socrates speaks of what is 'difficult' rather than, say, of κακά or αἰσχροί, because he wants to reserve the most severe terms of condemnation for vices. ἔρημα τῶν εὐφροσυνῶν: the thought that a life without the delights of youth is not worth living has many parallels (of which the most charming are Mimnermus frs. 1, 2, 4, 6 *IEG*). In particular, it has a parallel in an argument from the personification of Socratic bad reasoning in Ar. *Clouds* 1073–4: 'Boys, women, party games, dainty food, drink, laughter – what would be the point in living if you are deprived of these?' But we might not otherwise have expected to find this thought in Socrates.

9.10–11 μὰ Δία: see Xen. 4.18n. 9.13 ταύτην: this pronoun would have to refer not only to 'the opinion that I have of myself', but also to 'the fine things that I take myself to have received both from gods and from

men'; that is, it would have to be linked not only to the feminine singular relative *ἥν*, but also to the neuter plural *δῶν*. If such a change of number and gender seems too harsh, then it can be avoided by emending *ταύτην* to *ταύτ' ἥν*, and deleting, as now superfluous in the light of the *ἥν*, the *εἰ* that follows *ἀναφαίνων* in our manuscripts. 9.13–15 ... ἀναφαίνων εἰ βαρυνῶ τοὺς δικαστάς, αἰρήσομαι τελευτᾶν μᾶλλον ἢ ἀνελυθέρως τὸ ζῆν ἔτι προσαιτῶν κερδαίνει τὸν πολὺ χεῖρω βίον ἀντὶ θανάτου 'if I am going to upset the jurors by revealing ..., then I will opt for death, rather than, by begging slavishly for a continuation of life, gain, instead of death, a life that is much worse'.

10–13: The Charges of Irreligion

At his trial, Socrates responded to the charge of not acknowledging the city's gods by pointing out that anyone could see him participating in the city's public sacrifices and festivals. And he responded to the charge of introducing novel supernatural beings by arguing that there was nothing particularly novel about the supernatural voice that spoke to him: everyone agreed that some sounds (thunder, bird calls, the cries of the Pythian priestess) have prophetic significance. The only special thing about Socrates was that he was devout enough to insist that it is gods, rather than birds, who know and tell us the future. And that the supernatural voice was genuinely divine was shown by the reliability of the advice that it gave.

10.16 γνόντα: see Xen. 5.25n. 10.17–18 οὓς μὲν ἡ πόλις νομίζει θεοὺς οὐ νομίζοι, ἕτερα δὲ καινὰ δαίμόνια εἰσφέρει: on this charge, see Introduction, section 4. 10.18 καὶ τοὺς νέους διαφθεῖροι: on this charge, see Introduction, section 5.

11.18 ἀλλά: the connective, like the *δέ* in Pl. 37e4, marks a contrast with the presumed thoughts of someone other than the speaker. 11.19 τοῦτο ... θαυμάζω Μελήτου: for the contrast between the accusative and genitive cases, see Pl. 17a4n. on αὐτῶν ἐν ἐθαύμασα. ὅτῳ ποτὶ γνοὺς λέγει 'what on earth he can be relying on when he says'; as in e.g. Eur. *El.* 539, Xen. *HC*6.4.13, the dative is used for the sign or evidence which leads one to think something. For the meaning of γνοὺς here, see Xen. 5.25n. Compare also the idiom ὅτι μαθὼν in Pl. 36b5. 11.20–2 θύοντά γέ με ἐν ταῖς κοιναῖς ἑορταῖς καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν δημοσίων βωμῶν καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι οἱ παρατυγχάνοντες ἰώρων: Xen. *Mem.* 1.1.2 makes essentially the same point, but in the third person: 'What on earth could they have used as evidence for the charge that he did not acknowledge the gods whom the city acknowledges? He manifestly offered sacrifices, often at home, often on the common altars of the city, and his reliance on prophecy was evident.' 11.22 αὐτὸς Μίλητος, εἰ ἔβούλετο: this needs to be filled out

from the preceding clause, and amounts to 'Meletus could have been there to see this himself, if he wanted'; cf. Pl. 36b6n.

12.22 γε μὴν: this turn of phrase was a favourite of Xenophon's: 'γε μὴν occurs several times as often in Xenophon as γε μὴν, γε μάν, and γε μέν together in the whole of the rest of Greek classical literature' (GP 347). Here, as often in Xenophon, it does not seem to mean anything more than δέ. 12.23-4 σημαίνουσα ὅτι χρὴ ποιεῖν: unlike in Plato (Pl. 31d3-4 and n.), who has the voice speak only to forbid actions that Socrates is about to attempt. 12.24 φθόγγοις οἰωνῶν: the significance of the noise of birds is described by the blind prophet Teiresias in Soph. *Ant.* 999-1004, 1021; sighted diviners relied on many other things about birds, apart from their noise (e.g. Hom. *Od.* 15.160-81). φήματις ἀνθρώπων: this is the style of prophecy whereby a human utterance is seized on, as having a significance unintended by the utterer. One example is a prophecy of victory in Xen. *An.* 1.8.16-17: just before a battle, someone asks 'What's the password?', receives the answer 'Zeus is saviour, and victory', and says 'I accept that as an omen: may it come to pass.' Such an utterance is often called a κληδών. 12.25 φωνᾷς δήπου τεκμαίρονται: the δήπου ('presumably') hints at some hesitation. And certainly some hesitation is needed when comparing Socrates' supernatural sign to these other styles of divination, not least because the voice of his supernatural sign is audible only to him. βροντάς: for an example of thunder interpreted as communication from gods, see Xen. *Cyr.* 7.1.3: 'When he had mounted, and was stood there looking in the direction in which he intended to proceed, there was a clap of thunder on his right. He said "We will follow you, Zeus, O great one." And he set off, with the cavalry and their commander Chrysantas on his right, and Arsamas and the infantry on his left.' (Romans, by contrast, thought thunder favourable when it was on the left: see Cic. *De Divinatione* 2.82.) 12.26 οἰωνιστήριον: because of the prominence of birds in Greek divination, words for birds, and cognates of them, became general terms for all phenomena to which prophecy might appeal. A chorus of birds proclaims this with proud and lavish detail in Ar. *Birds* 716-22. ἡ δὲ Πυθοῖ ἐν τῷ τρίποδι ἱέρεια: the priestess sat on a three-legged stool and, under the influence of the god, made some loud sounds which may or may not have been articulate speech (Eur. *Orestes* 163, 330 and *Iphigenia in Tauris* 976 uses the verb λάσκω for the sounds that she makes, or that the god makes through her; Hom. *Hymn to Hermes* 145 uses this verb for dogs barking, and Eur. *Alcestis* 346 uses it for humans singing cheerfully); near the priestess's stool sat some male prophets ('leading citizens of Delphi, picked by lot', explains Eur. *Ion* 413-16) who redacted her sounds into the form, often hexameter verse, in which they were relayed to the inquirer.

13.30 συμβόλους: things encountered apparently by chance on the road, and interpreted as omens. See e.g. Thphr. *Char.* 16.3 on what a superstitious man does if a weasel runs across his path. 13.30-1 *ὀνομάζουσι τοὺς προσημαινοντας εἶναι*: just like a verb for stating, the verb for naming can take an accusative and infinitive construction; see Pl. 23a3n. 13.31-3 *τοῦτο δαιμόνιον καλῶ καὶ οἶμαι οὕτως ὀνομάζων καὶ ἀληθέστερα καὶ ὁσιώτερα λίγειν τῶν τοῖς ὄρνισιν ἀνατιθέντων τὴν τῶν θεῶν δύναμιν*: Socrates here makes himself seem guilty of both the religious offences with which he is charged. For he seems to be rejecting popular religion as untrue (or at least as less true than his own), and to be applying the term δαιμόνιον where popular religion does not. Contrast Xen. *Mem.* 1.1.3 'Socrates in fact introduced nothing particularly novel by comparison with other people, who believe in divination and make use of birds and φῆμαι and σύμβολοι and sacrifices [e.g. Soph. *Ant.* 1005-15 illustrates how to make use of sacrifices in divination]. For they do not suppose that it is birds, or the people that they come across, who know what is beneficial for those to whom the prophecy is conveyed; rather, they suppose that through these the gods indicate what is beneficial; and that is what Socrates thought too.' 13.33 *γε μήν*: on this phrase, see Xen. 12.22n. 13.34-6 *τῶν φίλων πολλοῖς δὴ ἑξαγγίλλας τὰ τοῦ θεοῦ συμβουλευμάτων οὐδεπώποτε ψευσάμενος ἑφάνην*: on the construction of participle with φαίνομαι see Xen. 2.8n. The thought generally resembles Xen. *Mem.* 1.1.4-5 'And he [Socrates] would announce to many of his associates that they were to do things, or not to do them, as indicated by the supernatural being. Those who obeyed him benefited thereby; those who did not obey him regretted it. Yet who could deny that he had no desire to seem a fool or a braggart to his associates? He would have been thought both those things if he had announced things as manifested by a god, and manifestly been wrong. It is clear therefore that he would not have foretold things, unless he was confident that he would be right.' Contrast the more limited operations of the supernatural sign according to Plato: Pl. 31d3-4n.

14-19: Delphi's Praise of Socrates

The Delphic oracle, Socrates recalls, once declared that he was unsurpassed in liberality, justice, and temperance. Socrates' possession of such virtues is, he suggests, a publicly observable fact. And he challenges Meletus to specify young men whom he has corrupted by causing them to lack such virtues.

14.1 *οἱ δικάσται ἰθροῦβουν*: see Pl. 17d2n. 14.2-3 *παρὰ θεῶν μαιζόνων ἢ αὐτοὶ τυγχάνοι* 'he got more from the gods than they did'. θεῶν is genitive with παρὰ, and μαιζόνων is genitive with τυγχάνοι. 14.3 *ἀγε δὴ*

ἀκούσατε: such a switch from singular to plural is perfectly commonplace (e.g. Xen. Cyr. 5.3.4 ἀγε δὴ ... δότε, and Dem. 14.58 φέρε δὴ πρὸς θεῶν κάκεινο σκέψασθε). Presumably this is because ἀγε δὴ was so recurrent a cliché that people were no longer sensitive to its derivation from a singular imperative. 14.5 δαίμωνων: Apollo is addressed as a δαίμων in Eur. *Andromache* 1036 ὦ δαῖμον, ὦ Φοῖβε, Callimachus fr. 229 Pfeiffer δαίμονες εὐνυμότατοι, Φοῖβέ τε καὶ Ζεῦ. See Pl. 27d1–2n. on the relation between δαίμονες and θεοί. Χαιρεφῶντος: the story of Chaerephon's consultation of the oracle is told also in Pl. 20e7–21a6. 14.6 πολλῶν παρόντων: hence the oracle was not delivered in the ἄδυτον ('unapproachable'), the private and inmost part of the shrine where the priestess sat on her stool (Xen. 12.26, Ar. *Knights* 1015–16). We may infer that instead of getting a response via the priestess, Chaerephon got the response to his question by the apparently random drawing of beans (one colour for yes, another for no) in some more public part of the shrine. See e.g. *CID* 1.13.15–16 for this procedure. It was apparently cheaper than getting a response via the priestess; and, according to Cratinus fr. 215 *PCG*, Chaerephon was a poor man. 14.6–7 μηδὲνα εἶναι ἀνθρώπων ἱμοῦ μήτε ἑλευθεριώτερον μήτε δικαιοτέρων μήτε σωφρονέστερον: according to Pl. 21a6, the answer was simply that 'nobody was wiser than' Socrates. Nor does Socrates' list of his virtues here coincide with the one that he gives in Xen. 16.15–21, when purporting to go into detail about what the god had said: σωφροσύνη, ἑλευθεριότης, δικαιοσύνη, and σοφία. The ultimate explanation for these vagaries may be that Socrates 'did not distinguish σοφία from σωφροσύνη, ... and said that δικαιοσύνη and the rest of virtue is σοφία' (Xen. *Mem.* 3.9.4–5).

15.8 ἑθορύβουν: see Pl. 17d2n. 15.10 ἐν χρημοῖς: that is, in verbal pronouncements, whether prose or verse, spoken, sung or written. Λυκούργου: 'Concerning Lycurgus the lawgiver,' begins Plutarch's *Lycurgus*, 'there is in general nothing uncontentious to say.' If he lived at all, he probably lived in the seventh century, when Sparta began to acquire the constitution for which it was famous in Socrates' day. There is an ampler version of the story about the oracle to Lycurgus in Hdt. 1.65.2–3: 'Lycurgus was a reputable figure among the citizens of Sparta. He went to Delphi to consult the oracle, and the moment that he entered the hall, the Pythian said "You have come, Lycurgus, to my rich temple, you who are dear to Zeus and to all whose home is Olympus. I am in two minds, whether to give my oracular pronouncement that you are a god, or a human being [δίζω ἢ σε θεὸν μαντεύσομαι ἢ ἄνθρωπον]. But I expect you are more of a god [μᾶλλον θεὸν ἔλπομαι]."' 15.13–14 μηδὲ ταῦτ' εἰκῇ πιστεύσῃτε τῷ

θεῶν: other orators warn against εὐκῆς πιστεῦειν (e.g. Isoc. 15.157, Dem. 28.5). But there seems to be no parallel for warning people not to trust lightly in a god. Perhaps this is because, while such a warning would not be so obviously impious as a warning not to trust a god at all, it might still seem to some degree impious.

16.15 δουλεύοντα: the cliché that those too concerned with bodily pleasure are enslaved to it (e.g. Grg. DK 82 B 11a.15, Xen. *Mem.* 1.5.5, Pl. *Phdr.* 238e. Eur. fr. 775.1 *TrGF*) went along with a cliché that slaves are obsessively concerned with bodily pleasure (e.g. Alexis fr. 25 *PCG*). 16.16-17 οὔτε δῶρα οὔτε μισθὸν δέχομαι: in Pl. 31b-c, Socrates gives a simple proof that he accepts no fees: his poverty. 16.17-19 δικαιότερον ... προσδεῖσθαι: in Xen. *Smp.* 4.42, Antisthenes gives similar expression to a similar thought: 'People who aspire to frugality rather than great expenditure can be expected to be much more just [δικαιοτέρους γε εἰκόσ]; for it is those who are most satisfied with what they have [τὰ παρόντα] who least grasp after what belongs to others [τῶν ἀλλοτρίων].' 16.18 τοῦ πρὸς τὰ παρόντα συνηρμοσμένου: the metaphor is of someone as exactly adapted to his circumstances as musical instruments are adapted to one another when they have been given the same tuning (Xen. *Smp.* 3.1). 16.20 ὅτουπερ ξυνιέναι τὰ λεγόμενα ἡρξάμην: that is, from very early childhood (Pl. *Prt.* 325c and Xen. *Lac.* 2.1 use such terms for learning one's mother tongue). The infinitive ξυνιέναι here is from ξυνίημι ('put together' and hence 'understand'), not from ξυνέρχομαι ('come together'). 16.20-1 καὶ ζητῶν καὶ μαθάνων: the contrast is between attempting to discover for oneself and receiving instruction from another, as in e.g. Soph. fr. 843 *TrGF* τὰ μὲν διδασκὰ μαθάνω, τὰ δ' εὐρετὰ ζητῶ. 16.21 ὅτι ἰδυνάμην ἀγαθόν 'any good thing that I could'. It is not clear what Xenophon takes these good things to be that Socrates has been studying since childhood, or how he takes the wisdom that resulted from this study to relate to the wisdom which Socrates claims for himself in Pl. 21b1-22e5, the wisdom of not overestimating what he knew.

17.22-3 πολλοὺς ... πολλοὺς: see Xen. 4.15-16n. 17.25-6 πολλοὺς ἐπιθυμῆν ἐμοὶ τι δωρεῖσθαι: one example was Charmides, who 'offered him [Socrates] some slaves, so that he could get an income from them; but he refused' (D.L. 2.31). 17.26 τὸ δὲ ... 'And then, isn't there the fact...'. Socrates does not find it necessary to tell us what to make of this fact. In Xen. *Mem.* 4.3.5-9 Socrates gives a string of five consecutive noun phrases formed like this, by turning nominative and indicative constructions into accusatives and infinitives, and prefixing the neuter article. Contrast Pl. 36a1-4, where Socrates uses such a noun phrase to announce a topic, on which he then makes a comment. ἐμὲ μὲν μὴδ' ὕφ' ἐνὸς ἀπαιτεῖσθαι εὐεργεσίας 'that not one person asks me to reciprocate good turns they

have done'. In the active, ἀπαιτῶ takes two accusatives, one for the person asked to give a thing back, and the other for the thing they are asked to give back, as in e.g. Eur. *Helen* 962-3 ὦ γέρον ... ἀπαιτῶ τὴν ἐμὴν δάμαρτά σε ('Old man, I ask you for my wife back'). Thus there can be a sentence in the active ἐμὲ οὐδὲ εἷς ἀπαιτεῖ εὐεργεσίας ('not one person asks me to reciprocate good turns they have done'), which would go into the passive as ἐγὼ οὐδ' ὑπ' ἐνὸς ἀπαιτοῦμαι εὐεργεσίας. When the indicative ἀπαιτοῦμαι is replaced by the infinitive ἀπαιτεῖσθαι, and consequent adjustments are made of ἐγὼ to ἐμέ and οὐδέ to μηδέ, Xenophon's phrase results.

18.27 τὸ δ' ἐν τῇ πολιορκίᾳ: in 405-404 BC the Spartans besieged the Athenians, and starved them into accepting a humiliating peace: the period is narrated in Xen. *HG* 2.2.10-23. 18.29-30 τὰς εὐπαθείας ἐκ τῆς ἀγορᾶς πολυτελεῖς: the 'expensive indulgences' available in the Athenian agora would have included the patisserie that Pl. *Rep.* 404d thinks comparable to a Corinthian courtesan. 18.30-1 ἐμὲ δὲ ἐκ τῆς ψυχῆς ἄνευ δαπάνης ἡδίου ἐκείνων μηχανᾶσθαι 'whereas I, from inside my own soul, and without expenditure, contrive for myself indulgences more pleasant than theirs'; in Xen. *Smp.* 4.41, Antisthenes gives similar praise to the simple life that he leads: 'And whenever I want a good time of it [ἡδυσταθῆσαι], I don't buy luxuries from the market (that works out expensive); I just get them out of the larder that is my soul [ἐκ τῆς ψυχῆς ταμιεύομαι].' 18.31 γὰρ μήν: see Xen. 1.2.22n.

19.35 τίνες εἰσὶ νέων διαφθοραὶ 'what the ways are of corrupting young men', by contrast with who the people are that corrupt them. The former question is settled; the latter is at issue in Socrates' trial on a charge of corrupting the young. Socrates hopes to move from agreement on the former question to agreement on the latter. 19.35-6 σὺ δὲ εἰπέ εἴ τινα οἶσθα ὑπ' ἐμοῦ γεγενημένον κτλ: Pl. 34a4-6 also suggests that the prosecution had not actually named any of those supposedly corrupted by Socrates.

20-21: Meletus Debates with Socrates

Meletus complains that Socrates persuades young men to obey him rather than their fathers. Socrates agrees that he persuades young men to obey him on questions of education. This however, he argues, is perfectly proper: it is a standard practice to obey experts rather than kin, and Socrates, these young men realise, has indeed concerned himself with education.

20.2-3 ἐκείνους οἶδα οὓς σὺ πείπεις σοὶ πείθεσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ τοῖς γειναμένοις: similar accusations are reported in Xen. *Mem* 1.2.49:

'Socrates . . . taught people to treat their fathers like dirt, by persuading his associates that he made them wiser than their fathers, and saying that the law allowed one to put even one's own father in chains, if one convicted him of losing his wits, using this to show that it is lawful for the more ignorant to be put in chains by the wiser.' Different is Pl. 26b3-6, where Meletus says that Socrates corrupts young men by his irreligious teachings. 20.3 ὁμολογῶ . . . περὶ γε παιδείας: this concern for education is more elaborately described in Xen. *Mem.* 4.2.40, according to which

Socrates, knowing that Euthydemus was a follower, 'used to explain to him, very simply and very clearly, what he considered to be the most important things for him to know and practise', and in Xen. *Mem.* 4.7.1-2 'He was, of all those of whom I am aware, most concerned to know what any of his associates was expert in. As for those things that it befits a gentleman to know, when he knew them himself, he would teach them most readily; and when he himself had comparatively little experience of them, he would introduce his associates to those who were familiar with them. He would teach also the extent to which correct education requires experience in different subjects.'

20.7 στρατηγούς αἰρήσθαι: see Pl. 28e1-2n. 20.8 καὶ ναὶ μὰ Δία γε: it is more usual for an oath to come without a γε, like the plain ναὶ μὰ Δία of Meletus in Xen. 20.1. With the γε here, Socrates emphasises his oath, and thereby emphasises how striking is the fact which he is about to recall. There are similar oaths in Pl. *Th.* 155c 'καὶ νῆ τοὺς θεοὺς γε, Socrates, I do marvel inordinately at what on earth these things are; in fact sometimes, to tell the truth, when I look at them I go all dizzy', and in Hermarchus fr. 32.19-20, where καὶ νῆ Δία γε marks, as the climax of a string of progressively bolder claims, the claim that gods talk to one another in Greek. πρὸ ὕμῶν αὐτῶν: Pl. *Ion* 541c-d gives

the names of three non-Athenians whom the Athenians elected to be their commanders. 20.9 φρονιμωτάτους: Arist. *Pol.* 1309a33-b14 points out that matters are more complicated: when electing commanders or any other officials, you need to consider not only what they know about how to do the job, but also their characters, and how loyal they are to the established constitution. But perhaps Socrates thinks that all these good qualities are subsumed under φρόνησις; see Xen. 14.6-7n.

21.12 τοὺς κρατίστους: the examples just given were all of people who owed their superior position to superior expertise (hence φρονιμώτατα in 20.6 and φρονιμωτάτους in 20.9). When Socrates generalises from these particular examples to a general rule about 'the best people getting not only an equal share', he can claim a superior position on the basis of this general rule without having to claim any superiority in expertise. 21.14 βέλτιστος εἶναι ὑπὸ τινων προκρίνομαι: Socrates is

now not only not claiming any superiority in expertise; he is not claiming

even any genuine superiority, but only a superiority in the opinion of some.

22–23: Socrates' Willingness to Die

Although Socrates was innocent of the charges against him, he was willing to be executed on those charges. After his conviction, he refused to propose any alternative to the death sentence sought by the prosecution. And he refused to let his friends spring him from gaol before that sentence could be executed.

22.16–17 τῶν συναγορευόντων φίλων αὐτῶι: we have no information about who these people were or what they said. According to Justus of Tiberias, *FGH* 734 fr. 1, writing nearly five centuries after the trial, Plato made an unsuccessful attempt to become one of them: 'Plato ascended the platform [see Pl. 17d2–3n.] and said "Although I am the youngest, men of Athens, of those to ascend [ἀναβάντων] the platform –"; but the jurors shouted out "descend, descend [καταβάντων]".' (The jurors would have been punning on καταβάντων as both a genitive plural participle and a third person plural imperative; thus in Ar. *Wasps* 979 a heckling juror keeps shouting κατάβα.) There being no professional advocates, those who joined Socrates in presenting his case, even if they had a professional write their words, would have been friends or kin, like the speakers of Isae. 4.1 'It so happens, gentlemen, that Agnon here and Agnotheus are good friends of mine, as was their father before them. So it strikes me as proper, so far as I am able, to join them in speaking' and Lys. 5.1 'If Callias were on trial for anything other than a capital offence, gentlemen of the jury, then I would be satisfied with what the others have said. But as things are, when I have had entreaties and requests from a man who is dear to me and was dear to my father when he was alive, and when there have been so many dealings between us, it strikes me as disgraceful not to do all I that can to supply Callias with the help that justice demands.' 22.19–20 περὶ παντός ἐποιεῖτο 'took to be supremely important'; see Pl. 21e5n.

23.20 τὸ δὲ μὴ ἀποθανεῖν οὐκ ὤλιτο λιπαρητέον εἶναι: on unseemly pleas to the jury, see Pl. 34c1–35d5, and Xen. *Mem.* 4.4.4, quoted in Pl. 35c1–2n. 23.21–2 ἐγίνωσκε: see Xen. 5.25n. 23.23–4 οὔτε αὐτὸς ὑπετιμήσατο οὔτε τοὺς φίλους εἶπαι: all our accounts of this stage of the trial agree that Socrates did not immediately propose any very large penalty (Pl. 36a1–37b10, D.L. 2.41–2, Aeschin. fr. 102.4 SSR); but there is nothing else to support Xenophon's assertion that Socrates refused outright to make any proposal at all. 23.25 τῶν ἑταίρων ἐκκλῆψαι βουλομένων αὐτὸν οὐκ ἐφείπετο: in Pl. *Cri.*, Crito offers to bribe Socrates' way out of gaol (44b–c), and says that others too are willing to contribute and that 'one, Simmias of Thebes, has actually brought with him enough

money for this very purpose' (45b); the rest of the dialogue expounds Socrates' reasons for refusing to go along with his comrades' wish. The genitive τῶν ἐταίρων . . . βουλομένων is a genitive absolute; if this phrase were the object of ἐφέπειτο, it would be in the dative. 23.26-7 ἐπισκῶψαι ἰδὼκει ἐρόμενος εἴ κτλ: Aristippus fr. 103 SSR makes the same joke: 'You can start from anywhere, and the road to Hades is just as good and just as short.' For other jokes in the face of death, see Xen. 27.15-17, 28.22-5 and notes, and Pl. 35a6-7n.

24-26: Socrates' Last Words to the Jury

After being sentenced to death, Socrates reiterates his innocence of the charges against him, taking comfort from the fact that, as an innocent man, it is not he, but those who convicted him, whom his unjust conviction disgraces.

24.29 τοὺς μάρτυρας: the prosecution apparently brought no witnesses to support the charge of corrupting the young (Xen. 19.35-1, Pl. 34a4-6). So presumably we are to imagine that the forsworn witnesses whom Socrates mentions here have attested to his impiety. 24.31-3 ἐμοὶ δὲ τί προσήκει νῦν μείον φρονεῖν ἢ πρὶν κατακριθῆναι, μηδὲν ἐλεγχθῆναι ὥς πεποίηκά τι ὧν ἐγράψαντό με: 'Why should I think any the worse of myself now than I did before I was found guilty, if I was not proved to have done any of the things of which they accused me in their writ?' Contrast Pl. *Smp.* 196b (which calls it 'the most important aspect of the virtue of Love' that 'Love neither commits nor is victim of injustice'), Lys. 12.4 (which treats it as praise that someone neither commits nor suffers injustice), and Arist. *Rh.* 1355a21-4 (which says that litigants deserve reproach if they are in the right but lose their case). 24.33 Διὸς καὶ Ἡρας καὶ τῶν σὺν τούτοις θεῶν: that is, the canonical twelve Olympian divinities, and perhaps a few others. 24.34 ὁμύς: contrast Pl. 22a1n., on Socrates' habitual swearing by 'the dog, the god of the Egyptians'. Greeks felt able to identify some Egyptian gods with some of their own (e.g. Hdt. 2.42.5-6); but since all their own gods were anthropomorphic, they would have found it difficult to identify an Egyptian dog god with any of them. ὀνομάζων: see Xen. 13.30-3 on the implications of calling something a god. 24.35 ἀναπέφνηα: this must mean 'I have been shown', for all that it looks active in form. Xen. *Cyr.* 3.2.16 προσοφελοντές σοι ἄλλας χάριτας ἀναπεφνηαμεν ('we plainly owe you further thanks') provides a parallel, but not an explanation.

25.36 γε μὴν: see Xen. 12.22n. 25.1 ἱεροσυλῖαι, τοιχωρυχῖαι, ἀνδραποδίσαι, πόλεως προδοσίαι: Xen. *Mem.* 1.2.62 gives another list of offences carrying an automatic death sentence, and declares 'Socrates, of all men, abstained most from these offences' (as if everyone else

committed at least one). 25.3-4 *ἔργον* ... *ἔμοι εἰργασμένον*: this puts the completed deed itself, rather than its doing or its doer, at the centre of attention; the same construction occurs, with the same effect, at Xen. 5.23-4 *ὁσῶς μοι καὶ δικαίως ἔπαντα τὸν βίον βεβιωμένον*.

26.4-6 *οὐδὲ μέντοι διὰ δίκως ἀποθνήσκω, διὰ τοῦτο μείον φρονητέον* οὐ γάρ *ἔμοι ἄλλὰ τοῖς καταγνοῦσι τοῦτο αἰσχρόν*: the *διὰ τοῦτο* 'because of this' refers to the clause *διὰ δίκως ἀποθνήσκω* 'because I am put to death unjustly'; it is not connected with the neuter singular *μείον* in *μείον φρονητέον* 'I should think the worse of myself'. Socrates gives a more elaborate version of this argument in Xen. *Mem.* 4.8.9: 'But if I am to be put to death unjustly, then that would disgrace my killers. For if it is a disgrace to commit an injustice, then how is it not a disgrace to do a thing unjustly, whatever the thing may be? And what disgrace is it to me if others are not able to think or act about me as justice requires?' Socrates is challenging the view of Callicles in Pl. *Grg.* 486a-b: 'Does it not strike you as disgraceful to be in what I take to be your state and the state of anyone who goes very far into philosophy? If someone seized you, or anyone like you, and took you to prison, saying that you were guilty of a crime, even though you weren't, you realise that you wouldn't know what to do with yourself: you'd just be dizzy and gawping and not know what to say. And if you were pleading in court, even if you had a wretchedly bad prosecutor, you would be put to death, if death was the penalty he wanted for you.' It was not only Callicles who held this view that the unjustly convicted have cause for shame. For this view underlies an argument for learning rhetoric in Arist. *Rh.* 1355a38-b2: 'Besides, it would be paradoxical if, although it is a disgrace to be unable to help oneself with one's body, it was no disgrace to be unable to help oneself with one's capacity for rational discourse - which is something more properly human than the use of the body.' 26.6 *αἰσχρόν γάρ ἐστι*: such echoes in a *γάρ* clause of the preceding sentence give (or, in a question, seek) reassurance that the words echoed were correct. Other examples are Ar. *Birds* 299-300 A. *τίς γάρ ἐσθ' οὐπίσθεν αὐτῆς*; B. *ὅστις ἐστί*; *χειρὺλος*. A. *χειρὺλος γάρ ἐστιν ὄρνις*; ('A: What's that behind her? B: What is it? A kingfisher. A: The bird's a kingfisher, is it?'), and Ar. *Ach.* 587-8, to someone who has just grabbed an ostrich plume, *οὗτος, τί δράσεις; τῷ πτίλῳ μέλλεις ἐμείν*; *πτίλον γάρ ἐστιν* ('You there! What are you up to? Do you mean to use that down to help you vomit? Yes, it's down.'). Such reassurance is all the more in place, given the way that many thought it shameful not to be able to defend oneself. Πάλαμῆδης: the supposed inventor of counting (Pl. *Rep.* 522d), he was a paradigm for σοφία (e.g. Ar. *Frogs* 1451 'Congratulations! You're a Palamedes! You are wise through and through'; Eup. fr. 385 PCG 'What a wise idea of yours! It's worthy of Palamedes!'). Socrates

mentions him also in *Pl. Apol.* 41b3. 26.6–7 ὁ παραπλησίως ἔμοι τελευτήσας: Palamedes was tried on charges brought by Odysseus and wrongly convicted; *Crg. DK* 82 B 11a purports to be the speech that he gave in his defence. In *Xen. Mem.* 4.2.33, Socrates asks Euthydemus: 'Haven't they told you what happened to Palamedes? It's in the hymn that everyone sings: because of his wisdom, Odysseus got jealous of him, and that's why he died.' The hymn is now lost. 26.7–8 πολὺ καλλίους ὕμνους παρέχεται: such a turn of phrase is grand enough for the grander kinds of poetry: *Pind. N.* 6.32–4 sings of a family with a series of athletic victories to their credit, who 'because of their exalted achievements can provide much song [παρέχειν πολλὸν ὕμνον] for those who plough the Muses' fields'. 26.8 Ὀδυσσεύς: this is a genitive of comparison with καλλίους in 26.7. The point is not that the songs are more beautiful than Odysseus himself, but that they are more beautiful than any songs that Odysseus has provided. 26.8–11 οἷδ' ὅτι κτλ: this is pretty much what Socrates said in a conversation with Hermogenes and others, according to *Xen. Mem.* 4.8.10: οἶδα γάρ ἄναι μαρτυρήσεσθαι μοι ὅτι ἐγὼ ἡδίκησα μὲν οὐδένα πρότερον ἀνθρώπων οὐδὲ χεῖρ ἔποίησα, βελτίους δὲ ποιεῖν ἐπειρώμην ἄναι τοὺς ἔμοι συνόντας. 26.9 μαρτυρήσεται: in the future tense, ostensibly middle forms can be used as readily as ostensibly passive ones to convey a passive meaning; cf. *Dem.* 57.37 καὶ ταῦτα μαρτυρήσεται ('there will be witnesses to all this too') and 19.40 καὶ νῦν δὲ μαρτυρηθήσεται ('and there will now be witnesses to this'). 26.9–10 ὑπὸ τοῦ ἐπιόντος καὶ ὑπὸ τοῦ παρεληλυθότος χρόνου: contrast the much simpler ἄναι in the parallel passage at *Xen. Mem.* 4.8.10, quoted in 26.8–11 n. on οἷδ' ὅτι κτλ. The thought that time will bear witness to Socrates' innocence has a parallel in *Eur. fr.* 222 *TrGF* 'Justice, they say, is a child of time; it shows which of us is not evil [δείκνυσσι δ' ἡμῶν ὅστις ἐστὶ μὴ κακός].' There is an obvious affinity with the thought that the daughter of Time is Truth; but that thought seems to be of Roman origin (*Aul. Gell.* 12.11.7, and *Plu. Greek and Roman Explanations* 266e–f). 26.11 προῖκα διδάσκων: this allusion to the sensitive point about payment (e.g. *Pl.* 19d7–20a2, *Xen.* 16.16–17) has no counterpart in the parallel passage at *Xen. Mem.* 4.8.10.

27–28: Socrates Consoles his Friends

In good spirits after his conviction, Socrates reminds his weeping friends that he was bound to die sometime, and that by dying now, he will escape the troubles of old age. With one friend who is particularly upset by the injustice of the condemnation, Socrates even cracks a joke: would a just condemnation be better?

27.14 καὶ ὄμμασι καὶ σχήματι καὶ βαδίσματι: these together amount to all aspects of his body language: the expression on his face, the way he held

himself, and the gait with which he moved. φαιδρός: similar is the unchanging expression of radiant good cheer with which Socrates takes and drinks the hemlock in Pl. *Phd.* 117b-c. 27.15-16 ἡ ἄρτι δακρύετε; οὐ γὰρ πάλαι ἴστε οτι: the implicit assumption is that we should not let our attitudes to an outcome be affected by its imminence, but only by its certainty. 27.16 ἐξ οτουπερ ἐγενόμην κτλ: Anaxagoras DK 59 A 1.13 has the same thought in connection with the deaths of himself and his children: 'Long ago, nature voted to condemn [ἡ φύσις κατεψηφίσαστο] both them and me.' A more elaborate version of the thought opens the *Apology* of Palamedes (Xen. 26.6-7nn.) in Grg. DK 82 B 11a.1: 'The prosecution and the defence are not a dispute about death. For nature, by an open vote, condemned all mortals to death [θάνατον μὲν γὰρ ἡ φύσις φανερεῖ τῇ ψήφῳ πάντων κατεψηφίσαστο τῶν θνητῶν] on the day they were born. At issue rather are honour and dishonour: whether I am to die justly, or die by violence, with the greatest reproaches and the most disgraceful accusation.' This more elaborate version addresses, as the version ascribed to Anaxagoras did not, and as the version ascribed to Socrates will go on to do, the thought that what is upsetting is not the bare and unavoidable fact of death, but something avoidable about its manner or timing or circumstances. See also Xen. 23.25-7 and Pl. 35a4-7. 27.16-17 κατεψηφισμένος ἦν μου ὑπὸ τῆς φύσεως ὁ θάνατος: this sentence results from κατεψηφίσται μου ἡ φύσις τὸν θάνατον ('nature has condemned me to death') by changing the verb from middle to passive, and making consequent adjustments to its subject (from ἡ φύσις to ὑπὸ τῆς φύσεως) and object (from τὸν θάνατον to ὁ θάνατος). 27.17-18 εἰ μὲν ἀγαθῶν ἐπιπρεπόντων προαπόλλυμαι: if this is to make the right contrast with the δέ clause, it must amount to 'If I die prematurely, when good things are flowing in, and can be expected to continue flowing in for some considerable time to come'. 27.19 εἰ δὲ χαλεπῶν προσδοκωμένων καταλύω τὸν βίον: if this is to make the right contrast with the μὲν clause, it must amount to 'If I end my life when difficulties are expected, and little apart from difficulties can be expected'. The difficulties are the difficulties of old age that Socrates listed in Xen. 6.27-8. See Xen. 8.10n. for why they are called 'difficulties'. ἐγὼ μὲν οἶμαι: the implicit contrast is with what others might think; see Pl. 21d2n.

28.21 τις Ἀπολλόδωρος: see Pl. 18b6n., on using the indefinite pronoun to express disdain. Apollodorus was the besotted admirer of Socrates who was always in his company (Xen. *Mem.* 3.11.17) and who narrates his doings in Plato's *Symposium*. According to Pl. *Smp.* 173d, he was nicknamed μαλακός ('Softy'). According to Pl. *Phd.* 117d, he was present when Socrates drank the hemlock: 'Even before then, he had been weeping without a break; and when that time came, he gave a shriek, and his weeping and

ranting reduced to tears absolutely everyone present, apart from Socrates himself.' Before falling under the influence of Socrates, he had devoted himself to the acquisition of wealth, so successfully that he was able both to disdain wealth and to guarantee that a large fine could be paid for Socrates' offences (Pl. *Smp.* 172e–173d, Pl. 38b8). 28.22 ἄλλως δ' εὔθης: that is, although Apollodorus was very fond of Socrates, he was in other ways a simpleton. 28.23 τὸν δὲ λέγεται ... 'It is said that he ...'. It would have been equally idiomatic to make Socrates the subject of λέγεται, and follow it with a nominative and infinitive construction ('He is said to ...'), as in Xen. 29.27. See Xen. 3.13n. on a similar freedom of choice between nominative or accusative and infinitive constructions with ἔφη. 28.24 καταψήσαντα αὐτοῦ τὴν κεφαλὴν: the gesture expresses, as might be expected, a sort of superior tenderness. This is clear from Pl. *Phd.* 89b, where Simmias speaks of the easy way that Socrates took a setback in argument: 'so he stroked my head [καταψήσας οὖν μου τὴν κεφαλὴν], and scrunched up my hair at the neck – it was his way, on occasion, to make fun of my hair'; and from Hdt. 6.61.6, where there is an epiphany of the now divine Helen of Troy to the nurse of an ugly little baby girl: 'She stroked the baby's head [καταψῶσαν τοῦ παιδίου τὴν κεφαλὴν], and said she would grow up to be the most beautiful woman in Sparta. From that day on, her looks changed.' 28.25 μᾶλλον ἰβούλου με ὀρᾶν δικαίως ἢ ἀδίκως ἀποθνήσκοντα; in other versions, Socrates makes this joke to his wife (D.L. 2.35, Valerius Maximus 7.2.Ext.1). Perhaps by way of Arist. *SE* 180b21–4 ('Isn't what is just preferable to what is unjust, and what takes place justly preferable to what takes place unjustly? But it is preferable to be put to death unjustly.'), Socrates' joke reached Lewis Carroll, *Through the Looking Glass* (London 1871) Chapter 5, where the White Queen uses it to perplex Alice.

29–31: Socrates and the Son of Anytus

Socrates criticises the education that one of the prosecutors, Anytus, has given to his son, and predicts that the son will turn out badly. The prediction is vindicated, when the son becomes an alcoholic.

29.28 ἀπέκτονε: the perfect tense represents the killing as fixed and settled, even if it has yet to be carried out; see Pl. 39c3–4n. We must therefore imagine that Socrates makes this remark as Anytus leaves the court at the end of the trial. 29.28–30 ὅτι κτλ: Pl. 23c4–24a1 gives another account of Anytus' motives in prosecuting Socrates. A third account may be conjectured from Plu. *Alc.* 4.4–6: Anytus was in love with Alcibiades, who spurned him and was in love with Socrates. 29.28–9 αὐτὸν τῶν μεγίστων ὑπὸ τῆς πόλεως ὀρῶν ἀξιούμενον: in 409 BC, and again

in 404 BC, Anytus had been one of the ten commanders (Arist. *Ath.* 27.5, Lys. 13.78), the highest elected officials in Athens (see Pl. 28e1–2n., 31b2–3n.). 29.29–30 οὐκ ἔφην χρῆναι τὸν υἱὸν περὶ βύρσας παιδεύειν: tanners belong on lists of despised occupations (Pl. *Smp.* 221e, Ar. *Knights* 736–40), no doubt partly because they smell (e.g. Ar. *Wasps* 38, *Knights* 892, *Peace* 753); in Xen. 30.1, Socrates will declare that tanning is an occupation fit for a slave. 29.31–2 ὁπότερος ἡμῶν καὶ συμφορώτερα καὶ καλλίως εἰς τὸν αἰὶ χρόνον διαπείπραται, οὗτός ἐστι καὶ ὁ νικῶν: such ideas of conquest by moral superiority recur in Dem. 18.247 'Just as the man who offers a bribe has conquered [νενίκηκε] the man who takes it if he manages to purchase him, so too the man who does not take a bribe has conquered the man who offers it'

30.33 Ὅμηρος: Socrates refers to *Il.* 16.851–4 (Hector is about to kill Patroclus, and Patroclus predicts to him that he will in his turn be killed by Achilles) and *Il.* 22.359–60 (Achilles is about to kill Hector, and Hector predicts to him that he will in his turn be killed by Paris and Apollo). ἔστιν οἷς 'to some'; an almost literal English version would be 'there is those to whom'. Phrases like this, where the subject is given by a relative clause and the verb is εἶναι, are the only exceptions to the rule that a masculine or feminine plural subject requires a plural verb. From Thuc. 7.11.2 πόλεων ἔστιν ὧν and Eur. fr. 504 *TrGF* ἀνθρώποισιν ἔστιν οἷς, it is clear that such exceptions can occur even in highly formal writing. 30.34 βούλομαι δὲ καὶ ἐγὼ χρησμαιδεῖσαι τι: Socrates gives some prophecies on the verge of death also in Pl. 39c1–dg. 30.35–1 ἔδοξε μοι οὐκ ἄρρωστος τὴν ψυχὴν εἶναι: in consequence, by the principle that Socrates formulates in Pl. *Rep.* 495a–b, his corruption will be all the worse. 30.1–2 δουλὸς περὶ διατριβῆς: the consensus, at least among the philosophers, was that those who laboured at trades like tanning were rendered unfit, both intellectually and physically, for the responsibilities of citizenship (see e.g. Pl. *Rep.* 495d–e, Xen. *Oec.* 4.2–3, Arist. *Pol.* 1328b39–1329a34). Although Socrates may himself have worked as a stonecutter (Pl. 22d1n. on τοὺς χειροτέχνους), none of the philosophers seems to have found it difficult to reconcile disdain for manual labour with admiration for Socrates. 30.3–4 καὶ προβήσεσθαι μέντοι πόρρω μοχθηρίας: the combination of καὶ with μέντοι, in particular in the split form καὶ . . . μέντοι, 'is a favourite one of Xenophon's' (*GP* 413). It marks a new step in a narrative: Anytus' son will first succumb to some ignoble appetite, and then advance far into vice. The metaphor of moving far into something named by an abstract noun was as much a cliché in Greek as the metaphor of getting deep into such a thing is in English; examples include Xen. *Hiero* 4.4 οὕτω δὲ πόρρω προεληλύθασι φυλακῆς ὥστε . . . ('who

have come to take so many precautions that ...') and Pl. *Laws* 660c πόρρω προβεβηκότα ἀμαρτίας ('far advanced in error').

§ 1.5 οὕτε νυκτός οὕτε ἡμέρας ἐπαύετο πίνων: Anytus' son evidently, as we might put it, suffered from alcoholism. But in its remoteness from any medicalisation of his condition, Xenophon's description of him as 'embracing some base appetite', 'advancing far in vice', and 'delighting in wine' accords with the values of his contemporaries. These values are vividly displayed in Epicrates *Antilais* fr. 3 PCG, an extended and wholly unsympathetic description of an aging and alcoholic prostitute. § 1.8 ἀγνωμοσύνη: this characteristic (literally 'witlessness') is associated with intellectual blindness (Democritus DK 68 B 175 νοῦ τυφλότητα καὶ ἀγνωμοσύνην), cackhandedness (Hdt. 7.9.β.1 ἀγνωμοσύνης καὶ σκαιότητος), confusion (Dem. 14.5 τὴν παραχρὴν ταύτην καὶ τὴν ἀγνωμοσύνην), and malice (Dem. 18.252 τὴν ἀγνωμοσύνην αὐτοῦ καὶ τὴν βασκανίαν). τετέλευτηκώς: we do not know when Anytus died. He (or a man or men with the same name) addressed the Athenian Assembly in 396 (*Hellenica Oxyrhynchia* 1.2) and served as a Custodian of the Corn Supply around 387 (Lys. 22.8-9). § 1.8-9 κακοδοξίας: according to later stories, Anytus suffered from more than just a bad reputation. In the first century BC, D.S. 14.37.7 wrote that, after the trial of Socrates, 'the people had a change of heart, on seeing how great a figure they had lost. For this reason, they became angry with those who had prosecuted him, and finally put them all to death, without trial.' In the third century AD, D.L. 2.43 says that after the death of Socrates 'the Athenians immediately repented. They exiled the others, and condemned Meletus to death ... And the very day that Anytus came to stay there, the inhabitants of Heracleia expelled him.' In the fourth century AD, Themistius 20.239c wrote: 'It was not long before the Athenians changed their mind about Socrates. Because of the trial of Socrates, they put Meletus on trial, and Anytus went into exile from the city. He was stoned to death, on account of Socrates, by the inhabitants of Heracleia in the Pontus. To this day, they point out the tomb of Anytus in the suburb by the sea, which is where the inhabitants of Heracleia pelted that selfsame Anytus.' If there were any truth in such stories, Xenophon would have told them here.

32-34: The Happiness of Socrates

Socrates' lack of humility at his trial helped bring on his condemnation. But all worked out well for him. And, so far from his corrupting the young, those who aim at virtue cannot hope for a better companion.

32.12 ἐμοὶ μὲν οὖν δοκεῖ ‘I think, though others might not’. The δέ that balances this μὲν is so obvious that it can remain unexpressed in the Greek. 32.12–13 τοῦ ... βίου τὸ χαλεπώτατον: see Xen. 8.10n. for why old age is described as the ‘most difficult’ part of life. 32.13 τῶν δὲ θανάτων τοῦ ράϊστος εὐτυχεν: see Xen. 7.31n. 33.15–16 οὐδὲ πρὸς τὰλλα τάγαθὰ προσάντης ἦν: this metaphor represents Socrates’ ready acceptance of good things as if he were terrain: good things did not have to struggle uphill to reach him. 33.16–17 οὐδὲ πρὸς τὸν θάνατον ἐμαλακίσατο, ἀλλ’ ἁπαρῶς καὶ προσεδέχετο αὐτὸν καὶ ἐπετελείσατο: Xen. *Mem.* 4.8.2–3 gives this comment on how Socrates spent his time after the trial: ‘To all his associates it was clear that his life at this time was no different from what it had been previously – and yet previously everyone had been amazed at the good spirits and good cheer with which he lived. And how could one die in a finer way than that? And what death could be finer than of someone dying in the finest way? And what death could be happier than the finest? Or what could be dearer to the gods than the happiest?’ This comment could serve as a summary of the two dialogues – the *Crito* and the *Phaedo* – in which Plato describes Socrates’ imprisonment and death.

34.19 μεμνησθαι ... μεμνημένος: these references to memory round the work off neatly by reminding us of μεμνησθαι in its first sentence.

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